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After the fall of Goose Green, the British effort was now free to concentrate on Port Stanley (called ''Puerto Argentino'' by the Argentinians). From the period between May 1st to May 28, there were three Vulcan sorties planned, but only one was carried out, achieving nothing. On May 25, the group suffered its first fatality, when a soldier was killed by the blast of an unexploded bomblet. Five days later, a pair of GR3 was initially tasked to attack with rockets entrenched troops on Mount Wall, west of Stanley, one of the very first strikes against the defensive ring around the Falklands capital. The air patrol was led by Sqn. Ld. Jerry Pook on XZ963. The original target was changed for the Stanley racecourse, some 4 km west of the city. The site was used as an alternative helipad. After approaching from the south, Pook flew right over a column of vehicles and troops, and was greeted by automatic fire.<ref>[http://www.raf.mod.uk/falklands/cr3005.html#prof RAF diaries, 30 May entry]</ref> Argentinian authors assert that the column was a GADA convoy completing the redeployment of the 1st section, B battery, from Moody Brook to a position between Sapper Hill and the racecourse, under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Ferre.<ref>Moro, page 351, first edition</ref><ref>Rodríguez Mottino, page 158</ref> While most of the British authors claim that small arms rounds from the marching troops damaged the aircraft, Argentinian accounts assure that Pook’s Harrier was struck by 35 mm fire.<ref>“During another action, an enemy aircraft fell victim to the 601 Air Defense’s 35mm batteries. The plane came down in the water and the pilot, Maj. Jerry Pook, was rescued shortly after.” Moro, page 272, English version</ref> <ref>Rodríguez Mottino, page 159</ref> Pook’s first hand account recalls to have feeling a “heavy thump”,<ref>“En route to the target area, my radio began playing up and went dead for a short time. Fortunately the problem cleared itself for awhile just before the attack. I flew through concentrated small arms fire from the ground just before the target and my aircraft was hit. I felt a fairly heavy thump, but everything seemed all right so I carried on with my attack which was on a helicopter landing site. This was deserted, so I flew on to the secondary target, an artillery position about 2 miles away. Coming over a hill saw the position in front of me and fired both 2 inch rockets at it, swamping the area with weapons. It was then I realised that things were not at all well. My wing man signalled that I was losing fuel -that must have been the heavy thump earlier. Just before my radio packed up totally my wing man told me that thefuel loss rate was increasing; by now I also had a hydraulic failure the Number 1 system. The radio failed again and I felt totally on my own. I decided to try to fly as far as I could towards the carriers I turned out over the sea and flew in the direction of the carrier force. But only minutes later I realised I wouldn't make it. My only hope lay in getting as close to the task force as possible.” Godden, page 53</ref> which is compatible with the impact of a large antiaircraft shell. After found no choppers on the assigned area, both Harriers attacked the original objective. At this time it became clear that Pook’s jet was leaking fuel as consequence of the hit. With the engine in the verge of burning out and an incipient hydraulic failure, Pook climbed to 7,000 meters and ejected some 45 [[nautical mile|NM]] from the ''Hermes''. He was rescued only 10 minutes later.
After the fall of Goose Green, the British effort was now free to concentrate on Port Stanley (called ''Puerto Argentino'' by the Argentinians). From the period between May 1st to May 28, there were three Vulcan sorties planned, but only one was carried out, achieving nothing. On May 25, the group suffered its first fatality, when a soldier was killed by the blast of an unexploded bomblet. Five days later, a pair of GR3 was initially tasked to attack with rockets entrenched troops on Mount Wall, west of Stanley, one of the very first strikes against the defensive ring around the Falklands capital. The air patrol was led by Sqn. Ld. Jerry Pook on XZ963. The original target was changed for the Stanley racecourse, some 4 km west of the city. The site was used as an alternative helipad. After approaching from the south, Pook flew right over a column of vehicles and troops, and was greeted by automatic fire.<ref>[http://www.raf.mod.uk/falklands/cr3005.html#prof RAF diaries, 30 May entry]</ref> Argentinian authors assert that the column was a GADA convoy completing the redeployment of the 1st section, B battery, from Moody Brook to a position between Sapper Hill and the racecourse, under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Ferre.<ref>Moro, page 351, first edition</ref><ref>Rodríguez Mottino, page 158</ref> While most of the British authors claim that small arms rounds from the marching troops damaged the aircraft, Argentinian accounts assure that Pook’s Harrier was struck by 35 mm fire.<ref>“During another action, an enemy aircraft fell victim to the 601 Air Defense’s 35mm batteries. The plane came down in the water and the pilot, Maj. Jerry Pook, was rescued shortly after.” Moro, page 272, English version</ref> <ref>Rodríguez Mottino, page 159</ref> Pook’s first hand account recalls to have feeling a “heavy thump”,<ref>“En route to the target area, my radio began playing up and went dead for a short time. Fortunately the problem cleared itself for awhile just before the attack. I flew through concentrated small arms fire from the ground just before the target and my aircraft was hit. I felt a fairly heavy thump, but everything seemed all right so I carried on with my attack which was on a helicopter landing site. This was deserted, so I flew on to the secondary target, an artillery position about 2 miles away. Coming over a hill saw the position in front of me and fired both 2 inch rockets at it, swamping the area with weapons. It was then I realised that things were not at all well. My wing man signalled that I was losing fuel -that must have been the heavy thump earlier. Just before my radio packed up totally my wing man told me that thefuel loss rate was increasing; by now I also had a hydraulic failure the Number 1 system. The radio failed again and I felt totally on my own. I decided to try to fly as far as I could towards the carriers I turned out over the sea and flew in the direction of the carrier force. But only minutes later I realised I wouldn't make it. My only hope lay in getting as close to the task force as possible.” Godden, page 53</ref> which is compatible with the impact of a large antiaircraft shell. After found no choppers on the assigned area, both Harriers attacked the original objective. At this time it became clear that Pook’s jet was leaking fuel as consequence of the hit. With the engine in the verge of burning out and an incipient hydraulic failure, Pook climbed to 7,000 meters and ejected some 45 [[nautical mile|NM]] from the ''Hermes''. He was rescued only 10 minutes later.
[[image:PookRescued.jpg|thumb|150px|Sqn. Leader Jerry Pook being rescued by a Royal Navy Sea King helicopter, May 30 1982]]
[[image:PookRescued.jpg|thumb|150px|Sqn. Leader Jerry Pook being rescued by a Royal Navy Sea King helicopter, May 30 1982]]
The next day, May 31, Stanley airport was hit by the combined action of Vulcan, Harrier and Sea Harrier aircraft. The Vulcan fired [[AGM-45 Shrike|Shrike]] anti-radar missiles, which went stray when the Argentinian radar-operators switch off their devices. The Sea Harriers dropped bombs from high level, and the Harriers straffed the airstrip with cannon fire and rockets, in the belief that A4 Skyhawks had recently landed there. A Skyguard section claims to have hit two GR3s just before the pilots opened fire.<ref>Fernández Reguera, pp. 563-564</ref> Indeed, the RAF acknowledges that the two aircraft were badly hit, but the source of the damage is unclear. The engine of the leading Harrier, XV789, had to be replaced onboard the ''Hermes''.
The next day, May 31, Stanley airport was hit by the combined action of Vulcan, Harrier and Sea Harrier aircraft. The Vulcan fired [[AGM-45 Shrike|Shrike]] anti-radar missiles, which went stray when the Argentinian radar-operators switched off their devices. The Sea Harriers dropped bombs from high level, and the Harriers straffed the airstrip with cannon fire and rockets, in the belief that A4 Skyhawks had recently landed there. A Skyguard section claims to have hit two GR3s just before the pilots opened fire.<ref>Fernández Reguera, pp. 563-564</ref> Indeed, the RAF acknowledges that the two aircraft were badly hit, but the source of the damage is unclear. The engine of the leading Harrier, XV789, had to be replaced onboard the ''Hermes''.
[[image:Gada82-Roland.jpg|thumb|200px|Roland-2 unit and crew at Port Stanley, May 1982]]
[[image:Gada82-Roland.jpg|thumb|200px|Roland-2 unit and crew at Port Stanley, May 1982]]
On June 1st, the Roland-2 system claim a Sea Harrier over the airport. The aircraft, XZ456, was in a recce mission 7 km south of Stanley, apparently out of the reach of the missile, but tracked by its radar. The Argentinian officer on charge of the unit, Lt. Regalini, fired the Roland despite the target being 7,000 meters away. The pilot, Flt. Lt. Ian Mortimer, climbed up, confident that he had successfully outmaneuvered the missile. A couple of seconds later, the rear bay of his jet was torn apart by the explosion of the proximity fuse, leaving only the cockpit undamaged. Mortimer’s ejection was witnessed by hundreds of Argentinian troops. After a 9-hours ordeal at sea, he was recovered by a British helicopter.<ref>Smith, page 97</ref>
On June 1st, the Roland-2 system claim a Sea Harrier over the airport. The aircraft, XZ456, was in a recce mission 7 km south of Stanley, apparently out of the reach of the missile, but tracked by its radar. The Argentinian officer on charge of the unit, Lt. Regalini, fired the Roland despite the target being 7,000 meters away. The pilot, Flt. Lt. Ian Mortimer, climbed up, confident that he had successfully outmaneuvered the missile. A couple of seconds later, the rear bay of his jet was torn apart by the explosion of the proximity fuse, leaving only the cockpit undamaged. Mortimer’s ejection was witnessed by hundreds of Argentinian troops. After a 9-hours ordeal at sea, he was recovered by a British helicopter.<ref>Smith, page 97</ref>

Revision as of 22:55, 4 May 2008

GADA 601
File:Gada82-c.jpg
Demobilization ceremony of GADA 601 veterans (1983)
Active1939-present
CountryRepública Argentina
BranchArgentine Army
TypeBattalion size group
RoleAir Defense
SizeAround 1,000+
EngagementsFalklands war
UNPROFOR/ UNFICYP
DecorationsFalklands Campaign Medal
Commanders
Notable
commanders
Lieutenant Colonel Héctor Lubin Arias (1982-1984)
Lieutenant Colonel Raúl Néstor Berisso (Honorary Commander)
Insignia
Identification
symbol
A Roland type missile over two vintage cannons set in an “x “ arrangement; a map of the Falklands in the background (GAA 601)

The 601st Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group (GAA 601), historically known as GADA 601 (Grupo de Artillería de Defensa Aérea 601) is the main antiarcraft artillery unit of the Argentine Army. Its headquarters are based north of Mar del Plata. Its name changed to GAA 601 Teniente General Pablo Ricchieri in 1999. The force played a key role during the 1982 conflict for the Falklands. The unit is the main air defense training center of Argentina.

Origins

The origin of the anti-aircraft artillery of the Argentine Army dates back to 1939, when the Grupo de Artillería Antiaérea was established in Campo de Mayo, the main headquarters of the army, along with the Centro de Instrucción Antiaéreo, a training unit.

In the meantime, the authorities of the resort city of Mar del Plata were seeking the settling of an army base near the town since the late 1920s. Some years later, in 1940, they made a formal petition to the Ministry of War.[1] By the end of 1944 the two anti-aircraft groups were merged and effectively transferred to Mar del Plata, under the name of Escuela Antiaérea.

Weapons

The first AAA weapons deployed were 76.2 mm Skoda guns [2] and 20 mm cannons.[3]

File:90mm-Loading.jpg
GADA soldiers uploading a 90 mm gun

Several years later, between 1949 and 1962, the army purchased Bofors 40 mm guns and 90 mm guns.[4] During 1951, the first long-range radar, a Westinghouse, was imported from the USA.[5] The group changed its name from Training Center of Air Defense (CIADA) to Artillery Battalion of Air Defense 601 (GADA 601) in 1964. Its first commander was Lieutenant Colonel Esteban Rodriguez. The GADA was composed of batteries, each one divided in three sections. The section, led by a sub-Lieutenant, usually comprised two artillery pieces. In 1968, a new sub-unit, Battery "C", was established, incorporating new material like the 40 mm L 70 Bofors-Contraves radar-guided system.

The first missile Battery was equipped with Tigercat triple launchers in 1970.[6]

In 1980, after a border crisis with Chile, the army acquired the 35 mm Oerlikon-Contraves radar-guided system. Furthermore, a new unit had been added to the GADA in 1976, the AADA 602, to deal with the recently incorporated Roland-2 missiles.

After loosing half of the 35 mm systems and one of the three Rolands in the war of 1982, the group was reinforced with 40 mm Bofors and 30 mm Hispano-Suiza guns.

Operational History

Political unrest (1955-1978)

From the second term in office of Juan Perón to the dictatorships of the 1970s, there were several periods of political unrest and violence involving the military. Argentina witnessed the overthrowing of constitutional governments followed by sporadic clashes between rival factions of the armed forces and the surge of leftists militant organizations. The GADA took part on a number of these incidents:

1955: Revolucion Libertadora. During the last days of peronism in power, the Army became the only force inside the military with a majority of officers supporting Perón. This was also the case of the GADA. There was a first ill-fated attempt against the government, led mostly by the Navy, on June 16, when rebel aircraft mounted a series of air strikes around Plaza de Mayo. In Mar del Plata, the group kept a close watch on the naval base, taking positions on the hills surrounding the port. Eventually, the uprising succeeded on September 16. This time, the attitude of the GADA was more hesitant. During the morning of the 19, the cruiser 9 de Julio (former USS Boise) and five destroyers shelled the group headquarters, already abandoned by the troops. A long range radar and other equipment was destroyed. The commander changed sides shortly after this action.

Sherman tank disabled near Florencio Varela by 90 mm fire, September 1962

1962: After the fall of president Arturo Frondizi and his replacement by a puppet civilian government under the supervision of the armed forces, the military remained divided over the issue of the banning of some political parties. While there was a wide consensus on the proscription of leftist ideologists, things became not so clear regarding peronism. The hard-line group was dubbed colorados (the purples), and the "legalist" -against an indiscriminate ban- azules (the blues).

In September 1962, the army’s command in chief and the Ministry of Defense were controlled by the “colorados”. An internal uprising started inside the army on the 18th , when the “azules “, commanded by General Ongania defied the central authority. President Jose Maria Guido remained neutral. On 22 September, the units involved marched to the capital. One of these was a 27 Sherman tanks strong column departed from their base at Magdalena, southeast of La Plata. The Commander in Chief sat up a roadblock near Florencio Varela, a city in the midway between Buenos Aires and La Plata. The GADA was called to duty to reinforce the position owing to the anti-tank capabilities of the 90 mm. The post was overpassed by the armored column, but according to Colonel Federico de la Fuente, the group commander, the 90 mm fire disabled between 4 to 5 tanks.[7] After a full day of clashes, the crisis ended with the dismissal Commander in Chief and the Minister of Defense. Onganía claimed victory for the azules and their “constitutional” point of view. However, he would took the presidential seat from president Arturo Illia by a coup d’etat in 1966.

1970-1978: The Dirty War. Leftist violence and social unrest resulted in an indiscriminate repression along this period. The first significant GADA activity was the deployment, in 1975, of a full battery of light antiaircraft guns in Tucumán province, which by the time was the scenario of a rough counterinsurgency campaign against the ERP. The guns were intended to deal with the alleged presence of a helicopter Hiller 1100 stolen by the guerrillas from a Government-owned company.[8] The conflict struck home in March 1976, when a splinter organization of the ERP ambushed and killed the GADA commander in Mar del Plata’s downtown. A few days later, the military overthrew the government of Isabel Perón. The coup gave them the complete control of the country and started the most vicious dictatorship in Argentina’s history. The group, along with special intelligence officers, mounted operations not only against militants, but also against those ideologically affiliated to them. These illegal arrests were carried out with the collaboration of the Air Force, which built a clandestine detention facility near the airport, dubbed La Cueva. Most of these detainees became missing or desaparecidos.[9]

Crisis with Chile (1978)

A dispute over the islands of the Beagle Channel prompted a conflict with Chile in 1978. On December 12, the bulk of the GADA was deployed in northern Patagonia. The Grupo de Artillería de Defensa Aérea Mixto 602, in charge of the Tiger Cat missiles was ferried by railway to Río Colorado, in Río Negro province. Meanwhile, the remainder of the force continued the trip further west, to the city of Zapala, in Neuquen province. The troops then marched by route to the build up area near Plaza Huincul. The group established three outposts along the rivers Colorado and Limay in order to provide AAA defense to key bridges. After a diplomatic breakthrough, the GADA came back to Mar del Plata on January 30.[10]

Falklands War (1982)

Build-up

Just before the start of the crisis which would led to the Falklands War, the army group was reinforced when an Argentinian Air Force detachement, the Grupo 1 de Artillería Antiaérea (1st Group of Antiarcraft Artillery) was transferred from Tandil to Mar del Plata on late 1981. Both forces would operate togheter during the conflict in the defense of Stanley airport, renamed BAM Malvinas (Falklands Military Air Base) by the Argentinians and Goose Green airstrip, redesigned BAM Cóndor (Cóndor Military Air Base).[11]

File:Gada82-a.jpg
GADA 601 conscripts and NCOs airlifted to Stanley, 24 April 1982

The GADA was mobilized to Comodoro Rivadavia on April 12th. The equipment was loaded at the naval base of Mar del Plata on board the cargo ship Córdoba, bound for Puerto Deseado. The keel of the ship was damaged while at anchor in this port, so the artillery, missiles systems and vehicles were airlifted to Comodoro Rivadavia. A battery comprising a Roland missile unit and two 35 mm Oerlikon twin cannons was left behind there to provide air defense for the mainland air bases on San Julián and Río Gallegos. The remainder of the troops and their material eventually crossed to the Islands on an airliner between April 12 and April 24.[12]

The troops were deployed in three batteries (A, B and C), with three sections each one, plus the AADA 602, with a Roland-2 launcher. Each section manned two twin Oerlikon-Contraves guns controlled by a Skyguard radar. A second antiaircraft group of the army, the GADA 101 from Ciudadela, Buenos Aires, arrived to Stanley on April 29. They were armed with four twin 30 mm cannons. The main early warning system for the army was a surveillance ALERT MK-II radar, manned by GADA 601 personnel. This radar was mounted on the eastern slopes of Sapper Hill. The main areas to defend were the airfields (Stanley and Goose Green), the Command and Control centers, and the artillery positions. The Air Force Grupo 1 de Artillería Antiaérea was in charge of the airport, with nine twin 20 mm cannons and a Super-Fledermaus-Oerlikon 35 mm system, almost identical to the Skyguard. The GADA 601 deployed one of its own 35 mm section near the east end of the airstrip. The other sections and the Roland unit were initially located in an arc from Moody Brook to the eastern footsteps of Sapper Hill.[13] The third section of B battery was transported by helicopter to Goose Green on May 29.[14]

Operations

File:Arias-82.jpg
Colonel Héctor Lubin Arias, GADA 601 commander

The GADA radar on Sapper Hill was the first to detect the inminent Black Buck raid of 1º May. The air base was warned at 4:20 AM local time, but the 300 ft final approach of the Vulcan bomber prevented the AAA defenses to track the direction of the attack. The reaction was therefore ineffective. The airport tower and the the runaway’s side was damaged, and two Air Force personnel killed. Nevertheless, the airstrip was still operational.[15] At 7:40 four Sea Harriers from the HMS Hermes carried out a second attack against the air base from the west. Argentinian sources claim that a Roland-2 hit one of these aircraft, a suggestion deny by the British. Another five Sea Harriers, coming in from the east, were received by heavy 35 and 20 mm AAA, both from the GADA and the Air Force’s Grupo 1. The ingress was from the north at low level. A fuel depot was left in flames, although no other significant damage was inflicted on the airport. The GADA claim two “kills” that morning, one to 35 mm fire, the other to a Tiger Cat missile.[16] The British account, however, while conceding that the reaction of the ground defenses was intense, only acknowledges a 20 mm hit on the tail of the Sea Harrier piloted by Lt. Cdr. David Morgan and some splinter holes in its rudder.[17] Later that day, a Mirage III, already damaged in combat by a Sea Harrier was the victim of a friendly fire incident while attempting to land on the air base.[18]

Contrary to the vigorous antiaircraft response in Port Stanley, the GADA 601/Grupo 1 team in Goose Green was taken by surprise. The ground crews there were assisting a number of Pucará aircraft which were about to take off to avoid being caught on the airstrip. At 8:00, the air warning was downgraded to “blue” to allow the Pucara’s departure. The antiaircraft guns were ordered to perform a training exercise. To make things worse, the gear of one of the planes became embedded in the mood, delaying the operation. A few minutes later, three Sea Harriers made a sudden appearance over the base. The leader of the PAC dropped two 1,000 lb bombs, which fell long of their intended targets (the airstrip and an ammunition depot). The other aircraft instead, loaded with four CBUs, found their mark. Several bomblets hit one of the still grounded Pucarás, killing the pilot as the Argentinian aircraft burst in flames. Another bomb spreaded explosive charges around the tents of the support personnel; seven men were killed and 13 wounded. The other bombs started a fire very close to a stockpile of heavy ammunition boxes. Eventually, the fire crews prevented further explosions.[19]

First Victory
File:Gada82-d.jpg
Ejectable seat from XZ450

After a few days without air strikes, a CAP of three Sea Harriers armed with CBUs raided Goose Green again on May 4. This time, the potential targets were well concealed and camouflaged, but the most important movement of the defenders, commanded by 2nd Lieutenant Claudio Braghini, was the redeploying of the 35 mm cannons. The guns were relocated south and north of the small Goose Green peninsular from their original position west of the airstrip. This single decision would have important consequences on the air war over the Falklands. The leading aircraft, XZ450, was locked by the Skyguard system while flying from the east at very low altitude; under fire, the pilot attempted to maneuver away, but a second salvo of 35 mm rounds hit the fuselage, which caught fire, losing the left wing in the process. The aircraft cartwheeled in the air and crashed at a 35º angle. The body of the pilot was thrown trough the canopy and fell 80 meters away from the jet wreckage. A second Sea Harrier was fired at, and a claim was made by 20 mm cannons from Grupo 1. The third jettisoned its bombs and flew back to the Hermes. The remains of the pilot of XZ450, Lt. Cdr. Nick Taylor, were buried with full honors. The shooting down of the Sea Harrier was a moral boost for GADA gunners and soldiers.[20] The Sea Harrier XZ450 had been the first of its kind to fly ever, on 20 August 1978[21]. This aircraft had been also used by British Aerospace to carry Sea Eagle anti-ship missiles on trials as recently as March 1982.[22]

This Argentinian success prompted a change of tactics in the employment of the Sea Harriers: in order to avoid further losses of such valuable air defense assets and pilots, the subsequent air-to-ground operations were carried out from high altitude, well above the reach of the enemy ground fire. It was not until the arrival of the first GR3 Harriers that limited low level missions were launched, most of them in close air support role.[23] The Harrier, however, repeated the experience of its naval counterpart: a series of shooting downs and aircraft damaged[24] left only one GR3 Harrier operational by June 1st.[25] To fix the problem, the RAF was forced to improve their countermeasures to continue its air campaign by increasing the number of chaff and flares packages onboard and enhancing its radar-detection capabilities. The GR3 were also supported by Sea Harrier’s diversionary missions.[26]

GR3 Harriers in action

On May 12, another friendly fire incident struck the GADA after three A4 Skyhawks conducted a successful attack on HMS Glasgow. One of the returning jets flew by mistake over a banned zone in Goose Green, and was shot down with the loss of the pilot.[27]

With the beginning of Operation Sutton, the Harriers stepped up their attacks on ground targets. During some high-altitude bombings the radar-guided guns locked the falling 1,000 lb bombs, destroying them in at least three occasions, according to 2nd Lt. Huergo, commander of the 2nd section, battery A, Port Stanley.[28] The Roland-2 blew up another large free-fall bomb in mid-air after the launching Harrier successfully break the radar lock.[29]

File:Gada82-b.jpg
GADA officers and NCOs in Goose Green, May 1982

On May 22, the section deployed in Goose Green fence off a GR3s strike. Second Lt. Braghini recalls that one of the Harriers dropped chaff, managing to blind the radar and triggering the anti-missile alarm. Nevertheless, Braghini re-locked the Harrier and fired several 35 mm rounds. The air attack produced no damage.[30] One of the GR3s flew back with its bombs still hanging up. The British report mentions four Harriers, the Argentinian one only three.[31] On the night of May 24, Braghini’s section warned the air base about the presence of a helicopter and the possible landing of special forces. In fact, several minutes later the SAS mounted a diversionary attack on Darwin hill.[32] On May 27, during the first stages of the battle of Goose Green, several Harrier sorties hit the Argentinian advanced positions to the north, carefully avoiding the base air defenses. However, on of them was locked in the egress and hit by two rounds. The aircraft, Harrier XZ998, exploded in the air about 5,000 meters from Braghini’s position. The pilot, Squadron Leader Bob Iveson, bailed out safely and was rescued by friendly forces three days later.[33][34][35]

Direct fire on Darwin Hill
File:Gada82-GooseGreen.jpg
The Darwin school-house in flames after been hit by 35 mm rounds

The next day, British troops from the 2nd PARA Regiment took over Darwin Hill after a fierce fighting. The GADA detachment, unaware of the situation, found that several platoons were coming down from the southern slopes of the ridge to right to the air base. Having identified them as British, Braghini’s men opened fired in direct mode. The 35 mm bursts blocked at least two companies, which suffered a significant rate of casualties. The Headquarters section of C Company was effectively put out of action.[36] Overall, 20 % of the Company were injured, including the commander, Major Hugh Jenner, and his signallers.[37] The Company was scattered in small groups.[38] The last direct fire mission of Braghini’s section targeted the Darwin school-house, occupied by troops of D Company. The building burnt to the ground, resulting in further British casualties. Shortly after, the position was subjected to mortar fire, and the power generator of the guns was damaged beyond repair. According to Braghini, a later Harrier strike was inaccurate and failed to hit the cannons.[39] The intensity of the mortar fire, however, forced the section’s men to seek shelter in the village. The morale of the GADA troops was intact,[40] but with the garrison isolated and surrounded, there was no alternative to the capitulation.

The Defense of Puerto Argentino

After the fall of Goose Green, the British effort was now free to concentrate on Port Stanley (called Puerto Argentino by the Argentinians). From the period between May 1st to May 28, there were three Vulcan sorties planned, but only one was carried out, achieving nothing. On May 25, the group suffered its first fatality, when a soldier was killed by the blast of an unexploded bomblet. Five days later, a pair of GR3 was initially tasked to attack with rockets entrenched troops on Mount Wall, west of Stanley, one of the very first strikes against the defensive ring around the Falklands capital. The air patrol was led by Sqn. Ld. Jerry Pook on XZ963. The original target was changed for the Stanley racecourse, some 4 km west of the city. The site was used as an alternative helipad. After approaching from the south, Pook flew right over a column of vehicles and troops, and was greeted by automatic fire.[41] Argentinian authors assert that the column was a GADA convoy completing the redeployment of the 1st section, B battery, from Moody Brook to a position between Sapper Hill and the racecourse, under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Ferre.[42][43] While most of the British authors claim that small arms rounds from the marching troops damaged the aircraft, Argentinian accounts assure that Pook’s Harrier was struck by 35 mm fire.[44] [45] Pook’s first hand account recalls to have feeling a “heavy thump”,[46] which is compatible with the impact of a large antiaircraft shell. After found no choppers on the assigned area, both Harriers attacked the original objective. At this time it became clear that Pook’s jet was leaking fuel as consequence of the hit. With the engine in the verge of burning out and an incipient hydraulic failure, Pook climbed to 7,000 meters and ejected some 45 NM from the Hermes. He was rescued only 10 minutes later.

File:PookRescued.jpg
Sqn. Leader Jerry Pook being rescued by a Royal Navy Sea King helicopter, May 30 1982

The next day, May 31, Stanley airport was hit by the combined action of Vulcan, Harrier and Sea Harrier aircraft. The Vulcan fired Shrike anti-radar missiles, which went stray when the Argentinian radar-operators switched off their devices. The Sea Harriers dropped bombs from high level, and the Harriers straffed the airstrip with cannon fire and rockets, in the belief that A4 Skyhawks had recently landed there. A Skyguard section claims to have hit two GR3s just before the pilots opened fire.[47] Indeed, the RAF acknowledges that the two aircraft were badly hit, but the source of the damage is unclear. The engine of the leading Harrier, XV789, had to be replaced onboard the Hermes.

File:Gada82-Roland.jpg
Roland-2 unit and crew at Port Stanley, May 1982

On June 1st, the Roland-2 system claim a Sea Harrier over the airport. The aircraft, XZ456, was in a recce mission 7 km south of Stanley, apparently out of the reach of the missile, but tracked by its radar. The Argentinian officer on charge of the unit, Lt. Regalini, fired the Roland despite the target being 7,000 meters away. The pilot, Flt. Lt. Ian Mortimer, climbed up, confident that he had successfully outmaneuvered the missile. A couple of seconds later, the rear bay of his jet was torn apart by the explosion of the proximity fuse, leaving only the cockpit undamaged. Mortimer’s ejection was witnessed by hundreds of Argentinian troops. After a 9-hours ordeal at sea, he was recovered by a British helicopter.[48]

File:Gada82-Sk.jpg
Skyguard radar unit destroyed

The GADA lost four men to a Shrike missile strike on June 3. While at least two Skyguard units were fighting off an air attack –believed at that time to be conducted by Harriers- two missiles were fired by one Vulcan bomber involved in the operation Black Buck six. The long range radars switched off their emissions as usual, but the two Skyguard systems waited until it was too late for one of them. Second Lt. Huergo’s section claims that them locked a “bomb” and destroyed it in mid-air –it may be they hit one of the missiles- but at the same time of this explosion, another blast was heard. The other missile, mounted on the radar wave of the 1st section of battery A’s Skyguard had hit its target.[49] First Lt. Alejandro Dachary, and three of his men were killed. Another soldier survived the attack.[50] Apparently the operator, warned by the alarm, turned off the radar, but the missile was already in terminal phase and hit home anyway.[51]

During a naval bombardment against Sapper Hill, on the night of June 11, the GADA’s main radar was damaged and another soldier was killed. The radar was again operational a few hours later.

In what may have been the last GADA 601 success in this war, Harrier XW919 was hit by shrapnel and seriously damaged on June 12, while dropping CBUs on an artillery positon near Sapper Hill. During the recovery, the aircraft caught fire on Hermes flight deck, owing to a fractured reaction pipe.[52] Argentinian sources claim that the aircraft was hit by AAA after the attack. A 155 mm gun was lightly damaged and six soldiers injured. The account mistakes the CBUs for rockets.[53] Sapper Hill was defended by at least one GADA section.[54]

The eastern most section of the group took part of the battle of Wireless Ridge, supporting the withdrawal of the Regiment of Infantry 7 with 35 mm fire.

After the Argentinian capitulation, the bulk of the group returned to the mainland on 17 June 1982.[55]

Aircraft shot down or disabled by GADA 601
Pilot Date Place Weapon Effect
Sea Harrier XZ450 Flt. Lt. Nick Taylor  04 May 1982 Goose Green 35 mm fire Shot Down
Harrier XZ988 Sqn. Ldr. Bob Iveson 27 May 1982 Goose Green 35 mm fire Shot Down
Harrier XZ963 Sqn. Ldr. Jerry Pook 30 May 1982 Stanley Racecourse 35 mm/Small arms fire Shot Down
Sea Harrier XZ456 Fl. Lt. Ian Mortimer 01 June 1982 South of Stanley airport Roland-2 missile Shot Down
Harrier XW919 Flt. Lt. Murdo McLeod 12 June 1982 Sapper Hill 35 mm splinters Out of action
Direct fire support
Date Place Target Effect
28 May 1982 Goose Green 2nd PARA Regiment 20% of casualties among PARA C Company
Company’s HQs out of action
13/14 June 1982 Wireless Ridge 2nd PARA Regiment unknown

Pecekeeping missions

After the war, the group took part in several UN peacekeeping missions since 1992 with a contingent of 200 troops. The main peacekeeping operation involving the GADA was UNPROFOR. The GADA was under the command of the Batallón Ejercito Argentino (BAE), deployed in Western Slavonia from February 1992 to November 1995. About 70 officers and NCOs of the force also joint the Fuerza de Tareas Argentina (FTA) in Cyprus.[56]

1999 Merge

As part of an Army reform, the GADA 101 was moved from Ciudadela and merged into the GADA 601 in 1999. The joint force was renamed Grupo de Artillería Antiaérea 601 Teniente General Pablo Ricchieri.

Notes

  1. ^ www.mardelplata-ayer.com.ar
  2. ^ www.mardelplata-ayer.com.ar
  3. ^ Reguera & others, page 416
  4. ^ ADA 601
  5. ^ Potash, page 234
  6. ^ Grupo de Artillería Antiaérea 601
  7. ^ La Capital newspaper, 09/23/1962
  8. ^ Burzaco, page 99
  9. ^ CONADEP report
  10. ^ www.mardelplata-ayer.com.ar
  11. ^ www.mardelplata-ayer.com.ar
  12. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, page 56
  13. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, pp. 165-166, page 212
  14. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, page 187
  15. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, pp. 166-167
  16. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, pp. 168-167
  17. ^ Jackson, page 154
  18. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, page 170
  19. ^ Andrada, pp. 86 -90
  20. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, 189
  21. ^ Jackson, Peacock, Munson and Taylor, page 309
  22. ^ “When the shooting war started, the first casualty was Lt.Nick Taylor in XZ450, brought down by I think a large AAA shell in a leading edge, though some earlier reports reckoned a Roland SAM was responsible. This was obviously uttermost a tragedy in human terms, but also a waste of a special aeroplane; 450 was the first Sea Harrier to fly, in August 1978, and had been with us at Dunsfold for development work ever since. It had taken thirteen months to instrument this aircraft for the Sea Eagle sea-skimming anti-ship missile, yet the Navy used it on a standard iron bomb raid on Goose Green.” From www.harrier.org.uk
  23. ^ Woodward, page 36
  24. ^ “Some 150 missions were flown by GR3 Harriers against well defended targets, which led to them sustaining considerable damage and further losses. On 27 May a Harrier flown by Sqdr. Cdr. Bob Iveson was shot down by AAA. (…) On 30 May a further GR3 was hit by ground fire and, losing fuel, ditched 45 nm. (83 km) short of Hermes.” Fowler, page 27
  25. ^ ”By now, following the losses of the previous days, 1 (F) is down to just three Harriers and of these only one is available for tasking.” From Joint Force Harrier commemorates 25th Anniversary
  26. ^ Fowler, pp. 27-28
  27. ^ Fernández Reguera, page 572
  28. ^ Fernández Reguera, page 562
  29. ^ En una oportunidad, se le efectuó un disparo a un Harrier, pero en el momento que el misil se aproximaba a su blanco, coincidió con una maniobra ascendente que realizó el piloto de la nave británica para arrojar una bomba. Finalmente, el misil impacta contra el arma lanzada, al tener ésta una mayor velocidad radial respecto del radar de tiro en ese instante. From El Roland en Malvinas
  30. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, page 192
  31. ^ RAF official diaries, May 22 entry
  32. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, pp. 193-194
  33. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, 194
  34. ^ Jackson, page 156
  35. ^ RAF- Goose Green
  36. ^ Battle of Goose Green
  37. ^ page 147
  38. ^ page 148
  39. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, page 196
  40. ^ Quince minutos después un oficial dijo que debíamos rendirnos, y ninguno de nosotros quería hacerlo. Las bajas (por los dos lados) habían sido terribles, y queríamos seguir luchando. From an interview to GADA soldier Víctor Daniel Urbani, Somos magazine, issue 301, 25 June 1982
  41. ^ RAF diaries, 30 May entry
  42. ^ Moro, page 351, first edition
  43. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, page 158
  44. ^ “During another action, an enemy aircraft fell victim to the 601 Air Defense’s 35mm batteries. The plane came down in the water and the pilot, Maj. Jerry Pook, was rescued shortly after.” Moro, page 272, English version
  45. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, page 159
  46. ^ “En route to the target area, my radio began playing up and went dead for a short time. Fortunately the problem cleared itself for awhile just before the attack. I flew through concentrated small arms fire from the ground just before the target and my aircraft was hit. I felt a fairly heavy thump, but everything seemed all right so I carried on with my attack which was on a helicopter landing site. This was deserted, so I flew on to the secondary target, an artillery position about 2 miles away. Coming over a hill saw the position in front of me and fired both 2 inch rockets at it, swamping the area with weapons. It was then I realised that things were not at all well. My wing man signalled that I was losing fuel -that must have been the heavy thump earlier. Just before my radio packed up totally my wing man told me that thefuel loss rate was increasing; by now I also had a hydraulic failure the Number 1 system. The radio failed again and I felt totally on my own. I decided to try to fly as far as I could towards the carriers I turned out over the sea and flew in the direction of the carrier force. But only minutes later I realised I wouldn't make it. My only hope lay in getting as close to the task force as possible.” Godden, page 53
  47. ^ Fernández Reguera, pp. 563-564
  48. ^ Smith, page 97
  49. ^ La pieza a mi cargo impactó una de las bombas, y la explosión fue simultánea con la del misil que voló la unidad del Teniente Dachary. El Shrike había sido lanzado por un Vulcan que estaba volando a 6,000 metros de altura. Fernández Reguera, page 564
  50. ^ Along with Dachary lost their lives Sergeant René P. Blanco, soldiers Jorge Llamas and Oscar Diarte. Another soldier survived uninjured.
  51. ^ Balza, page 258
  52. ^ ”During the attack, Macleod's aircraft was hit by shrapnel which penetrated the rear equipment bay area of the aircraft and fractured the aft reaction control air pipe. On decelerating to the hover during the recovery, this caused a fire to start in the rear equipment bay and smoke as seen coming from the aircraft. Fuel indications suggested a considerable fuel leak at the same time. MacLeod executed a very quick and professional landing in worrying circumstances. Having landed-on, the fire was extinguished by the groundcrew.” RAF diaries , 12 June entry
  53. ^ En uno de esos ataques -12 de Junio- el enemigo en vuelo rasante (150 mts. del suelo) descargó todos sus cohetes sobre el cañón: resultaron seis heridos leves y fue “tocado” por la propia artillería antiaérea; uno de los sirvientes descargó sobre la máquina enemiga su fusil FAL; el cañón continuó en servicio. Rodríguez Mottino, page 91
  54. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, page 70
  55. ^ Rodríguez Mottino, page 184
  56. ^ www.mardelplata-ayer.com.ar

References

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  • Balza, Martín: Operationes Terrestres en las Islas Malvinas: El Combate contra el Enemigo Aéreo.Círculo militar, Buenos Aires, 1985. ISBN 9504306187. Template:Es
  • Burzaco, Ricardo: Infierno en el monte tucumano. RE Editores, 1994. ISBN 9789879676431. Template:Es
  • Fernández Reguera, José: La Guerra de las Malvinas. Ed. Fernández Reguera, Buenos Aires, 1987. Template:Es
  • Fitz-Gibbon, Spencer: Not Mentioned in Dispatches. James Clarke and Co., 1995. ISBN 0718830164. Transclusion error: {{En}} is only for use in File namespace. Use {{lang-en}} or {{in lang|en}} instead.
  • Fowler & others: Battle of the Falklands: Air Forces. Osprey , 1982. ISBN 085045493X. Transclusion error: {{En}} is only for use in File namespace. Use {{lang-en}} or {{in lang|en}} instead.
  • Godden, John: Harrier: Ski Jump to Victory. British Aerospace Publishing, 1983. ISBN 0080311679. Transclusion error: {{En}} is only for use in File namespace. Use {{lang-en}} or {{in lang|en}} instead.
  • Jackson, Peacock, Munson and Taylor: Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft. Jane’s information group, 1996. ISBN 0710613776. Transclusion error: {{En}} is only for use in File namespace. Use {{lang-en}} or {{in lang|en}} instead.
  • Jackson, Robert: The RAF in Action: From Flanders to the Falklands. Sterling Publishers Co., 1985. ISBN 0713714190. Transclusion error: {{En}} is only for use in File namespace. Use {{lang-en}} or {{in lang|en}} instead.
  • Moro, Rubén Oscar: La Guerra Inaudita. Ed. Pleamar. (1st Edition). 1985. Template:Es
  • Moro, Rubén Oscar: The History of the South Atlantic Conflict: The War for the Malvinas. Praeguer, New York, 1989. ISBN 0275930815. Transclusion error: {{En}} is only for use in File namespace. Use {{lang-en}} or {{in lang|en}} instead.
  • Potash, Robert:El Ejército y la Política en Argentina. 1945-1962. Ed. Sudamericana, 1984. ISBN 9500700085. Template:Es
  • Rodríguez Mottino, Héctor: La Artillería Argentina en Malvinas. Ed. Clío, 1984. ISBN 9509377023. Template:Es
  • Smith, Gordon: Battle Atlas of the Falklands War 1982. Lulu.com, 2006. ISBN 1847539505. Transclusion error: {{En}} is only for use in File namespace. Use {{lang-en}} or {{in lang|en}} instead.
  • Woodward, Sandy: The one hundred days. Naval Institute Press, 1997. ISBN 0002157233. Transclusion error: {{En}} is only for use in File namespace. Use {{lang-en}} or {{in lang|en}} instead.