Company Tanne Ost
Gulf of Finland and location of the highlands island
| date | September 14 to September 15, 1944 |
|---|---|
| place | Highlands , Gulf of Finland , Baltic Sea |
| output | Finnish defensive victory |
| consequences | Tactical defeat and surrender of the German landing forces, but no strategic impact on the war situation. |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
Vice-Admiral Theodor Burchardi |
|
| Troop strength | |
| 2,600 soldiers 14 minesweepers 12 artillery booms ~ 38 other vehicles |
1,600 soldiers 2 coastal guns ~ 38 light guns 9 mortars |
| losses | |
|
153 dead |
36 dead |
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The company Tanne Ost was a German sea landing company on the Finnish Baltic Sea island Hochland (Finnish: Suursari), in the Gulf of Finland on September 15, 1944, in the Lapland War in World War II , which was just beginning . It ended with a Finnish defensive win.
prehistory
This was preceded by the end of Finnish participation in World War II on the German side ( continuation war ) and the associated inevitable withdrawal of German troops from Finland ( Birke company ). In parallel to the Tanne Ost company, the German naval command also planned the Tanne West company for this case , which planned a German invasion of the Åland Islands in the Baltic Sea. Both undertakings had been worked out for the first time in March 1944.
The aim of the Tanne Ost company was to maintain the German "sea urchin" mine barrier in the eastern Baltic Sea, which ran between the Finnish Kotka over the islands of Hochland and Groß Tütters towards the Estonian coast, approximately up to the level of Narwas . In the event of the Finns handing over the highlands to the Soviets as part of an armistice, the German mine lock would have been broken, as the island was a pivotal point of the lock. In order to prevent this and the possible breakout of the Soviet Baltic fleet from the bay of Kronstadt , the German leadership considered a violent occupation of the highlands.
German preparations
After Finland announced on September 2, 1944 that it wanted to break off diplomatic relations with the German Reich and the request for the withdrawal of German troops from Finland had been issued within twelve days, the Germans began to prepare for Plan Tanne Ost. To this end, they moved two flotillas with Marinefährprähmen that Sturmboot - company 902 with 20 boats and around 200 men, the 7th Artillery carrier flotilla (cm 10.5 with 12 renovated and and 88mm guns armed Ferry boat) and the 5th speedboat flotilla together. The 3rd and 25th minesweeper flotilla with 14 minesweepers and one flotilla of clearing boats were supposed to provide immediate security . A total of around 65 ships, booms and boats and around 2,600 men were involved in the company, of which around 1,400 men were to be deposited in the first wave of landing.
The German troops, however, were hastily assembled and consisted of both air force and naval units . And although both the commanding German officer on site, Captain Karl-Conrad Mecke , and the German Naval Command Eastern Baltic Sea (Vice Admiral Theodor Burchardi ) had considerable doubts about the sense and the feasibility of the enterprise, the naval war command put under pressure by the Führer Headquarters persisted on an implementation of the plan.
The Finnish Defense
On the highlands themselves, around 1,600 Finnish soldiers stood in well-developed and camouflaged positions. The island commander was Lieutenant Colonel Martti Miettinen . In addition to numerous machine guns and nine heavy 120 mm mortars , the Finns also had around twenty 40 mm anti-aircraft guns , eight 45 mm anti-tank guns of Russian origin and around a dozen field guns , including two captured 12.2 cm guns ( also of Russian origin) and several lighter 7.5 cm guns of the type K17. In addition, the waters around the highlands were seen as a potential mine warning area, as drifting mines repeatedly broke free from the surrounding minefields. For the German landing forces there was also the problem that Hochland only had a halfway usable port, Suurkylä, for disembarkation. This port, located on the northeast tip of the island, was very small, at most only two landing vehicles could dock and disembark troops at the same time, and was also well monitored.
Contrary to the erroneous German assumptions that the Finns might even give up the island without resistance, the Finnish crew on site had the order not to violate the conditions of the Finnish-Soviet armistice agreement of September 4, 1944 and to defend the island if necessary.
course
The German landing forces were concentrated in Reval on September 11th and moved to the ready room in the Loksabucht on the morning of September 14th . In the evening hours of the same day the fleet marched towards the highlands. Before the actual landing began, the commander of the German 3rd minesweeper flotilla, Frigate Captain Gustav Forstmann , went ashore again at about 11.40 p.m. and had a short talk with the Finnish commander about a possible handover of the island to the Finn but ended with the note that he could not decide this. Both officers parted with a polite handshake. Shortly after 0.20 o'clock the first German clearing boats entered the port of Suurkylä and both sides opened fire. The small Finnish guard boats VMV-10 and VMV-14 (35 ts each) lying in the harbor were sunk by the Germans by artillery fire. There were no losses here, as the Finnish crews had withdrawn into the interior of the island when the German ships approached.
The battles for the port
During the first two hours, the German attackers suffered serious losses from the Finnish defensive fire; Assault Boat Company 902 alone lost around 50 men dead and wounded by 3:00 a.m. The German ships fired at the bank positions of the Finnish defenders with their 10.5 cm and 8.8 cm guns and put two Finnish field cannons out of action, but the camouflaged positions were the lighter defensive weapons, especially the 40 mm Flak and the mortar, hard to see in the dark. It was these weapons that caused most of the German casualties. In the Finnish fire, the landing pads F-177 (154 ts) and F-822 (165 ts) and three motor boats sank . Another landing stage, F-868 (165 ts), received multiple hits from artillery and drifted incapable of maneuvering on a mine, which tore the ship in two and sank in front of the port entrance. Several other ships, including three minesweepers, were also damaged by the gunfire.
The already small port of Hochland was largely blocked by the sunk vehicles, which is why the landing stages were ordered to drop their troops on the free beach in the area if possible. This created significant confusion and arbitrary disembarkations. So it happened that a boat dropped a load of urgently needed anti-aircraft guns, but the following boat, who had the ammunition for them on board, turned around in front of the port and returned to the ready room, which meant that every anti-aircraft gun was straight once eight shots were available.
Despite this confusion, the Germans managed to establish themselves in the port of Suurkylä, to conquer a landing head of about two square kilometers by about 4 a.m. and to gradually advance inland. In the morning hours, around 6:00 a.m., the Germans stormed a hill above the harbor and captured a position with 40 mm flak, which at least stopped the constant bombardment of the pier area. About 100 Finns were captured. In front of another ridge, where the command post of the Finnish island commander was, the German advance got stuck.
Radio interference and hasty withdrawal
The landed German troops were also in a fateful position, as the captain on the island Mecke was unable to establish radio contact with the German operations command in Reval due to radio interference . There Vice Admiral Burchardi assumed because of the lack of situation reports that the landed units had been wiped out and contacted the minesweepers of the 3rd Flotilla of Frigate Captain Forstmann standing off the coast. However, he was only able to give an unclear assessment of the situation, as he knew nothing about the outcome of the fighting on land in the dark and could only report heavy artillery fire.
In this situation there was a surprising Soviet air attack with ten Ilyushin Il-2 attack aircraft and some Tupolev SB-2 light bombers on the port of Suurkylä, whereby two Il-2s were shot down by the flak, but other German ships, including the landing barge F-422 and the tugboat Pärnu (which later ran aground and was captured by the Finns), were damaged. A few Soviet cluster bombs also hit the Finnish side. Since, at dawn, on the one hand the heavy Finnish 12.2 cm guns could see the German ships better and caught fire and on the other hand the air support promised by the German Air Force did not take place as desired (only three Bf 109 G - Fighter bombers flew over the island around 11 a.m. and dropped some 50-kilogram bombs without success), Vice Admiral Burchardi ordered the rest of the ships to march back to Reval in order to prevent even greater losses (he suspected the landing troops had already been worn out), and thus the demolition the company. Any units still in existence should be evacuated.
Cessation of fire and surrender of the landing forces
The image of the German ships departing from the coast (which also had the soldiers of the 2nd landing wave on board) had an extremely negative effect on the morale of the Germans on the highlands, as it made them aware that they had been given up. A few clearing boats stayed behind and began to transport a few German soldiers (around 60 men). Two Finnish speedboats pushed into these movements, with the speedboat Taisto 5 being able to achieve a torpedo hit on the clearing boat R-29 , which then sank near the coast. All further evacuation attempts were discontinued as a result.
After the flotillas withdrew, the German troops on the highlands were left to their own devices. Fierce exchanges of fire raged throughout September 15, but the Germans slowly ran out of ammunition from around 3 p.m. When a Finnish counterattack in the afternoon brought the anti-aircraft position above the harbor, which had previously been captured by the Germans, back into Finnish hands, Captain Mecke realized that he could no longer win the fight. As a parliamentarian , he went over to the Finns and asked for a ceasefire so as not to senselessly sacrifice his soldiers. Since the Finnish side only gave the Germans the choice between a task or an annihilation, Mecke decided to surrender around 6 p.m. , whereupon the fighting on the highlands ended and the remaining German troops were taken prisoner.
Balance sheet
The Tanne Ost company was a complete failure for the Germans. Of the soldiers who landed, 153 were killed and 175 wounded. 1,231 German soldiers (the wounded are included) were taken prisoner in Finland and some of them were later extradited to the Soviets. In addition, the Germans lost three landing pads ( F-173 , F-822 and F-868 ), the mine clearing boat R 29 , three motor boats and the tug Pernau .
The Finnish side lost about 110 dead and wounded, as well as two patrol boats and some field guns and flak. Almost all of the 100 or so Finnish prisoners with the Germans were freed after the German surrender (only eight Finns were brought onto a landing vehicle by the Germans and transported away). In addition, two Soviet aircraft were lost (with four flight personnel).
Conclusion
Not only was the Tanne Ost company a tactical disaster for the Germans, it was also pointless from a strategic point of view. It should have been recognized that the German "sea urchin" mine barriers would have been breached, even if the Germans had successfully conquered the highlands, as the Finns would have had to clear their archipelago waters of mines in accordance with the Finnish-Soviet armistice agreement. So the northern shore connection of the mine bar (near Kotka) would have been lost in any case (which also happened). This fact had been recognized by both Vice Admiral Burchardi and Captain Mecke and cited as a point of criticism. The naval war command in Berlin ignored this.
Furthermore, maintaining the shore connection in the south (i.e. to the Estonian coast) would have been extremely questionable, as the Red Army began a major offensive against the Baltic states and the German armed forces there until November In 1944 it was largely displaced from the entire Baltic region .
literature
- Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulun Historian laitos (ed.) (1994). Jatkosodan historia 6: Meri- ja ilmapuolustus, hallinto ja sotatalous, huolto ja aselajit, kotijoukot. Werner Söderström osakeyhtiö, ISBN 951-0-15332-X , pp. 114-119.
- Cajus Bekker: Escape across the sea . Bechtermünz Verlag, Augsburg 1999, pp. 78-105.
Web links
- Jürgen Rohwer , Gerhard Hümmelchen : Chronicle of the naval war September 1944
- Jürgen Rohwer, Gerhard Hümmelchen: Chronicle of the naval war pictures of the island highlands