Strike at the Berlin transport company in 1932

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BVG strike 1932: Tram tracks in Berlin-Schöneberg are blocked in order to stop trams driven by strikebreakers

In the final phase of the Weimar Republic, the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) and the National Socialist Germans went on strike at the Berliner Verkehrsgesellschaft ( BVG ), which formed the climax of a wave of industrial disputes that followed Chancellor Franz von Papen's emergency decree of September 1932 Workers' Party (NSDAP) together.

prehistory

Begun immediately before the Reichstag elections on November 6, 1932 , the strike was directed against a wage cut negotiated between the BVG and the Association of Workers in Public Enterprises and the Movement of Persons and Goods, which belongs to the free trade unions . This agreement was a compromise between both sides. Initially, the company had asked for a cut from 14 to 23 pfennings an hour. The union managed to reduce the cut to 2 pfennigs an hour. Nevertheless, this led to violent protests by the KPD and the Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition (RGO), which is dependent on it .

Of the 22,000 BVG employees, around 1,200 belonged to the RGO, while 6,000 belonged to the general association. Around 1,200 belonged to the National Socialist Company Cell Organization (NSBO). About two thirds of the workforce (including NSBO ​​members) were not organized. Nevertheless, the RGO had a strong position with the BVG, among other things because it had started in 1932 to form so-called unitary committees. A delegates' conference was recruited from representatives of these committees and met on October 29th. Of 127 delegates, 27 belonged to the general association, 5 to the railway workers 'union, 5 to the German Metalworkers' Association and 52 to the RGO. There were also 40 delegates, most of whom were not organized or a small number belonged to the NSBO. The conference formed a "combat committee" to prepare a strike vote . Under the propagandistic pressure of the KPD and NSDAP, the general association no longer saw itself in a position to bear sole responsibility for further developments. He agreed that the ballot should take place among the entire workforce , instead of the usual union members. On November 2nd, 84% of the workforce took part. 14,471 workers voted in favor of the strike, 3,993 voted against. Since this resulted in a three-quarters majority of the voters, but not of the employees, this would have meant a rejection of the strike according to normal trade union practice. At least that was the view of the general association, which absolutely wanted to prevent a strike that was not just about wage demands but was viewed by the RGO as a political strike. However, this position could not be enforced with a radicalized and largely unorganized workforce. Instead, a central strike leadership was elected on November 2nd. In this, the RGO was able to secure a dominant position. In addition to members of the General German Trade Union Federation (ADGB) and unorganized people, two members of the NSBO ​​were also elected.

The parties' calculation

The inclusion of the NSBO ​​in the strike leadership corresponded to the line of the KPD at this time. Ernst Thälmann had already said in autumn 1932 : "If strikes were triggered in the factories (...) the inclusion of Nazis in the strike committees (...) was absolutely necessary and desirable." This was based on the attempt to modify the united front tactics from below. Instead of addressing SPD supporters, this was now transferred to the National Socialists. One reason for this was that the SPD, defamed as “ social fascists ” and the reformist trade union bureaucracy dominated by it, as the KPD put it, were still considered the party's main opponents.

The NSDAP took part in the strike for tactical reasons. Since she expected losses in the bourgeois camp in the upcoming elections anyway , this part of the electorate did not play a decisive role in the decision. For Joseph Goebbels, as Gauleiter of Berlin, the break-in into the workers' camp was more important: “Here, before this election, we have one more great opportunity to show the public that our anti- reactionary course is really meant and wanted from within the NSDAP is indeed a new kind of political action and a conscious departure from bourgeois methods. ”While the bourgeois voters could be won back later, it would be different with the workers:“ But you have lost the worker once then he is lost forever. ”The apparent social radicalism of the NSBO ​​and the NSDAP as a whole, as it emerged during the traffic strike, reinforced the negative trend feared by the NSDAP leadership in the Reichstag elections on November 6th. The socio-political radicalism did not bring about a noteworthy break-in in the labor electoral camp, as hoped by the NSDAP. The KPD, on the other hand, won more than 2 million votes, as did the DNVP , which skimmed off the losses of the NSDAP.

Course of the strike

Tramers picket in front of the Müllerstrasse tram depot in Berlin

On November 3, the strike paralyzed all local public transport in Berlin. The labor dispute, which enjoyed great sympathy among the Berlin workers, was supported by the KPD and the NSDAP as propaganda. The Reichstag member Albert Kayser , KPD, former works council chairman of the BVG, then dismissed, led the strike preparations in close consultation with the Central Committee of the KPD.

The social democratic forward appealed to the employees to orientate themselves to the trade unions “... and not where one would like to cook communist or national socialist party soup over the fire of a wage strike. "

The Reich government did not judge the strike as a wage strike, since the wages were well above those of the Reichsbahn , but as a political test of strength for the KPD. According to the government's findings, the actual cooperation between the KPD and the NSDAP during the strike was rather poor. The government clearly saw the KPD as the driving force. State repression measures were therefore directed against them. This included, among other things, the temporary ban on the party newspaper Die Rote Fahne .

The unions took the opportunity to improve their position. They now rejected a first arbitration decision, which essentially confirmed the result of the earlier negotiations. When the arbitrator then declared the verdict binding, the unions asked their members to resume work. In the event of refusal, the employees were threatened with dismissal without notice from the management. As a result, the police carried out numerous arrests, some of which were arbitrary, on the night of November 4th. The following day, three demonstrators were shot dead by the police and eight others seriously injured. Then on November 6th the Reichstag election took place, which brought profits for the KPD in the Berlin working-class districts and losses for the SPD and NSDAP (the latter especially in the bourgeois quarters of the capital). When the strike front crumbled, the central strike leadership broke off the fight on November 7th.

From then on, the Social Democrats saw the BVG strike as a prime example of an anti-republican united front of "Nazis" and "Kozis".

literature

Contemporary witness reports

Web links

Commons : Strike at the Berliner Verkehrsgesellschaft 1932  - collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Quoted from Winkler, p. 766.
  2. ↑ Quoted from Winkler, p. 767.
  3. ↑ Winkler, p. 775.
  4. ↑ Quoted from Winkler, p. 769.