Uranium-9

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Uranium-9
Uran-9 at an exhibition in 2016

Uran-9 at an exhibition in 2016
General properties
crew no
length 5.12 m
width 2.53 m
height 2.50 m
Dimensions 10–12 tons combat weight
Armor and armament
Main armament 1 x 30-mm 2A72 automatic cannon
Secondary armament 1 × 7.62 mm PKTM ( coaxial MG), 9M120 Ataka anti- tank guided weapons or RPO rocket launchers
agility
drive
Top speed 35 km / h (road)
Power / weight

Uranium-9 is a vendor internal name for an unmanned land vehicle that as Spähpanzer for Russia , the company and the international market Rostec was developed. The Russian name of the vehicle is BMRK - Boevoy mobilniy razvedyvatelniy complex (mobile combat reconnaissance system ). According to the presentation of Rosoboronexport , the official Russian export company for armaments, the unmanned land vehicle should represent a combination between a reconnaissance and combat vehicle that can be used, among other things, in operations in urban terrain. For this purpose, it should, for example, provide remote reconnaissance data and possible fire support.

development

Uran-9 was developed by JSC 766 UPTK , part of the Rostec consortium . The system was presented to the public for the first time in 2016. In the same year, the first systems were delivered to the Russian armed forces for test purposes . Uran-9 was finally operational in 2019.

technology

A Uran-9 unit consists of four unmanned land vehicles and a manned command station, which is installed on a KAMAZ truck. The Uran-9 tracked vehicle can be remotely controlled from the command station by an operator or it can travel a preprogrammed route. The tracked vehicle based on the URP-01G - chassis and has depending on the version and arming a weight of 10-12 tons. It reaches a top speed of around 35 km / h on the road and should be able to be remotely controlled up to a distance of 3 km.

The Uran-9 unmanned land vehicle is equipped with a daylight camera and a thermal imaging camera . In daylight, targets should be able to be detected up to a distance of 6 km. At night, target acquisition should be possible at a distance of 3 km and target identification at around 1.5 km. The images recorded by the cameras are sent to the command station via a 2-way data link . The vehicle is also equipped with a laser warning device and has light armor to protect against firearms and splinters .

A remote-controlled weapon station of the type ABM-M30M3 is installed on the vehicle roof. This uses a 30 mm 2A72 automatic cannon as primary armament and a 7.62 mm PKT coaxial machine gun as secondary armament . Four 9M120 Ataka anti-tank guided weapons are also attached to the weapon station . Optionally, the weapon station can also be equipped with 6–12 RPO rocket launchers or an anti-aircraft missile system of the type 9K38 Igla or 9K333 Werba . The 9M120 Ataka anti-tank guided weapons can also be replaced by the 9M133 Kornet . The weapon station has no weapon stabilization and the weapons can therefore only be fired with accuracy when the vehicle is stationary.

commitment

After test operations and combat trials as part of the Russian military operation in Syria , z. Some significant weaknesses were found. Investigations by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation criticized the reliability, remote control, mobility, firepower and reconnaissance capabilities. During test operations in built-up areas, only a short operational range of 200–300 m was achieved, due to the low range and bandwidth of the data transmission . Likewise broke again and again, for z. T. long time from the communication link to the unmanned land vehicle. The quality of the optics was also criticized, which only allows target identification over distances of max. 2 km allow. The landing gear and the automatic cannon were also criticized as being mechanically unreliable. The investigation concluded that unmanned combat vehicles will not be able to perform combat operations for the next 10–15 years.

User states

  • RussiaRussia Russia - As of 2016, at least 20 uranium-9s are in service with the Russian army . After test deployments by army units, Uran-9 was officially put into regular service by the army only from January 24, 2019.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Russia to start promoting Uran-9 combat robotic system. In: defense-blog.com. December 30, 2015, accessed September 2, 2018 .
  2. ↑ Kyle Mizokami: The Kremlin's Tiny Remote Controlled Tank Bristles With Weapons. In: popularmechanics.com. January 13, 2016, accessed September 2, 2018 .
  3. ↑ Tamir Eshel: Russian Military to Test Combat Robots in 2016. In: defense-update.com. December 31, 2015, accessed September 2, 2018 .
  4. ↑ a b c d e f Waldemar Geiger: Unmanned combat vehicle URAN-9. In: esut.de. European Security & Technology, September 14, 2019, accessed November 15, 2019 .
  5. ↑ Russia ready to export Uran-9 robotic combat system in 2016. In: customstoday.com.pk. December 31, 2015, accessed September 2, 2018 .
  6. ↑ a b c d Uran-9 Unmanned Ground Combat Vehicle. In: army-technology.com. Army Technology, accessed November 15, 2019 .
  7. ↑ a b Боевой робот "Уран-9" поступил на вооружение российской армии. In: ИЗВЕСТИЯ - iz.ru. January 24, 2019, Retrieved January 25, 2019 (Russian).
  8. ↑ a b c Uranium-9 CMRC. In: army-guide.com. Army Guide, accessed November 15, 2019 .
  9. ↑ Боевой робототехнический комплекс «Уран-9». Инфографика. Военное обозрение - topwar.ru, September 7, 2017, accessed January 25, 2019 (Russian).
  10. ↑ uranium-9 UGV UGCV Unmanned Ground Combat Vehicle. In: armyrecognition.com. Army Recognition, February 1, 2019, accessed November 15, 2019 .
  11. ↑ a b c d Jared Keller: Russia's Robot Tank Sucks, But Its Military Is Adopting It Anyway. In: taskandpurpose.com. Task & Purpose, January 24, 2019, accessed November 15, 2019 .
  12. ↑ a b Kyle Mizokami: Russia's Tank Drone Performed Poorly in Syria. In: popularmechanics.com. Popular Mechanics, June 18, 2019, accessed November 15, 2019 .
  13. ↑ Российские военные купят в 2016 году 20 ударных роботов «Уран-9». In: lenta.ru. September 7, 2016, Retrieved September 2, 2018 (Russian).

literature

  • Paul Scharre: Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War . WW Norton & Company, 2018, ISBN 978-0-393-60899-1 , pp. 114-116 (English).
  • Stephan De Spiegeleire, Matthijs Maas, Tim Sweijs: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Defense: Strategic Implications For Small- and Medium-Sized Force Providers . Ed .: The Hague Center for Strategic Studies. 2017, ISBN 978-94-92102-54-6 , pp. 82 (English).

Web links

Commons : Uran-9  - Collection of images, videos and audio files