Armed Forces of Russia

Armed Forces of Russia Russian Вооружённые силы России
guide
Commander in Chief :	President Vladimir Putin
Defense Minister:	Army General Sergei Shojgu
Military Commander:	Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov
Military leadership:	General Staff
Headquarters:	Moscow
Military strength
Active soldiers:	1,013,628 (as of 2018)
Reservists:	2,572,500 (as of 2017)
Conscription:	Yes
Resilient population:	total (men and women; ages 15–49): 21,500,000 men and 28,800,000 women
Eligibility for military service:	18 years of age
household
Military budget:	$ 65.1 billion (2019)
Share of gross domestic product :	3.9% (2019)
history
Founding:	1992

Flag, front side

Flag, back

The armed forces of Russia ( Russian Вооружённые силы России Wooruschjonnyje sily Rossii ), sometimes semantically imprecise as Russian armed forces - are officially named Armed Forces of the Russian Federation ( Вооружёниные силе, part of РоссФий силе , and are made up of the three abbreviation Российий Вооружёниные силе, РоссФсы, part of РоссФсы , and the abbreviation of РоссФий .

• Land Forces ( Army ) - ru. Сухопутные войска (СВ);
• Air-Cosmos Armed Forces ( air and space forces ) - ru. Воздушно-космические силы (ВКС);
• Naval Forces / Naval War Fleet (Navy) - ru. Военно-морские силы (ВМС) / Военно-морской флот (ВМФ);

as well as the independent (strategic) military branches (ru.Рода войск)

• Strategic missile forces - ru. Ракетные войска стратегического назначения (РВСН) and
• Airborne Forces - ru. Воздушно-десантные войска (ВДВ).

The armed forces of the Russian Federation are a direct successor to the armed forces of the Soviet Union (USSR). They took over the numerical largest share of personnel, weapon systems, equipment and institutions and the tradition of the Soviet Army and the naval navy .

The President of the Russian Federation is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Russia (ru. Верховный Главнокомандующий Вооружёнными силами Российской Федерации).

Russia supplements its armed forces, among other things, with a conscription system , maintains military bases abroad and what is currently the world's largest nuclear arsenal . Russia ranked 6th out of 155 countries in the Global Militarization Index (GMI) in 2018 . According to the Global Firepower Index, Russia has the second strongest armed forces and the strongest army in the world.

Historical framework

Origin of the armed forces of Russia - 1991/92

As a result of the declarations of independence of various Soviet republics in the course of 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ( USSR, Russian СССР ) was officially dissolved from December 21 to 25, 1991 .

The entire structure of the Soviet armed forces down to the composition of the individual troops was initially not separated according to the new national criteria. The armed forces of the former USSR and their military potential were initially under the control of the military commanders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The Victory Banner - among other things, the official "symbol of victory " used by the Russian Army in parades

After the collapse of the Soviet Union , on May 7, 1992, the President of Russia , Boris Yeltsin, signed a decree establishing the Ministry of Defense of Russia and at the same time placed all former Soviet armed forces on the territory of the RSFSR under the control of the Russian Federation.

However, in May 1992, Russia created its own military structure. This was done in response to the formation of their own armed forces in various CIS countries, especially in Ukraine .

The CIS military command remained active for another year, although its power was already severely limited. In June 1993 the command was abolished; most of its functions were transferred to the armed forces of Russia. It is noteworthy that not only the tradition of the Soviet army and naval fleet, but also the military ceremonies from the pre-Soviet periods (e.g. naming, memorial days, parade uniforms), the corresponding education in the military schools and the influence of the Orthodox Church in Russia were revived.

Armed Forces of Russia in Constitutional Crisis - 1993

Russian soldiers on BTR-80 armored personnel carriers as part of the IFOR mission, November 1996

During the Yeltsin era (1992 to 1999), the Russian armed forces experienced their most difficult phase to date. In October 1993, parts of the armed forces were drawn into the conflict between President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet during the constitutional crisis . Russia was on the brink of civil war. The higher levels of command in the security services and the military supported Yeltsin. Soldiers violently ended the crisis by besieging and shooting at the parliament building. The armed resistance against Yeltsin collapsed at the cost of nearly 200 dead and several hundred injured. It was the worst unrest in Moscow since the revolutionary year 1917.

As a result of “bilateral agreements”, troop contingents of the Russian Federation have remained in Transnistria and South Ossetia since 1992 . In both cases, their presence supports the “stabilized de facto regimes ” there.

Security policy concepts of Russia - from 1993

Concepts for foreign and military policy

In the first 22 months of the state's existence there was no independent security policy conception of Russia or national military doctrine. Instead, much the same doctrine as during the Cold War was maintained. Since the early 1990s, however, a large number of such concepts have been developed and publicly discussed. The adopted concepts for foreign and military policy as well as for national security give an insight into the strategic thinking of the Russian leadership.

After the Russian constitutional conflict of 1993, the principles of military doctrine in the field of military policy were adopted by the President (November 2, 1993).

These principles admitted that the danger of world-wide conflict has not been eliminated, but that internal and local conflicts are the greatest threat to the maintenance of peace. The doctrine was still in the tradition of the Cold War. Thus the doctrine contained a number of reasons which gave the Russian state its own legitimacy to intervene militarily in neighboring countries and republics. The lack of a clear vision and line led to various misconceptions in the following years. So the creators of this doctrine started from the conditions before 1987, in which the armed forces of the USSR could dispose of almost unlimited resources.

The military doctrine of the Russian Federation went through another three versions in the following years: the draft of October 1999, the decrees of April 2000 and February 2010, and most recently in December 2014.

The military policy guidelines in the field of military-maritime activity of Russia were, shortly after the respective military doctrine, formulated in the form of a separate naval doctrine : As a precursor, the foundations of the policy of the RF in the field of military-maritime activity in the period up to the years 2010 (March 2000), as well as the Navy Doctrine of the RF (July 2001) and the Navy Doctrine of the RF (July 2015).

In addition, three documents Conception of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation were published, first in June 2000 (President Vladimir Putin), then in July 2008 (President D. Medvedev) and most recently in December 2016 (President V. Putin).

National Security Concepts

An overarching, state strategic concept that brings together domestic, foreign and military policy areas in the interests of national security was probably not created in Russia until 1996/97. The concept of national security of the Russian Federation was adopted in May 1997 by the Security Council of the RF without prior publication and, unlike before, was classified as “only for official use”.

It was not until December 17, 1997 that the President of the Russian Federation, Boris N. Yeltsin (in office from 1991 to 1999) confirmed the revised concept, i.e. after the signing of the basic documents between Russia and NATO and the 1997 treaty of friendship with Ukraine, Collaboration and partnership.

Adapted to the changed situation, the Security Council of the RF confirmed another national security concept of the same name (October 1999) .

As a result of his assumption of office and during Vladimir Putin's first term as President of Russia (from December 31, 1999), a new security concept and a new military doctrine were derived from this. The background to this was Putin's intention to restore national defense capabilities in view of the widening gap between the US armed forces and weapons technology and to modernize the military. In doing so, he also wanted to restore the former military reputation that had been lost in the 1990s.

By decree of the new President Vladimir V. Putin, the concept of national security of the Russian Federation came into force (January 2000) .

This was followed by the military doctrine of the Russian Federation (April 2000).

During the presidency of Dmitrij Medvedev, a conception of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation (July 2008) was published on the basis of the above .

In the following year, the national security concept, which was completely redesigned in terms of content, was published, now titled the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2020 (from May 2009).

This revision of the security strategy was followed by a changed military doctrine of the Russian Federation (from February 2010). Since the turn of the year 2014/15, this military doctrine and, from the end of December 2015, the national security strategy have been replaced by follow-up documents.

National Security Strategy (2015)

The culmination point so far is the national security strategy from 2015, which summarizes the long-term national interests and strategic priorities with regard to foreign, security and domestic policy. After public debates and deliberations in the political bodies, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2015) came into force on December 31, 2015 by decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir V. Putin. Compared to the previous document from 2009, the Strategy 2015 is structured in the same way, but its content has been expanded and arranged more coherently.

The document shows that the current strategic thinking of the Russian ruling political elite is determined by an expanded concept of security. It comprises nine “strategic national priorities”. National defense is mentioned first.

Threat Perceptions in Russia

Threats to national security in Russia are measured against factors and conditions that "directly or indirectly offer an opportunity to harm national interests."

With the signature of President Putin on December 25, 2014 with decree No. 805, a changed military doctrine of the Russian Federation (more precise editorial 12/2014) came into force, which reflects the aforementioned understanding of threats.

Although the long-term national interests and strategic national priorities for Russian foreign, security and domestic policy to protect against internal and external threats are named in detail in Strategy 2015 , the overall content received little and divided echo in Western media. The German-language media essentially only adopted the abbreviated statement by a British news agency that allegedly Russia for the first time named the USA and its allies, NATO and the EU as a threat to Russia and its neighbors in the aforementioned new strategic documents.

The military doctrine (12/2014) as well as the strategy (2015) differentiate between military dangers and threats. They do not designate any states per se as enemies or threats to Russia. However, new threats to national security are derived from the actions of non-state and state actors.

It is assessed that the USA and its allies are striving for global dominance and are pursuing a policy of containment of Russia by means of political, economic, military and informational pressure. This would find its expression in the assignment of global functions to NATO in violation of international legal norms, in the growth of the potential and in the further expansion of the alliance, as well as in the approximation of its military infrastructure to the Russian borders. The stationing of US missile defense components in Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region significantly reduces the possibilities for maintaining global and regional stability from a Russian perspective.

In the early 2020s, President Putin publicly voiced serious concern about the depletion of the arms control system. Not only the destruction of the Treaty on the Abolition of Medium- and Short-Range Missiles INF Treaty by the United States under a pretext worries Russia, but also the uncertainty created by the United States since November 2019 about its continued participation in the Open Skies Treaty . The prospects for an extension of the Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Weapons ( Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty New-START ) are also still unclear.

At the college meeting on December 24, 2019, Defense Minister Shojgu referred to the implementation of the “readiness initiative 4X30” (Nato Readiness Initiative, NRI), which was clearly directed against Russia.

Russia's Nuclear Deterrence Policy (2020)

According to an announcement from the Presidential Administration dated June 2, 2020, the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, by decree No. 355, confirmed the official document on the “Basics of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence” . This strategic planning document complements the current military doctrine of the Russian Federation and has recently been published for the first time.

Russia understands its policy of deterrence as a policy of minimum deterrence, which is focused on selected qualitative areas and primarily aims at maintaining the nuclear second strike capability. Russia rejects the early use of nuclear weapons and shows determination to prevent a nuclear war and deter all potential opponents from it. Russia considers the limitation of a nuclear war - especially on its own territory - a very dangerous illusion and advocates political dialogue.

Order for the armed forces of Russia

Security framework

Russia sees the strategic goals of national defense in creating conditions for peaceful and dynamic socio-economic development of the country and ensuring its military security. This is to be achieved within the framework of the implementation of military policy by means of strategic restraint (deterrence) and the prevention of military conflicts.

Russia wants to direct its military policy towards preventing an arms race, preventing and preventing military conflicts, and developing the military organization and armed forces in the interests of ensuring the defense and security of Russia and the interests of its allies.

The prevention of a nuclear military conflict, as well as any other military conflict, forms the guiding principle of military policy for Russia.

The strategy (2015) stipulates that "the stipulations of the strategy [...] are to be dutifully fulfilled by all organs of state power and organs of local self-government." It seems important that the military doctrine (12/2014) also provides a clear classification under constitutional law learned.

Military-political armed forces commission

According to military doctrine (12/2014), the Russian Federation considers the use of the armed forces to defend against aggression directed against them and (or) their allies and to maintain (restore) peace by resolution of the United Nations Security Council or other collective security structures lawful.

The use of the armed forces to ensure the protection of their citizens who stay outside the borders of the RF, in accordance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law and the international treaties of Russia, is just as legitimate.

The armed forces were deployed in peacetime at the decision of the President of the Russian Federation in accordance with the rules laid down in federal legislation. The deployment of the armed forces should be resolute, targeted and complex on the basis of timely and constant analysis of the developing military-political and military-strategic situation.

Leadership, management (as of August 2019)

The Russian President Vladimir Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu at the parade on Victory Day in Moscow on May 9, 2013

Political leadership by the president

In peacetime, the head of state assumes general political leadership over the armed forces.

The President of the Russian Federation is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Russia (Russian Верховный Главнокомандующий Вооружёнными силами Российской Федерации).

In the event of aggression against Russia or in the event of an imminent threat of aggression, the President of the RF shall declare a state of war for the entire territory or individual areas of Russia in order to create conditions for the prevention or defense of aggression. He shall immediately notify the Federation Council and the State Duma of this in order to confirm a corresponding decree.

In a state of war he heads the defense of the state and leads the armed forces to ward off aggression.

A corresponding decision by the Federation Council is required for the possible deployment of Russian armed forces beyond the borders.

The President of Russia appoints, releases and presides over the Security Council of the RF; he appoints and releases the high command of the armed forces.

As Supreme Commander in chief, the President affirms the RF National Security Strategy and Military Doctrine, the Armed Forces Development Concept, the Armed Forces and Economic Mobilization Plans, the Civil Defense Plan, and other military construction documents.

The head of state also confirms the general military regulations, the provisions on the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.

The President has the call-up for military service as well as the transfer from the armed forces to the reserve according to the age limits.

As head of state he signs international treaties on common defense and military cooperation.

Political direction by the Ministry of Defense

The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Russian Министерство обороны Российской Федерации), or the Ministry of Defense (Russian Министерство обороыны, Минобороны for the armed forces.) Is the leading organ of Russia.

The main tasks assigned include:

• the development and implementation of state policy in the defense field and its normative and legal implementation;
• the organization of the deployment of the armed forces in accordance with federal constitutional law, federal law and international treaties of Russia;
• the maintenance of the necessary readiness and the realization of the development of the armed forces;
• ensuring the social security of military personnel (uniformed workers, civilian workers, reservists) and their family members;
• the development and implementation of the state policy for international military cooperation.

The Ministry of Defense is responsible for supplying the armed forces, managing personnel, and generally maintaining combat capability.

The Ministry of Defense leads directly and through the management organs of the military districts, through the territorial organs and the military commissariats.

The Ministry is headed by the Defense Minister of the Russian Federation (Russian Министр обороны Российской Федерации) who is appointed and dismissed by the President of the RF on the proposal of the Prime Minister. The Minister reports directly to the President; but in matters of constitutional law, federal laws and presidential government decrees - the Prime Minister.

The minister is personally responsible for performing the duties assigned to the ministry and the armed forces. He realizes the principle of the single line. In peacetime, the defense minister is also the chief military commander.

He works with the college of the ministry (Russian коллегия) in the structure: the minister, his first deputies and deputies, the chiefs of the ministry's services and the commanders in chief of the armed forces.

Acting Defense Minister is the Hero of Russia (Russian Герой Российской Федерации) Army General Sergej Shojgu . Traditionally, the Russian (Soviet) defense ministers were not civilians, but high-ranking general. As an exception, Sergei Ivanov was the first civilian to hold this post from 2001 to 2007.

For the orderly fulfillment of functions, the specialist departments in the Ministry of Defense are structurally divided into main administrations, administrations, departments (ministerial departments), departments, centers and independent services (service areas).

From these subject-related structural elements, the first deputies and the deputies of the Minister of Defense were assigned the respective function-related management bodies listed below in the course of the formation of departments.

National Defense Command Center

The National Defense Center has been in operation since December 19, 2014, and during this time it has developed into an effective management tool for the armed forces and the navy and has become an important link in cross-departmental cooperation.

With the existing and growing protected IT capacity, the center enables the control of all types of armed forces activities, from day-to-day management to combat management. A 24-hour monitoring of the state of compliance with state defense requirements is also fully guaranteed.

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia

Position of the General Staff

General Staff Building in Moscow

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Russian Генеральный штаб Вооружённых сил Российской Федерации) is the central organ of military command of the Ministry and the basic operational management body of the armed forces.

The work of the General Staff is directed by the Defense Minister. The General Staff is part of the structure of the Ministry of Defense.

The General Staff coordinates the activities of the border troops (Russian пограничные войска), the organs of the Federal Security Service of the RF, the troops of the National Guard , the railroad troops , the federal bodies for special communication and information, the civil defense troops, the engineering-technical and military formation Road construction, the foreign intelligence services of the RF (SWR), the federal organs of the state security, the federal organs of the mobilization preparation of the state organs, the establishment and development of the armed forces as well as their deployment.

Main functions of the general staff

The main functions of the General Staff according to the Statute (2014) include:

• the organization of command of the armed forces;
• ensuring the strategic planning of the deployment of the armed forces and other troops and bodies;
• the preparation of proposals for national defense policy;
• the coordination of the actions of the armed forces with the other military formations in peacetime for measures of strategic restraint (deterrence);
• Planning and organization of the measures to build up the armed forces;
• the transfer of the armed forces to the organization and existence in a state of war;
• the management and coordination of the operational and mobilization preparation of the armed forces;
• the organization and implementation of the measures for the strategic (operational) security of the armed forces (including the topographical-geodetic, navigational-hydrographic, hydrometeorological).
• the organization of reconnaissance activities in the interests of defense and security of Russia;
• the development of the communication system and the automated command system of the armed forces;
• the organization of personnel replenishment of the armed forces, the strategic and mobilization development of the armed forces, other troops and organs;
• planning the provision of the armed forces with the main types of weapon systems, equipment and material resources, as well as their introduction and formation of reserves;
• the development of a uniform military-technical policy;
• the organization of state protection of secrets in the armed forces and in the ministerial authorities.

Leadership of the General Staff

The General Staff is headed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (Russian начальник Генерального штаба Вооружённых сил Российской Федерации); he is also First Deputy of the Minister of Defense of the RF (Russian первый заместителъ Министра обороны РФ) and represents the Minister in his absence.

The chief of staff reports directly to the defense minister; he bears personal responsibility for the fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the General Staff. The chief of staff determines the distribution of departmental tasks for the deputies of the chief of staff.

Acting Chief of Staff is the Hero of Russia (Russian Герой Российской Федерации) Army General Valery Gerasimov (since November 9, 2012).

Executive organs of the chief of staff

The General Staff ( Генеральный штаб Вооружённых Сил Российской Федерации ) comprises the following military command bodies reporting directly to the Chief of Staff (as of August 2019):

• Headquarters Operational of the General Staff (ru. Главное оперативное управление ); The area of ​​responsibility is operational and operational planning.
• Headquarters of the General Staff (ru. Главное управление Гш); former Second Headquarters of the General Staff (ru. Второе Главное управление ); - Organ of foreign intelligence and intelligence of the armed forces.
• Headquarters Organization and mobilization of the General Staff (ru. Главное организационно-мобилизационное управление Гш ); - Staff replenishment and mobilization issues.
• Headquarters of communications (links) of the armed forces (ru. Главное управление связи ВС ); - Security of the armed forces with communications technology.
• National Command Center for Defense of the Russian Federation (ru. Национальный центр управления обороной Российской Федерации); - Coordination of troops, forces and organs; Organization of cooperation.
• Management of the Chief of the Troops of the Radio Electronic Combat (ru. Управление начальника войск радиоэлектронной борьбы ВС ); - Planning, organization and leadership of the radio electronic combat of the armed forces.
• Administration of the military topography of the General Staff (ru. Военно-топографическое управление Гш ); - Planning, organization and management of the topographical-geodetic and navigational security of the armed forces.
• Eighth Administration of the General Staff (ru. Восьмое управление Гш ); - Ensuring the internal information and communication of the Ministry of Defense as well as the state protection of secrets and information security.
• Administration Operational Training of the Armed Forces (ru. Управление оперативной подготовки ВС); - Preparation and implementation of operational training measures under the direction of the Defense Minister and the Chief of Staff.
• Administration of the General Staff (for the construction and development of unmanned missiles). (ru. Управление строительства и развития системы беспилотных летательных аппаратов Гш ).
• Administration of the Department of Defense for Intellectual Property, military-technical cooperation and supply expertise for armaments and military technology. (Ru Управление интеллектуальной собственности, военно-технического сотрудничества и экспертизы поставок вооружения и военной техники Минобороны России.);
• Archive Service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (ru. Архивная служба ВС РФ ).
• Military Police Headquarters of the Ministry of Defense (ru. Главное управление военной полиции Минобороны России ).
• Ministry of Defense Administration for the Control of Nuclear and Radiation Safety (ru.
• Military Orchestra Service of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (ru. Военно-оркестровая служба ВС РФ).

Management bodies of the First Deputy Minister of Defense

A First Deputy Minister of Defense (ru. Первый заместитель Министра обороны РФ) is responsible for judicial and legal affairs as well as financial control. He coordinates questions of information policy and the cooperation with the organs of legal security.

The following military command organs are subordinate to this First Deputy Minister of Defense (as of August 2019):

• Department of the Ministry of Defense for Control and Audit of Financial Management (ru. Департамент ведомственного финансового контроля и аудита Минобороны России).
• Department (Department) of the Ministry of Defense for Information and Mass Communication. (ru. Департамент информации и массовых коммуникаций Минобороны России).
• Department of the Ministry of Defense for Legal Matters. (ru. Правовой департамент Минобороны России).
• Ministry of Defense Headquarters for Control and Inspection Activities (ru. Главное управление контрольной и надзорной деятельности МО РФ).
• Department (division) of the Ministry of Defense for military-economic analysis (ru. Департамент военно-экономического анализа Министерства обороны РФ).

Management bodies of other deputies of the Minister of Defense

Management bodies of the State Secretary

A State Secretary and Deputy Minister of Defense (ru. Статс-секратарь - заместитель Министра обороны РФ) organizes legislative matters in cooperation with the chambers of the Federal Assembly. He is responsible for ensuring the management, time and civil personnel requirements as well as financial control. He coordinates issues of civic work with the staff and the system of military training. He also organizes cooperation with the armed forces of the CIS countries.

The following military command bodies are subordinate to this State Secretary and Deputy Minister of Defense (as of August 2019):

• Headquarters of the Ministry of Defense for cadres (ru. Главное управление кадров Минобороны России).
• Administration of the Armed Forces for Physical Education and Sports. (ru. Управление физической подготовки и спорта ВС РФ).

Management bodies for military political work

The deputy minister of defense and head of the main military and political administration (ru.

• Headquarters of the Military Policy of the RF Armed Forces. (ru. Главное военно-политическое управление Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации).
• Department of the Ministry of Defense of Culture. (ru. Департамент культуры Минобороны России).
• Management of Defense to work with citizens' concerns [Community Office of Defense] (ru. Управление Минобороны России по работе с обращениями граждан [общественная приёмная Министра обороны Российской Федерации]).
• Heraldic Service of the Armed Forces of the RF. (ru. Военно-геральдическая служба ВС РФ).

The Main Military Political Administration (MPHV) was established by decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 30, 2018 and appointed Colonel General Andrei Kartapolov to the post of head of the MPHV and at the same time Deputy Minister of Defense. According to him, around 300 posts in the military and political organs have been filled from April to November 2019.

According to press reports, the MPHV was created on the basis of the “Headquarters for Working with the Workforce”, which since 1991 had succeeded the Military Political Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the USSR, which was dissolved after the coup. The aim is to respond to the growing role of the political and moral unity of the army and society in the structural reorganization of the armed forces and for moral and spiritual stability in the armed forces of Russia.

Management bodies for material-technical security

A deputy of the defense minister (ru. Заместитель Министра обороны РФ) is responsible for organizing the material-technical security (ru. Материально-техническоe Техническоe Теспечениe).

The following military command organs report to this deputy of the Defense Minister (as of August 2019):

• Staff of the material and technical security of the armed forces of the RF. (ru. Штаб материально-технического обеспечения Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации).
• Department of Defense for Transport Security. (ru. Департамент транспортного обеспечения Минобороны России).
• Department (division) of the Ministry of Defense for the procurement of resources. (ru. Департамент ресурсного обеспечения Минобороны России). - Procurement of labor and service and material resources, procedures as a state consumer.
• Department (department) of the Ministry of Defense for the use and guarantee of municipal services by the military units and organizations. .
• Headquarters of the Ministry of Defense for vehicle and armored security. (ru. Главное автобронетанковое управление Минобороны России).
• Ministry of Defense Headquarters for Missiles and Artillery. (ru. Главное ракетно-артиллерийское управление Минобороны России) - Organization of missile and artillery security.
• Ministry of Defense headquarters for the railroad troops. (ru. Главное управление начальника Железнодорожных войск Минобороны России).
• Administration of the armed forces of the RF for metrology. (ru. Управление метрологии ВС РФ). - Organization of uniformity and accuracy in military metrology.
• Administration of the Ministry of Defense for the eternal memory of those killed in defense of the Fatherland. (ru. Управление Минобороны России по увековечению памяти погибших при защите Отечества).

Command organs for combat training

A deputy to the Defense Minister (ru. Заместитель Министра обороны РФ) is responsible for organizing (combat) training (ru. Боевая подготовка) in the armed forces.

The following military command organs report to this deputy of the Defense Minister (as of August 2019):

• Headquarters Combat Training of the RF Armed Forces. (ru. Главное управление боевой подготовки ВС РФ).
• Air traffic control service of the armed forces of the RF. (ru. Служба безопасности полетов авиации ВС РФ).

Management bodies for accommodation and medical security

A deputy minister of defense (ru. Заместитель Министра обороны РФ) is responsible for organizing the administration of the armed forces' property and the accommodation of troops / forces. His portfolio includes the security of housing and medical security for the armed forces of the RF.

The following military command organs report to this deputy of the Defense Minister (as of August 2019):

• Department of the Ministry of Defense of Construction. (ru. Департамент строительства Минобороны России).
• Department (division) of the Ministry of Defense for planning and coordinating the restructuring of the armed forces. (ru. Департамент планирования и координации обустройства войск (сил) Минобороны России).
• Department (division) of the Ministry of Defense for Seizure with Housing. (ru. Департамент жилищного обеспечения Минобороны России).
• Department of Defense for Property Matters. (ru. Департамент имущественных отношений Минобороны России)
• Department of Defense Ministry of State Assessment / Certification. (ru. Государственная экспертиза Минобороны России).
• Department of Defense Headquarters for Military Medicine. (ru. Главное военно-медицинское управление Минобороны России).
• Federal administration for the military home savings scheme. (ru. Федеральное управление накопительно- ипотечной системы жилищного обеспечения военнослужащих).

Management bodies to ensure security with technology and armament

A deputy to the Defense Minister (ru. Заместитель Министра обороны РФ) is responsible for the organization of the military security of the armed forces of the RF with military and special technology. His portfolio includes the definition of a uniform military-technical policy, state contracts and orders as well as inventor and rationalization projects.

The following military command organs report to this deputy of the Defense Minister (as of August 2019):

• Headquarters of the armed forces of the RF for armament. (ru. Главное управление вооружения Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации).
• Department (division) of the Ministry of Defense for state procurement of defense supplies. (ru. Департамент Минобороны России по обеспечению государственного оборонного заказа).
• Department of Defense Ministry of State Purchasing. (ru. Департамент государственных закупок Минобороны России).
• Administration of the RF Armed Forces for procurement to perfect the technical base of the command system. (ru. Управление заказов по совершенствованию технической основы системы управления ВС РФ).
• Administration of the Ministry of Defense for perspective cross-armed forces research and special projects. (ru. Управление перспективных межвидовых исследований и специальных проектов Минобороны России).
• Department of Defense for Contract Audit. (ru. Департамент аудита государственных контрактов Министерства обороны Российской Федерации).
• Administration of the Ministry of Defense of the RF for military representatives. (ru. Управление военных представительств Минобороны России). - Quality control and reception of military and special equipment for export as well as civil aircraft and space systems.
• Central Scientific Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the RF. (ru. Центральный научно- исследовательский институт Министерства обороны Российской Федерации).
• RF Ministry of Defense center for special development work. (ru. Центр специальных разработок Министерства обороны Российской Федерации). - Development work on the security of communication and information systems of the Ministry of Defense.

Management bodies for scientific and research activities

A deputy to the Minister of Defense (ru. Заместитель Министра обороны РФ) is responsible for organizing scientific and research activities in the fields of cutting-edge technologies as well as information and robotics.

The following military command organs report to this deputy of the Defense Minister (as of August 2019):

• Headquarters of the Ministry of Defense for scientific and research activities and technological support for cutting-edge technologies (innovation research). (Ru. Главное управление научно-исследовательской деятельности и технологического сопровождения передовых технологий (инновационных исследований) Министерства обороны Российской Федерации).
• Department of Defense for Information Technology Systems. (ru. Департамент информационных систем Министерства обороны Российской Федерации).
• Ministry of Defense main center for research and testing of robotics. (ru. Главный научно-исследовательский испытательный центр робототехники Министерства обороны Россий обороны Россий обороны Россий).

Management bodies for the Office of the Minister of Defense

A deputy minister of defense (ru. Заместитель Министра обороны РФ) is responsible for organizing the administrative activities of the ministerial office (apparatus).

The following military command organs report to this deputy of the Defense Minister (as of August 2019):

• Administration of the Ministry of Defense of the RF for General Affairs. (ru. Управление делами Минобороны России).
• Department of the Ministry of Defense of the RF for protocol coordination. (ru. Протокольно-координационный департамент Минобороны России).
• Administration of the Ministry of Defense of the RF for organization. (ru. Организационное управление Минобороны России). - All-round security for the performance of the minister's and managerial duties.
• Administration of the Ministry of Defense of the RF for control. (ru. Контрольное управление Минобороны России). - Internal audit and control in the ministry and in the subordinate areas.

Management bodies for international cooperation

A Deputy Minister of Defense (ru. Заместитель Министра обороны РФ) is responsible for organizing international military cooperation, including the fulfillment of the international treaties of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Defense.

The following military command organs report to this deputy of the Defense Minister (as of August 2019):

• Headquarters of the Ministry of Defense of the RF for international military cooperation. (ru. Главное управление международного военного сотрудничества Минобороны России).
• Administration of the Ministry of Defense for the control of the performance of the contract. [National Center for Nuclear Hazard Reduction]. (ru. Управление Минобороны России по контролю за выполнением договоров [Национальный ентр контролю оентр по умерин).

Management bodies for financial security

A deputy of the Defense Minister (ru. Заместитель Министра обороны РФ) is responsible for organizing the financial security of the armed forces of the RF.

The following military command bodies report to this deputy of the Defense Minister (as of August 2019):

• Department of the Ministry of Defense of the RF for financial security. (ru. Департамент финансового обеспечения Минобороны России).
• Department (division) of the Ministry of Defense of the RF for financial planning. (ru. Департамент финансового планирования Министерства обороны Российской Федерации).
• Department (department) of the Ministry of Defense of the RF for social guarantees. (ru. Департамент социальных гарантий Министерства обороны Российской Федерации).
• Department of the Ministry of Defense of the RF for financial monitoring of national defense needs. (ru. Департамент финансового мониторинга государственного оборонного заказа Минобороны России).
• Department of the Armed Forces of the RF for the planning of the financial security of the mobilization development. .

Management bodies of the services in the Ministry of Defense

The heads of the services in the Ministry of Defense (ru.начальники службы Министерство обороны РФ) are subordinate to the following military command bodies (as of August 2019):

• Administration of the chief of the troops of the KCB protection (nuclear radiation, chemical and biological protection; German NBC defense troops) of the armed forces of the RF. (ru. Управление начальника войск радиационной, химической и биологической защиты ВС РФ ).
• Administration of the Chief of Engineering Troops of the RF Armed Forces (ru. Управление начальника инженерных войск ВС РФ ).

In addition, the following organs belong to the management structure of the Ministry of Defense - in unknown allocation (as of August 2019):

• Press Secretary to the Defense Minister of the RF. (ru. Пресс-секретарь Министра обороны Российской Федерации ).
• Hydrometeorological Service of the RF Armed Forces. (ru. Гидрометеорологическая служба ВС РФ ).
• Military Scientific Committee of the Armed Forces of the RF. (ru. Военно-научный комитет ВС РФ ).

High command of the armed forces and commands of the strategic troops

The Defense Minister of the RF reports directly to the commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the armed forces and the commanders of the independent (strategic) troops, who have the following functional management bodies:

• High Command of the Land Forces (the Army). (ru. Главное командование Сухопутных войск).
• High Command of the Air and Cosmos Forces. (ru. Главное командование Воздушно-космических сил).
• Command of the Naval War Fleet (naval forces, navy). (ru. Главное командование Военно-Морского Флота).
• Command of the Strategic Missile Forces (missile forces of strategic destination). (ru. Командование Ракетных войск стратегического назначения).
• Airborne Forces Command. (ru. Командование Воздушно-десантных войск).

Existence and structure of the armed forces (as of August 2019)

Composition of the armed forces of Russia

The armed forces of the Russian Federation consist of the three armed forces

• Land Forces (Army) - ru. Сухопутные войска (СВ);
• Air-Cosmos Armed Forces (air and space forces) - ru. Воздушно-космические силы (ВКС) and
• Naval War Fleet / Naval Forces (Navy) - ru. Военно-морские силы (ВМС) / Военно-морской флот (ВМФ);

as well as the independent (strategic) military branches (ru.Рода войск)

• Airborne Forces - ru. Воздушно-десантные войска (ВДВ) and
• Strategic missile forces - ru. Ракетные войска стратегического назначения (РВСН).

The armed forces of Russia have other special troops at their disposal that do not belong to the armed forces and independent branches of the armed forces. These include:

• the railway troops (ru. железнодорожные войска), the pipeline construction units (ru.трубопроводные войска), the road construction units (ru. дорожные войска),
• Information Operations Troops (ru. войска информационных операций),
• the Medical Service (ru. медицинская служба),
• the material and technical security of the armed forces of the RF (ru. Материально-техническое обеспечение Вооружённых сил, МТО);
• the military topographic service (ru. топографическая служба),
• special purpose troops (ru. части специального назначения).

Combat experiences of the leadership stock

At the beginning of the 2019/2020 training year, Defense Minister S. Shojgu assessed that the military education system had achieved the required volume of training and was able to meet the army's needs for qualified military cadres. The staffing of officers has been increased to 95 percent and the average age is 35 years.

The officer corps is characterized by high moral and volitional qualities and professionalism. “All commanders of the military districts, the general armies, the armies of the Air Cosmic Forces (LKS), the armies of the air defense (LV) are endowed with combat experience; the commanders of the divisions, brigades and regiments; 90 percent of the aircrew, 56 percent of the air defense (LV) specialists, 61 percent of the naval fleet, 98 percent of the military police, 78 percent of the engineer troops. "(As of December 2019)

Land Forces of Russia

→ Main article : Russian Army

237th Panzer Regiment of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Guard Army at the Pogonovo training ground in Voronezh Oblast amid the COVID-19 coronavirus pandemic .

The land forces (ru. Сухопутные войска) are numerically the strongest armed forces and are intended for actions on land / on the ground / on the mainland / in continental theaters of war.

Army General Oleg L. Saljukov (ru. Салюков Олег Леонидович, Главнокомандующий Сухопутными войсками, генерил) has been Commander in Chief of the Land Forces since May 2014.

The land forces of Russia have the following branches of arms in stock (as of August 2019):

• Motorized rifle troops (ru. Мотострелковые войска, МСВ);
• Armored troops (ru. Танковые войска, ТВ);
• Missile troops and artillery (ru. Ракетные войска и артиллерия, РВиА);
• Air defense (ru. Войска противовоздушной обороны Сухопутных войск, ПВО СВ);

The special troops in the land forces (ru. Специальные войска СВ) include:

• Troop reconnaissance (ru. Разведывательные соединения и воинские части),
• Engineer troops (ru. Инженерные войска),
• Troops of the (NBC) KCB defense (ru. Войска радиационной, химической и биологической защиты, войска РХБ защиты),
• (Telecommunication) intelligence forces (ru. Войска связи),
• Troops of the (Eloka) radio electronic combat (ru. Войска РЭБ),
• Commanders Service Troops (ru. Коммандантские войска).

Air Cosmos Armed Forces of Russia

The air-cosmos armed forces (ru. Воздушно-космические силы) are intended for actions in the air / in the air / in the cosmos (space) / on continental and oceanic (sea) theaters of war.

They were restructured in 2015 as a military force in Russia by merging the following types of forces (ru.Родa сил) (as of August 2019):. Air Force (ru. Военно-воздушные силы); . Air defense and missile defense troops (ru. Войска противовоздушной и противоракетной обороны); . Cosmos troops (ru. Космические войска).

Air Force of Russia

→ Main article : Russian Air Force

Sukhoi Su-30SM fighters of the 120th separate mixed air regiment on the Domna military airfield .

The Russian Air Force has the following types of aircraft (ru. Род авиации) (as of August 2019):

• Long-distance aviation forces (ru. Дальней авиации);
• Front Air Force (ru. Дальней авиации);
• Transport air force (ru. Военно-транспортной авиации).

The inventory also includes:

• Special Aviation Forces (ru. 8-я авиационная дивизия особого назначения)
• Aviation training centers (ru. Авиационные центры) and officers' colleges (ru. Высшие военно-учебные заведения).

The Air Force of the Russian Federation emerged in 1991 from the Air Force of the Soviet Union (USSR). The air defense troops of the country (Woiska PWO / Protiwowosduschnoj oborony strany), which included the bulk of interceptors and ground-based air defense systems , were integrated into the air force in 1998 as an independent branch of the armed forces, alongside land forces, naval war fleet , air forces and strategic missile forces .

In 2003, the Army Air Force (Army Aviation) previously assigned to the Land Forces were placed under the command of the Air Force. The naval aviation units ( Aviazija Wojenno Morskowo Flota , AWMF), which are under the command of the Russian Navy, do not belong to the air force .

(Actuality not checked)

• Long-range Air Force Command (Командование дальней авиации, КДА) (Moscow). The command includes heavy bomber forces and air refueling aircraft; Air force army with two air bases (division equivalent) and advanced air bases.
  • 6950th Air Base (6950-я Авиабаза) (Engels, Saratov region),
  • 6952. Air base (6952-я Авиабаза) (Ukrainka, Amur region).
• Military Transport Aviation Command (Командование военно-транспортной авиации, КВТА) (Moscow). The command includes heavy air transport forces and air surveillance aircraft;
• Air force army with an air transport division and an air surveillance regiment.
  • 12th Air Transport Division (12-я ВТАД) (Tver),
  • 144th Air Monitoring Regiment (144-й ап ДРЛО) (Ivanovo).

Kosmos troops of Russia

The Cosmos troops of Russia (Space troops) have the following constituents (August 2019):

• 15th Army of the Air Cosmos Armed Forces, special purpose (ru. 15-я армия Воздушно-космических сил - особого назначения) with
  • Main Center for Trials in the Cosmos (ru. Главный испытательный космический центр им. Г.С. Титова),
  • Main center for early warning of missile raids (ru. Главный центр предупреждения о ракетном нападении),
  • Main center for situation investigation in the cosmos / space (ru. Главный центр разведки космической обстановки).
• 1. State test cosmodrome of the Ministry of Defense "Plesetsk" (ru. 1-й Государственный испытательный космодром Министерства «оборонм цросецм окосерства" оборонм цросецицм цросецм цросецм оборонм цросец цмосец оборонм цросецм.
• Kosmos Military Academy "AF Moshajskij" (ru. Военно-космическая академия им. А.Ф. Можайского).

Up-to-dateness of the following information has not been checked.

The space troops of Russia (Kosmitscheskije woiska Rossii) consist of units, units and associations that are responsible for strategic missile defense, the execution of nuclear strikes , the reconnaissance of a potential enemy and the supply of information to other TSKs and consumers.

In addition to Russia, Russian space forces facilities are also stationed in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Belarus. You can also use the rocket launch sites at Baikonur , Plesetsk and Vostochny .

The arsenal of the space forces is mainly the Russian satellite fleet . This consists of at least 95 satellites; According to the sources, a number of 102 satellites should be reached by the end of 2007, most of which are military in nature as spy satellites . Originally, this sector was part of the Air Defense Forces (PWO) . It was not until 1992 that it became an independent branch and in 1997 they were subordinated to the Strategic Missile Forces. The actual hour of birth as an independent part of the Russian armed forces was June 1, 2001.

Space Forces Day is celebrated annually in Russia on October 4th.

Air defense and missile defense troops of Russia

The troops of the air defense and missile defense of Russia are as follows (as of August 2019):

• 1st Army of Air Defense and Missile Defense (LV – RA) - special provision (ru. 1-я армия ПВО-ПРО - особого назначения) with
• 4th and 5th Air Defense Divisions (ru. 4-я, 5-я дивизия противовоздушной обороны);
• 9th Missile Defense Division (ru. 9-я дивизия противоракетной обороны);
• Military Academy of Air-Cosmos Defense “GK Zhukov” in Tver (ru. Военная академия воздушно-космической обороны им. Марш.зга.ко Советсконы Т;
• Air Defense Officers College of the 1st Army LV – RA in Yaroslavl (ru. Ярославское высшее военное училище противовоздушной обороны1-я армия ПибО).

(Actuality not checked)

Information on 1st Army LV-RA: with the task of protecting the capital Moscow from massive ballistic attacks.

• 1st Army of Air Defense and Missile Defense (LV – RA) (1-я армия ПВО и ПРО) (Moscow) with
  • 4th Air Defense Division (4-я Д ПВО) (Petrovskoye, Moscow region),
  • 5th Air Defense Division (5-я Д ПВО) (Dolgoprudny, Moscow region),
  • 9th Missile Defense Division (9-я Д ПРО) (Sofrino, Moscow region).

Naval Navy of Russia

→ Main article : Russian naval navy

Joint exercises of the Northern and Black Sea Fleets

The Seekriegsflotte Russia (ru. Russian Военно-морской флот, ВМФ ), as Russia's Navy and naval forces (ru. Военно-морские силы) called, is / designed for actions at sea to sea / on (oceanic) Seekriegsschauplätzen.

Since May 2019, the commander-in-chief of the Russian naval fleet has been Admiral Nikolaj A. Evmenov (ru.Евменов Николай Анатольевич, Главнокомандующий Военно-Морскмим Флотоим ладим).

The High Command of the Naval War Fleet of Russia (ru.Gлавное командование Военно-Морского Флота) carries the following (weapons, forces) types (as of June 2020):

• Coastal troops (ru. Береговые войска) with the two branches of service
  • Coastal Missile Forces Artillery (ru. Береговые ракетно-артиллерийские войска),
  • Marine infantry (ru. Морская пехота).
• Surface forces (ru. Надводные силы),
• Underwater forces (ru. Подводные силы),
• Naval forces (ru. Морская авиация),
• (Operational-strategic) union of the fleet (ru. Объединение флота) in the composition:
  • Northern Fleet of Russia (ru. Северный флот), at the same time the United Strategic Command Northern Fleet (ru. Объединённое стратегическое командование);
  • Baltic Fleet - Russian Baltic Fleet (ru. Балтийский флот),
  • Black Sea Fleet of Russia (ru. Черноморский флот),
  • Pacific Fleet of Russia (ru. Тихоокеанский флот),
  • Caspian Flotilla of Russia (ru. Каспийская флотилия).

The Russian Navy took over most of the former Soviet fleet after 1991.

In 2008 the Russian Navy operated several times in the world's oceans. She took part in a joint exercise with the Venezuelan Navy in the Caribbean and passed the Panama Canal for the first time since 1944 . Further fleet visits took place in Nicaragua and Cuba .

The international name for a ship of the Russian Navy is "RFS" - "Russian Federation Ship" (ship of the Russian Federation).

Independent (strategic) military branches

Strategic Missile Forces of Russia

The strategic missile forces Russia / strategic missile forces determination (ru. Ракетные войска стратегического назначения, РВСН [ Raketnyje wojska strategitscheskowo nasnatschenija Rossijskoj Federazii, RWSN ]), the ground-based main component of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia. Like the sea-based component of the Russian Navy, they are intended for the nuclear containment (deterrence) of a possible aggressor.

They are able to conduct massed, group or individual strikes on strategic objects in the holdings of the Strategic Nuclear Forces or independently. In the armament are ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with nuclear charge.

Since June 2010, the commander of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia has been Colonel-General Sergei Viktorovich Karakajew (ru.

The Strategic Missile Forces of Russia have three armies and the following formations in their inventory (as of August 2019):

• three operational missile units (missile armies):
  • Vladimir Operational Missile Force (ru. Владимирское ракетное объединение) / Wiitebsk Red Banner Guard Missile Army (ru. Гвардейская ракетная ракетная Вимазнар;
  • Orenburg operational missile unit (ru. Оренбургское ракетное объединение) / Orenburg missile army (ru. Оренбургская ракетная армия) with staff in Rostoshi, Orenburg region;
  • Omsk operative association missile (ru. Омское ракетное объединение) / Berislawa-Chinganer, twice with excellent Red Banner and Order of Suvorov Garde-missile Army (ru гвардейская ракетная Бериславско-Хинганская дважды Краснознамённая, ордена Суворова армия) with rod in Omsk.
• Missile formations:
  • Bologoj missile formation (ru. Бологоевское ракетное соединение / гвардейская Краснознаменная Режицкая ракетное дивизиятная дивизиятная дивизиятная дивизиятная дивизиятная дивизиятная
  • Barnauler Missile Association (ru. Барнаульское ракетное соединение / ракетная Краснознаменная орденов Кутузова и Александсрова и Алексозандрая);
  • Irkutsk Missile Association (ru. Иркутское ракетное соединение / гвардейская ракетная Витебская ордена Ленина Красеноз);
  • Yoshkar-Olin missile unit (ru. Йошкар-Олинское ракетное соединение / Киевско-Житомирская ордена Куитивена Куитивева III стезяпенение);
  • Koseler Missile Association (ru. Козельское ракетное соединение / гвардейская Краснознаменная дивизия);
  • Novosibirsk missile Association (ru Новосибирское ракетное соединение / гвардейская Глуховская ордена Ленина, Краснознаменная орденов Суворова, Кутузова и Б.Хмельницкого ракетная дивизия.);
  • Tatishchevo missile formation (ru. Татищевское ракетное соединение / Таманская ракетная ордена Октябрьской Октябрьской револеции револеная ордена Октябрьской револецизая револеции револеции револецизая револеции револеции ракетное ракетное соединение);
  • Tagiler missile formation (ru. Тагильское ракетное соединение / Тагильская ракетная дивизия);
  • Tejkovo missile formation (ru. Тейковское ракетное соединение / гвардейская ракетная ордена Кутузова дивизия);
  • Ushur Missile Association (ru. Ужурское ракетное соединение / Краснознаменная ракетная дивизия);
  • Jurja missile formation (ru. Юрьянское ракетное соединение / Мелитопольская Краснознаменная ракетная дивизия);
  • Jasnyj missile formation (ru. Ясненское ракетное соединение / Ракетная Краснознаменная дивизия).
• Other military facilities:
  • State Central Multipurpose Polygon of the Ministry of Defense of the RF (ru. Государственный центральный межвидовой полигон Министерства обороны РоссФийскойр РоссФийскойроссийскойр Российской);
• Training centers and technical schools (ru. Учебные центры и школы техников)
  • 161. Technical School, Astrakhan Region (ru. 161-я школа техников РВСН, Астраханская область);
  • 90. Regional multipurpose training center of the strategic missile forces, Yaroslavl region (ru. 90 й Межвидовый региональный учебный центр Ракетных войск стратегического назначения, Ярославская область).
  • Regional multipurpose training center of the strategic missile forces, Pskov (ru. Межвидовой региональный учебный центр Ракетных войск стратегического назначения, Псковская область).
• Academic teaching institution (ru. Высшие военно-учебные заведения):
  • Military Academy of Strategic Missile Forces "Peter the Great" (ru. Военная академия Ракетных войск стратегического назначения им. Петра Велико).

Up-to-dateness of the information in the following section has not been checked:

The Strategic Missile Forces were founded on March 24, 2001 by a decree of the Russian President and, historically, are related to the armed forces of the Soviet armed forces founded in 1959 (in the official ranking of armed forces of the Soviet armed forces, the missile troops were ranked first before the armed forces of the land ). In June 2001, the space forces were spun off from the Strategic Missile Forces and combined into a separate subdivision of the total armed forces.

• Central command post in Vlasicha near Moscow
  • 27th Missile Army in Vladimir with five missile divisions and 196 missiles under its control
  • 31st Missile Army in Orenburg with two missile divisions, 36 missiles
  • 33rd Missile Army in Omsk with four missile divisions, 73 missiles

A fourth, the 53rd Missile Army in Chita , was disbanded in 2002.

The team is currently 120,000 men, two thirds of them military personnel, the rest civil employees.

Number of systems and warheads

The Topol-M launcher for Victory Day in Moscow . 2015 year.

• 46 silo-based intercontinental missile systems of the type R-36M UTTH / R-36M2 (SS-18 Satan) with 10 warheads each or a total of 460 warheads. Deployed to the Komarowski missile base (Dombarowski-3) near Jasny and in Solnetschny near Ushur .
• 60 silo-based intercontinental missile systems UR-100N UTTH or RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) with 6 warheads each (= 360 warheads). Stationed near Koselsk and Tatishchevo ( Saratov Oblast ).
• 72 mobile intercontinental missile systems RS-12M Topol (SS-25 Sickle) with one warhead each (= 72 warheads). Deployment areas: Yoshkar-Ola , Irkutsk , Sibirski near Barnaul and Vypolsowo near Surskoye ( Ulyanovsk Oblast ).
• 60 silo-based intercontinental missile systems RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27 Sickle-B) with one warhead each in Tatishchevo (= 60 warheads)
• 18 mobile intercontinental missile systems RS-12M2 Topol-M (SS-27 Sickle-B) each with one warhead. Deployment area: Teikowo .
• 45 mobile intercontinental missile systems RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod. 2 Sickle-B) with 4 warheads (= 180 warheads), stationed near Teikowo , Novosibirsk and Nizhny Tagil .
• 4 silo-based intercontinental missile systems RS-24 Yars-M (SS-27 Mod. 3 Sickle-B) with 4 warheads (= 16 warheads), stationed near Koselsk .

Airborne troops of Russia

→ Main article : Airborne troops (Russia)

Inspection of the 56th Separate Air Raid Brigade of the Russian Airborne Forces.

The airborne troops of Russia (ru. Russian Воздушно-десантные войска , ВДВ; [Wosduschno-Dessantnyje Wojska]) belong to the reserve of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of Russia (ru Резерв Верховного главнокомандоющего Вооружёнными силами Российской федерации, РВГК РФ.). They were founded as part of the Soviet armed forces during the Second World War .

They have airborne airborne and air storm units and are intended for operational air landings and for conducting combat activities in the enemy's hinterland.

Since October 2016, the commander of the airborne troops has been Colonel-General Andrei N. Serdyukov (ru. Сердюков Андрей Николаевич Командующий Воздушно-десантныкогнавойсками, войсками, войсками).

The airborne troops of Russia have the following branches of arms in stock (as of August 2019):

• Airborne and Air Assault Divisions (ru. Воздушно-десантные и десантно-штурмовые дивизии):
  • 7. Rotbanner-, Suvorov, Kutusow Medal II.-bearing Guard air Storm Division - mountain warfare (ru 7-я гвардейская десантно-штурмовая (горная) Краснознаменная орденов Суворова и Кутузова 2-й степени дивизия.) - Rod in Noworossijsk ;
  • 76. Chernigov Red Banner Order of Carrying Garde-air Storm Division (ru 76-я гвардейская десантно-штурмовая Черниговская Краснознамённая дивизия.) - Rod in Pskow ;
  • 98th Swirer Red Banner, Kutuzov Order II Airborne Division (ru. 98-я гвардейская воздушно-десантная Свирская Краснознам Краснознам Краснознам Краснознамённая ордейская - Краснознам краснознам краснознамённая ордейская - краснознам краснознознамённая ордейская - краснознам красноз ордена -
  • 106. Tula Red Banner Order of Carrying Guards Airborne Division (ru 106-я гвардейская воздушно-десантная Тульская Краснознамённая ордена Кутузова дивизия.) - Rod in Tula .
• Air storm brigades (ru. Десантно-штурмовые бригады):
  • 11th Independent Guard Air Storm Brigade (ru. 11-я отдельная гвардейская десантно-штурмовая бригада) - headquarters in Ulan-Ude;
  • 31 independent Kutusow Medal-II.-bearing Guard air Sturmbrigade - in rod (31 ru-я отдельная гвардейская десантно-штурмовая Ордена Кутузова 2-й степени бригада.) Uljanowsk ;
  • 56th Independent Guard Air Storm Brigade (ru. 56-я отдельная гвардейская десантно-штурмовая ордена Отечественной войны бригада)
  • 83rd Independent Guard Air Storm Brigade (ru. 83-я отдельная гвардейская десантно-штурмовая бригада) - headquarters in Ussuriysk.
• Unit of special purpose (ru. Воинская часть специального назначения):
  • 45th independent Kutuzov, Alexander Nevsky Order-bearing Guard-Spetsnaz-Brigade (ru. 45-я отдельная гвардейская орденов Кутузова и Александра Невсазаандра Невского блександра Александра Невского бленганганганганганганганганганганганганганганганганганганганганг.
• Training institutions (ru. Образовательные учреждения):
  • Ryazan Officers' School for Commanders of Airborne Forces / Military Institute "Army General WF Margelow" (ru. Рязанское высшее воздушно-десантное командное училиме.а имандное училиме.имандное училиме.имандное училиме.имандное училиме.ванское имандное училиме.имандное училиме.вораное училиме.
  • Omsk Military Cadet Corps (ru. Омский кадетский военный корпус);
  • Ulyanovsk Suvorov Guard Military School (ru. Ульяновское гвардейское суворовское военное училище);
  • Tula Suvorov Military School (ru. Тульское суворовское военное училище);
  • 242. School Center for the Training of Young Specialists (ru. 242-й учебный центр (подготовки младших специалистов Воздушно-десантных войск)) - in Omsk .
• Security troops (ru. Воинские части обеспечения):
  • 38th Guards Brigade of Airborne Forces Command (ru. 38-я гвардейская бригада управления Воздушно-десантных войск);
  • 150th Independent Airborne Repair Battalion (ru. 150-й отдельный ремонтно-восстановительный батальон Воздушно-десантных войскесантных войскесантных войскантных).

Topicality of the information in the following section has not been checked:

In addition, there is an airborne division and an airborne regiment, each of which reports directly to the military district in which they are currently stationed. In addition to light infantry weapons, the WDW are also equipped with artillery and armored vehicles such as the BMD tank .

The Special Operations Forces (Силы специальных операций) were formed in 2009 as a high-quality special attack component so that the GRU Spetsnaz Brigades can concentrate on their main tasks as a reconnaissance component. The command is roughly the Russian equivalent of the US JSOC.

Territorial Organization of the Armed Forces of Russia

History of the emergence of the territorial armed forces organization

Territorial armed forces organization: armed forces divided, led by 4 military districts and 1 united strategic command.

The four military districts were newly created in 2010 during the course of the military reform (decree of October 21, 2010). Initially they were formed as four United Strategic Commands:

• United Strategic Command West, with headquarters in Moscow;
• United Strategic Command South, with headquarters in Rostov-on-Don;
• United Strategic Command Center, with headquarters in Yekaterinburg;
• United Strategic Command East, with headquarters in Khabarovsk.

Later, according to tradition, they were renamed the military district (ru.военный округ) (as of August 2019):

• Western military district, with headquarters in Sankt Peterburg;

Arkhangelsk Region, Komi Republic, Nenets Autonomous Okrug.

• Southern Military District, with headquarters in Rostov-on-Don;
• Central Military District, with headquarters in Yekaterinburg;
• Eastern Military District, with headquarters in Khabarovsk.

From December 1, 2014, another command was formed, which in 2020 will be called:

• United Strategic Command "Northern Fleet" (ru. Объединённое стратегическое командование Северный флот) - headquarters in Severomorsk, Murmansk region.

Its area of ​​responsibility extends along the northern border regions of Russia and includes: the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions, the Komi republic and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. In fact, a fifth military district has been created, which territorially encompasses the Arctic Circle with the military formations of the land, air and naval forces of Russia set up there. The Northern Fleet forms the basis of this strategic command.

Existence of the territorial armed forces organization

The armed forces of Russia are territorially grouped into four military districts (ru. Военные округа) and a United Strategic Command (ru. Oбъединённое стратегическое командование). (As of August 2019)

Western Military District

The inventory in the Western Military District includes (ru. Западный военный округ) - Staff in Sankt Peterburg:

• Land Forces
  • 1st Red Banner Order-bearing Guards Tank Army (ru. 1-я гвардейская танковая Краснознамённая армия) - headquarters in Odintsovo, Moscow region;
  • 6th Red Banner Order-bearing General Army combined arms (ru. 6-я общевойсковая Краснознамённая армия) - headquarters in Sankt Peterburg;
  • 20th Red Banner Order-bearing Guard Army (ru. 20-я гвардейская общевойсковая Краснознамённая армия) - staff in Voronezh; Voronezh region.
• Air Force
  • 6th Leningrad Red Banner Order-bearing Army of Air Forces / Air Defense LSK / LV (ru. 6-я Ленинградская Краснознамённая армия ВВС и ПВО) - headquarters in Voronezh, Voronezh region.
• marine
  • The Baltic Fleet (ru. Дважды Краснознамённый Балтиийский флот) - headquarters in Kaliningrad, Kaliningrad region.

Southern Military District

The portfolio of the Southern Military District includes (ru. Южный военный округ) - headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov region:

• Land Forces
  • 8th General Guard Army of the Lenin Order (ru. 8-я гвардейская общевойсковая ордена Ленина армия) - headquarters in Novocherkassk, Rostov region;
  • 49th General Army (ru. 49-я общевойсковая армия) - headquarters in Stavropol, Stavropol district;
  • 58th General Army (ru. 58-я общевойсковая армия) - headquarters in Vladikavkaz, Republic of North Ossetia - Alania.
• Air Force
  • 4th Army of the Air Force / Air Defense LSK / LV (ru. 4-я Краснознамённая армия ВВС и ПВО) - headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, Rostov region.
• marine
  • Red Banner Order-bearing Black Sea Fleet (ru. Краснознамённый Черноморский флот) - Staff in Sevastopol, Federal City of Sevastopol;
  • Caspian Flotilla carrying the Red Banner Order (ru. Краснознамённая Каспийская флотилия) - staff in Astrakhan, Astrakhan region.

Central military district

The inventory of the Central Military District includes (ru. Центральный военный округ) - headquarters in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk region:

• Land Forces:
  • 2nd General Army bearing the Red Banner Order (ru. 2-я гвардейская общевойсковая Краснознамённая армия) - headquarters in Samara, Samara region;
  • 41st General Army of the Red Banner Order (ru. 41-я общевойсковая Краснознамённая армия) - headquarters in Novosibirsk, Novosibirsk region.
• Air Force
  • 14th Red Banner Medal-carrying Army of the Air Force / Air Defense LSK / LV (14-я Краснознамённая армия ВВС и ПВО) - headquarters in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk region.

Eastern Military District

The inventory of the Eastern Military District includes (ru. Восточный военный округ) - staff in Khabarovsk, Khabarovsk district:

• Land Forces
  • 5th General Army carrying the Red Banner Order (ru. 5-я общевойсковая Краснознамённая армия) - headquarters in Ussuriysk, Ussuriysk region;
  • 29th Red Banner Order-bearing General Army (ru. 29-я общевойсковая армия) - headquarters in Chita, Chita region;
  • 35th General Army of the Red Banner Order (35-я общевойсковая Краснознамённая армия) - headquarters in Belogorsk, Amur region;
  • 36th General Army (ru. 36-я общевойсковая армия) - headquarters in Ulan-Ude, Republic of Buryatia;
  • 68th Army Corps (ru. 68-й армейский корпус) - headquarters in Yushno-Sakhalinsk, Sakhalin Oblast.
• Air Force
  • 11th Red Banner Order-bearing Army of the Air Force / Air Defense LSK / LV (ru. 11-я Краснознамённая армия ВВС и ПВО) - headquarters in Khabarovsk, Khabarovsk district.
• marine
  • Pacific Fleet (ru. Тихоокеанский флот) - headquarters in Vladivostok, Primorsky Krai.

United Strategic Command Northern Fleet

The holdings of the United Strategic Command Red Banner Order-bearing Northern Fleet (ru. Объединённое стратегическое командование Краснознамённый Северный северный стратегическое командование Краснознамённый Северный северный северный стратегическое командование Краснознамённый Северный северный северный флотurm 2020), include: Staff in the Meransk region, 2020

• Land Forces
  • 61st Independent Marine Brigade (ru. 61 отдельная бригада морской пехоты);
  • 200th independent motorized rifle brigade (ru. 200 отдельная мотострелковая бригада);
  • 80th Independent Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (ru. 80 отдельная мотострелковая бригада [арктическая]);
• Air Force
  • 45th Red Banner Order-bearing Army of the Air Force / Air Defense LSK / LV (ru. 45-я Армия ВВС и ПВО) - headquarters in Khabarovsk, Khabarovskiy Krai.
• marine
  • Red Banner Order-bearing Kola flotilla of various forces, (ru. Краснознамённая Кольская флотилия разнородных сил - КолФлРС);
  • Red Banner Order-bearing naval base White Sea (ru. Краснознамённая Беломорская военно-морская база - БелВМБ) дислоцированная вельцированная вельская база - БелВМБ) дислоцированная вецированная верская Сверская верская каза.

Military facilities abroad

Topicality of the section unchecked.

There were Soviet naval bases in Egypt ( Port Said , 1967–1972; Alexandria ; Marsa Matruh ), the GDR ( Rostock ), Poland ( Swinoujscie ), Finland ( Porkkala , 1944–1956), Cuba ( Cienfuegos ), Somalia ( Berbera , 1964 –1978), Yemen ( al-Hudaida ) and Eritrea ( Norka , one of the islands in the Dahlak archipelago , 1977–1991).

The most important bases for the presence of the Soviet naval navy in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf were Cam Ranh ( Vietnam , province Khánh Hòa , with the provincial capital Nha Trang ; 1979-2002) on the South China Sea and Tartus and Latakia in the Mediterranean. Cam Ranh was the last naval base to be abandoned in 2002, so that only the Russian naval base Tartus in “distant foreign countries” remains .

From 1956 (or 1958?) The Soviet Union had a naval base for its submarines in Vlora (Albania, today's Albanian naval base Pashaliman in the Bay of Vlora). After the break with Moscow, the base was closed by the Albanians in 1961. At the time, this base was the only Soviet military base in the Mediterranean.

Kyrgyzstan is a specialty. It was the only country to allow both the USA and Russia to operate military installations on its territory. There was both a large US and a large Russian facility near the capital Bishkek until 2014, with Russia repeatedly putting pressure on Kyrgyzstan to expel the Americans.

Today there are an estimated 25 Russian military bases in nine former Soviet republics . It is about maintaining influence in Central Asia in competition with China and influencing the southern region, especially the Caucasus . The most important bases abroad are:

country	Military base	Troop strength, unit
Abkhazia (Georgia)	Gali and Gudauta	Military bases, 1,300 soldiers of the Russian border troops are stationed
Armenia	Yerevan	426th Air Force Group
Armenia	Gyumri	127th Motorized Rifle Division; around 3200 soldiers are stationed in Yerevan in Armenia, see also: Group of Russian Armed Forces in Transcaucasia
Kazakhstan	Sary-Shagan	Missile launch site and training area
	Baikonur	Spaceport
Kyrgyzstan	Kant	Military airfield with a large number of quickly air deployable units and the 5th Air Army and around 700 soldiers
Moldova	Tiraspol	Operation Group of the Russian Armed Forces, formerly the 5th Motorized Guards Rifle Brigade. A total of around 1500 soldiers for peacekeeping in Transnistria and to protect an ammunition depot
South Ossetia (Georgia)	Dschawa and Tschinwali	Military bases, 1200 soldiers of the border troops are stationed
Syria	Tartus	Navy logistics facility with 150 soldiers
	Latakia	Military base
Tajikistan	Okno	Satellite control center
	Dushanbe , Kulob and Qurghonteppa	201st Motorized Rifle Division and 670th Air Force Group at Ayni Air Force Base. A total of around 5000 soldiers.
de facto Russia de jure Ukraine 1	Sevastopol	Base of the Black Sea Fleet with around 13,000 soldiers
Belarus	Baranavichy	Facilities of the space forces and the 37th Strategic Air Army with 800 soldiers
	Vilejka	Longest wave transmitter Vilejka

¹The Crimean peninsula joined the Russian Federation on March 21, 2014, but is still considered Ukrainian territory by Ukraine and most of the international community.

Personnel organization of the armed forces of Russia

Topicality of the section unchecked.

Recruitment and training

Conscription

Cadets of the President's Cadet Institute in Tyumen .

In Russia there is general conscription by law . The service period is currently 12 months, to be served by men between 18 and 27 years of age who are fit for military service. By law of February 11, 1993, the Soviet period of service was reduced from 24 months to 18 months, but in the Navy it was still 24 months. On May 9, 1996, the length of service for conscripts in all units was increased to 24 months. For conscripts with higher education, it was 12 months. In 2007 it was generally shortened from 24 to 18 months, and in 2008 to 12 months. Western estimates are that a third of the members of a recruit class currently have to do military service. Today almost half of the armed forces' workforce consists of conscripts. In the past, conscript soldiers (almost exclusively members of the army) were also used in internal war missions. Thousands of mostly poorly trained and ineffectively deployed Russian conscripts died in the two Chechen wars . Probably due to protests from the population - including the Soldiers' Mothers Committee , which has meanwhile been classified as a "non-profit organization in the function of foreign agents" (as of January 2017) - the Russian army command now only sends professional workers to war and crisis areas such as the Caucasus. and regular soldiers. However, because of the often unbearable service conditions for recruits, conscription is still the subject of criticism. As far as possible, the citizen tries to circumvent the convocation, also through corruption.

The table below shows the rounded number of conscripts called up for military service in the respective conscription years:

vintage	spring	autumn	Total number
2003	175.050	175,806	350,856
2004	166.050	176.393	342,443
2005	157,700	140,900	298,600
2006	124,550	123.310	247.860
2007	133,500	132,500	266,000
2008	133,200	219,000	352.200
2009	305,560	271.020	576,580
2010	270,600	278,821	549.421
2011	218.720	135,850	354,570
2012	155,570	140.140	295.710
2013	153.200	150.030	303.230
2014	154,000	154,100	308.100

Military schools of Russia

The tradition of military educational institutions youth extends to the time of Tsar Peter the back. Partly dissolved during the Soviet era, the historical tradition of cadet schools and military high schools was revived after the collapse of the Soviet Union .

The institutions themselves set a wide variety of goals, requirements and possibilities. While some are little more than general schools with a military or military-related background, other elite institutions offer tough entrance exams with opportunities for an officer career upon graduation. There are semi-independent institutions like the Suvorov and Nakhimov military schools; but there are also institutions that are run by the presidential administration, the defense ministry, the interior ministry or the FSB .

At the beginning of the 2020s, the traditional Suvorov military schools (ru. Суворовские военные училища) revived in Russia . These 11 military schools can be found in the following cities:

• Yekaterinburg (ru. Екатеринбургское суворовское военное училище),
• Saint Petersburg (ru.Санкт-Петербургское суворовское военное училище),
• Moscow as a music school (ru. Московское военно-музыкальное училище имени генерал-лейтенанта В.М.Халилова)
• Kazan (ru. Казанское суворовское военное училище),
• Moscow (ru. Московское суворовское военное училище),
• Tver (ru. Тверское суворовское военное училище),
• Ulyanovsk (ru. Ульяновское гвардейское суворовское военное училище),
• Ussuriysk (ru. Уссурийское суворовское военное училище),
• Vladikavkas, North Caucasus (ru. Северо-Кавказское суворовское военное училище),
• Perm (ru. Пермское суворовское военное училище),
• Tula (ru. Тульское суворовское военное училище).

The Nakhimov Military School in Sevastopol (ru.Nахимовское военно-морское училище) offers the maritime variant for middle school education with its branches in the following locations:

• Vladivostok (ru.Филиал Нахимовского военно-морского училища (Владивостокское президентские)), кадетское учил
• Sevastopol (ru. Филиал Нахимовского военно-морского училища (Севастопольское президентские кадетскоещ учил)),
• Murmansk (ru. Филиал Нахимовского военно-морского училище).

In addition, cadet schools of the presidential administration (ru. Президентские кадетские училища) have been established. These educational institutions are located in the following 7 cities:

• Orenburg (ru.Oренбургское президентское кадетское училище),
• Stavropol (ru. Ставропольское президентское кадетское училище),
• Krasnodar (ru. Краснодарское президентское кадетское училище),
• Tyumen (ru.Tюменское президентское кадетское училище),
• Kyzyl, capital of the Republic of Tywa (ru. Кызылское президентское кадетское училище),
• Petrozavodsk (ru. Петрозаводское президентское кадетское училище),
• Kemerovo (ru. Кемеровское президентское кадетское училище).

After several years of training, graduates have the opportunity to enter higher military schools without having to take an entrance exam. They also have the qualification to be admitted to any non-military university with an entrance examination. There is also a tradition of taking in a significant number of children from difficult living conditions, such as children from severely disabled parents or from orphanages.

Portions of this article appear since 2006 is out of date to be .
Please help to research and insert the missing information .

Reforms in troop strength and budget

A Russian marine during a maneuver in Poland in June 2003

After the end of the Cold War, many states had the need to reform their military. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the international security agenda had changed significantly. At the same time, there were considerable innovations in the technological field that changed the way warfare was conducted. Another impetus for the reform of the military in Russia was provided by the dramatic social changes that took place in Russia in the early 1990s.

In 1995 a military reform was decided under Yeltsin , the core of which provided for the transition from the conscription army with over one million soldiers to a professional army . In reality, however, the implementation of these core tasks of military reform has been postponed again and again and reform steps that have already been implemented have been repealed. In May 1996, President Yeltsin issued a decree stating that a professional army should be created by 2000. In 1998 this date was postponed to 2005.

At the end of 2001, President Putin announced 2010 as the new date. The target figures for reducing staffing levels were also subject to permanent changes. According to the original plans, the nominal strength of the Russian armed forces, including civilian employees, should be reduced by 600,000 to 835,000 men by 2005. In June 2002 the Security Council of the Russian Federation changed the timing of the reduction to 2010 and the target, which now provides for a target strength of between 850,000 and 1 million for 2010.

The changes in schedule and numbers are due not only to a reluctance to reform on the part of parts of the army command but also to the social burdens that would have arisen with a large-scale reduction in the armed forces together with the creation of a professional army.

The attempts at structural reform made in the 1990s had not led to any substantial changes until the mid-2000s, meaning that the fundamental renewal of the entire Russian military system - from the armed forces and their equipment to the command structures - remained an unsolved task. This was particularly evident in the tragic accident involving the K-141 Kursk . The circumstances and causes of the accident caused a rethink in the government in such a way that the problems of the army could not be solved by increasing the defense budget. In addition, the handling and information policy of the army authorities with the disaster of the sunken submarine K-141 Kursk led to criticism from the Russian population. At the end of Putin's first term in office, progress was therefore rather limited. The situation of the armed forces had deteriorated further and the security issue remained unsolved.

Development of troop strength

The numerical size and budget allocations fell significantly in the early 1990s. From 2.8 million at the time the Russian armed forces were established in June 1992, the troop size dropped to below 2 million by 1994.

As of January 1, 2005, the armed forces were around 1,207,000 men, plus 876,000 civilian employees. For 2006 the strength is given as 1,037,000 men. (2006)

Development of manpower in the Russian armed forces from 1992 to 2003:

year	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
in millions	2.72	2.03	1.71	1.52	1.27	1.24	1.16	1.00	1.00	0.98	0.98	0.96

Therefore, a comprehensive military reform was started in 2008, which should lead to the reduction of the army to one million soldiers. A reduction in the number of generals (2008: 1100) is also planned. Instead of regiments and divisions , a brigade structure is to be introduced and mobile units with constant readiness for action are to be set up. The rank of praporschtschik (de: ensign) is no longer provided for in the reform. However, the plans are not new concepts, but are based heavily on the reform plans under Yeltsin.

Troop strength and leadership structure in 2008

Troop strength	1,130,000
Officers	355,000
Generals	1.107
Top	25,665
Majors	99,550
Captains	90,000
Lieutenant	50,000
Ensigns	140,000
Officers in management bodies of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff	27,873
NCOs	unknown

Budget development

A major problem facing the Russian armed forces was the chronic financial shortage due to the ongoing economic weakness. The percentage of defense expenditure in the gross national product fell from 10% in the last years of the Soviet Union to around 5% in the first years of the new Russian state. After President Putin took office, the latter began to increase the budget again, thereby ending the cutback policy of his predecessor Boris Yeltsin . The budget situation for the army when President Putin took office was catastrophic. Defense spending had fallen from $ 142 billion to $ 4 billion - a 98% decrease. The budget increases that followed were not high enough to alleviate the army's crisis. Despite the budget increases, Putin did not respond to the army generals' demands for even higher budgets. These related to a presidential decree issued by Yeltsin in 1998, which provided for a budget allocation for the armed forces of 3.5% of GNP.

Development of the percentage of the defense budget in the Russian GNP :

year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Percent of GDP	2.34	2.63	2.66	2.60	2.65	2.69	2.8	2.74

The military budget quadrupled from 2000 to about 2006; Observers suggested that actual military spending was far higher than officially stated. During this time the price of oil rose sharply and Russia had far higher foreign exchange income from oil and gas exports than in the 1990s.

The Russian government has stated that military spending in 2011 was around 72 billion US dollars. In the list of the highest armament budgets, Russia took third place. In 2016 budget cuts were announced for all areas of the state; The military should receive one trillion rubles less in the 2017-2019 budget than previously planned.

Inner constitution

According to the Russian Military Prosecutor's Office, a total of 139,000 crimes were recorded within the army in 2005. 6000 soldiers were injured for ill-treatment by comrades and 2600 soldiers were convicted of such crimes. In 2006, 6,700 recruits were mistreated by superiors, 33 died as a result of the mistreatment. Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika said that of the total of 766 people who died from accidents and crimes in the Russian army, some also died while doing private work for their superiors.

The number of suicides in the army increased from 224 soldiers in 2007 to 231 suicides by military personnel in 2008. In 2011, 119 suicides were registered. One of the reasons for the high number of suicides was the brutal harassment of recruits by senior citizens. This systematic harassment is also called Dedowschtschina (translated rule of grandfathers ). Older cohorts have unrestricted power over the new recruits. For example, older people, often officers too, confiscate private property from younger people. Other manifestations are leasing for work assignments to external companies and the compulsion to carry out degrading activities. There is (as of 2005) no official authority in the Russian army to which the tortured could turn. Relevant violations of civil and human rights were and still are a high-profile topic within the Russian armed forces.

Furthermore, in the 1990s there were repeated problems with the payments of the already low wages . More than 100,000 officers and non-commissioned officers had no apartments. These circumstances led to 70% of the army personnel being dissatisfied with their living conditions at the time.

In January 2015, President Putin signed a decree allowing foreigners between the ages of 18 and 30 to serve five years in the Russian armed forces.

Armament and equipment of the armed forces

T-14 main battle tank in Red Square

Due to the upheaval in the 1990s combined with a dramatic collapse in the economy and state revenue, the army hardly received any new equipment. As a result, many of the equipment, ships, submarines , aircraft and vehicles are in poor condition. In 2000, more than a third of the most important weapon systems and military equipment, less than half of combat aircraft and tanks and around 80 percent of helicopters were inoperable. There are currently more than 20,000 main battle tanks in service. Of this large number of tanks, however, only a part, namely a little more than 6000 tanks, is in active service, while the rest are stored in depots. The T-90 is the most modern Russian main battle tank currently in service. Russia has around 241 T-90s and around a dozen T-90A tanks. The latter is produced in small numbers for the Russian army.

The air force will also be equipped with modernized MiG-31 BM, Su-27 SM interceptors , new Su-34 fighter-bombers and modernized Su-25 SM ground attack aircraft. However, the addition of new aircraft cannot keep up with the age-related retirement of aircraft, so that the total number of aircraft due to decommissioning and crashes continues to decrease. Around a third of the approximately 200-strong MiG-29 fleet would no longer be able to fly or be operational in 2009. Considerable sums are being invested in modernizing nuclear weapons. New rocket shaft launch systems and mobile Topol-M rocket complexes are to be put into service. In 2008, the Russian armed forces received 17 ICBMs , 4 Iskander systems, 52 T-90 tanks, 210 armored personnel carriers, 41 BMP-3 armored personnel carriers , 34 missiles for the S-400 air defense systems and 4,500 vehicles.

Individual equipment of the infantrymen

Russian soldiers with equipment

The current standard equipment of a Russian motorized shooter is called "Barmiza" and consists of the bulletproof vest 6B12 "Sabralo", which is intended to intercept a direct hit from an AK-74 from a distance of more than ten meters, the helmet 6B6 "Borit- M ”, a water treatment filter and devices for individual field observation, as well as communication and life support facilities.

In addition to the AK-74 , the successor AN-94 or the AK-74u, which is intended as a light assault weapon, are also available. However, the improved Ratnik system is already being introduced as the successor model. It offers the soldier more protection and has modern communication devices as well as a connection to the GLONASS navigation system .

Armored vehicles

From the collapse of the Soviet Union and until roughly the Second Chechen War , a third of the Russian armored troops consisted of outdated T-55 and T-62 , which were gradually being phased out. The supply of the T-80UM, the modernization of older T-80 U and the commissioning of the T-90 have started and will be accelerated depending on the financial situation. There are now around 334 T-90As in service. While 31 T-90s were put into active service in 2007, the number increased to 62 T-90s in 2008. In addition, there is roughly the same number of T-72s upgraded to the level of the T-90s . However, the T-90 is only an interim solution; production has already been stopped again. The future main battle tank of the Russian armed forces will be the T-14 , a version of the Armata platform . This completely redeveloped vehicle is to go into series production from 2017.

Aircraft

In the years of decline up to around 2002, the air force was the branch of the armed forces that suffered the most. Most of the projects were canceled, the pilots and the planes remained on the ground as there was no fuel for flight exercises.

In the meantime, the situation looks different again, although the current strategy is less aimed at manufacturing a fifth generation aircraft ( Sukhoi Su-57 ), but rather at maximizing the capabilities of the fourth generation aircraft. Many aircraft are being retrofitted and improved accordingly. However, the development of a fifth generation aircraft is also in progress. The first prototype flew in 2010, and like its fifth generation counterparts, it has stealth properties. In addition, the development of a modern helicopter fleet is being promoted.

The Mil Mi-24 , which can still be used but is getting on in years, are to be replaced or supplemented by Mil Mi-35M , Mi-28N and Kamow Ka-52 . 300 Mi-28s are to be put into service by 2015 (50 by 2010). The Mi-28N will presumably take over the role of the main combat helicopter and the Ka-52 will be reserved for the special forces.

Ships

Russia has eleven destroyers of Udaloy class

After the turmoil and the catastrophic situation of the 1990s, the fleet is currently in a major modernization phase. Around 45% of the equipment is to be replaced by 2015. 25% of the sum made available to the armed forces is explicitly intended to be used to modernize the fleet.

Even the Soviet Navy attached comparatively little importance to aircraft carriers . This may mainly be due to the fact that in the great maritime armament phase of the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet leadership came to the opinion that the aircraft carriers were too vulnerable in terms of their price-performance ratio to be able to catch up with the in This area would be worth the far more experienced USA. Therefore, Russia only has one of only two aircraft carriers in the Red Fleet - the Admiral Kuznetsov . Most of the other aircraft or helicopter carrying ships were either sold or scrapped. New acquisitions are only planned after 2015. In contrast, a large number of strategic and conventional submarines are under construction or are already in use (as of January 2017). In addition, many ships are undergoing major modernization measures.

Missiles

After several successful tests, the conversion of the old SS-18 and SS-19 to the developed RS-24 (SS-27 Mod. 2 Sickle-B) is currently planned.

Armed forces groups of Russia in action

CIS peace missions

Russia participates in the CIS peace missions in Tajikistan (1993 together with Kazakh units), South Ossetia and Abkhazia (the only participants since 1994).

Armed conflict in the Caucasus

First Chechen War

In the First Chechen War (1994–1996), the Russian armed forces were drawn into the largest internal conflict since the Russian Civil War (1918–1920). The armed forces were not prepared for this war due to the difficult transition period between the end of the Cold War and the establishment of the national armed forces.

The situation of the armed forces around 1994 was such that 37 divisions were withdrawn from Central Europe and the Baltic States and 57 divisions were transferred to Belarus and Ukraine . Furthermore, new regulations guaranteed thousands of students exemption from military service. A number of divisions were being reorganized into independent brigades or disbanded at the time . According to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 1990, thousands of tanks, armored personnel carriers and artillery weapons were also disarmed. The units of the armed forces were far from their nominal strength. The living conditions were also very difficult and morale was very low.

After a year and a half of war, the Russian central government and the Chechen rebels negotiated a ceasefire that would allow Russian forces to withdraw from the territory of the Chechen Republic . In connection with this debacle, the armed forces lost a considerable amount of reputation and support among their own people. The main problems were the inadequate staffing and the poor level of training of the conscripts. The war had a negative impact on the reform efforts of the armed forces. Firstly, all efforts were directed towards the conflict; secondly, the war in Chechnya entailed additional financial expenditures on an army that was already underfunded, which made expensive reform projects impossible. In addition, the morale of the armed forces was further undermined by the outcome of the conflict.

Second Chechnya War

After the incidents in Dagestan and the bomb attacks on houses in Russia , in which 228 civilians were killed, the readiness of the Russian population increased for a new armed conflict in the breakaway republic. After artillery and air strikes on Chechen positions, a 100,000-strong Russian armed force marched into Chechnya in October 1999. The second war was very different from the First Chechen War. This time the Russian armed forces used a different tactic. Instead of sending poorly trained, lightly motorized units into house- to- house warfare, the Russian forces used powerful artillery and air strikes before the infantry took over the destroyed villages and towns. By March 2000 all major settlements had been taken, including Grozny . The rebels were driven back to the mountainous south, but still remained capable of guerrilla warfare , so that years of attacks on the Russian armed forces followed. In the spring of 2001, large-scale Russian military operations came to an end. The war entered a new phase in which the Russian armed forces concentrated on fighting guerrilla activities.

The Second Chechen War from 1999 onwards increased morale within the army. Through the successful campaign, President Vladimir Putin secured the Russian armed forces as a reliable instrument of power and in the subsequent presidential election his own position of power. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, between September 1999 and December 2002, when the large-scale operations ended, the armed forces complained of 4,572 soldiers killed and 15,549 injured.

Caucasus War 2008

In August 2008, units of the Russian armed forces in the 2008 Caucasus War, together with South Ossetian militias, repelled the Georgian invasion, which had begun with an attack on Russian peacekeepers, within a few days. This was the first combat deployment by Russian troops outside Russia's national borders since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Caucasus War ended with the de facto independence of South Ossetia from Georgia.

The military success of the Russian armed forces was due to the large numerical superiority of at least 3: 1. The approach of the Russian armed forces corresponded to the operational doctrine from the Soviet era: A quick and deep advance with mechanized units in order to build up an overpowering concentration as quickly as possible. The deep advance took place very quickly and without much fire support or flank protection.

The tactics used, the troops and the material used, however, revealed considerable shortcomings. Western analysts even described the Russian performance as embarrassing . According to the Russian chief of staff Nikolai Yegorovich Makarov , only around 17% of the ground troops, 5 of the 150 regiments of the air force and around half of the warships were ready for action at the start of the hostilities.

During the war there were blatant deficiencies in terms of leadership and connections to the army units deployed. For various reasons it was not possible for the General Staff in Moscow to establish a secure connection with the units deployed in Georgia . Therefore, the associations were z. Some of them were commanded by cell phones over the networks of Georgian telephone companies . Next neither the satellite navigation system were GLONASS , unmanned aerial vehicles and precision weapons available. No satellite images were available either , so the Russians used a Tu-22M3 Backfire to reconnaissance over Georgia, which was shot down by a Georgian 9K37 Buk . Since the Russian combat helicopters did not have an up -to- date friend-foe detection system and because their on-board radio system was not interoperable with that of the ground troops, no combat helicopters could be used for close air support . In addition, the Russian fighter planes could not fly night missions and only had limited electronic warfare capabilities . Of the six Russian fighter planes lost during the war, four were shot down by their own troops. Almost 75% of the battle tanks used were older models such as T-62M , T-72M and T-72BM. These battle tanks had no modern reactive armor , no night vision devices and were equipped without modern fire control and radio systems.

The Russian units operating according to Soviet operational doctrine suffered during battles with Georgian units trained according to Western standards and equipped with modern weapons. T. heavy losses. Almost all 30 vehicles of the command group of the 58th Army were destroyed in one battle, and many of the staff officers were killed or wounded.

According to western analyzes, only the deployment of airborne and logistics troops did not show any deficiencies.

Crimea 2014

Soldiers without national emblems at Simferopol airport on February 28, 2014

An award from the Russian Defense Ministry named the start of operations on February 20, 2014. From March 25, 2014 it was awarded not only to the units involved, but also to the Chechen chief Kadyrov and the governor of Krasnodar, Tkachev, and the chief of the night wolves for that they had "supported the Crimea in its self-determination".

On the same February 27, 2014, when “self-defenders of the Russian-speaking population of Crimea” occupied parliament, additional Russian soldiers were flown into Crimea. On February 28, faced with unmarked soldiers in the Crimea, the Ukrainian parliament asked the UN Security Council for help in stopping the "aggression of the Russian Federation".

Denials and confirmation of the official Russia

On March 4, President Putin claimed in a TV interview that it was not Russian troops but “local self-defense forces” that had taken control of the Crimea. A deployment of Russian troops in Ukraine has not yet been necessary. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu also spoke of a provocation on March 5 when he was shown pictures of Russian military equipment from the “unknown” soldiers. When asked about a video in which uniformed men refer to themselves as Russians, he said “This is pure nonsense”, and when asked where the armored vehicles “Tiger” and “Luchs” came from, he replied: “I have no idea”.

On April 16, 2014, Russian President Putin admitted in a TV question time that the friendly “green men” were Russian troops.

Ukraine

In addition to Russian troop concentrations and maneuvers near the border with Ukraine as a threat, members of regular Russian troops were killed as “volunteers on vacation” in the Ukraine. The committees of the Soldiers' Mothers of Russia became aware that operations may have been carried out against the will of soldiers and not on a voluntary basis. Two soldiers who were captured in Ukraine in May 2015 also stated that they were there on the orders of their unit.

Weapon systems of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine

T-72 tanks of a version used by the Russian armed forces had been seen in Ukraine since August 2014. Just as early was the talk of exclusively Russian rocket launcher systems " Tornado "; this system is even mentioned in the memorandum on heavy weapons to be withdrawn from the combat areas in accordance with the Minsk Protocol in September 2014. In May 2015, a Russian IAI searcher fire control drone was shot down over Ukraine. Shortly afterwards, Bellingcat published a (further) localization of a Panzir S1 system in Luhansk . Text in italics

UN peace missions

Participation of Russia in 2008

mission	S.	MB	P
MINURSO (Western Sahara)	-	18th	-
MINUSTAH (Haiti)	-	-	7th
MONUC (Dem. Rep. Congo)	-	29	4th
UNIOSIL (Sierra Leone)	-	1	-
UNMEE (Ethiopia, Eritrea)	-	3	-
UNMIK (Kosovo)	-	1	39
UNMIL (Liberia)	-	3	8th
UNMIN (Nepal)	-	8th	-
UNMIS (Sudan)	122	13	11
UNMIT (East Timor)	-	-	5
UNOCI (Ivory Coast)	-	11	-
UNOMIG (Georgia)	-	4th	2
UNTSO (Israel, Palestine)	-	4th	-
P = police officers MB = military observers S = soldiers

Russia has participated several times on a smaller scale in UN peace missions. For example at the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, led by NATO and legitimized by a UN mandate, and at the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo (formerly Serbia). Another mission was the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which ended in December 2005 and in which Russia participated with 113 soldiers. In addition, Russia participates in the CIS peace missions in Tajikistan (1993 together with Kazakh units) and in Abkhazia (since 1994).

Syria

See also : Russian military operation in Syria

On the course of events (2015-2017)

On September 30, 2015, the spokesman for the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation announced that Russia had complied with the Syrian government's request for military assistance. The US was informed in advance of the start of the attack.

On September 30, 2015, the Federation Council , the upper house of Russia, authorized President Putin to deploy a Russian armed force grouping in Syria. The aim of the military operation is to support the Syrian government troops; the use of ground troops has been ruled out.

Fighter planes bombed not only positions of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria ISIS , but also all irregular armed combat groups that do not belong to the political system according to the Syrian constitution. According to an evaluation by the Reuters news agency , 80 percent of the targets of Russian air strikes were in non-IS areas.

This was preceded by the relocation of aircraft, personnel and other military equipment from Russia to the Ḫumaymīm air base near Latakia and the Russian naval base in Tartus in Syria.

On October 10, 2015, the Syrian Democratic Forces were founded in response to the Russian air strikes . For this amalgamation of the separate oppositional combat groups of the YPG / YPJ , MFS and Army of the Revolutionaries, a founding manifesto was drawn up, which contains the political definition and the political goals. The Syrian Democratic Forces were thus legitimized as a political party in accordance with the Syrian constitution of 2012. A press conference useful for media purposes was held on the same day.

The losses of Russian soldiers were officially given as 20 in August 2016, but the main losses of Russian citizens in Syria were private mercenary companies, the Wagner group was mentioned ; Russia Beyond the Headlines translated an article by RBK with: "Russia's main losses in Syria were sustained by PMCs."

In December 2016, Russian involvement in the bombing of Aleppo was criticized and the Russian bombings are said to have included several war crimes .

Conclusion of the General Staff of Russia (2017)

Russia's view of the campaign by its armed forces grouping in Syria in 2015–2017 does not have to be shared, but it should be known in order to arrive at an objective and balanced assessment.

Under the headline “We broke the backbone of the shock forces of terrorism”, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia's Army General Valery Gerasimov said in an interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda on December 26, 2017. The published text gives a comprehensive insight into the complex battle operations against the terrorist groups in Syria.

In addition, surprising details of the military probation for the armed forces grouping of Russia can be learned, which so far received little attention in the media, e.g. B .:

• Relocation and base of the Russian group,
• Opponent assessment, jihad mobile in local combat,
• Planning the operation, supporting the armed forces of Syria,
• Aviation forces. Dangerous flight maneuvers on the Euphrates,
• Use of drones and special forces,
• Russian military advisers and leaders in Syria,
• American bases and collusion,
• Supreme leadership in Moscow, presidential visit to Syria,
• Center of reconciliation,
• Russian armament and technology in probation,
• Possible developments in the situation, evaluation of the deployment in Syria.

Noteworthy for the outside observer are the statements on new tactical procedures and methods and the evaluation of the combat experience of the military, armament and technology.

Libya

In February and March 2017, Russian special forces used Egyptian airports, which has been linked to Russia's support for Khalifa Haftar . Russia advocates a participation in power by Haftar.

See also

• Ranks of the Russian Armed Forces 1994–2010
• Military ranks, special ranks and civil ranks of the Russian Federation

literature

• Scientific services of the German Bundestag WD 2 - 3000 - 052/15: The military doctrines of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation since the 1970s. Comparison of threat scenarios and language. (PDF bundestag.de ) Accessed August 28, 2019.
• Series of publications DGKSP discussion papers . Documents on the military and security policy of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. Translations from Russian and English. ISSN  2627-3470 , Dresden from 2017. urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-325519
• Publication series Security Policy and Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: Documents on the foreign, military and security policy of the Russian Federation. Translations from Russian. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.), DSS working papers , ISSN  1436-6010 , Dresden 1990 to 2016. urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-209278
• Ilya Schaidurow: Russian firearms - types. Technology. Data. Motorbuch Verlag, 2010, ISBN 978-3-613-03187-6 .
• Zdzislaw Lachowski: Foreign Military Bases in Eurasia. SIPRI Policy Paper No. June 18, 2007 (PDF books.sipri.org ).
• Pavel Podvig (Ed.): Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. MIT Press, Cambridge / Massachusetts, London 2004, ISBN 0-262-66181-0 .

Web links

Commons : Russian Armed Forces  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

• Russian Ministry of Defense (Russian, English)
• Official website of the army newspaper "Красная Звезда" ("Red Star") of the Russian Ministry of Defense (Russian)
• Armed forces of Russia at the beginning of the 2020s. Transcript of speeches at the college meeting of the Ministry of Defense of the RF on December 24, 2019 in Moscow. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. Series of publications DGKSP discussion papers, Dresden 2020, January. Retrieved from urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-376387 .
• Overview 2014 Gruppe Giardino - Groupe Giardino For a strong Swiss militia army - Pour une armée de milice forte The Russian Armed Forces: Present and Future by Albert A. Stahel, from April 1st, 2014
• Margarete Klein : Russia's military potential between claim to great power and reality - Science and Politics Foundation (2009)
• Russian Nuclear Forces 2010 - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
• New weapons for the Russian army ( RIA Novosti news agency special , Nov. 2006 ff.)
• Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Project
• Sergei Ivanov : Russia's Armed Forces: The Way to New Quality and a New Face , in: Austrian Military Journal, issue 4/2004
• Hannes Adomeit : Putin's Military Policy - Science and Politics Foundation (2003)
• Russian Military Capabilities in a 10 year perspective English-language study by the Swedish Defense Research Agency on the development of Russia's military capabilities

Individual evidence

1. ↑ ^{a b} 2018 Russia Military Strength. www.globalfirepower.com, accessed June 7, 2018 . 
2. ↑ https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/157935/umfrage/laender-mit-den-hoechsten-militaerverbindungen/
3. ↑ https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/150664/umfrage/Share-der-militaergabe-am-bip-ausgewaehlter-laender/
4. ↑ In Russia, the use of the words Russian - русский (meaning: linguistic ethnicity) versus Russian, Russia - российский, Россия (meaning: Russia as a multi-ethnic state) leads to a clear semantic distinction. In addition, the slang spelling is avoided.
5. ↑ See Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: Structure. In: website URL: structure.mil.ru , accessed on August 15, 2019.
6. ^ Brian D. Taylor: Politics and the Russian army. P. 259.
7. ↑ GLOBAL MILITARIZATION INDEX 2018. (PDF) Max M. Mutschler, Marius Bales \ BICC, accessed on February 10, 2019 . 
8. ↑ "2019 Russia Military Strength"
9. ↑ Federal Law No. 68 of May 7, 2007 (Russian).
10. ↑ Principles of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (illustration). In force by Presidential Decree No. 1833 of November 2, 1993. Translation from Russian by Harald Kießlich-Köcher and Erich Hocke. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik DSS e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, Issue 11.1, Dresden 1994, 27 pp. Urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-350824 .
11. ↑ See Wolfgang Scheler: About the military doctrine of the Russian Federation (illustration). In: Force by presidential decree No. 1833 of November 2, 1993. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik DSS e. V. (ed.). DSS working papers, issue 11.2, Dresden 1994, 27 pp. Urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-350834 .
12. ↑ Kris D. Beasley, Lt Col, USAF: RUSSIAN MILITARY REFORM FROM PERESTROIKA TO PUTIN. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY, Alabama 2004, p. 23.
13. ↑ See Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Translations from Russian by Rainer Böhme, Peter Freitag, Joachim Klopfer, et al. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, issue 11.1 / 1994; H. 51.1 / 2000; H. 51.4 / 2000; H. 99/2010; H. 113/2015. urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-209278 .
14. ↑ See Basics of the Policy of the RF in the Field of Military-Maritime Activities in the Period up to 2010 (March 2000). Confirmed by presidential decree of March 4, 2000. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme and Joachim Klopfer. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, volume 51.5, Dresden 2000, 25 pp.
15. ↑ See Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2020 (July 2001). Confirmed by the President of the Russian Federation on July 27, 2001 (Pr-1387). Translation from Russian by Egbert Lemcke and Joachim Klopfer. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, Issue 51.7, Dresden 2002, 46 pp.
16. ↑ See (Russian) Морская доктрина Российской Федерации. Naval Doctrine of the Russian Federation (July 2015). Confirmed by the President of the Russian Federation on July 26, 2015. Polling at URL: docs.cntd.ru .
17. ↑ See conception. The foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Translations from Russian. Confirmed by the President of the Russian Federation on June 28, 2000 (No. Pr-351). In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, Dresden 2000, no. 51.6
18. ↑ See Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Confirmed by the President of the Russian Federation on July 12, 2008. Translation from Russian by Egbert Lemcke and Frank Preiss. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, volume 92, Dresden 2008, 34 pp.
19. ↑ See (Russian) decree of the President of November 30, 2016 № 640 as well as the concept in the Russian full text. In: URL kremlin.ru , accessed on August 14, 2019.
20. ↑ See National Security Concept of the Russian Federation. Confirmed by the decree of the President of the RF dated December 17, 1997, № 1300. Translation from Russian by Peter Freitag and Harald Kießlich-Köcher. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (eds.): DSS papers, Issue 39, Dresden 1998, pp 16 to 44. urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14 qucosa2-325358 .
21. ↑ See The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation (Version of October 5, 1999). Confirmed by the Security Council of the RF on October 5, 1999. Translation from Russian by Peter Freitag, with assistance from Rainer Böhme. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, volume 51.2, Dresden 2000, 21 pp.
22. ^ ^{A b} Steven E. Miller, Dmitriĭ Trenin: The Russian military. P. 44.
23. ↑ See The Concept of National Security of the Russian Federation . In force by Presidential Decree No. 24 of January 10, 2000. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme, Peter Freitag, Joachim Klopfer. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, Issue 51.3, Dresden 2000, 27 pp. Urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-351151 .
24. ↑ See The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. In: Force by Presidential Decree No. 706 of April 21, 2000. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme, Peter Freitag, Joachim Klopfer. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, Issue 51.4, Dresden 2000. 45 p. Urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-351148 .
25. ↑ See The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Approved by the President of the Russian Federation by decree of July 12, 2008 (Document No. PR-1440). Working translation from Russian by Egbert Lemcke and Frank Preiß. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, Issue 92, Dresden 2008, 34 pp.
26. ↑ See National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (dated May 12, 2009). Confirmed by Decree № 537 of the President of the Russian Federation of May 12, 2009. Translation from Russian by Egbert Lemcke and Frank Preiss. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, Issue 96, Dresden 2009, 40 pp. Urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-325465 . Soot. Original at URL: kremlin.ru (accessed February 20, 2017).
27. ^ Military doctrine of the Russian Federation. Confirmed by Decree No. 146 of the President of February 5, 2010. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme, Egbert Lemcke, Frank Preiß. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, Issue 99, Dresden 2010, 40 pp. Urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-339726 .
28. ↑ See National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2015). Confirmed by Decree No. 68 of the President of the Russian Federation of December 31, 2015. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) i. L. (Ed.): DSS working papers, issue [117], Dresden 2016, June, 54 pp. Urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-78763 . Soot. Original from URL: kremlin.ru , accessed on August 15, 2019.
29. ↑ This is followed by the strategic national priorities: state and social security; Increasing the quality of life of Russian citizens; Economic growth; Science, technology and education; Health protection; Culture; Ecology and sensible use of nature; strategic stability and equal strategic partnership.
30. ↑ See National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2015). Confirmed by Decree No. 68 of the President of the Russian Federation of December 31, 2015. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) i. L. (Ed.): DSS working papers, issue [117], Dresden 2016, June, no. 6. urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14 qucosa2-78763 .
31. ↑ See Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Specified Editing 12/2014) . Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V .: DSS working papers, Heft 113, Dresden 2015, p. 10 ff. Available at URL: urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-209286 .
32. ↑ See The Kremlin (PDF), December 31, 2015
33. ↑ See Putin names United States among threats in new Russian security strategy (English), Reuters on January 2, 2016
34. ↑ See elaboration: The Military Doctrines of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation since the 1970s. Comparison of threat scenarios and language. (Ed.) Scientific services of the German Bundestag: WD 2 - 3000 - 052/15, Berlin 2016, 32 p. Access on June 23, 2020. URL: [1]
35. ↑ See National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2015). Confirmed by Decree No. 68 of the President of the Russian Federation of December 31, 2015. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) i. L. (Ed.): DSS working papers, issue [117], Dresden 2016, June, no. 15 ff. Urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-78763
36. ↑ See speech by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin. In: Armed Forces of Russia at the Beginning of the 2020s. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. Series of publications DGKSP discussion papers, Dresden 2020, January, pp. 5–10. Retrieved from urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-376387
37. ↑ The term “Readiness Initiative 4X30” (Nato Readiness Initiative, NRI) comes from a passage in the final document of July 11, 2018 at the NATO meeting in Brussels. Two further projects with central German participation were decided there. It says: "From the total pool of armed forces, the allies will also put 30 larger combat ships, 30 heavy or medium infantry battalions and 30 combat aircraft squadrons with support forces in a response capacity of 30 days or less." Access URL: https://www.nato. int / cps / en / natohq / official_texts_156624.htm
38. ↑ ^{a b c} See report by Sergej Schojgu. In: Armed Forces of Russia at the Beginning of the 2020s. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. Series of publications DGKSP discussion papers, Dresden 2020, January, pp. 11–23. Retrieved from urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-376387
39. ↑ See communication: State system of legal information . (Ed.): Official Internet portal for legal infomation, June 2, 2020. Original (ru.) "Указ Президента Российской федерации от 06.02.2020 № 355" Об основах государственной политики Российской Фесдерации в области ядарного сдерживания "." Moscow. Accessed June 4, 2020. URL: [2]
40. ↑ The identical text passages from the military doctrine of the RF, Precise Version (December 2014) refer to the context. See on Russian military doctrines: Foreign and military policy aspects of the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation” (2015). In: Multipolar, Issue 2, WeltTrends Potsdam 2017, pp. 19–32.
41. ↑ See full text of the document: Decree and Fundamentals ... , German translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. In: Russia's Nuclear Deterrence Policy in the Early 2020s. DGKSP discussion papers, Dresden 2020, June, pp. 16–23. Accessed June 23, 2020. URL: [3]
42. ↑ See National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2015). Confirmed by Decree No. 68 of the President of the Russian Federation of December 31, 2015. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) i. L. (Ed.): DSS working papers, issue [117], Dresden 2016, June, no. 33 ff., 54 p. Urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-78763 Russ. Original from URL: kremlin.ru , accessed on August 15, 2019.
43. ↑ See Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Specified Editing 12/2014). Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V .: DSS working papers, issue 113, Dresden 2015, no. 18.Retrieved from URL: urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-209286 .
44. ↑ See Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Specified Editing 12/2014). Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V .: DSS working papers, issue 113, Dresden 2015, no. 21 urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14 qucosa2-209286
45. ↑ See National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2015). Confirmed by Decree No. 68 of the President of the Russian Federation of December 31, 2015. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) i. L. (Ed.): DSS working papers, issue [117], Dresden 2016, June, no. 35 and 109.
46. ↑ See Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Specified Editing 12/2014). Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V .: DSS working papers, issue 113, Dresden 2015, no. 22 ff. Retrieved from URL: urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-209286 .
47. ↑ See Articles 87 and 88, Constitution of the Russian Federation. Translation from Russian by the chair of Prof. Dr. Martin Fincke, University of Passau. ( constitution.ru ), accessed on August 19, 2019.
48. ↑ See Decree No. 683 of the President of the RF of December 31, 2015. In: Strategy of National Security of the RF. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, issue [117], Dresden 2016, June. urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-78763
49. ↑ See decree of the President of the RF of December 25, 2014, No. 815. In: Military Doctrine of the RF. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik (DSS) e. V. (Ed.): DSS working papers, Heft 113, Dresden 2015, 42 pp. Urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-209286
50. ↑ See Statute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation of August 16, 2004, No. 1082. mil.ru ( Memento of November 27, 2010 in the Internet Archive )}, accessed on August 19, 2019.
51. ↑ See current functional structure of the Ministry of Defense of the RF (as of August 2019). In: (Russian) website URL: .structure.mil.ru , accessed on August 23, 2019.
52. ↑ See Statute on the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Confirmed by decree of July 23, 2013, No. 631 (edited on July 1, 2014) of the President of the RF. Orig. (Russian) In: Указ Президента РФ от 23.07.2013 N 631 (ред. От 1. 7. 2014 N 483). Вопросы Генерального штаба Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации (вместе с Положерального штаба Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации (вместе с Положением о келожением о келожением о Генералтации . consultant.ru , accessed on August 20, 2019.
53. ↑ See explanation of terms. In: Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (detailed editorial 12/2014). Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. In: Dresdener Studiengemeinschaft Sicherheitsppolitik e. V. (Ed.): DSS-Arbeitspapiere, Dresden 2015, Heft 113, S. 10 ff. Access under URL: urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-209286 .
54. ↑ Putin fires Chief of Staff after Defense Minister (November 9, 2012). Retrieved November 9, 2012.
55. ↑ ^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n} See current structural information on the Ministry of Defense of the RF and the General Staff. In: (Russian) Retrieved August 20, 2019, under URL: https://structure.mil.ru/management/deputy.htm
56. ↑ See Unmanned Missile - Russian беспилотный летательный аппарат. In: Russian-German military dictionary. Horst Hochmuth (Ed.), Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1979, p. 23.
57. ↑ See Vladimir Ivanov: The political workers restore positions that have been lost. (ru. - Политработники восстанавливают утраченные позиции.) Based on material from the "Independent Military Review" magazine, November 25, 2019. In: Online edition of the military-industry-courier. URL: [4] Accessed December 6, 2019.
58. ↑ See Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: Structure. In: website URL: structure.mil.ru , accessed on August 23, 2019.
59. ↑ See Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: Structure. In: website URL: structure.mil.ru , accessed on August 15, 2019.
60. ↑ See technical terms for translation from Russian. In: Russian-German military dictionary. (Ed.) Horst Hochhut, Military Publishing House of the GDR (VEB), Berlin 1979, 639 pp.
61. ↑ See structure of the armed forces. In: website URL: structure.mil.ru , accessed on August 24, 2019.
62. ↑ ^{a b c d} See structure of the armed forces. In: website URL: structure.mil.ru , accessed on August 24, 2019.
63. ↑ The Russian Federation Ministry of Defense official homepage on the Internet ( Memento of March 11, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
64. ↑ Lenta.ru: Численность российской орбитальной группировки превысит сто спутников
65. ↑ See structure of the armed forces. In: website URL: [5] Accessed June 2, 2020.
66. ↑ ru. Объединение = operational association / (operational-strategic) association. In: Military Dictionary. Russian German. Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1979, p. 263.
67. ↑ ^{a b} See ru. Oбъединённый = united, allied. In: Military Dictionary Russian-German, Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin 1979, p. 263
68. ↑ ^{a b c} See structure of the northern fleet. In: website URL: [6] Accessed June 2, 2020.
69. ↑ See structure of the armed forces. In: website URL: structure.mil.ru , accessed on August 25, 2019.
70. ↑ russianforces.org
71. ↑ See structure of the armed forces. In: website URL: structure.mil.ru , accessed on August 25, 2019.
72. ↑ Боевые возможности воздушно-десантных войск ( Memento from January 14, 2008 in the Internet Archive )
73. ↑ America's outpost in Central Asia in the NZZ of June 21, 2013.
74. ^ These are the tanks Russia is setting up in Syria. Busisnessinsider, September 15, 2015.
75. ^ Military Service - 1990s on globalsecurity.org, accessed June 2, 2017.
76. ↑ Hans-Joachim Giessmann, Ursel Schlichting: Safety handbook. Military and Security in Central and Eastern Europe. Data-fact-analysis Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft Baden-Baden, 1995, p. 274: 18 months (army), 24 months (navy)
77. ↑ Кадетские учебные заведения, СВУ, НВМУ, кадетские корпуса. In: ruscadet.ru. Retrieved November 30, 2016 (Russian). 
78. ↑ See the list of Suvorov military schools. Accessed February 3, 2020. URL: https://ens.mil.ru/education/secondary/suvorovs_school.htm .
79. ↑ See the list of Nakhimov military schools . Accessed February 3, 2020, URL: http://ens.mil.ru/education/secondary/nakhimovs_school.htm .
80. ↑ See list of cadet schools. Accessed February 3, 2020, URL: https://ens.mil.ru/education/secondary/presidential_cadet_school.htm .
81. ↑ Что собой представляют суворовские военные училища. Справка. In: ria.ru. Retrieved November 30, 2016 (Russian). 
82. ↑ Carolina Vendil Pallin: Russian military reform: a failed exercise in defense decision making. P. 49.
83. ↑ bits.de
84. ↑ russian-online.net
85. ↑ The Asian Conventional Military Balance in 2006 ( Memento from September 11, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 762 kB), Center for Strategic and International Studies, p. 32. (English)
86. ↑ Kris D. Beasley, Lt Col, USAF: RUSSIAN MILITARY REFORM FROM PERESTROIKA TO PUTIN. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY, Alabama 2004, p. 76. Figures refer to all armed forces controlled by the Department of Defense.
87. ↑ Archive link ( Memento from March 2, 2016 in the Internet Archive )
88. ^ Brian D. Taylor: Politics and the Russian army. P. 267.
89. ^ Dale Roy Herspring: Putin's Russia. P. 174.
90. ^ Dale Roy Herspring: Putin's Russia. P. 183.
91. ^ Dale Roy Herspring: Putin's Russia. P. 184.
92. ↑ Keir Giles, Military Service in Russia: No New Model Army. CSRC, May 2007.
93. ↑ Archive link ( Memento from March 21, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
94. ^ Defense budget is a burden , Kommersant, Nov. 1, 2016.
95. ^ Accidents, abuse, murder - Moscow's deadly army In: n-tv.de , April 13, 2007.
96. ↑ Russian army loses 231 soldiers to suicide In: de.sputniknews.com, January 18, 2009.
97. ↑ Cornelia Rabitz: The law of thumb rules in the Russian army In: dw-world.de , February 23, 2006.
98. ↑ friedenskooperative.de
99. ↑ de.rian.ru (up to 22,000 tanks are even given, of which approx. 4,500 of the type T-80 and more than 7,400 of the type T-72 , of which 1200 are active, the rest in reserve or mothballed)
100. ↑ de.rian.ru
101. ↑ nachrichten.t-online.de
102. ↑ Archive link ( Memento from July 22, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
103. ↑ niistali.ru/article/gladishev_1.doc
104. ↑ Kirasa Offers new Soldier is Protective Wear ( Memento from April 12, 2008 in the Internet Archive )
105. ↑ Боевой комплект индивидуальной защиты бойца - "Бармица"
106. ↑ warfare.ru
107. ↑ Russia's Air Force to Replace Combat Helicopters by 2015 - Kommersant Moscow ( Memento from October 26, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
108. ^ RIA Novosti - Unmanned aerial vehicles increase in numbers
109. ^ RIA Novosti - Russia's Navy gets ambitious
110. ↑ Грани.Ру // Война :: Масорин: Россия построит атомные авианосцы ( Memento from December 10, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
111. ↑ RIA Novosti - Russia hits target in ICBM debut test
112. ↑ Archive link ( Memento from December 18, 2007 in the Internet Archive )
113. ↑ RVSN - Strategic Missile Troops - Russian and Soviet Nuclear Forces
114. ↑ Kris D. Beasley, Lt Col, USAF: RUSSIAN MILITARY REFORM FROM PERESTROIKA TO PUTIN. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY, Alabama 2004, p. 26.
115. ↑ Christoph Zürcher: The post-Soviet wars: rebellion, ethnic conflict, and nationhood in the Caucasus. P. 93.
116. ↑ Christoph Zürcher: The post-Soviet wars: rebellion, ethnic conflict, and nationhood in the Caucasus. P. 100.
117. ↑ ^{a b c d e} Patrick Truffer: A Long Way: The Russian Military Reform - Part 1. In: officiere.ch. Officers.ch: Security Policy - Armed Forces - Media, January 18, 2019, accessed on January 5, 2019 . 
118. ↑ Chechnya boss Kadyrov receives medal "For the liberation of Crimea" / Sputnik Germany - news, opinion, radio. In: de.sputniknews.com. June 8, 2014, accessed April 24, 2015 . 
119. ↑ Russia in the pillory in New York. FAZ of March 2, 2014.
120. ↑ Putin does not want to move troops to Ukraine "for the time being". FAZ of March 4, 2014.
121. ^ Defense Minister Shoigu: Pictures of Russian military equipment in Crimea are provocation , RIA March 5, 2014.
122. ↑ RT March 5, 2014 Sergei Shoigu has “no idea” where the new armored vehicles “ Tigr ” and “ Luchs ” in the Crimea come from.
123. ^ Crimea "Tiger" at the Victory Parade in Moscow (photo, video). novayagazeta.ru, March 7, 2014 with one of the pictures of Russian vehicles that Shoigu “had no idea” about.
124. ↑ Kathy Lally: Putin's remarks raise fears of future moves against Ukraine. In: Washington Post. 17th April 2014.
125. ↑ Putin's soldiers do not know that they are going to war. Die Welt, August 26, 2014.
126. ↑ Ukraine: Separatists confirm deployment of Russian soldiers. SPON dated August 28, 2014, viewed December 2, 2014.
127. ↑ Are Russian soldiers dying in Ukraine? ( Memento from September 9, 2014 in the web archive archive.today ) Russia Beyond the Headlines , September 1, 2014, viewed on December 2, 2014.
128. ↑ There is no other work. Novaja Gazeta, September 1, 2014, English translation on Kyiv Post: http://www.kyivpost.com/content/russia-and-former-soviet-union/russian-soldier-dies-in-ukraine-because-there- was-no-other-job-363238.html
129. ↑ OSCE confirms: captured soldiers in Ukraine are Russians. Der Spiegel , May 21, 2015, accessed on May 23, 2015 . 
130. ↑ Ukraine crisis: T-72 tank shoots hole in Russian denial. BBC, August 28, 2014.
131. ↑ OSCE releases original of Minsk ceasefire memorandum. Interfax Ukraine, September 22, 2014; the original at http://www.osce.org/ru/home/123807
132. ↑ Ukrainian fighters claim to have taken Russian high-tech drones from the sky. Watson, May 22, 2015.
133. ↑ Russia's Pantsir-S1s Geolocated in Ukraine. Bellingcat, May 28, 2015.
134. ↑ USA informed in advance: Russia flies first air strikes in Syria. In: n-tv.de. September 30, 2015, accessed September 30, 2015 . 
135. ↑ War in Syria: Putin receives permission for military operations against IS. In: faz.net. September 30, 2015, accessed September 30, 2015 . 
136. ↑ "IS has no presence in the bombed areas". In: welt.de. October 1, 2015, accessed October 1, 2015 . 
137. ^ Ministry of Defense of Russia: Russian planes strike against IS positions in Syria. In: de.sputniknews.com. September 30, 2015, accessed September 30, 2015 . 
138. ↑ Four-fifths of Russia's Syria strikes don't target Islamic State: Reuters analysis Reuters, October 21, 2015.
139. ↑ Russia and the war in Syria: ground troops not excluded. In: taz.de. September 19, 2015, accessed September 30, 2015 . 
140. ↑ Video of the press conference
141. ↑ Russian private military company 'spotted' in Syria on Russia Beyond on August 26, 2016.
142. ↑ No more mass murder in Aleppo! , Tagesspiegel on December 6, 2016.
143. ↑ For Putin, allegations of war crimes are just “rhetoric” , Spiegel on October 12, 2016.
144. ↑ UN accuses Syria, Russia and rebels of war crimes in front of Spiegel on March 1, 2017.
145. ↑ See conclusion of the Russian army's campaign in Syria (2015–2017). Interview with Valery Gerasimov. Translation from Russian by Rainer Böhme. In: Rainer Böhme (ed.): DGKSP discussion papers, Dresden 2018, February, 20 pp. Urn : nbn: de: bsz: 14-qucosa2-210841 .
146. ↑ Russia is apparently sending special forces to Libya , Die Zeit, March 14, 2017.
147. ↑ Russia Urges Libya Leadership Role for UN-Defying Military Chief. Retrieved October 11, 2017 .