Treaty of Saint Petersburg (1723)

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The Treaty of Saint Petersburg was signed on September 23, 1723 between Russia and Persia under the Safavid dynasty. It ended the Russo-Persian War (1722-1723) and led to extensive territorial cessions of Persia to Russia.

The conclusion of the contract was preceded by a largely unsuccessful attack by Russia in the South Caucasus. Tsar Peter the Great's plan was for Russian troops to land on the Caspian coast with their newly built Caspian fleet and move inland from there. There the Georgian King Vakhtang VI. with 30,000 Georgians and 10,000 Armenians join the Russians to join forces against Daud Khan, who sacked the city of Şamaxı in 1721 . However, numerous difficulties of the Russian troops led to their withdrawal to Astrakhan , only a few garrisons remained on the territory of today's Republic of Azerbaijan .

In the late autumn of 1722, Russian troops occupied the city of Rasht , supposedly to protect it. In February 1723 the Russian commander refused to withdraw the troops. From the ensuing siege, Russian troops broke out at the end of March 1723, killing more than 1,000 Persian soldiers. Shah Tahmasp II was forced to negotiate in this way.

His ambassador, Ismail Beg, had to sign the humiliating Treaty of Saint Petersburg in September 1723. It stipulated that Russia would henceforth be on friendly terms with the Shah and would help him fight rebels. The tsar would grant the Shah peaceful ownership of the throne . In return, the Shah undertook to cede the cities of Derbent and Baku and the associated regions (today's Republic of Azerbaijan) to Russia , as well as the provinces of Gilan , Shirvan , Māzandarān and Astarabad (today's Northern Iran ). These territories were intended to support the Russian troops so that the Shah would not incur any costs for Russian support.

The contract was brought to Isfahan by Prince Boris Meshchersky . When he was traveling through Persia in April 1724, he was threatened by the Persian inhabitants who knew about the Russian actions. The Shah received the Russian ambassador with the usual ceremonial, but refused to ratify the agreement. The Shah was aware that the Russian troops in the Caspian region were too weak to help him, and he may also be aware of negotiations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire (which led to the Treaty of Constantinople concluded in 1724 ). The tsar refrained from threatening the Shah to ratify the agreement because he feared that the Shah would ask him to fulfill the treaty and to assist the Turks, whose troops had already invaded western Persia and the South Caucasus . As a result, Russia even defended the legitimacy of Tahmasp II's rule against the Ottoman Empire .

After the death of Peter the Great, Russia began to withdraw from Persia and the South Caucasus. The war and occupation of the Caspian territories were expensive, while the economic benefits turned out worse than hoped. In 1729 a treaty was signed between Ashraf Khan and the Russians, which affirmed the Treaty of Saint Petersburg and provided for an exchange of territory. However, this treaty never came into force because Afghans' rule over Persia collapsed.

In 1730, an envoy from Tahmasp II appeared in Moscow, suggesting that Russia should provide assistance against the Afghans while Tahmasp was ready to ratify the Treaty of Saint Petersburg. The envoy also stressed that Russia should evacuate the occupied Persian territories if it is not ready to help the Shah in the fight against the Afghans. The Russian Empress Anna Ivanovna approved the recommendation of her Foreign Ministry to make peace with Persia, even if the acquired Caspian provinces would have to be given up.

The Russian diplomats who conducted the negotiations at Tahmasp's court described the situation there as "bad, terrifying and depraved". Despite a renewed defeat of Persia against the Turks at Yerevan , peace was made, above all because there was fear of Tahmasp giving in to the Turkish demands or even an alliance against Russia. The Treaty of Rash of February 1, 1732 stipulated that the areas south of the Kura would become Persian possession and that the provinces north of it would be returned to Persia if the Shah had expelled all invaders from his empire.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b Firuz Kazemzadeh : Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 318 .
  2. ↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 318 f .
  3. ↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 319 .
  4. ↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 320 .
  5. ↑ a b Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 322 .
  6. ↑ Firuz Kazemzadeh: Iranian relations with Russia and the Soviet Union, to 1921 . In: Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly and Charles Melville (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Iran . tape 7 . Cambridge University Press, 1991, ISBN 978-0-521-20095-0 , pp. 323 .