Sixtus affair

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Emperor Karl I.

The Sixtus affair marked the discovery of the secret negotiations between Austria-Hungary and France in particular during the First World War in 1917.

prehistory

Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma, around 1930

Since taking office on November 21, 1916, Emperor Charles I of Austria tried to find a peace treaty with the Entente . The common peace offer of the Central Powers of December 12th failed mainly because of the refusal of the German Reich to name concrete peace goals.

Emperor Karl tried to negotiate new peace talks through the mediation of the Belgian officers and Prince Sixtus of Bourbon-Parma and Franz Xaver of Bourbon-Parma , who were both brothers of his wife Zita .

In March 1917, the German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg had indicated in secret talks that he was ready to renounce Alsace-Lorraine , which had been part of the German Empire since 1871 . Emperor Karl wrote in a letter dated March 24th that “using my own personal influence with my allies, he would support France's just claims for restitution with regard to Alsace-Lorraine”.

Peace negotiations

Count Ottokar Czernin

Sixtus and Xavier brought the letter to the French President, who also informed the British King George V. A second letter followed on May 9th. The Austrian Foreign Minister Count Ottokar Czernin was informed of these peace efforts, but did not know the contents of the letters.

Sixtus declared that, in his view, the basic conditions for peace with the Entente were: the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France without compensation from colonies, the restoration of Belgium, the restoration of Serbia, which was enlarged by Albania, and the surrender of Constantinople to Russia. Sixtus deliberately excluded the Italian demands and the ideas of the Entente about the internal transformation of the monarchy. Karl agreed on the points that did not directly concern him, only on Serbia he disagreed. His plans were to establish an autonomous Yugoslav kingdom, comprising Bosnia, Herzegovina, Serbia, Albania and Montenegro, with an Austrian archduke at its head, under the Austrian monarchy.

Accepting Sixtus' peace conditions would have been tantamount to admitting defeat because it would have strengthened the main opponents, Serbia and Russia. When Czernin found out about the talks with Sixtus late on February 17, he laid down his views on the peace conditions as advice for further negotiations: the alliance was indissoluble, a separate peace was ruled out.

In his famous Sixtus Letter of March 24, 1917, Karl saw "no drastic divergence in our intentions and endeavors" separating his empire from France. He promised "that I will endeavor to support the just French claims in relation to Alsace-Lorraine" ("justes revindications françaises relatives à l'Alsace Lorraine") with all my means and influence with my allies. Belgium must be "restored in its entirety", retain its African possessions and receive compensation for its losses. Serbia's sovereignty was to be restored, with "appropriate and natural access to the Adriatic Sea" and economic concessions could be obtained. To do this, it must stop political agitation against the monarchy and suppress the forces that wanted to destroy the monarchy. Because of the February Revolution in 1917 , he did not want to express his opinion on Russia at this time, which saved him from commenting on the issue of the straits.

In the draft of the letter there was still talk of the monarchy's disinterest in Constantinople against the surrender of the territories occupied by Russia. Poland and Rumania were not mentioned , in complete denial of the monarchy's war aims . Czernin later denied having known about the letter, but was by and large informed about the content, if not about the wording, on which Sixtus probably helped formulate.

A separate peace was not Czernin's primary goal, he believed that he could act as an intermediary between France and Germany and thus end the war as a whole. In March 1917, behind the scenes, Czernin tried to persuade the German Reich to conclude a peace treaty along the lines of the Sixtus letter. When the Austrian position on Alsace-Lorraine was announced to the German ally, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg was angry: “Count Czernin has just declared that he could not cede a square meter of Austrian land to Italy, but we should give the French a piece of the Reichsland . ”Thereupon, Emperor Karl offered compensation in the east - Russian areas in Poland and possibly also Austrian parts of Galicia . The emperor and his foreign minister believed that they had found an acceptable solution. Czernin noted: "If we have won France, we are winners, and Germany can make ample compensation elsewhere". In fact, however, the French willingness to give the Germans a free hand in Poland was not there. In addition, Briand had not sought a mutual agreement with Germany from the start, but was only interested in a separate peace with the monarchy.

For the historian Gary W. Shanafelt, the Sixtus Letter was a sign of the naive impulsiveness of Emperor Charles, which led him to his "unauthorized and in any case unconstitutional procedure". The Sixtus Letter intensified the Allies' view that Austria should be dissuaded from the German alliance and encouraged them to continue the (special) peace negotiations on a broader basis. The recognition of nationality movements abroad was postponed, which means that the letter may even have had a delaying effect on the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy .

Czernin provided Karl with guidelines for his negotiations with Sixtus, in which territorial cession of the monarchy was only considered against compensation. Furthermore, Czernin demanded guarantees for the integrity of the monarchy, including possible border rectifications in their favor. During her second visit to Laxenburg on 8/9 In May 1917 the Bourbon princes tried to convince their brother-in-law of the necessity of ceding the Trentino . But in Charles's second letter to Sixtus, dated May 9, 1917, the agreement with France and England was only externally emphasized. However, he postponed the investigation of Italy's claims to the Italian-speaking Tyrol after Italy had allegedly waived its other claims. These questionable Italian peace feelers were supposed to "probably only restrict Austria's freedom of military decision-making". The emperor's approval of French claims to Alsace-Lorraine stood in embarrassing contrast to the unwillingness to make his own territorial concessions. The formulation of the war goals in Kreuznach was then, along with the Italian war goals, the main reason why the mediation campaign was not continued.

From June to August 1917 there were further peace talks between Count Nikolaus Revertera-Salandra and Comte Abel Armand , in which France tried to persuade Austria-Hungary to a separate peace , which was rejected by Emperor Karl on the advice of Czernin.

The peace efforts of Emperor Charles were slowed down more and more in the following months by Foreign Minister Count Czernin, who meanwhile believed in a military victory. If the emperor were to initiate a separate peace, he feared that the associated internal restructuring and federalization of the monarchy would be at the expense of the Austrian and Hungarian rulers. An Austria-Hungary without dominance of these groups was out of the question for him. So there could only be peace on the side of Germany, in order not to leave the German-settled areas of the monarchy to the Czechs and other ethnic groups even in the event of the empire being fragmented.

The affair

Georges Clemenceau

On April 2, 1918, Count Czernin gave a speech to the Vienna City Council in which he said:

“ Some time before the offensive to the west, Clemenceau asked me whether I was ready to negotiate and on what basis. I replied immediately, in agreement with Berlin, that I was ready for this and that I could see no obstacle to peace with France other than France's wish for Alsace-Lorraine. It was replied from Paris that it was not possible to negotiate on this basis. There was no longer any choice. "

The speech appeared on the front page of the newspaper Fremd-Blatt the next day .

Since Czernin's account was not true and he did not want to appear as a supplicant, the French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau published Charles' first letter on April 12, 1918. Emperor Karl publicly denied that further letters existed and that concessions regarding Alsace-Lorraine had been offered. On April 12th, the Kaiser gave Czernin an honorary declaration of this content.

Czernin did not, which would have been tactically wise, take the blame on himself, denied knowing the letter and thereby exposed his ruler to his ally. He then tried to persuade the emperor to temporarily resign from government affairs, which he resolutely refused. Finally, on April 16, 1918, Karl dismissed him from his post, which was received with incomprehension in the press, which had recently celebrated Czernin as Minister of Peace. Czernin had thereby compromised the emperor both in foreign and domestic politics.

Consequences and evaluation

The American Secretary of State Robert Lansing described Clémenceau's behavior as an act of blatant stupidity : If Clémenceau wanted to prove that Czernin was a liar, he might have succeeded, but at what price! Its unveiling drove Austria into Germany's arms , so that only a military victory on the western front could open the doors that Clémenceau slammed . The French Prime Minister had finally driven the wavering Habsburg monarchy back into the arms of the oppressive German ally.

And indeed, Czernin's press feud with Clémenceau (temporarily) led to the monarchy's loss of freedom of action in foreign policy. In view of the disrupted domestic political and economic situation of the monarchy, the ally was no longer obliged to balance power on the question of war goals after the Sixtus affair.

After Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest , the Sixtus affair has finally destroyed the prospects that the Western powers might prefer to maintain the monarchy rather than support foreign emigration. Not only did it destroy the possibility of further negotiations with the Western powers, but it also led within weeks to their decision to recognize the principle of self-determination to the fullest and most radical extent and thus to pronounce the death sentence of the multi-ethnic state .

The disclosure of these secret negotiations meant the end of Austria-Hungary as an equal partner of the German Reich. The German national Austrian propaganda now called Emperor Karl a slippery hero who was handed over to high women of Welsh descent, and Empress Zita an Italian traitor .

In fact, the Sixtus affair remained in the memory of the Austrian population for decades: “The so-called Sixtus affair shaped the image of the young emperor more than anything else during his entire reign. It probably contributed a lot to the departure of the (German) Austrians from the monarchy. The clichés and legends that emerged at that time were partly responsible for the exaggerated fear of legitimism in the First Republic and still unfolded their effect half a century later during the "Habsburg crisis" of the 1960s. "

The military historian Manfried Rauchsteiner pointed out that the monarch's reputation at home and abroad was severely damaged by the Sixtus affair: “An act, whose political and moral justification was given, turned into a thoughtless act of psychological warfare Dishonesty and prestige on all sides an affair. The reputation of the imperial central authority was almost instantly destroyed. "The highest circles of the Austro-Hungarian Army were shaken, Chief of Staff Arthur Arz von Straussenburg declared:" I learned that my Kaiser is lying. "

literature

  • Alexander Demblin (ed.), August Demblin: Minister against Kaiser. Notes by an Austro-Hungarian diplomat about Foreign Minister Czernin and Kaiser Karl. Böhlau, Vienna 1997, ISBN 3-205-98762-4 .
  • Tamara Griesser-Pecar: The Sixtus Mission. Amalthea Verlag, Vienna 1988, ISBN 3-85002-245-5 .
  • Jan Mikrut (ed.): Emperor Karl I (IV.) As a Christian, statesman, husband and father. Dom Verlag, Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-85351-188-0 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Arthur Polzer-Hoditz: Kaiser Karl. From the secret folder of his head of cabinet. Amalthea, Vienna 1980, ISBN 3-85002-122-X , p. 321; Hugo Hantsch: Austria's peace efforts 1916/18 . Brixlegg 1938, p. 33.
  2. ^ Ingeborg Meckling: The foreign policy of Count Czernin . Vienna 1969, p. 122.
  3. ↑ Arthur Polzer-Hoditz: Kaiser Karl. From the secret folder of his head of cabinet. Amalthea, Vienna 1980, ISBN 3-85002-122-X , p. 322; Singer, Czernin 104.
  4. ^ Hugo Hantsch: Austria's peace efforts 1916/18 . Brixlegg 1938, p. 34.
  5. ↑ Ladislaus Singer : Ottokar Graf Czernin. Statesman of a turning point. Styria, Graz / Vienna / Cologne 1965, pp. 105ff; Gerhard Ritter: statecraft and war craft. The problem of "militarism" in Germany. Volume 3: The tragedy of statecraft. Bethmann Hollweg as war chancellor (1914–1917) . Munich 1964, ISBN 3-486-47041-8 , p. 458.
  6. ↑ Arthur Polzer-Hoditz: Kaiser Karl. From the secret folder of his head of cabinet. Amalthea, Vienna 1980, ISBN 3-85002-122-X , p. 600f (wording); Reinhold Lorenz: Emperor Karl and the fall of the Danube monarchy. Styria, Graz / Vienna / Cologne 1959, p. 329 f (wording); Tamara Griesser-Pecar: The Sixtus Mission. Austria's attempt at peace in the First World War. Amalthea Verlag, Vienna / Munich 1988, ISBN 3-85002-245-5 , p. 154 f (wording).
  7. ↑ Tamara Griesser-Pecar: The Sixtus Mission. Austria's attempt at peace in the First World War. Amalthea Verlag, Vienna / Munich 1988, ISBN 3-85002-245-5 , p. 147f.
  8. ↑ Ladislaus Singer: Ottokar Graf Czernin. Statesman of a turning point. Styria, Graz / Vienna / Cologne 1965, p. 132.
  9. ↑ Ottokar Czernin: In the world wars. Berlin / Vienna 1919, p. 98.
  10. ↑ Lothar Höbelt : “Standing or Falling?” Austrian Politics in the First World War. Böhlau, Vienna / Cologne / Weimar 2015, ISBN 978-3-205-79650-3 , pp. 154f.
  11. ↑ Reinhold Lorenz: Emperor Karl and the fall of the Danube monarchy. Styria, Graz / Vienna / Cologne 1959, p. 342f.
  12. ↑ Gary W. Shanafelt: The Secret Enemy. Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance 1914-1918. Columbia University Press, New York 1985, ISBN 0-88033-080-5 , p. 129.
  13. ^ Robert A. Kann : The nationality problem of the Habsburg Monarchy. History and ideas of national endeavors from the Vormärz to the dissolution of the Reich in 1918 . Volume 2: Ideas and Plans for Reich Reform . Böhlau, Graz / Cologne 1964, p. 274.
  14. ↑ Ladislaus Singer: Ottokar Graf Czernin. Statesman of a turning point. Styria, Graz / Vienna / Cologne 1965, p. 151.
    Reinhold Lorenz: Emperor Karl and the fall of the Danube monarchy. Styria, Graz / Vienna / Cologne 1959, p. 346.
  15. ^ Ingeborg Meckling: The foreign policy of Count Czernin . Vienna 1969, p. 123.
  16. ↑ Reinhold Lorenz: Emperor Karl and the fall of the Danube monarchy. Styria, Graz / Vienna / Cologne 1959, p. 345ff.
  17. ↑ Robert A. Kann: The Sixtus Affair and the secret Austria-Hungary peace negotiations in the First World War. Vienna 1966, pp. 55 and 9.
  18. ↑ Peter Feldl: The playful realm. The last days of Austria-Hungary. Zsolnay, Vienna 1968, pp. 120ff.
  19. ↑ Robert A. Kann: The Sixtus Affair and the secret Austria-Hungary peace negotiations in the First World War. Vienna 1966, p. 41.
  20. ↑ Robert A. Kann: The Sixtus Affair and the secret Austria-Hungary peace negotiations in the First World War . Vienna 1966, pp. 11 and 46; and Erich Feigl : "God preserve! ..." - Kaiser Karl - Personal records and documents . Amalthea Signum Verlag, Vienna 2006, ISBN 978-3-85002-520-1 , pp. 173ff.
  21. ^ François Fejtö: Requiem for a monarchy. The smashing of Austria-Hungary . Austrian Bundesverlag, Vienna 1991, ISBN 3-215-07526-1 , p. 284.
  22. ^ Ingeborg Meckling: The foreign policy of Count Czernin . Vienna 1969, pp. 5 and 219.
  23. ↑ Robert A. Kann: The Sixtus Affair and the secret Austria-Hungary peace negotiations in the First World War . Vienna 1966. p. 54.
  24. ↑ Lothar Höbelt: “Standing or Falling?” Austrian Politics in the First World War. Böhlau, Vienna / Cologne / Weimar 2015, ISBN 978-3-205-79650-3 , p. 234.
  25. ↑ Manfried Rauchsteiner: “I found out that my Kaiser is lying.” The “Sixtus Affair” 1917/18. In: Michael Gehler, Hubert Sickinger: Political affairs and scandals in Austria. From Mayerling to Waldheim. Kulturverlag, Thaur / Wien / Munich 1996, ISBN 3-85400-005-7 , pp. 148–169, here pp. 162f.