Energy industry of Russia

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The energy industry is of outstanding importance within Russia's economy , the focus is on fossil fuels both in terms of production and consumption . Together with the other raw material sectors, it contributes around a fifth to overall economic production in Russia, according to World Bank estimates. The share of energy exports in total goods export revenues is around two thirds. The energy industry contributes around half of the federal state income.

Russia has areas within a geographical area known as the Strategic Ellipse with rich fossil deposits and therefore has relatively large deposits of coal and natural gas and, to a lesser extent, oil. The production volumes make up about a fifth of global natural gas production and a tenth of global oil production. Russia is currently (as of 2/2019) the world's largest exporter of natural gas and oil and its economy is heavily dependent on the oil price. Russia also has significant deposits of uranium and peat . The country has a wide range of options for using renewable energies , especially hydropower to generate electricity .

Russia's importance as an oil and gas supplier, alongside its position as a nuclear power, is the basis of its claim to be recognized as a world power again. If Russia wants to maintain and expand its position as an “energy superpower”, it must ensure that its oil and gas production increases in line with demand. Since production from the fields in western Siberia is likely to decline soon, new deposits must be developed in regions that are climatically even more difficult to develop, for example on the Yamal peninsula , in eastern Siberia , in the Barents Sea and on the island of Sakhalin .

At home, the main task is to use energy more economically and efficiently. Price increases could curb the widespread waste of energy. Domestic energy prices are also gradually increasing, but are still far from the international energy price level. Energy saved in Russia could be exported.

Russia is one of the nations that is most damaging to the global climate through its use of energy; The Germanwatch report on climate protection ranks the country in 52nd place, with only Saudi Arabia, USA, Iran, Korea, China, Australia, Canada and Kazakhstan performing worse worldwide.

Energy industry of Russia as a whole

Energy production grows strongly after a deep slump

Oil, gas and coal production

After the collapse of the Soviet Union , Russian energy production also fell drastically for years. Oil and coal production in particular collapsed.

The production of crude oil halved from its peak in the late 80s with around 575 million tons until the mid-90s. In the second half of the 1990s it stagnated at a good 300 million tons per year. Since then it has risen by around half by 2004 thanks to significantly increased investments and the use of modern technologies in the now largely privatized oil companies. The rapid rise in the price of oil created the financial basis for this.

In 2005, however, the increase in funding weakened to only 2.4%, significantly less than the increase in funding in the previous five years (around + 8 percent annually). In 2006 growth remained similarly weak (+ 2.1%). At around 480 million tons, production in 2006 was just under a fifth lower than at the end of the 1980s

In 2006 Russia struggled to supply Germany with oil.

Russian natural gas production rose in 2005 even more slowly than oil production by 0.5% to 636 billion cubic meters. In 2006, however, it increased by around 3% to around 656 billion cubic meters. OAO Gazprom produced around 85% of this with 556 billion m³.

Since 1998, natural gas production has increased significantly less than oil production. Before that, however, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it had only decreased slightly in comparison with oil and coal production. Since 2003 it has exceeded its previous high, which was reached in the early 1990s.

Coal mining, which slumped from around 400 million tons in the 1980s to just 233 million tons in 1998, is just as strong as oil production, but is also recovering, but in 2006 it was a good fifth at around 315 million tons the level of the 80s.

However, Russian coal is of much less importance for the international energy market than Russian natural gas and oil. If Russian coal imports are taken into account, only around a tenth of coal production is exported net.

Electricity production

The production of electrical power has been at an almost constant level of around 1100 terawatt hours (TWh) since 2010 , with relatively low annual fluctuations between 1037 TWh (2010) and 1109 TWh (2018). After growing since 1999, it reached around 1,040 billion kilowatt hours in 2008. It was thus slightly lower than in 1990 (1,080 billion kilowatt hours).

Thermal power plants operated with oil, natural gas or coal and fired peat accounted for around 64% of total electricity production in 2018. Nuclear power plants accounted for around 18.5% and hydropower plants for around 17.5% of electricity generation. The strongest growth in the period 2010–2018 was recorded by nuclear power with +35 TWh, followed by hydropower with +25 TWh. The thermal power plants have increased by +11 TWh since 2010.

The Russian government plans to double the share of nuclear energy in electricity generation to around a third by 2020 in order to be able to export even more oil and natural gas. The share of coal should also increase.

Energy consumption: high proportion of natural gas; great savings

By far the most important energy source for covering the Russian primary energy consumption is natural gas , which accounts for a good half of the primary energy consumption. It has risen in the last 15 years, while the share of crude oil as the second most important primary energy source has fallen to around a fifth.

The energy intensity of the Russian economy, i.e. the amount of energy required to produce one unit of total economic output, is more than three times the EU average, although it was depressed by 21% from 2000 to 2004. Industries with high energy intensity grew more slowly than those with low energy intensity.

However, measures for a more efficient use of energy could save around 30 to 40% of the energy consumed in Russia, explained Industry and Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko at a German-Russian energy forum in spring 2007. However, Russia needs access to modern technologies and materials for this and equipments. Reasons for the high energy intensity of the Russian economy are the less favorable climatic conditions in Russia (severe winters), the higher share of industry in the creation of the gross domestic product (60%) and the technically outdated power generation capacities. But that is not enough to explain.

According to Johannes Voswinkel, the most important step towards greater energy efficiency in Russia would be an increase in domestic market prices for electricity and heat. The low energy prices in Russia, stemming from pricing policies in the Soviet era, do not reflect actual costs.

The building sector, for example, offers a wealth of illustrative material for possible savings. Inadequate thermal insulation, leaky windows and inefficient ventilation systems have been weak points in many houses so far. State housing programs in the years of the Soviet Union were primarily about the number of square meters built and meeting deadlines, not the quality of the apartments. The thermal insulation was neglected and the heating was not adjustable. You often don't find any radiators in Russian prefabricated apartment buildings. Their function is fulfilled by pipes embedded in concrete in the walls. The water temperature in the heating pipes is adapted to the weather conditions centrally for all apartments in a heating plant. Since it is hardly possible with this system to distribute the heat evenly over all apartments, some families have to chronically freeze or reheat with electrical appliances or the oven, while others live with the windows open all winter.

In the absence of measuring devices, many households still pay for water, gas, heating and sometimes even electricity with monthly flat rates. Since most people perceive the latter as "too high anyway", everyone then wants to have at least as much of it as possible, which in turn increases consumption and leads to rising flat rates: a vicious circle of energy waste is set in motion.

Energy export: Russia is extremely important for international energy supply

In 2006, Russia was by far in first place as a producer of natural gas in an international comparison. Despite the high domestic gas consumption and an export quota of only around 30 percent of natural gas production, Russia was also the world's largest natural gas exporter.

In 2006 Russia was the world's second largest producer and exporter of oil after Saudi Arabia. Around 51 percent of crude oil production was exported, including the export of mineral oil products, 73 percent of crude oil production went abroad.

With around one third of the world's natural gas reserves, Russia has by far the highest safely extractable natural gas reserves in an international comparison. For this reason, Russia will continue to occupy a leading position in world natural gas trade.

Russia's securely extractable oil reserves are not of such great importance internationally. They “only” make up around 5% of the world's reserves. Future increases in oil production, which according to some forecasts can still be expected at least until around 2015, should, however, largely flow into exports and thus continue to contribute to meeting the growing global demand. Domestic mineral oil consumption is unlikely to rise despite strong economic growth and rapidly increasing motorization due to the great potential for savings. During the previous phase of production recovery, it has hardly increased since the mid-1990s, but has almost stagnated at a depressed level.

However, Russian oil production is likely to grow much less rapidly in future than in recent years. Oil exports are also expected to grow more slowly, having almost doubled in the past 5 years. Russia has covered a large part of the growth in world oil consumption. Its share in world oil exports has increased. In the medium and long term, however, this share is likely to decrease again, while the weight of the OPEC countries, which have much higher reserves, will increase in the global oil trade.

Gunvor , a company registered in Switzerland, plays an important role in the international distribution of Russian oil and gas .

Macroeconomic importance of the energy industry

Share of the extraction of raw materials in the gross domestic product

According to the Russian statistics agency Rosstat, companies that were active in the field of raw materials extraction, i.e. oil and gas extraction companies in particular, contributed only 7.7% to total economic output, the gross domestic product (GDP), in 2004 . In contrast, the trade and service sector accounted for a total of almost 60%, including the trade sector alone 21.3%.

According to the World Bank, however, the official statistics are likely to show the share of the raw materials sector too low and the share of trade too high, since the Russian raw material companies are shifting added value from the raw materials sector to the trading sector by applying internal transfer prices - especially to save taxes. The World Bank estimates that around a quarter of total economic output is actually provided by the raw materials sector.

Share of export earnings and government revenue

Since the end of the 1990s, the overall economic importance of the energy industry has increased further with the strong recovery in oil production and the almost doubling of oil exports with rising oil prices. According to the Russian Central Bank, the share of exports of crude oil, mineral oil products and natural gas in total goods exports rose to around 63% in 2006 (2005: 62%). Currently (as of 2018) it is almost 60%.

In the last few years the dependence of the Russian state budget on oil has increased significantly. The development is to a large extent dependent on taxes and duties in the energy sector. According to the Federal Agency for Foreign Trade, the energy industry contributed around half of federal government revenues in 2006. Without this contribution the budget as a whole would have shown considerable deficits for many years. The (hypothetical) deficit of the Russian state budget excluding income from oil and gas ( non-oil / gas general government primary deficit , an indicator published by the Russian Ministry of Finance for the dependence of the Russian economy on oil) fell from 7% in 2017 to 5% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2018. In 2007 the indicator was 3.3%, in the financial crisis it rose to 14%, in the years after that the hypothetical deficit in the state budget was 9-10% of GDP. Due to the sharp rise in oil prices in conjunction with other factors, a budget surplus is forecast for the years up to 2020.

Risks of strong energy dependence

The foreign exchange that flows in abundantly thanks to the high proceeds from energy exports brings Russian monetary and exchange rate policy into a conflict of objectives. If the central bank tries to dampen the appreciation of the ruble by buying up foreign currencies in order to avoid an all too rapid deterioration in the price competitiveness of Russian companies on the world market, the money supply increases and with it the inflation potential. Some observers believe that the competitiveness of Russian economic sectors outside the energy sector is already being impaired by the ongoing appreciation, and that Russia is suffering from the so-called " Dutch disease ".

In early 2004, the government set up the stabilization fund to prevent oil prices from falling .

The basic idea of ​​the fund is that the spending of the Russian government should correspond to an oil price set by the government (2007: $ 27). Income that flows to the state due to a higher oil price should be placed in the fund. If the oil price falls below $ 27, government spending should be able to be stabilized by withdrawing funds from the fund if the fund has reached a minimum level of 500 billion rubles.

At the beginning of November 2007, the fund's portfolio reached around 3,649 billion rubles, or around 12% of the 2007 gross domestic product. Its value was about $ 148 billion.

Investment of energy export proceeds on international capital markets

In February 2008, the fund , which will then also be fed from tax and customs revenues from the gas sector, will be renamed "Oil and Gas Fund" and divided into a "Reserve Fund" and a "Prosperity Fund". The reserve fund should include financial resources of up to 10% of the value of total economic output. Like the previous stabilization fund, the reserve fund is to be invested with the aim of achieving the highest possible level of security and liquidity. The funds exceeding 10 percent of the gross domestic product are allocated to a new "prosperity fund". The Russian government plans to invest the resources in the prosperity fund in a more risky manner with the aim of a higher return on capital in the international capital markets.

Energy policy under Yeltsin and Putin

In accordance with the high overall economic importance of the energy industry, the regulatory design of the energy sector is a focus of Russian economic policy. After the overwhelming majority of the oil industry had been privatized under President Boris Yeltsin and opened to foreign companies, President Vladimir Putin is pursuing the goal of at least partially correcting the results of Yeltsin's liberalization policy and gaining a dominant position in the energy industry as a “strategically important branch of the economy” of the state.

Privatization and opening up to foreign trade under Yeltsin

In the oil industry, the former state monopoly company was split up in the course of privatization under President Yeltsin. Almost all of the companies were owned by a few oligarchs . The state company Rosneft had only a very small part of the oil industry left. Mikhail Khodorkovsky , who founded the Yukos concern, Roman Abramowitsch ( Sibneft ), Wagit Alekperow ( Lukoil ), Vladimir Potanin ( Sidanko ) and Wiktor Wechselberg ( TNK-BP ) became particularly well-known among the new oligarchs in the oil sector .

In contrast to the oil industry, the state-owned companies in the natural gas and electricity industries, which as pipeline-based operations are often referred to as “natural monopolies ”, have only been privatized to a small extent. In the natural gas sector, smaller private natural gas companies such as Novatek and Surgutneftegas have been founded alongside the market-dominating state company Gazprom . In the electricity industry, the state-owned EES Rossii (РАО "ЕЭС России") (often referred to as RAO UES or Unified Energy System ) retained its leading position.

Under President Yeltsin, the Russian energy industry was also opened up to investment by foreign companies. Corporations such as BP , Royal Dutch Shell , ExxonMobil , ConocoPhillips , Chevron and the German companies Ruhrgas AG and BASF AG acquired holdings, production licenses or founded joint ventures with Russian partners.

Extensive reform freeze and renationalization under Putin

Under President Putin, reforms that lead to more market and competition in the energy industry are so far only discernible in the electricity sector. Unified Energy System (UES), whose CEO is Anatoly Chubais , who was responsible for the privatization of the Russian economy under Yeltsin, is to be split up into a company operating the national power grid and regional production and distribution companies. So far, however, the state still holds around 53% of the shares in UES.

In the gas and oil sectors, on the other hand, clear tendencies towards “renationalization” can be observed. Ever since the government and judiciary began to crack down on the Yukos oil company owned by the oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003, it has become apparent that the Russian leadership is determined to strengthen its position in the oil sector again. Foreign companies should not be allowed to gain any decisive influence in the energy industry as a "strategically important sector". The British BP's 50% stake in the oil company TNK-BP appears to remain an exception.

Putin's policy of renationalization is evident on the one hand in the purchase of private companies by the state-owned corporations Rosneft and Gazprom. The Russian government is also calling for Rosneft and Gazprom to participate in consortia that have received licenses to develop oil and gas fields. In the opinion of many observers, the government is proceeding with “tricks and pressure” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung).

At the end of 2004, the state-owned oil company Rosneft bought the largest production company of the private oil company Yukos for around $ 9.4 billion after Russian tax authorities forced Yukos to sell with additional tax claims of around $ 28 billion. In the spring of 2007, Rosneft bought other important parts of the Yukos group. After these acquisitions, Rosneft became the largest Russian oil producer again in 2007.

The leading Russian natural gas company Gazprom, which accounted for around 85% of gas production in 2006, wants the Russian government to transform it into an energy company with a state majority holding, which also has considerable market shares in other branches of the energy industry, especially in the oil sector. To this end, the government increased its stake in Gazprom share capital through its oil company Rosneft in mid-2005 to 50% plus one share.

In October 2005, Gazprom took over nearly three quarters of the Sibneft oil company for $ 13.1 billion. Most of Sibneft belonged to the oligarch Roman Abramowitsch. In 2004 Sibneft produced 34 million tons of crude oil, making it the fifth largest mining company.

Due to the takeover of Yukos and Sibneft by Rosneft and Gazprom, the state again controlled around 40% of Russian oil production in spring 2007.

In the 90 years for the development of oil and gas deposits in the territory of the island of Sakhalin with international companies closed so-called " production sharing agreements " ( " Production Sharing Agreements ") the Russians have now been partially renegotiated to pressure. President Putin criticized these agreements to press representatives in June 2007 as "colonial-style treaties."

During the renegotiation of the agreement with a consortium to develop the Sakhalin 2 deposit at the end of 2006, the Russian government secured Gazprom's admission as a majority shareholder in the consortium after threatening to withdraw its license for violating environmental regulations.

Gazprom also asserted a stake in the development of the large Kowykta gas field in eastern Siberia , for which TNK-BP, in which BP holds a half-share, had received a license. The government had previously threatened the consortium with withdrawing its license because the field would not be developed as quickly as agreed.

Parallel to these renationalization measures, however, Russian energy policy is still striving to encourage foreign companies to invest in the Russian energy industry, in particular to use their technical knowledge in the often very difficult development of the deposits.

Foreign companies can still hold minority stakes. In mid-April 2005, Gazprom and the German Wintershall AG , a subsidiary of BASF , agreed on a joint company for the production of natural gas in Western Siberia in the Yushno Russkoye field . Wintershall will participate directly with 50% minus one share. In return, Gazprom's stake in the Wingas joint venture , which sells natural gas in Germany, was increased from 35% to 50% minus 1 share.

In addition, in the summer of 2006 the Russian government sold around 15% of the share capital of the state-owned oil company Rosneft via various stock exchanges. With the proceeds from the IPO (around 10.4 billion US dollars), Rosneft replaced, among other things, a loan of 7.5 billion US dollars with which the government group had financed the acquisition of the majority stake in Gazprom. Large blocks of Rosneft shares have been acquired by Malaysian oil company Petronas , BP and the Chinese state-owned company China National Petroleum Corporation , among others .

Conflicts between "siloviki" and "liberals"

In spite of all agreement on the “strategic importance” of the energy industry, there are also differences in energy policy between different political groups within the government. The so-called " Silowiki ", members of the government, who mostly worked in the secret service before and plead for strong state intervention in the economy, and the so-called "Liberals", who are more market-oriented, pursue different concepts and goals. The financial interests of the politicians involved also seem to play a role.

The conflicts became particularly clear during the discussion about the development of the oil and gas industry after the smashing of the Yukos group of oligarch Khodorkovsky in spring 2005. They also arose from the fact that the leading representatives of the "Siloviki" and the "Liberals" also in important positions of leading energy companies are:

Igor Sechin is considered to be the head of the "Silowiki". He is chairman of the board of directors and deputy chairman of the board of directors of the state-owned oil company Rosneft and was deputy prime minister of the government of the Russian Federation under President Putin until 2012. As a former secret service employee, he accompanied President Putin from the mayor's office in St. Petersburg to the Kremlin.

Dmitri Anatolyevich Medvedev , head of the presidential administration until November 2005 and President of Russia since May 2008 , is considered to be the head of the liberals in the Kremlin. Medvedev was from 2002 to 2008 the supervisory board of Gazprom.

The plan to break up the Yukos group, which in 2004 was Russia's largest oil producer, came from Sechin - according to the Moscow correspondent for the daily newspaper “Die Welt”, Jens Hartmann, citing his employees. The production of Rosneft, the only oil production company that remained completely in state hands after the extensive privatization of the oil production companies, in 2004 ranked far behind that of the leading oil producers Yukos and Lukoil. After the break-up of the Yukos group, Rosneft made a big leap up in the ranking of Russian oil producers in 2005 by taking over Yuganskneftegas (JNG), the largest production company in the Yukos group, and is now in third place. According to the ideas of the Gazprom leadership and its supervisory board chairman Medvedev, who were also supported by President Putin, it should not stay that way. Rosneft was to merge with Gazprom to form an energy group that spanned the oil and gas sector. Setschin has evidently successfully fought against this and secured Rosneft's independence.

According to some observers, the episode shows that Putin cannot always get his ideas through. In the decision not to merge Gazprom with Rosneft, it could also have played a role that Rosneft took over the Yukos development company in early 2005 in a legally open manner. The Russian leadership may not want to risk taking action against Gazprom in international courts.

Energy foreign policy

Conflicts with transit states

In the last few years there have been repeated conflicts in particular with regard to energy supplies to states that used to belong to the Soviet Union or to the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON).

On the one hand, it was about the prices for Russian energy supplies. Russia supplied the former Soviet republics with natural gas and oil at prices far below world market levels. An agreement on a price hike proved to be very difficult , for example with Ukraine and Belarus .

On the other hand, problems arose repeatedly with the passage of Russian gas and oil exports to the main buyer countries in Western Europe.

Diversification of export routes

Russia wants to avoid the risks of supply disruptions in conflicts with transit states such as Ukraine, Poland and the Baltic states as far as possible. In order to be more independent from transit states, it diversifies the transport options.

For petroleum exports, Russia is expanding ports for export across the Baltic Sea and the Pacific. It improves the opportunities for oil exports from the Russian Black Sea coast through its participation in the construction of an oil pipeline between the Bulgarian Black Sea coast and the Greek Aegean Sea, which replaces the transport through the Bosporus.

In the case of natural gas, the “ Nord Stream ” gas pipeline from the Russian Baltic coast through the Baltic Sea to Germany creates a direct connection to its customers in Western Europe. The construction of the South Stream natural gas pipeline through the Black Sea from Novorossiysk in Russia to Burgas on the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, agreed between Gazprom and the Italian energy company ENI in 2007, is intended to expand the possibilities for delivering Russian natural gas to southern and southeastern Europe. At the same time, Russia is improving its negotiating position with the previous transit countries.

Petroleum industry

Regulatory development

1995 to 2003

Since 1995, the Russian oil companies grouped together in the state holding Rosneft have in many cases become the property of banks and oligarchs. In order to obtain loans, the Russian government pledged its shares in the oil companies in dubious procedures (" loans-for-shares "). Since she regularly failed to repay the loans, she lost her property. Only the Rosneft oil company remained fully state-owned.

The concentration of funding on the largest mining companies has increased since 1999 as support has recovered. At the end of 2003, approx. 75% of Russian funding to only 5 private companies. By far the largest funding companies in 2003 were the companies Jukos and Lukoil, each accounting for around a fifth of total funding. In 2003, state oil companies only provided around 12% of Russian oil production.

Development since 2003

The tendency of the Russian government, which has prevailed since 2003, to secure a prominent position in the oil sector again, was initially evident in the action taken by the judiciary and government against the chairman of the board and major shareholder of the Yukos mineral oil company , Mikhail Khodorkovsky . The most important stages of the Yukos affair, which led to the conviction of Khodorkovsky to nine years in prison and the takeover of the most important Yukos production company by the state oil company Rosneft :

  • Jul 9, 2003: Attorney General announces that Yukos has been investigated into tax evasion.
  • Oct. 25, 2003: Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the chairman of the board and major shareholder of the Yukos group, was arrested on charges of tax fraud.
  • Oct 27, 2003: ExxonMobil and Chevron break off talks to acquire a stake in Yukos. In the summer of 2003 rumors had increased that Yukos would sell 25% of its shares to US companies.
  • Jul 20, 2004: Ministry of Justice announces the sale of Yukos subsidiary Yuganskneftegas in order to use the proceeds to pay tax debts. Juganskneftegas is with approx. 60% of total Yukos funding is the largest Yukos funding company.
  • Nov. 30, 2004: Gazprom declares its intention to buy Yuganskneftegaz through Gazpromneft.
  • Dec. 19, 2004: Juganskneftegas is auctioned by a previously completely unknown "Baikal finance group" for around 7 billion euros.
  • Dec. 22, 2004: The “Baikal Finance Group” is taken over by the state oil company Rosneft.
  • May 16. 2005: Khodorkovsky was sentenced to nine years in prison, in particular for fraud, tax evasion and the formation of a criminal organization.

The government also pushed ahead with strengthening the state's influence on the oil industry through the majority-owned leading natural gas company Gazprom:

October 2005: Gazprom takes over almost three quarters of the Sibneft oil company for around $ 13 billion. Gazprom is thus - comparable to the international energy groups ExxonMobil, Shell and BP - in addition to the gas sector, increasingly active in the oil sector, increasingly profiling itself as a multi-sector energy company, which was also evident in the acquisition of stakes in coal companies.

December 2006: Gazprom takes over the majority in the Sakhalin 2 gas and oil project for around $ 7.5 billion, the only remaining project with exclusively foreign companies ( Royal Dutch Shell and the Japanese companies Mitsui and Mitsubishi ).

Roland Götz, Russia expert at the Berlin Science and Politics Foundation , came to the conclusion at the beginning of 2006 that the Russian oil industry had a “still“ healthy ”mixture of private, state and foreign companies”.

In 2006, however, Rosneft (17 percent) and Gazprom (10 percent) already accounted for around 27 percent of Russian oil production . In addition to the promotion of the Tatneft and Bashneft companies, which are managed by the authorities of Tatarstan and Bashkiria , the state share reached 35 percent of Russian oil production. Compared to 2003, the production share of the state oil companies has roughly tripled.

In 2006, after taking over the largest mining company in the Yukos Group, Rosneft was only a little behind the private company Lukoil (90 million t) with production of around 82 million tons. TNK-BP fell back to third place (72 million t).

After Rosneft bought other Yukos production companies at auctions in the spring of 2007, Rosneft oil production is likely to rise to over 100 million tons in 2007. The state share in Russian oil production is expected to reach almost 40 percent.

However, the development of the Russian oil industry is not only heading in the direction of "renationalization". At the end of September 2004, for example, the Russian state sold its remaining shares in the largest oil company Lukoil (7.59%) to the American oil company ConocoPhillips for just under $ 2 billion . At the end of 2005, the limit on foreigners' stake in Gazprom to a maximum of 20% was lifted.

In addition, Rosneft and Gazprom are striving for close technical cooperation with international energy groups. “Strategic partnerships”, also for cooperation on projects outside Russia, have been agreed.

Oil reserves

According to the 2007 energy study by the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Raw Materials , Russia's safely extractable oil reserves are around 10 billion tons. Russia thus has around 6% of the world's oil reserves, an order of magnitude that is comparable to those of the United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran (all between 5% and around 10% share). Only Saudi Arabia, with a share of 22%, significantly outperforms Russia - like all other countries in the world.

Oil production

Russian oil production has fluctuated very strongly over the past 20 years.

After it had peaked at around 575 million tons in the late 1980s - shortly before the dissolution of the Soviet Union - it almost halved by the mid-1990s. The reasons for this were the decline in demand as a result of the collapse in overall economic production after the break-up of the Soviet Union, but also organizational difficulties in the privatization of the oil industry.

In the second half of the 1990s, production stagnated at a good 300 million tons.

From 1999 to 2004, thanks to drastically increased investments and the use of modern technologies in the now largely privatized oil companies, it rose by a total of around 50 percent to 459 million tons in 2004.

Oil production 1990–2008
year 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Oil production, million t 516 307 305 323 348 380 421 459 470 481 491 488

In 2005, however, the increase in funding weakened to only 2.4%, significantly less than the increase in funding in the previous five years (around + 8 percent annually). In 2006 growth remained similarly weak (+ 2.1%).

The International Energy Agency (IEA) stated in its “World Energy Outlook” published in October 2004 that the possibilities of increasing production at short notice and at low costs had largely been exhausted. In a scenario published in July 2007, the Russian Ministry of Economic Affairs assumes a moderate increase of around 2% annually up to 2020.

The assessments for the development after 2010 differ widely.

  • The IEA and other “cautious optimists”, including the authors of the Russian government's “Energy Strategy”, expect production to stabilize at around 10 to 11 million barrels per day (500 to 550 million tons per year).
  • "Optimists" consider a further rapid increase to 12 million b / d (600 million tons per year) and beyond to be possible.
  • “Skeptics” predict a decline to only 5 to 9 million b / d (250 to 450 million tons annually) in 2020.

Oil fields

Oil fields and pipelines

Important fields of production for crude oil are among others

Jamal Peninsula

Priraslomnaja in the Barents Sea, the oldest production platform in the Arctic. Built since 1984, first subsidy in 1989, this subsidy is ecologically risky, as the next mainland station is over 1000 kilometers away and major environmental damage can occur in the event of accidents. Attempted to climb by activists from Greenpeace in 2013, and in 2014 the French company Total withdrew from the production because of excessive environmental risks, but bought the oil.

East Prinowosemelski in the Kara Sea in the Arctic, Russia's largest presumed oil reserves with over 1 billion tons of crude oil, 33% development since 2004 with Exxon Mobil's participation, which withdrew in 2014 due to sanctions. No commercial funding yet.

Sakhalin 1 and 2 on the shelf of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk off the Pacific island of Sakhalin, one of the largest oil reserves. Sakhalin 1 is operated by foreign companies led by ExxonMobil, with a blocking minority from Rosneft, Sakhalin 2 from the Sakhalin Energy consortium led by Gazprom.

Oil consumption in Russia

Crude oil accounts for around a fifth of primary energy consumption . It has the second highest share after natural gas.

Petroleum export

Since oil consumption within Russia increased only very slightly from the low point reached in 1998 until 2005, the increase in oil production was almost entirely exported. An incentive for increasing exports was also the rise in the price of oil on the world market.

The growing oil supply from Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union dampened the global rise in oil prices.

Between 1999 and 2004, Russia increased its oil exports from 135 million tons to 254 million tons, almost doubling in just 5 years. Saudi Arabia's lead as the world's largest oil exporter rapidly melted.

Oil export 1999-2006
year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Petroleum export, million t 135 145 162 188 223 254 251 246

The trends changed in 2005: At 251 million tons, oil exports were a good 1% lower than in the previous year. At the same time, however, the volume of exports of mineral oil products from Russia rose by around 14%. The Federal Agency for Foreign Trade cites the cause that the export tariffs on crude oil have been raised more than the export tariffs on petroleum products.

In 2006, petroleum exports continued to decrease by around 2%, while product exports rose by around 7%.

Including the export of mineral oil products, around 73% of crude oil production went abroad.

Oil transportation

The strong growth in oil exports up to 2004 was limited by a lack of transport capacities. Through the pipeline system of the state transport company Transneft , which has a monopoly for the transport of crude oil, for example, only around a third of the export growth of approx. 40% are transported, although the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) in particular has been expanded for export across the Baltic Sea. In order to almost double exports from 2000 to 2004, the - considerably more expensive - exports by rail had to be greatly expanded.

The investments of the state monopoly companies in the transport of crude oil ( Transneft ) and mineral oil products ( Transnefteprodukt ), which the government has decided to merge into one company, have already increased significantly in recent years. The wear rate of oil pipelines is up to 70 percent. The Russian Ministry of Energy estimated the investment required for the expansion of pipeline systems and port facilities in the period from 2005 to 2010 at around $ 13 billion (at 2000 prices).

The Russian government wants to diversify oil exports more regionally. In addition to expanding the transport systems for deliveries to Eastern and Western Europe, projects are also planned to cover the growing demand for oil in Asia and the USA. At the same time, it is striving for greater independence from transit states such as Ukraine, Belarus, Poland and the Baltic states for its exports to Europe. As with natural gas, there had been repeated conflicts over the passage of oil. This is why the capacities of the Russian Baltic Sea ports in particular are being expanded significantly.

The following projects are currently in the foreground in expanding the Russian export infrastructure:

Expansion of the Baltic Pipeline System (BPS) via the Baltic Sea port of Primorsk : The deliveries started in 2002 via Primorsk were already as high as 62 million t in 2006, as were the deliveries through the friendship oil pipeline ("Druzhba Pipeline") through Belarus and Poland or the Ukraine and the Slovak Republic. At the same time, exports to and through the Baltic States were reduced by around two thirds from 2001 to 2006, from 27 to 8 million t. About a third of the deliveries via Primorsk were at the expense of the Baltic states.

Since the energy dispute with Belarus at the turn of the year 2006/2007, the Russian government has been increasingly looking for ways to avoid Belarus as a transit country. The plan is to build a branch from the Druzhba pipeline, which will lead around 1200 kilometers north to the Baltic Sea on Russian territory from Unecha near the Russian-Belarusian border (so-called Baltic Pipeline System 2, BPS-2). The planned capacity (50 million t / year) would correspond to a good 60% of the oil transit through Belarus. It has not yet been decided whether the oil should be shipped via Primorsk or the Ust-Luga port, which is closer to Saint Petersburg .

Burgas-Alexandroupolis-Pipeline (BAP): In order to be able to increase oil exports from the Russian ports on the Black Sea , the construction of a pipeline is necessary to bypass the Bosphorus Strait in Istanbul, Turkey, which is overloaded by tanker traffic . Russia, Bulgaria and Greece agreed in March 2007 to build a pipeline from the Bulgarian city of Burgas on the Black Sea to the Greek city of Alexandroupoli on the Aegean Sea (see Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline ; length: 280 kilometers; start of construction: early 2008; expected completion: 2010; capacity: initially 35 million t; later 50 million t; estimated costs: around $ 1 billion). The Russian state-owned companies Transneft, Gazpromneft and Rosneft hold a majority of 51% of the capital in the consortium that is to build the pipeline. The Greek and Bulgarian sides should each receive 24.5% of the capital shares.

For oil shipments from Taishet in eastern Siberia to the Russian Pacific coast to Nakhodka became the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline annual capacity when completed; 4,200 km: 80 million tons; estimated cost; (ESPO length from 11.5 to 18 billion $ ) built. Onward transport to Japan, China, other Asian countries and the Pacific Rim is carried out by ship.

The state-owned pipeline company Transneft, commissioned with the project, began construction in April 2006. In the first construction phase, which is to be completed in 2008, a pipeline section of 2,400 kilometers from Taischet north of Lake Baikal to the east to Skovorodino in the Amur region near the Chinese border will be laid for the transport of 30 million tons annually . At the same time, an oil terminal is to be built on the Pacific coast near the port of Nakhodka. The oil is initially to be transported by rail from Skoworodino to the oil terminal on the Pacific.

The Russian government responded to concerns from environmentalists, who warned against laying the pipeline in the immediate vicinity of Lake Baikal. Following the intervention of President Putin, it was decided in spring 2006 that the ESPO line would be laid at least 40 kilometers from Lake Baikal.

With regard to the planned extension of the ESPO from Skovorodino to the Pacific coast in a second construction phase with an increase in capacity to 80 million t, many experts appear particularly questionable as to whether sufficiently large oil reserves can be developed in Eastern Siberia. Even in the first construction phase, the pipeline will be operated partly with oil from Western Siberia.

Further possibilities for increasing Russian oil exports are mentioned:

  • Construction of an oil pipeline from Western Siberia to Indiga on the Barents Sea .
  • Expansion of the "Friendship" oil pipeline through Belarus and Poland and the use of the " Adriatic Pipeline " to the Croatian Adriatic coast to Omišalj near Rijeka .

Natural gas industry

Regulatory development

Gazprom has a dominant position

The Russian natural gas industry is largely dominated by the joint stock company OAO Gazprom , whose capital has belonged to the Russian state to just over 50% since 2005. In 2006 Gazprom provided around 85% of all Russian natural gas production with around 556 billion cubic meters. This makes Gazprom the world's largest gas producer. In terms of turnover, number of employees and market capitalization, the company is the largest Russian company and pays around a quarter of the state budget with its tax and other levy payments. The approximately 150,000 km long pipeline network for the supraregional natural gas transport belongs exclusively to Gazprom. Gazprom alone is authorized by the state to export natural gas.

In addition to Gazprom, the companies Novatek , Surgutneftegas and the state-owned oil company Rosneft also produce natural gas in Russia.

Domestic low price policy is slowly being relaxed

The domestic gas price - like the electricity price - is set by the Federal Energy Commission. It is considered not to cover costs. Gazprom regularly and unsuccessfully calls for gas price increases that are significantly higher than the energy commission's approval. At the end of 2006, the average gas price for the consumer groups was around $ 44 per 1000 m³. It was therefore less than half as high as the export price ($ 95 to $ 200 per 1000 m³).

Due to the low price of natural gas, there are few incentives to use natural gas economically and efficiently in Russia. Compared to other countries, natural gas is used extensively in Russia as a fuel in industry and to generate electricity. Gazprom sells around two thirds of its production volume on the domestic market at a loss. The low price policy weakens the company's investment power.

At the end of 2006, the Russian government finally decided that the price for natural gas would gradually be brought closer to the freely established export price (minus export taxes and transport costs) for all domestic customers with the exception of private households by 2011. For 2007 an increase in the gas price of 15% was planned. In 2008 it is expected to increase by 25%, in 2009 by 26% and again in 2010 by 25%.

In the future, domestic consumers will be supplied on the one hand on the basis of long-term supply contracts with a term of several years, but on the other hand also through quantities purchased at short notice on a natural gas exchange.

No fundamental reform in sight

A reform of the natural gas industry planned at the beginning of Putin's presidency, which, similar to the one in the electricity sector, should lead to more competition, did not make significant progress until the end of 2006, although there were indications that Gazprom cannot fully meet the growing domestic demand in Russia, the need for Underline reforms. The independent natural gas producers, in turn, are often unable to deliver because Gazprom claims bottlenecks in the pipeline system it controls.

Russia continues to refuse to ratify the European Energy Charter . Implementation of the charter provisions would give foreign companies greater scope for business activities in Russia and thus intensify competition for Gazprom. However, within the Gazprom Group there are now efforts to reorganize the confusing corporate structure.

Natural gas reserves

Russia has the largest proven reserves of natural gas in the world. At the end of 2004, they were estimated at around 48 trillion cubic meters, a good quarter of the world's natural gas reserves (source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005).

Natural gas production

In 2006 Russian natural gas production rose by around 3% to 656 billion m³. OAO Gazprom produced around 85% of this with 556 billion m³.

Natural gas production
year 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Billion m³ 641 595 584 581 595 620 633 641 656 653 664

This makes Russia the world's largest gas producer - ahead of the USA and Canada. Russia accounts for a good fifth of global natural gas production.

Gazprom plans to keep its natural gas production at 550 to 560 billion cubic meters by 2010 and to increase it to 580 to 590 billion cubic meters by 2020.

However, deposits that are only geologically difficult to access in areas with extremely inhospitable climates can increasingly be developed. Gazprom is ready to involve foreign partners in order to use the technological knowledge of foreign partners and to facilitate the financing of the high costs.

Oil and gas fields

The most important oil and gas fields in Russia are on the shelf of the Sakhalin Island off the Pacific coast (oil reserves: 0.9 billion tons; natural gas reserves: 1.2 trillion m³). Funding is provided in the Sakhalin 1 , 2 and 3 projects , and three more projects are planned. The first facility for shipping liquefied natural gas is built on the island. Destination countries include the USA and Japan. The aim is to produce 9.6 million t per year from 2008.

Until the end of 2006, Sakhalin-2 was the only major energy project in Russia to be developed exclusively by foreign companies, the Sakhalin Energy consortium. Oil production in the Sakhalin-2 project began on the Sakhalin shelf in 1999. Since the icing in winter makes shipping from the platform in the open sea impossible, funding can only be provided for 6 months a year. Phase 2 of the Sakhalin-2 project includes the construction of 800 kilometers of oil and gas pipelines to the southern tip of Sakhalin, from where the oil and gas are to be shipped.

Yuzhno-Russkoye , a deposit located in the north of Western Siberia, from which the planned pipeline through the Baltic Sea to Germany is to be fed with natural gas (estimated gas reserves: at least 700 billion m³; expected output: 25 billion m³ per year). The German companies E.ON and BASF are involvedin the development of the field. In return, Gazprom can increase its stake in Wingas , a joint venture with the BASF subsidiary Wintershall , from 35 to 50% minus one share. No final agreement has yet been reached on the consideration given by E.ON AG.

Shtokman in the Barents Sea , 650 km from the port of Murmansk (gas reserves: 3.7 trillion m³; gas condensate reserves: 31 million t). Initially, the plan was to produce liquefied natural gas, LNG, which was to be shipped from Murmansk in tankers, including to the USA. In October 2006, however, Gazprom announced that it would deliver the Schtokmann gas to Europe by pipeline. Gazprom wants to develop the field in cooperation with western energy companies.

Kowykta , a gas condensate field of the Russian-British joint venture TNK-BP in eastern Siberia, around 450 km northeast of the city of Irkutsk (gas reserves: more than 1.4 trillion m³; condensate reserves: 95 million t). The natural gas is to be sold in Eastern Siberia and the Asia-Pacific region. Negotiations are ongoing between TNK-BP and Gazprom with regard to the development of the deposit.

East Prinowosemelski in the Kara Sea in the Arctic is the northernmost deposit in the world. There are suspected deposits of more than 1.3 trillion m³ of natural gas and 1 billion barrels of oil. This makes it one of the largest deposits of all. The development began in 2011 by Rosneft together with ExxonMobil from the USA, which however withdrew in 2014 due to the sanctions.

Natural gas consumption in Russia

A good two thirds of natural gas production is consumed domestically. Natural gas accounts for a good half of primary energy consumption - by far the most of all energy sources .

Around 53% of Russian households are currently connected to the natural gas network. In its "Gasification Program 2005 to 2007", Gazprom plans to significantly expand the supply of natural gas to the Russian regions within the next two years.

Natural gas export

Around a third of Gazprom's natural gas production is exported abroad. This also makes Russia the world's largest natural gas exporter. Its share in international natural gas trade is a good fifth. Around three quarters of exports are delivered to countries outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The first individual deliveries of liquefied natural gas (LNG ) to the USA, agreed at short notice , began in 2005.

The gas export to Western and Eastern Europe takes place for the most part through the Ukraine (2004: around 130 billion m³) and through Belarus and Poland. The Turkey supplies Russia through the Blue Stream pipeline under the Black Sea.

In order to expand the transport capacities to Western Europe, the construction of the so-called North Stream pipeline will serve in particular , which in the final stage will transport around 55 billion cubic meters annually from the Saint Petersburg area through the Baltic Sea to Greifswald . It is therefore often also called the Baltic Sea Pipeline . Russia pushed for the construction of this pipeline in order to be able to deliver more natural gas directly - without transit via other countries - to Western Europe. The Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute, which had been smoldering for years, flared up again in 2005/2006 .

The construction of the South Stream natural gas pipeline through the Black Sea, which was agreed between Gazprom and the Italian energy company ENI in 2007 and was stopped at the end of 2014, was intended to expand the possibilities for the delivery of Russian natural gas to southern and southeastern Europe.

Other outstanding projects in Russia to expand its export capacities:

A line that currently extends to Angarsk in eastern Siberia is to be extended eastwards towards the Pacific , with a branch to China being considered.

Lines to China are to be built from West and East Siberia . On the occasion of President Putin's visit to China in March 2006, agreements were made to build two gas pipelines and deliver 60 billion to 80 billion m³ of gas annually.

Plants for the export of liquefied natural gas by tankers, so-called “liquefied natural gas” (LNG) , are being built in eastern Russia on the Pacific coast on the island of Sakhalin and in northwestern Russia in the Murmansk area on the Barents Sea . In addition, an LNG terminal is to be built near Saint Petersburg ("Baltic LNG"). Gazprom agreed this with the Canadian company Petro-Canada.

However, the prerequisite for the realization of these plans is a substantial expansion of production in Russia. Amounts for additional exports could also be cleared if Russia could increase its natural gas imports from Central Asia , mainly from Turkmenistan , to supply the Russian market. However, some experts doubt that Russia will be able to create the conditions for a significant increase in its exports in the next few years. In view of the great distance, the economic viability of deliveries from Western Siberia to China is also called into question.

Foreign investment

In recent years, Gazprom has made greater efforts not to sell its natural gas to foreign intermediaries, but to sell it to end customers either itself or with partners abroad. In Germany, Gazprom has been involved in the marketing of its natural gas through Wingas , a joint subsidiary with BASF AG , since the 1990s .

In February 2006, Gazprom founded the UkrGasEnergo joint venture with the Ukrainian state-owned Naftogaz Ukrainy through its subsidiary RosUkrEnergo to handle the sale of natural gas in Ukraine.

In addition to Ukraine, Gazprom is also targeting other foreign markets, including Serbia, Great Britain and Italy. Gazprom has encountered considerable resistance, for example in its efforts to acquire Centrica , the UK's largest electricity and gas supplier .

Electricity industry

Russia's electricity industry generated around 992 billion kilowatt hours of electricity in 2006 . Around 67% of this came from thermal power plants operated with oil, natural gas or coal . In hydropower plants approximately accounted for one-fifth, to nuclear power plants around one sixth of the electricity generation.

The Russian electricity industry is in urgent need of modernization, both in terms of its technical equipment and performance as well as in terms of its organization.

Around 70% of the electricity production came from the Unified Energy System (UES) group, around 53% of which belonged to the state. The gas company Gazprom , the majority of which is state- owned, also owns around 10% . In particular, the nuclear power plants and the independent producers Mosenergo (Moscow) and Irkutsenergo (Irkutsk) do not belong to the area of ​​responsibility of UES.

A reform program presented by the Ministry of Industry and Energy provided for a liberalization of the electricity sector. The focus was on the splitting up and partial privatization of the electricity company UES, whose CEO Anatoli Tschubais under President Boris Yeltsin was responsible for the privatization of the Russian economy. UES was split into a state company to operate the electricity network as a " natural monopoly " and private companies in the fields of electricity generation and electricity trading. 14 regional power generators (so-called TGC) and 6 power generators with power plants across the country (so-called OGK -1 , OGK-2 , OGK-3 , OGK-4 , OGK-5 , OGK-6 )) were formed. The hydropower plants should - like the nuclear power plants - be combined in a state holding company. There should also be five trading companies. The government hoped that the reform would generate an inflow of investment funds for modernization.

The split of UES was very hesitant and was only completed in 2008. The hydropower plants were transferred to the RusHydro company . The Italian electricity company ENEL ( OGK-5 ) and the German energy company E.ON Russia Power (OGK-4) participated in the privatizations in 2007 .

The introduction of cost-covering electricity prices is also making slow progress; the electricity prices of some customer groups will continue to be kept particularly low at the expense of other customer groups (so - called cross - subsidization ). So far, only a small segment of electricity trading has been liberalized; State-set tariffs still apply to 91 percent of the market. Further liberalization of electricity prices could increase the incentives for investments in the Russian electricity industry.

See also

swell

  1. ↑ From Transition Economy to Development Economy, World Bank Group 2005, p. 36.
  2. ↑ DENA: Country Profile Russia. (pdf; 3.7MB) Information on the use and promotion of renewable energies. 2013, p. 23 , accessed on June 14, 2019 : " ... Russia is one of the largest energy producers in the world and at the end of 2012 owned around 17.6 percent of the world's gas reserves. In addition, the country has 5.2 percent of the world's oil reserves and 18.2 percent of the coal reserves. "
  3. ↑ DENA: Country Profile Russia. (pdf; 3.7MB) Information on the use and promotion of renewable energies. 2013, p. 23 , accessed on June 14, 2019 : “ The Russian share of global natural gas production in 2012 was 18.5 percent, the Russian share of global oil production in 2012 was approx. 12.8 percent. "
  4. ↑ Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany: Russian Federation: Economy. Economic structure and economic situation. In: Basic information. February 14, 2019, accessed June 13, 2019 .
  5. ↑ Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Germany: Russian Federation: Economy. Economic structure and economic situation. In: Basic information. February 14, 2019, accessed June 18, 2019 .
  6. ↑ DENA: Country Profile Russia. (pdf; 3.7MB) Information on the use and promotion of renewable energies. 2013, p. 30 , accessed on June 14, 2019 : "In view of the extensive reserves of crude oil and natural gas as well as coal and peat, Russia's energy balance is largely determined by fossil primary energy sources"
  7. ↑ Legvold, Robert:: Russia's Strategic Vision and the Role of Energy. 2008, p. 14. (pdf; 6.5MB) quoted from: Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung Baden Württemberg, Deutschland und Europa, Issue 61 Energy and Climate Policy (2011), Die Russische Energie- und Klimappolitik, p.54 . Retrieved on June 22, 2019 (English): “ Putin and those around him have made plain this important foreign policy role of energy. As he stressed before Russia's December 2005 National Council: "Energy is, at least today, the most important motive force of world economic progress. The present and future prosperity of Russia depends directly on the place we occupy in the global energy context. "The deputy head of the Presidential Administration, Vladislav Surkov, put it somewhat more soonly:" We need to choose that which will work for us, and simply do it better. The concept of Russia as an energy superpower, it seems to me, fully corresponds to this approach. If you have strong legs, you should compete in the long jump, not play chess. "One Russian executive with TNK-BP, a man with long experience as a foreign policy analyst, offered the rather extravagant view in 2004 that oil and gas is for today's Russia what nuclear weapons were for the former Soviet Union. "
  8. ↑ Germanwatch: CCPI 2019. Overall Results. 2019, accessed July 12, 2019 .
  9. ^ A b German-Russian Chamber of Commerce, GTAI: Russia in Figures. Spring 2019, February 2019, p. 19 , accessed June 14, 2019 .
  10. ↑ Voswinkel, Johannes: The heating glows in the prefabricated building. Die Zeit No. 13, March 22, 2007, p. 40 , accessed on July 14, 2019 : “Russian households often use ten times as much gas and oil as households in Central Europe, but on average they only pay around 170 euros a year for the heating energy. "
  11. ^ German-Russian Chamber of Commerce, GTAI: Russia in Figures. Spring 2019, February 2019, p. 6 , accessed June 14, 2019 .
  12. ^ Kluge, Janis: Mounting Pressure on Russia's Government Budget. (pdf; 1.8MB) Financial and Political Risks of Stagnation . Science and Politics Foundation, February 2019, p. 0 , accessed on June 13, 2019 : "Meanwhile, the oil dependency of Russia's budget has increased significantly."
  13. ^ Kluge, Janis: Mounting Pressure on Russia's Government Budget. (pdf; 1.8MB) Financial and Political Risks of Stagnation. Science and Politics Foundation, February 2019, p. 9 , accessed on June 13, 2019 (English): "non-oil deficit, an indicator published by the Russian Finance Ministry for the Russian budget's oil dependence"
  14. ^ World Bank Group: Russia Economic Report. (pdf; 3.7MB) Modest Growth; Focus on informality. June 10, 2019, p. IV , accessed on June 13, 2019 (English): "The non-oil / gas general government primary deficit fell to 5 percent of GDP from 7 percent in 2017."
  15. ↑ Государственная Дума Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации: Федеральный закон от 03.07.2018 № 193-ФЗии. (pdf; 46.9 MB) О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон "О федеральном бюджете на 2018 год и на и на плановыйг on July 18, 2019, 2019 .
  16. ↑ rosneft: Management board - Igor Sechin. Retrieved June 14, 2019 .
  17. ↑ Source: russland.RU; Chronicle and analysis of the Yukos affair also in "Analyzes of Russia" by the Research Center for Eastern Europe at the University of Bremen; in particular No. 34 of July 9, 2004.
  18. ↑ Federal Institute for Geosciences and Raw Materials (ed.): Reserves, Resources and Availability of Energy Raw Materials 2007. Short study . 2008, p. 35 , Table 7 ( Reserves, resources and availability of energy resources 2007 ( Memento from March 6, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) [PDF; 7,9 MB ; accessed on July 14, 2019]). Reserves, resources and availability of energy resources 2007. Short study ( Memento from March 6, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
  19. ↑ Federal Institute for Geosciences and Raw Materials (ed.): Reserves, Resources and Availability of Energy Raw Materials 2007. Short study . 2008, p. 40 , Table 9 ( Reserves, resources and availability of energy resources 2007 ( Memento from March 6, 2009 in the Internet Archive ) [PDF; 7,9 MB ; accessed on July 14, 2019]). Reserves, resources and availability of energy resources 2007. Short study ( Memento from March 6, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
  20. ^ Mathias von Hofen: Russia. An inventory before the start of the Winter Olympics in Sochi. State Center for Political Education, Erfurt 2014, ISBN 978-3-943588-38-5 , p. 56.
  21. ↑ Energy Charter of the European Commission in German (PDF)

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