Tartus naval base

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Tartus in the Eastern Mediterranean
Tartus in Syria

The Tartus naval base is a naval base of the Syrian Navy in the Syrian port city of Tartus .

The Syrian naval base occupies an area of ​​0.4 km² (40 ha), besides it houses a small base (strictly speaking only a technical base) of the Russian navy and a pier , which essentially consists of 1.5 ha two floating jetties, each 120 m long.

The naval base in Tartus has been used by the Soviet Union since the signing of a corresponding bilateral agreement with Syria in 1971 . It is currently the only base the Russian Navy maintains in the Mediterranean .

location

The base is located in the eastern Mediterranean in the Syrian city of Tartus , which has around 100,000 inhabitants and is the country's largest port city after Latakia . Tartus is located in the south of the Syrian Mediterranean coast, 30 km from the Lebanese border.

Rounded distances to neighboring places and important straits include:

Syrian naval base

Boundaries of the Syrian naval base in the port of Tartus (outlined in blue); inside the blue border - green: the two Russian jetties; violet: concrete pier
Detailed map of the naval base in the port of Tartus. 1a, b, c: halls; 2: Longitudinal slipway with transverse shifting system ; 3 parking space for vehicles and weapons technology (“park”); 4 roll call area; 5 Russian pontoon bridges, which serve as jetties for Russian warships and the repair ship ( Schlengel ); 6 concrete pier as a ship pier; 7 Dalben Bridge; 8 civil harbor basins; 9 railway line; 10 Protective harbor wall to the open sea

The Syrian Navy has its bases in Baniyas , Latakia , Minat al Bayda (11 km north of Latakia; ⊙ ) and Tartus.

Harbor basin

The port is located 2 km northwest of Tartus city center. A mole surrounds the entire port and gives access to the north-west of the open Mediterranean Sea. The port has a total of five docks , of which the northern one is occupied by the naval base. The entire port covers an area of ​​3 million m² (300 ha), of which 1.8 million m² is land and 1.2 million m² is water.

The northern port basin, the Syrian naval base, is 800 m long and 220 m wide. Halfway along a 120 m long and 10 m wide concrete pier protrudes into the basin from the south side and divides it into a 370 m long inner harbor basin and a 430 m long outer harbor basin. On the north side, two jetties, each 120 m long, the “Russian jetties”, protrude from the north into the harbor basin. These are pontoon bridges that serve as floating jetties. (Further details: see below.)

investment

The land area of ​​the naval base is bounded to the west by the harbor basin and to the east by the railway line leading to the harbor. To the north, the naval base and the pier border the open sea. The naval base covers an area of ​​40 hectares. There are several halls on the site, the largest of which is 150 by 80 meters. In addition to numerous buildings, there is a dry dock, a large storage area for vehicles and weapons technology (“park”) and a roll call area.

Russian naval base

The Russian naval base Tartus covers an area of ​​approximately 1.5 hectares and is located within the Syrian naval base. It is not a full-fledged naval base, but just a small supply base, where mainly fuel and provisions can be picked up and a repair ship is available. It serves mainly as a supply station for ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet and for other Russian naval units that pass through the Mediterranean. No Russian warships are permanently stationed at this base. The Russian base is guarded by Syrian guards.

The Russian naval base in Tartus is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation . This naval base is formally called : “720. Base for material-technical security for ships of the Russian naval fleet "(Russian:" Пункт материально-технического обеспечения "/" Punkt materialno-technitscheskowo obespetschenija ";" 720. ПМ. Support Point ";" 720th Logistic Aid Group ").

Russia shows its presence in Tartus in the form of a regularly alternating “station ship”. This unit is provided by the Russian Black Sea Fleet and is usually represented by a workshop ship (Russian: плавучая база / plawutschaja basa; German: floating base) of the AMUR class built in Poland at the time. In 2011 it was the rule that the workshop ships (repair ships ; Russian: плавучая мастерская , short: плавмастерская / plawmasterskaja; short: ПМ / PM; English: repair ship ) "PM-56" ("ПМ-56") and "PM-138" ("ПМ-138") alternately replace there. These workshop ships are special ships that are replaced every six months. With the arrival and departure, a workshop ship is seven months away from its home port in the Crimea. There are various types of Soviet and Russian ships that are used as repair ships.

investment

The two floating jetties at which the Russian warships can moor are a kind of large floating jetty of the PM-61M type (Russian ПМ ‑ 61М; PM stands for pontoon bridge; ПМ = понтонный мост / pontonny most). One of the two jetties dates from 1999. The floating jetties are 150 m apart. They also do not protrude vertically into the harbor basin, but at an angle of 45 ° in the direction of the entrance to the harbor basin, so that mooring ships can dock at the pontoon bridge without a major change in course. Because of these floating jetties, the passage into the harbor basin is narrowed to 120 m.

According to other information, the Russian base still includes fuel stores and other stores, a barracks, two halls, a "car park" (storage area for military technology) and various economic objects. With an alleged workforce of eleven people in 2012, the systems listed are certainly information that refer to earlier times.

In 2008 the somewhat dilapidated port area was repaired by the Russian Black Sea Fleet through extensive work. From 2015 onwards, Russia plans to further modernize the base and invest in new air defense systems, for example.

Workforce

The base itself is operated by the Russian Navy with a permanent crew of 50 men. However, there are various other data on the strength of the personnel at the Tartus naval base, although it was certainly different at different times. There are numbers of 600, 300 (January 2012), 150, 50 or 11 Russian marines.

In a short news report on Russian state television, Perwy kanal , in October 2011, it was reported that the “entire staff” of the naval base consists of “3 officers, 4 ensigns and 3 sailors”. Then there is the crew of the repair ship that docked in the naval base.

In January 2012, the base was under the command of Captain Vladimir Gudkov, who was formerly with the Russian Northern Fleet . After his transfer from Sevastopol to Tartus, Gudkow requested additional personnel to repair the dilapidated base, so that 300 soldiers then worked in the base. The Russian soldiers wore Syrian uniforms, but a short film on the TV news featured them in Russian uniforms. The Russian temporary soldiers have a contract term of three years, they receive three times the pay for their service in Syria. The officers have their families with them on the base, but they also have to spend their free time in an enclosed area of ​​the naval base.

History, political and military importance

The base was used by the Soviet Navy since 1971. In earlier years it housed perhaps up to 600 men and also comprised a larger area than it is today. At the beginning of 2012 it was only an area of ​​1.5 hectares (= 0.015 km²) with a commander and a ten-man crew. The two pontoon jetties for a maximum of four ships of 120 meters in length are hardly impressive either. In comparison, the US Navy's Rota naval base near Gibraltar , for example, has an area of ​​24 km² and 3,000 men.

The importance of the Tartus naval base, however, is that it is the only " naval base " for Russian warships in the Mediterranean and currently also the only military base of the Russian Federation in "distant foreign countries" (a Russian military term for areas outside the CIS region, i.e. outside of the post-Soviet space). Russia is also flying its flag with this naval base and reaffirming its military presence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

prehistory

In 1964 the Soviet Union signed a contract with Gamal Abdel Nasser on naval bases in Egypt in Alexandria and Marsa Matruh , and from 1967 to 1972 a base in Port Said was added. During this time, Egypt came closer to the Soviet Union, among other things, the Aswan Dam was built with Soviet help from 1960 to 1971 , after the Soviet Union had already sided with Egypt in the Suez crisis in 1956/57.

The end of the Soviet naval bases in Egypt is understandable through the further course of the Soviet-Egyptian relations: After Nasser's death, Anwar as-Sadat became Egyptian President in 1970. Sadat's first major foreign policy act was the signing of a friendship and alliance treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971. However, in 1972, when there were no Soviet arms deliveries, a break in Soviet-Egyptian relations occurred. This was followed by the expulsion of all 15,000 Soviet experts and the end for the three Soviet naval bases in Egypt. The 5th Squadron (Soviet "Mediterranean Squadron ") stationed there needed a new base and was relocated to Tartus and Latakia as well as to smaller ports in Tunisia and Libya. The use of the Syrian naval base in Tartus also began in 1971.

history

In 1977 the Egyptian support bases of the Soviets ( Soviet 54th Rapid Response Brigade ) in Alexandria and Marsa Matruh were evacuated, their ships and the inventory were brought to Tartus. In April 1977 the “229. Naval Support Division of Marine and Liman Ships "(Russian: 229th дивизион морских и рейдовых судов обеспечения ; English:" 229th Naval and Estuary Vessel Support Division "). Seven years later (1984) the support point in Tartus became the “720. Base for material-technical security for ships of the Russian naval fleet ”(“ 720th Logistic Aid Group ”for short) upgraded.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact , the powerful “5. Geschwader ”(Mediterranean Squadron) withdrew from the Mediterranean with its flagship Zhdanov and disbanded.

The naval base in Syria, however, was retained and continued to be operated by Russia. In the years 1991 to 2007 there were occasional visits by ships of the Russian naval navy that were in the Mediterranean. The ships replenished their fuel and food supplies in Tartus.

In 1996, for the first time, Russian combat ships, heavy guided missile cruisers and auxiliary ships were stationed in the Mediterranean to fly the flag. Since then, Russian ships, mainly from the Black Sea Fleet, have participated in naval exercises and anti-terrorism operations.

After the fatal attack on Rafiq al-Hariri in Lebanon in 2005, Syria came under suspicion of being the mastermind and was under international pressure. In November 2006, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad invited the Syrian President to Tehran to further strengthen relations and to expand Iranian influence in Syria. However, Bashar al-Assad did not accept the invitation. In December 2006, he traveled to Moscow to see Vladimir Putin to break through the US-initiated isolation of Syria. Russian-Syrian relations were further strengthened. Russia canceled about three-quarters of its old debts to Syria totaling US $ 13.4 billion. The Syrian consideration consisted of the free use of Latakia and Tartus by Russian armed forces as well as gas concessions in Syria. Russia wanted to increase the presence of its navy in the two Syrian ports and agreed with Syria to expand the naval base in Tartus. In 2007, Russia announced that it would resume regular patrols in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic. In 2008 the naval base in Tartus was put into operation in its current form.

From 2009 Russia renovated the naval base in Tartus. A modern floating dock was towed to Syria by two ships. The harbor basin was also dredged deeper. At that time it was planned to set up a naval base for very large ships such as cruisers or aircraft carriers .

The Russian-Ukrainian contract on the use of the Sevastopol naval base as the base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet was originally limited to 2017. The deterioration in relations after the Orange Revolution in 2004 led the Russian government and military to controversial discussions about a future naval base for their fleet. In this context, reactivation and expansion of the naval base in Tartus were also considered. Tartus could become a permanent naval base in the Middle East for stationing warships with nuclear weapons. The ports in Tartus and Latakia should be expanded to accommodate ships with great drafts. In Latakia the work should start in 2010, in Tartus it should be completed in 2011. Considerations for expanding the base in Tartus took a back seat after the Russian-Ukrainian contract on the use of Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula as a Russian naval base was extended by 25 years (until 2042) with the option of a further five years.

Military importance

Initially, the naval base for the logistics of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean was created. The Soviet Navy consisted of various fleets and the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was responsible for the Mediterranean area of ​​operations . The naval base in Tartus was needed for ship repairs of the 5th operational squadron - the Mediterranean squadron , as well as for its supply of fuel and consumables. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union also stationed its 5th squadron in the Mediterranean as a military counterweight to the US Sixth Fleet, which operates in the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union wanted to balance the US and Western European military supremacy in the Mediterranean Sea and US influence in the Middle East. Geostrategically, the land power Russia tried to strengthen its influence on the Mediterranean and the Middle East via the sea.

After all, there were US and British naval bases in the Mediterranean region: there were British bases in Gibraltar and Cyprus. The two British bases in Cyprus, two military bases Akrotiri and Dekelia , are only 200 kilometers from Tartus, but do not house a naval port. In April 1957, the British government had modified its ideas about Cyprus under new conditions - evidently due to the Suez crisis : instead of “Cyprus as a military base” it was satisfied with two “military bases in Cyprus”. There were US naval bases in the Mediterranean in Chania on Crete (Naval Support Activity Souda Bay; NSA Souda Bay), as well as in Italy in Naples and Gaeta . The US naval base Rota on the Spanish Atlantic coast was already in the Atlantic, but not far from Gibraltar . The USA regards the Mediterranean basin as a strategic area for securing American troops in Europe and as a potential deployment area in order to be able to intervene militarily in conflicts in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Important trade routes run through the Mediterranean Sea and the bottlenecks (Gibraltar, Dardanelles, Bosporus, entrance to the Suez Canal) represent neuralgic points in the event of a conflict. Russian warships could reach the Suez Canal from the Tartus naval base within a few days and thus access the Indian Ocean.

The Tartus naval base also had the purpose of allowing submarines to be refueled and, if necessary, to carry out minor repairs. The submarines had to return from the Mediterranean to their home bases in Sevastopol or Nikolayev (now Mykolaiv ) less often . This also minimized the number of passages through the Bosporus in Istanbul, which is subject to all-round NATO surveillance. The Treaty of Montreux of 1936 regulates, among other things, the passage of warships through the Bosporus: In times of peace, Turkey must be notified of the passage of a warship through diplomatic channels, usually eight days in advance.

The crews of the submarines and warships that could be flown in and out of Syria by plane could also be exchanged via the Tartus base.

If a Russian fleet can be present in the Mediterranean, it has a shorter approach for missions in the Gulf of Aden or the Horn of Africa than if it were stationed in the Crimea. Today the Tartus naval base can ensure the supply of all ships that are necessary to protect Russian shipping from Somali pirates in the region around the Horn of Africa - Russian ships have also been attacked by pirates since 2003.

The naval base improves the possibilities for the operational use of the fleet, as Port Said , the entrance to the Suez Canal , via which the approach to the Red Sea takes place, is only 720 kilometers away from Tartus. In addition, it is only a few days' drive from Tartus to the Strait of Gibraltar , through which the ships sail into the Atlantic Ocean . The Atlantic is the operational area of the Northern Fleet and the Baltic Fleet .

According to the British weekly The Economist , the naval base is of great importance for Russian military reconnaissance , including electronic reconnaissance . In particular, it would make it easier to keep an eye on Israel. In 2007, Israel considered the Russian naval base in Syria a threat to its national security , as it was likely used for electronic surveillance and as an air defense center.

Upgrade of the Tartus base from 2015

The Russian Navy plans to fundamentally renovate and upgrade its base in the Syrian port city of Tartus from 2015. According to Interfax, the base built during the Cold War will then be able to accommodate larger warships. Accordingly, Tartus will be “significantly renewed with a view to the political situation in Syria and the military situation in the Mediterranean region”. The work affects the entire infrastructure of the base, which dates back to the 1970s. Their own defense systems, including the air defense, are to be strengthened.

Political importance

Tartus is Russia's only naval base in the Mediterranean. Officially, the base, which went into operation in its current form in 2008, serves to supply Russian ships that are on their way to the Black Sea after voyages in the Mediterranean. In addition, the base is primarily an expression of Russia's claim to play a geopolitical role in the region. It is not known whether Russia will pay a lease for the naval base.

After the deterioration in Russian relations with the West due to the US plans for the NATO missile defense program (ALTBMD) in Poland (discussed since 2005, decided in 2008), as well as the Caucasus War in 2008 , the decision to expand the base can be seen as a Russian “sharp response” become. Syria then agreed to expand the base into a permanent Russian naval base for nuclear-armed warships.

Russian-Syrian relations

Relations between Syria and Russia have traditionally been good. They go back to the alliance of the Soviet Union with Syria at the time of the Cold War. For Russia, the Syrian government in Syria is a strategic ally in the region. Syria is Russia's most important partner in the entire Middle East. About 10,000 Syrian officers have received training at Soviet military academies . The more than 400,000 strong Syrian army acquired almost all of its equipment in the Soviet Union and later Russia, such as its 4,600 tanks.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Tartus naval base almost sank into insignificance, but was never abandoned as Syria remained one of Russia's most important allies in the Arab world.

Russia works closely with Syria in the military-technical field. After India and Algeria, Syria is the third largest customer of Russian weapons technology. In 2012, supply contracts were signed for 24 Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-29 M / M2, 8 division complexes of the medium-range anti-aircraft missile system Buk M2E "Ural" (for comparison see Buk M1 ) and 36 training aircraft Yakovlev Jak-130 . Supply contracts for the coastal defense missile system "Bastion" are in the order fulfillment stage. According to experts, a break in military-technical cooperation with Syria would mean the loss of contracts totaling 3.8 billion US dollars for Russia. Syria wants to buy planes, artillery and surface-to-air missiles from Russia on this scale.

Even Russian energy companies (eg. Tatneft / Татнефть, Sojusneftegas / Союзнефтегаз, Strojtransgas / Стройтрансгаз, Federal Agency on Atomic Energy Rosatom | Росатом, Technopromexport / Технопромэкспорт, Severo-Zapadnaya Neftianaya gruppa / Северо-Западная нефтяная группа) have significant financial interests in Syria. Other Russian companies outside the energy sector also have a great economic interest in Syria. The Russian oil company Tatneft announced in October 2011 that it would invest almost 13 billion dollars in the development of the Syrian oil field "South Kishma" (Russian Южная Кишма ) in the Deir ez-Zor governorate near the Iraqi border in eastern Syria . However, the company stopped its work in Syria as early as December 2011 - in view of the "unrest" in Syria.

civil war in Syria

Russia rejects the overthrow of the Syrian government sought by the USA. Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria , journalists have also been speculating about the Russian naval base in Tartus. It was speculated that the Russian rejection of harsh measures against Syria was partly determined by their interest in the continued existence of their base in Tartus. The naval base was seen by politicians and journalists, despite its modest size (78 manpower), as a “threatening backdrop against NATO”.

On January 8, 2012, an aircraft carrier combat group of the Russian naval fleet with the aircraft carrier "Admiral Kuznetsov" arrived in the roadstead off Tartus. It was the first Russian naval visit since the beginning of the civil war in Syria. The Russian Defense Ministry spoke of a routine visit to replenish supplies. The Syrian government assessed this visit as a gesture of solidarity. A Syrian military delegation led by the Syrian Defense Minister was received on board the aircraft carrier.

Government representatives from Syria have already raised military cooperation in the region several times, but have received no clear answer from the Russian side. Due to a foreign intervention in Syria that cannot be ruled out, the Tartus naval base and its possibly planned defense is of particular importance for Russia, especially in terms of the geopolitical struggle in the Middle East .

On August 24, 2012, according to the Moscow daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the Russian Navy decided to temporarily stop using the Tartus naval base. Allegedly Russia wanted to vacate the base. At this time heavy fighting took place 350 km from Tartus.

In 2015, the pier was being expanded or converted, and the Russian newspaper Kommersant quoted a soldier in Tartus who said there were 1,700 Russians present.

The naval base from 1971 to 2011 in the portrayal of a Russian naval historian

According to the opinion of the Russian author Alexander Rosin (November 2011), a hobby marine historian, the “Point for Material-Technical Security in Tartus” (“PMTO Tartus”) has a staff of 50 men. However, the widespread statement that the base was founded in 1971 is not true at all. Until the mid-1980s, there was no Soviet "PMTO Tartus". Beginning in the mid-1960s, visits by Soviet ships to Syrian ports were regulated by ordinary bilateral agreements. These ship visits served the recreation of the crew, the intake of fresh water, provisions and, very rarely, fuel. Most of these goods to be picked up were only picked up by Soviet supply ships in Syria and then handed over to the combat ships on the open sea.

After the defeat of Egypt and Syria in 1967 in the six-day war against Israel from June 5 to 10, 1967, Soviet ships were in Egyptian ports and in the Syrian port of Latakia to seek their unity and support for the Arab countries “in the fight against the Israeli aggressors " to demonstrate. Since then, a rapprochement began in Soviet-Syrian cooperation in naval matters. This also had a positive effect on the possibilities for Soviet warships to call at ports in Syria. However, it must be taken into account that at that time Egypt was the main partner for the Soviet fleet. Egypt was the only non-communist country that allowed the Soviet Navy to use its onshore repair capabilities. However, the more the Soviet-Egyptian relations cooled, the more consideration was given to using Syrian ports.

In 1971, the Soviet Union concluded an agreement with Syria on the use of the port of Tartus for stationing during maneuvers of the naval forces ; in addition, minor repairs were allowed to be carried out on ships in the port - with the help of Soviet swimming pools and workshop ships. The use of workshops on land was limited. The Soviet naval navy paid for the use of the port of Tartus, but enjoyed various benefits, including simplified entry into the port. The contract also became known abroad. The New York Times reported on September 14, 1972, citing US officials, that the Soviet Union and Syria had entered into a treaty allowing the Soviet Union to install and use service facilities for the Soviet Navy in the ports of Latakia and Tartus Exchange for the delivery of new anti -aircraft missiles and MiG-21 aircraft to Syria.

The newly acquired naval base was not large. The head of the political department of the Mediterranean Squadron, Rear Admiral Pavel Dubjagin (Russian: Павел Романович Дубягин ; 1973–1976), later recalled: “In the port of Tartus, which Syria offered us as a maneuver base, there was not enough space. There was also no repair center at all. So the repairs between submarine trips had to be carried out with our own resources - our workshop ships. ”But against the background of the continued cooling of relations with Egypt, the treaty with Syria was a significant achievement. Soon the harbor was used for the first upcoming repairs. In November 1972 the commander of the “211. U-Boot-Brigade ”(Russian: 211. бригада подводных лодок ; short: 211 БПЛ / 211. BPL) the sea captain A. Akatow with the repair ship“ PM-24 ”(Russian: плавмастерская“ ПМ-24 ”) and the submarine "B-26 Yaroslav Komsomolze" (Russian "Б-26 Ярославский комсомолец"; from April 1970 "B-826 Yaroslav Komsomolze") in the port of Tartus - with the task of carrying out repairs between two trips and for the purpose of Recovery of the team. That was the first Soviet experience in the port of Tartus. Akatov recalls: “I paid a visit to the commander of the naval base. We were treated very benevolently. They made everything available to us. ... My staff officers and the officers of the submarine took part in the preparation of a large-scale naval landing exercise in Syria. At the end of the exercise, there was a grand reception at the Syrian Navy commander. During our stay in the port, we witnessed attacks by the Israeli air force on objects in the port and the naval base twice. After a month the submarine had been properly repaired, the crew had recovered, and we were greeted warmly and left the port. "

During the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, the very presence of the Soviet Navy in Syrian ports limited the capabilities of the Israeli Navy . After the end of the war, the reputation of the Soviet fleet in Syria grew even more.

In the spring of 1974, during a visit to the port of Soviet ships in Tartus, two Russian officers, the head of the political department of the 5th Squadron Rear Admiral Pavel Romanovich Dubjagin and the Soviet military adviser to the commander of the Syrian navy, sea captain Vladimir Leontievich Turuk, solved the question of improving maneuvering of the ships of the Soviet squadron in Tartus during a meeting with the commander of the Syrian navy, the naval brigadier (Amid Bachari - a Syrian rank between a sea captain and a rear admiral) Fadl Hussein. He had learned in the Soviet Union, completed his officer career in a combat preparation department, made it to the position of head of department in the staff of the Syrian Navy, then he was the commander of a brigade of missile speedboats - the basic combat unit of the Syrian fleet. The Soviet side asked for permission to station three of their ships, if possible more, in Tartus.

The commander of the Syrian Navy, Hussein, agreed to the stay of three Soviet ships, as well as the fact that smaller equipment is at the jetty, but with the condition that they can be cleared aside quickly, as construction of the port should continue in the future. However, he refused to lay a provisional water pipe because a permanent water pipe was to be laid to the landing stages this year.

Rear Admiral Pavel Dubjagin remembers: “In practice, we have come to an understanding on all important questions. Hussein expressed his concern to us, he told us straightforward: 'The US 6th Fleet - this is your concern. And the Israeli Navy - that's my headache. It would not be bad if we could get educational material from them about their activities so that we can counteract them in good time. ' He went on to say that he is impatiently awaiting the arrival of two guard ships bought in the Soviet Union. The Syrian commander made a good impression on us. "

After the Soviet Navy was no longer limited to only carrying out small repairs in Tartus, the management of the Soviet Navy tried to expand the possibilities for using the Syrian port, even if they had no way of performing additional security functions for the activities of the fleet there create. At the beginning of 1974, the head of the rearward services of the Soviet Navy, Admiral L. Mazin, familiarized himself with the possibilities of maneuvering ships in Syria and then agreed with the command of the Syrian Navy that, in the event of an acute need, Soviet ships would have fuel in Syrian ports can get. No continued use was made of this, however, as the Syrians made this service very expensive.

In the period from 1967 to 1973 a total of 361 ships of the Soviet Navy entered Syrian ports.

The importance of the Syrian ports for the ships of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron grew after the final break in relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union in March 1976. Just then a number of Soviet auxiliary ships, which had previously been stationed in Alexandria, were brought to Syria from Egypt. But not everything went smoothly. In June 1976 the Soviet-Syrian relations deteriorated in connection with the intensification of the Lebanon crisis (see also: Massacre of Karantina , Massacre of Damur ).

From May 1976, Soviet dissatisfaction with Syrian interference in Lebanon became increasingly evident. Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin , who was on a visit to Baghdad on May 31, said that the solution to the Lebanon crisis must be solved by the Lebanese themselves. On the night of May 31st and June 1st, however, the Arab League decided to march in multinational Arab troops - mainly a Syrian contingent - an armored division and a brigade. When Kosygin arrived in Damascus on June 1, Hafiz al-Assad presented him with a fait accompli. The Soviet Union did not approve of this operation - no Soviet military advisers and specialists took part either - and temporarily suspended its arms deliveries. The Syrians, for their part, restricted access for ships of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron to the coastal objects in Tartus. This forced the Soviet Union to reconsider its position. At the beginning of 1977 the original situation was restored: the arms deliveries were made in full and the Soviet ships had access to the port of Tartus.

In April 1977, the 229th Division of Sea Ships for the purpose of security (Russian: 229th дивизион морских и рейдовых судов обеспечения ) was formed in the port of Tartus . She was subordinate to the commander of the 9th Brigade of Sea Ships Securing the Black Sea Fleet (Russian: 9. бригада морских судов обеспечения Черноморского флота ). The following were permanently stationed in the port of Tartus: a workshop ship, a floating warehouse, a tug, a small seaworthy ship for the delivery of water (Russian: морская водоналивная баржа ) and a diving boat . As in the past, the Soviet sailors had no facilities whatsoever in the port. Even so, the submarines were able to carry out their repairs, replenish their supplies and replace the crew in this port, so that they could relax between trips in Sevastopol. Of course, the repair possibilities in Tartus were much more modest compared to Alexandria and limited to the possibilities of the workshop ship. The repairs between the individual trips were carried out by the people of the second crew.

The management of the Soviet Navy wanted to have a full-fledged base in Syria for their Mediterranean squadron. As it turned out, however, this process took much longer than planned. In the course of the high-level Syrian-Soviet talks in October 1979, the question of how the Soviet Union could continue to help Syria strengthen its defense potential was discussed. In return for Soviet military aid and support, Syria was expected to agree to the construction of a Soviet naval base in the Latakia-Baniasa area for the 5th Mediterranean Squadron. Hafiz al-Assad agreed to the construction of a naval base on October 8, 1980. On October 9, 1980, a friendship and cooperation agreement was signed between the Soviet Union and Syria. One point of the treaty said: "If a third power invades Syria, the Soviet Union will intervene in the events." The third side was not specified, it could be both Israel and Iraq, with which Syria had a tense relationship. In the Iran-Iraq war , Syria was wholly on the side of Iran and wanted Iraq to be defeated soon. But Damascus was firmly promised that in the very near future Syria will be able to stand up to and even “fight with” any enemy in the region independently “without the support of Arab countries”. It goes without saying that this required huge deliveries of weapons technology from the Soviet Union, on a credit basis too. It was precisely this treaty that dampened further military ambitions among the Israeli generals. In the course of the Lebanon War of 1982 they had not only once proposed to their Prime Minister Menachem Begin that Syria be punished for his aid to the Palestinians with a “demonstrative” invasion and the encirclement of Damascus.

In mid-February 1981 a Soviet delegation headed by the First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Nikolai Smirnov , was in Damascus. Its task was to choose a suitable place for the creation of the Soviet naval base in Syria. The delegation members carefully explored the entire coast and chose an extensive area between Latakia and Tartus. This was an ideal place to build a naval base, behind it was an airfield for supplying the base from the air. The admiral reported to his superior that this could be done within six months. But the Soviet leadership did not agree on the question of creating a Soviet base in Syria, as this would be particularly vulnerable if the conflict with Israel intensified. Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov concluded , however, that it was not only in the Soviet interest to establish military bases in Syria, but also to station Soviet troops and fighter planes for their defense.

So the warlike intentions of Israel should be dampened and the whole world should be shown that the Soviet Union will not drop its friends. But Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko spoke out against sending Soviet soldiers to Syria, since in the event of a worsening situation and exceptional circumstances, the Soviet Union has no way of ensuring its support and they could become hostage. This threatens the Soviet Union to be drawn into a global conflict.

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Yuri Andropov acted as mediator between the two positions . Under his personal supervision, an urgent letter was sent to the Central Committee in May 1981, stating that they should not agree to the Syrian conditions for subordinating Soviet troops to them. In the further letter, however, he followed the position of the Soviet military almost verbatim: to agree to the placement of the "point for material and technical security" in Tartus, to station a missile- armed anti-aircraft regiment (Russian зенитный ракетный полк ) for his protection - a total of 2000 Military personnel. In the second stage, which begins in 1983, a mixed fighter regiment of the Soviet naval forces and a reserve regiment of the rocket-armed air defense are to be stationed in the brigade. The number of military personnel increases to 6,000. On May 14, 1981, the Syrian President made a secret visit to Moscow. On May 15, he met with the Soviet leadership. An agreement was reached on the stationing of Soviet forces - a missile anti-aircraft regiment on the territory of Syria. So the friendship treaty with Syria was filled with concrete content. However, no final agreement was reached on the creation of a military base in Syria.

During a visit by a Soviet delegation to Syria under Admiral Smirnov in June 1981, four main points were agreed so that a treaty could include the following points:

  • A) Soviet warships picked up in Syrian ports
  • B) Creation of the PMTO (base for material and technical security for ships of the Soviet naval fleet; Russian: ПМТО) in Tartus, where it was planned that a floating dock would be stationed and storage facilities for equipment, provisions and military supplies would be built. 500 Soviet soldiers are sent to Syria to service them. In addition, two docks for warships were to be created - on an island near Tartus and in the bay near Latakia. A total of 20 ships could be accommodated there.
  • C) Stationing of Soviet military aircraft at Tifor airfield (the name is derived from the English T4 - T four; it is 90 km from Homs and 100 km from Palmyra ) and other airfields listed in the protocol to the treaty. In 1981 reconnaissance planes, flying boats and a fighter regiment were stationed there. 46 aircraft and 4 helicopters are stationed. 2700 men are stationed in Tifor and 250 men at the command point for their operation and maintenance.
  • D) Reconnaissance planes and flying boats, as was already the case in Egypt, will carry soviet emblems , the fighter planes will carry Syrian emblems. From 1983 an air regiment with 40 aircraft was also stationed in Syria.

Despite the difficulties, the creation of the PMTO made progress. Colonel Al Sitini, who was in Syria from January 1982 to May 1984, remembers: “I remember a very large and responsible work in Syria in which I was able to participate. That was the selection of the site, the definition of the facilities and, accordingly, the scope of the work and the costs, the weighing up of the technical and economic expediencies of the base for the Mediterranean squadron of the Soviet Navy. In contrast to the US Navy, our warships did not have a base in the area of ​​their military use. The Soviet Ministry of Defense and the Headquarters Technical Administration of the Economic Relations Committee (Russian: Государственный комитет по экономическим связям; ГКЭС) were entrusted with this work. The results of the work should then be submitted as a corresponding proposal to the government of the Soviet Union. The work was directed by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Nikolai Ivanovich Smirnov. Several variants have been worked out, including the creation of a base in the area of ​​the ports of Latakia and Tartus. Unfortunately, for various reasons (including purely political and economic reasons), the matter was not realized later. "

The main military advisor in Syria, Grigory Pavlovich Jaschkin, recalls: “In the winter-spring of 1982 the Soviet leadership put great pressure on us and the ambassador to help solve the problem of stationing our troops in the Syrian Arab Republic: bases the rear service of the 5th Mediterranean Squadron, three to four missile anti-aircraft brigades and some regiments of fighter pilots. Moscow did not want to lose its influence in the Middle East and especially in Syria, whose troops were involved in a fratricidal war with the units of the 'Lebanese Front' - the Phalangists - supported by Israel. The Syrian troops were also involved in operations within Syria that were directed against the extremist opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood . The danger that the Soviet Union will be drawn into the war increased many times over. And it wasn't until April 8, 1982 that this danger was averted. From the encrypted telegram: 'Damascus, to the Soviet ambassador ... Only for you and the chief military advisor. Decision of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee No. 723 of April 8, 1982. In order to support the rule of Hafiz al-Assad and his fight against the anti-government uprising in Syria and the Arab reaction, it is considered appropriate to reach an agreement on the stationing of Soviet troops not to be connected with the question of arms deliveries. L. Brezhnev . '"

On May 12, 1983, the Politburo approved the proposal of a Syrian project for the creation of a point for material and technical security (PMTO) in the port of Tartus and also the entry of Soviet ships into the Syrian territorial waters and ports. To sign the agreement, a Soviet government delegation headed by the First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, NI Smirnov, was immediately sent to Damascus, so that a contingent of 1,000 military specialists could be sent to Syria immediately after the signature. Yuri Andropov summarized this step as follows: "We have not only strengthened our own positions, but also ensured the safety of our friends."

In 1984 in the Syrian port of Tartus the “720. Base for material-technical security for ships of the Russian naval fleet "(Russian:" Пункт материально-технического обеспечения "/" Punkt materialno-technitscheskowo ") created. 720. ПМТschenОTO"; for short: "720. ПМТschenОTO"). He was subordinate to the head of the rear services of the Black Sea Fleet. A floating pier PM-61M (ПМ-61М) has been established on the territory provided by the Syrian side. An administration and economic building was built, two SRM type warehouses, a diesel workshop, a barracks, a dining room and other economic objects. A workshop ship was also permanently stationed. From 1985, after the crew of the 30th reconnaissance regiment of the Black Sea Fleet was stationed at Tifor airfield (T4) in Syria, regular flights for combat service in the Mediterranean began with aircraft of the type Tu-16 P. Their task was air reconnaissance and identification in the area of ​​action Aircraft Carrier Group and the Naval Combat Group of the NATO fleet.

The PMTO was used intensively: in the mid-1980s, repairs were carried out on seven submarines and eight surface vessels annually between the individual voyages in the port of Tartus. The premises of the barracks allow the accommodation of an entire submarine crew. The property has an area of ​​2.3 hectares, but until now the Syrian side has not asked for any money for the lease, nor for the electricity supply or technical requirements. The infrastructure of the base was constantly expanded. From 1987 to 1988 an independent Mobile Engineering Battalion (Russian: отдельный мобильный инженерный батальон ; short: ОМИБ / OMIB) carried out work for the Black Sea Fleet for the construction of the PMTO in Tartus.

Because of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, the Mediterranean Squadron ended, and that almost ended up being the end of the PMTO in Tartus. In 1996, the PMTO ensured the stay of a division of Russian escort ships for an aircraft carrier in the port of Tartus, already with a reduced crew. At the end of January 1996, the aircraft carrier groups (Russian авианосная многоцелевая группа; short: АМГ / AMG) with the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and the destroyer "Bezstrashny" (Russian Бесстрашный from Tartus) were in the roadstead. During this time, the repair ships not only carried out repairs to ships that were part of the department's inventory, but were also used as transport ships to transport cargo and fresh water to the ships on the outer roadstead. More than 100 tons of potatoes alone were handed over to the ships.

The visits to the PTMO became rare; in 1997 and 1998 only two ships per year had to be attended to. The base could no longer function normally because a section of jetty no. 1 had sunk. In the summer of 1998, the decline in during a storm reinforced concrete investors in Tartus from rescue was tugboat (: Captain I. Kuszmowitsch;; СБ-5 Russian буксир спасательный short.) And the SB-5 anchor handling tug судно KIL-158 (Russian Килекторное; short. : КИЛ-158; Captain Nikolaj Perun) lifted within two weeks. The investor was owned by the Russian Federation. Preliminary work on the object was carried out by the diver repair ship PM-56 (Russian ПМ-56). The pier was then pulled out to sea by the rescue tug SB-5 and sunk. The excavation work for the jetty and the subsequent sinking was directed by the chief engineer of the department for search and rescue work (Russian: управления поисковых и аварийно-спасательных работ; in short: Управления поисковых и аварийно-спасательных работ; In March 1999 the NATO-led attack against Yugoslavia ( Operation Allied Force ) began. At that time, the Russian Navy had only one workshop ship in the Mediterranean, the PM-138 in Tartus. After these events the slow return of the Russian Navy to the Mediterranean began; only the PMTO in Tartus could offer help as a land base. From January to May 1999 three Russian ships used the PMTO's services. In May 1999 the PMTO Tartus consisted of four main units: a motor vehicle company (twelve motor vehicles), an electrical power station, an economic department and a general warehouse. A workshop ship from the Black Sea Fleet was always available to the PMTO for operational use. The full nominal strength of the PMTO was 14 Russian military personnel. Because of the incoherent policy of the Russian leadership, the expansion project of the base in Taruts fell asleep, which should increase the possibilities of the PMTO many times over.

According to the Roswooruschenije project, a ship repair yard for the Syrian Navy was to be built in Tartus in the mid-1990s. However, due to financing problems, it could not be completed and not achieve its planned performance. No highly qualified specialists stayed there either. At first, Russian specialists worked there as contract workers, but workers from Ukraine came there in 1998 because they were working for lower pay. In 2002 the shipyard was completed by the Ukrainian company Selchospromexport (Russian: Сельхозпромэкспорт), with some of the company's specialists being Russians. The Chinese received the order to build a slipway to allow ships to launch.

Life at the base was not easy. In December 2004, the Black Sea Fleet was inspected at the PMTO for the first time in many years. She assessed his condition and made a number of suggestions for further use of the PMTO. The base was in dire condition. According to the assessment of the head of the marine engineer service (Russian: морская инженерная злужба; short: МИС) of the Black Sea Fleet, Colonel Sergei Tawadjan, the barracks accommodations were in an unsatisfactory condition. The administrative apartment buildings, which had been built 16 years earlier, could have been in better condition as they had not really been renovated since. It was also necessary to bring the area adjacent to the properties in good condition, especially the area around the motor vehicle park. Repair work on floating jetty No. 2 had to be carried out for normal inclusion of ships in the base, since it was the only functioning one. Much greater effort would be required to restore the sunken sections of jetty # 1, which was inoperable. Its restoration required two swimming sections and additional equipment: concrete anchors, chains and floating buoys.

The work required dragged on for several years. In March 2005, the large Azov landing ship (Russian: БДК Азов ; Большой десантный корабль) brought the equipment to the port of Tartus, and the planned work to replace the technical equipment in the PMTO could be carried out. The necessary equipment for the repair of the swimming jetties and for the functioning of the military town was delivered by the ship. A number of news outlets reported in the summer of 2006 that Russia had begun deepening the port of Tartus. The deepening of the fairway could begin after a Russian-Syrian agreement had been reached on the cancellation of Syrian debts amounting to USD 3.6 billion out of a total of USD 14.4 billion Syrian debt. However, the representatives of the Russian Navy have contradicted reports that ships of the Russian Navy have been commissioned with the work or that this deepening work in the port is being carried out in the interests of the Russians: “We have not carried out any deepening work in the port of Tartus, neither now nor before . The depth available there is sufficient for ships with a shallow draft. Large ships such as B. Cruisers can lie there in front of the roadstead of this or that port. Of course, the jetties need to be repaired, modernized or rebuilt, but the most important thing is that a developed infrastructure is created on the coast - with the necessary objects to ensure repairs, as well as to replenish provisions, water, fuel and ammunition and the Serving the crew's recreation. We will have to deal with this in the next few years. "

In August 2008 Russian Deputy Ambassador to Syria, Igor Belyayev, said at a press conference in Damascus: “Russia intends to significantly increase its military presence in the Mediterranean. Russian warships will be frequent guests in Syrian ports and in other friendly countries in the Mediterranean. ”That was soon felt at the Tartus base. In January 2009, a group of ships from the Northern Fleet came to Tartus to replenish its water and provisions. The heavy aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov , the anti-submarine ship Admiral Levchenko (Большой противолодочный корабль Адмирал Левченко in short, БПК / BPK; from the Udaloy class ) and the security ship Nikolaj Tschiker were anchored in the harbor. The missile cruiser Moskva (Гвардейский ракетный крейсер "Москва"; short: ГРКР "Москва") replenished its fuel supplies in the roadstead of Tartus and took over the fuel from the tanker Iman. During their stay in the roadstead, the crew was trained to guard and defend their ship in the unprotected roadstead. Since the base in Tartus was very much needed, work there was accelerated.

The auxiliary ship KIL-158 ( anchor- handling tug КИЛ 158 / KIL 158; picture ; Russian: Килекторное судно) lifted some anchors with the help of divers, each of which weighed several tons and had held the floating jetty. The chains were also replaced and then the jetty was anchored again. The concrete ceiling was renewed, welding and painting work was carried out. The crew of KIL-158 also assisted the marine engineering service (Russian: морская инженерная злужба; short: МИС) of the port in laying underwater pipelines for the delivery of fresh water. In 2009, two new sections were brought out of the Black Sea to replace the floating jetty, which was no longer functional and sunk in 1998. In July 2009 the rescue tug Shakhtar towed the reinforced concrete sections to Tartus. Another section was brought to Tartus by the rescue tug SB-5 (Russian спасательный буксир; short: СБ-5).

The work carried out at the PMTO was classified as scheduled repairs, continued in 2010 and should be completed in 2011. As part of this work, old objects will be repaired and new objects created for the coastal infrastructure so that the Russian fleet can use the PMTO to the full. After the modernization of the investor, the PMTO will be fully functional.

The representative of the main staff of the Russian fleet explained: "The base in Tartus ensures the supply of all ships required for the defense of civilian Russian shipping in the Horn of Africa."

As practice shows, the PMTO Tartus is extremely necessary for the Russian Navy, and its expansion is not without reason. In October 2009, in addition to a number of smaller auxiliary ships, four large Russian landing ships (Russian: Большой десантный корабль; short: БДК) were in Tartus - the landing ships "Azov", "Jamal", "Novocherkassk" and "Caesar Kunikow".

At the end of 2009, the submarine hunt frigate Neustraschimy (Russian: СКР "Неустрашимы"; SKR = сторожевой корабль = guard ship) of the Baltic fleet was in Tartus - during its combat mission in the Gulf of Aden .

In April 2010, the nuclear powered battle cruiser (heavy rocket cruiser) Pyotr Veliki was to replenish its supplies in the PMTO Tartus. The Russian fleet had big plans for the Tartus base. In August 2010, the Russian Navy commander in chief Vladimir Vysotsky told the RIA Novosti news agency that after 2012 the base in Tartuz will be able to accommodate heavy ships, including cruisers and even aircraft carriers. He said, “Tartus will be developed first as a deployment base and then as a naval base. The first stage of development and modernization will be completed in 2012. "

Currently, the PMTO in Syria consists of PM-61M floating jetties, a Black Sea Fleet repair ship (which is replaced every six months), warehouses, barracks and various economic objects. The PMTO is operated by 50 sailors.

Stays by Russian repair ships in Tartus

The following ships were temporarily stationed in Tartus:

  • April 1989: PM-9 (PM stands for repair ship)
  • February 1990 PM-138
  • September 1995 to April 1996: PM-138
  • End of April 1996: PM-56
  • September 1997: PM-138 returns to Sevastopol from the Mediterranean Sea
  • Fall 1997 to Spring 1998: PM-56
  • May to September 15, 1998: KIL-158 (KIL = килекторное судно; anchor tug)
  • August 1998 to May 2, 1999: PM-138
  • April 18 to October 12, 1999: PM-56
  • September 27, 1999 to April 20, 2000: PM-138
  • April 4 to November 6, 2000: PM-56
  • November 2000 to March 2001: KIL-158
  • March 1 to September 2001: PM-138
  • September 5, 2001 to March 2002: PM-56
  • March to September 2002: PM-138
  • September to [unknown] 2002: KIL-158
  • Fall 2003: PM-56
  • [unknown] until December 2004: PM-138
  • December 2004 to March 2005: PM-56
  • January to July 2006: PM-138
  • July 31 to March 2008: PM-138 (after a stay of more than 6 months in the Mediterranean Sea, it was damaged in a strong storm on February 18, 2008 in the Aegean Sea on the way back to its home port Sevastopol and later had to be repaired in the home port.)
  • In 2008, KIL-158 performed tasks in the port of Tartus for more than two months
  • August (?) 2008 to March 2009: PM-56
  • August 2009 to January 2010: PM-138 (during the stay in Tartus there was also a landing division of marines on board - under the command of Colonel Sergei Fedun. This anti-terror group guarded the ship, the crew and the object)
  • December 2009 to April 2010: PM-56
  • August 2010 to February 1, 2011: PM-138
  • August 2011 to January 31, 2012: PM-56 (the captain Igor Bakurandze reported: "In Tartus the situation is normal. There are of course restrictions, certain restrictions on exiting the city - but only because of the concern for the full safety of the sailors There were no excesses. The crew lived their ordinary lives. They go about their business and prepare gifts from Syria for their relatives. ”There was also a platoon of marines on board the PM-56 under the command of Lieutenant Mikhail Dzhigir. Recently, a colonel Dimitrij Viktorowitsch Zhaworonikow the head of the PMTO Tartus.)

literature

(Sources for the section "The naval base 1971 to 2011 in the presentation of a Russian naval historian" )

  • Society of Submarine Veterans in Latvia (russ.)
  • О. А. Гриневский: Сценарий для третьей мировой войны. Как Израиль чуть не стал ее причиной. (Russian .; М. ОЛМА-ПРЕСС Образование; 2002, ISBN 5-94849-067-Х ; OA Grinewskij: Scenario for the Third World War. How Israel almost became the cause. as an e-book )
  • П. Р. Дубягин: На Средиземноморской эскадре. Verlag Андреевский флаг, Moscow 2006, ISBN 5-9553-0053-8 (Russian; PR Dubjagin: Auf dem Mediterraneangeschwader .; As an e-book )
  • В. Иванов: Боевое содружество в ожидании перемен. In: Морской сборник . No. 5/2002 (Russian)
  • И. В. Касатонов : Командую флотом. Vol. 2, Verlag Андреевский флаг, Moscow 2004 (Russian; Igor Kasatonow: I command the fleet. )
  • А. А. Киличенков: "Холодная война" в океане. Советская военно-морская деятельность 1945–1991 гг. в зеркале зарубежной историографии. Publishing house Российский государственный гуманитарный университет , Moscow 2009; soot.; Kilichenko: "Cold War" on the ocean. Soviet naval activities 1945–1991 as reflected in foreign historiography.
  • Андрей Николаевич: Работы по модернизации. In: Красная звезда. January 14, 2010 (Russian; Andrei Nikolajewitsch: Modernization work. In: Krasnaja Swesda . )
  • В. Пасякин: Тартус - далекий и близкий. In: Красная звезда. December 24, 2004 (Russian; W. Pasjakin: Tartus - far and near. In: Krasnaja Swesda. )
  • А. Почтарев: На ливанском направлении. In: Красная звезда. February 28, 2002 (Russian; A. Potscharew: Direction Lebanon. In: Krasnaja Swesda. )
  • Sea captain И. Сидоров: На перекрестке трех цивилизаций. In: Морской сборник. No. 7 1999 (Russian; I. Sidorow: At the intersection of two civilizations. In: Morskoj sbornik. )
  • Павел Симонов, Розен Сами: Россия может быть втянута в конфликт на Ближнем Востоке. July 19, 2006
  • М. Усов: О ВОЕННО-ТЕХНИЧЕСКОМ СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВЕ С СИРИЕЙ. In: Журнал "Техника и вооружение". (Russian; M. Usow: On military-technical cooperation with Syria. )
  • Николай Черкашин: Одиночное плавание. Publisher: Совершенно секретно, Москва 2006, ISBN 5-91179-001-7 (Russian; Nikolaj Tscherkashin: Einsame Fahrt. As an e-book )
  • Штаб Российского Черноморского флота. Simferopol «Таврида» 2002 г. (Russian; Staff of the Russian Black Sea Fleet .; Simferopol)

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ www.tartousport.com ( Memento of the original from January 14, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (English, official website of the port of Tarus)  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.tartousport.com
  2. ↑ Последняя база ВМФ России за границей Сирия (youtube film; Russian; 2:30 min) an interviewed soldier reports at 1:45 minutes that a Russian warship berths about once a month. The anchor- handling tug КИЛ 158 / KIL 158 ( picture ; Russian: Килекторное судно) can be seen in the background. The Russian base commander Gennady Lipatov (October 2011) gives a short interview.
  3. ↑ a b c d e f Russia’s bases in Syria ( Memento of the original from June 2, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / wakeupfromyourslumber.com
  4. ^ Category: Repair ships of the Soviet Union on Wikimedia Commons
  5. ↑ Note: The basic model PM-61 has the following dimensions; Width 8 m; Board height 2.20 m; Draft 0.75 m; Load capacity per section 250 t
  6. ↑ a b ВМФ РФ модернизирует пункт базирования кораблей в Сирии (Russian; RIA novosti; July 20, 2009; The Russian naval fleet is modernizing the naval base in Syria.)
  7. ↑ a b ВМФ России опроверг информацию о модернизации морской базы в Сирии (russ .; Lenta.ru, January 13, 2010; The Russian Navy denies information on the modernization of Marinebasi in Tartus.)
  8. ↑ Russia is upgrading its navy. In: tagesschau.de. July 27, 2014, archived from the original on July 29, 2014 ; Retrieved on July 27, 2014 : “According to the information, the work affects the entire infrastructure of the 1970s base. Their defenses - including the air defense - are to be reinforced. "
  9. ↑ a b c Russia completes naval base in Syrian Tartus (RIA Novosti; April 23, 2010)
  10. ↑ El Almirante Kuznetsov rumbo al Mediterráneo ( Memento of the original from January 7, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / rusiahoy.com
  11. ↑ a b c Последняя база ВМФ России за границей Сирия (youtube-film; russ .; 2:30 min; at 0:30 roll call of the base staff)
  12. ↑ Olga Berezintseva: Russian Fleet Worries Israel. ( Memento of the original from October 14, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Kommersant, August 7, 2007.  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.kommersant.com
  13. ↑ Военные базы РФ за границей. (soot.)
  14. ↑ David Eshel: Assad's Ticket to Putin's Mid East Comeback. ( Memento of the original from July 12, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (December 23, 2006) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / defense-update.com
  15. ↑ a b Russian warships set course for the Syrian port of Tartous (Berliner Umschau, June 17, 2012)
  16. ↑ Syria. Arms Trade. Arms Procurement and Security Assistance Received ( Memento of the original dated October 2, 2011 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 98 kB) (Institute for National Security Studies) September 3, 2011; P. 3: Quote: "Assistance [from] Russia: Upgrading of naval bases in Tartus and Latakya (2009)"  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.inss.org.il
  17. ↑ Главком: ВМФ планирует базировать в Тартусе тяжелые корабли и авианосцы (Russian; High Command: The Naval War Fleet plans to station heavy ships and aircraft carriers in Tartul.)
  18. ↑ a b Sebastian Bruns, Jasna Makdissi: Middle East - Is the Cold War returning to the Middle East? ( Memento of the original from May 14, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (Page 1; from the magazine: Marineforum) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.globaldefence.net
  19. ↑ Sebastian Bruns, Jasna Makdissi: Middle East - Is the Cold War returning to the Middle East - Mare Omnium ( Memento of the original from December 13, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (Page 3; from the magazine: Marineforum) @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.globaldefence.net
  20. ↑ Syria and Russia - Wait and sea ( The Economist ; January 14, 2012)
  21. ↑ Russia is upgrading its navy ( Memento from March 21, 2015 in the Internet Archive )
  22. ^ Assad's trip to Russia. Putin plans Middle East conference in Moscow (spiegel-online; December 19, 2006)
  23. ↑ Аль-Каида выступила против Башара Асада (Russian; February 12, 2012; Al-Qaeda opposed Bashar al-Assad .)
  24. ↑ a b Moscow's loyalty to Syria. Alone against Assad's enemies. (Frankfurter Allgemeine; January 31, 2012)
  25. ↑ Syria: Lavrov and UN Secretary-General call for the violence to be stopped as soon as possible ( memento of the original from August 25, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (russland.ru; March 14, 2012)  @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / russland.ru
  26. ↑ Российские интересы в Сирии (russ .; Kommersant.ru; February 8, 2012; Russian interests in Syria)
  27. ↑ Russia's New Foreign Policy. Return of the Njet warriors . Spiegel Online , October 7, 2011
  28. ↑ Беспорядки в Сирии приостановили работу "Татнефти" (Russian; Lenta.ru; December 23, 2011; unrest in Syria interrupted the work of "Tantneft")
  29. ↑ Russian warships call at Syria . Spiegel Online , January 8, 2012
  30. ↑ Максим Юсин: ЛАГ заговорила голосом Москвы. Отчет арабских наблюдателей разочаровал сирийскую оппозицию.  ( Page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (Russian; January 11, 2012; Maksim Jusin: The Arab League spoke with the voice of Moscow. The report by the Arab observers has disappointed the Syrian opposition. ) (Quotes the Russian daily Kommersant , №1 (4786), 10. January 2012)@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / www.za-kaddafi.ru  
  31. ↑ Крейсер "Адмирал Кузнецов" прибыл в Тартус (Russian; cruiser "Admiral Kuznetsov" in Tartus; youtube film; 2:10)
  32. ↑ Russia lets naval base in Syria rest - Nezavisimaya Gazeta . RIA Novosti . August 24, 2012. Retrieved September 29, 2013.
  33. ↑ Russia is not planning any naval aid to Assad in the Mediterranean
  34. ↑ Rheinische Post , 23 August 2012
  35. ↑ The Moscow Times: why russia is expanding its syrian navalbase , Sept. 21, 2015
  36. ↑ Сотрудничество Сирии и СССР в военно-морской области. Часть 2. ПМТО в порту Тартус. (Russian; German translation of the title: Syria and the Soviet Union in the field of the navy. Part 2. Point for material-technical security in Tartus), 23 November 2011; The author Alexander Rozin (Russian Розин Александр) only reveals that he does not have a scientific title in this field and only pursues it as a hobby. He has also written 20 to 30 lengthy articles on other topics in Soviet naval history. He mentions publicly accessible newspapers, magazines, books and the Internet as sources in his guest book ( Memento from June 16, 2008 in the Internet Archive ).

Coordinates: 34 ° 54 ′ 50 ″  N , 35 ° 52 ′ 27 ″  E