Operation Lüttich

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Operation Lüttich
Part of World War II, Battle of Normandy
DateAugust 7August 13, 1944
Location
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
Allied Powers Germany Germany
Commanders and leaders
United States Omar Bradley Germany Hans von Kluge
Strength
5 infantry divisions,
3 armoured combat commands
3 Panzer Divisions,
2 infantry divisions,
5 panzer or infantry battlegroups
Casualties and losses
N/A N/A

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Operation Lüttich was a counterattack launched by German forces on the left flank of the Allied lodgment around Mortain (the objective of Operation Cobra). Part of the Battle of Normandy during World War II, it began on 7 August, and had been successfully repulsed within six days, mainly by the efforts of the 30th Infantry Division (United States Army). The counterattack foundered against well organised Allied defense, aided by Ultra decrypts that had alerted SHAEF to the movement.

"Lüttich" is the name “Liege” in German, a reference to the World War I Battle of Liege, in which a similar maneuver had finally broken Belgian resistance to the German advance.

Situation

On July 25, 1944, after several weeks of near-stalemate, the Americans had broken through the German defences on the western flank of the Normandy beachhead, in Operation Cobra. On August 1, they seized Avranches. With the capture of this town, and an intact bridge at Pontaubault nearby, the Americans had "turned the corner"; the German line could no longer be anchored against the sea on both flanks. Over the next three days, no less than seven divisions of the newly-activated United States Third Army were pushed through the narrow bottleneck at Avranches, and fanned out through north-western France.

Meanwhile, the British Second Army mounted a supporting offensive, Operation Bluecoat, which intercepted several of the Panzer divisions being rushed to the western flank. The First United States Army also advanced to Mortain, where they held easily defended terrain.

The German high command in the West, under Field Marshal Günther von Kluge, had no fixed plans to deal with this crisis. On their right flank, their defences south and east of Caen were intact, and von Kluge originally intended to use his Panzer (armoured) divisions to fight a delaying action on his left flank while his armies made a deliberate withdrawal across the Seine River. Adolf Hitler refused to allow any retreat. He insisted instead on a counter-attack to retake Avranches, and thereby cut off the American troops now driving through Brittany and Maine. He despatched General Walter Warlimont to emphasise his radio and telephone orders.

Von Kluge, and SS General Paul Hausser, commanding the German Seventh Army, knew the order to be suicidal, but also that it would be futile to dispute it. They determined to launch the attack as soon as possible, before the situation deteriorated further. Hitler had demanded that eight Panzer divisions be used in the attack, but only four (one of them incomplete) could be relieved in the line and assembled in time.

The German attack

Omar Bradley had reliable and timely intelligence of the German intentions, thanks to ULTRA, and air reconnaissance. The Germans launched their attack soon after midnight on August 7. North of Mortain, the German 2nd Panzer Division penetrated the American lines but was stopped by a combat command of U.S. 3rd Armored Division. South of the town, the 2nd SS Division Das Reich and a battlegroup of 1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler made little progress against 30th Infantry Division. 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment, of the 30th Division was cut off, but fought on with supplies dropped to it by parachute.

The morning of August 7 was foggy, but as the fog dispersed, Allied fighter-bombers appeared over the battlefield in great numbers. (With knowledge of the German plans, the RAF Second Tactical Air Force had been released to operate on the American front, augmenting the American Ninth Air Force.) Soon the German XLVII Panzer Corps was complaining that the situation was intolerable. The Germans were caught in the open in daylight by the Allied aircraft, and suffered severe losses and disruption.

The American counter-moves

Through August 7, American troops had continued to press south near Vire, on the right flank of the German attack. The German 116th Panzer Division, supposed to advance in this sector, was actually driven back. Meanwhile, Bradley sent two armoured combat commands against the German southern (left) flank. On August 8, one of these was attacking the rear of the two German SS Panzer divisions. Although fighting would continue around Mortain for several more days, there was no further prospect of any German success.

Also on the same day, units from the U.S. Third Army were advancing unchecked through the area south of the Mortain offensive, and some were attacking the vital supply centre of Le Mans. That evening, Hitler ordered the attack at Mortain to be renewed, and even demanded that the German 9th Panzer Division, struggling to hold Le Mans, be moved to aid in the attack. Von Kluge acquiesced in this apparently suicidal order. He probably feared that the Gestapo would soon discover incriminating evidence against him in the aftermath of the July 20 Plot and was anxious to prove his loyalty. The proposed stronger counter-attack was soon overtaken by events, and never mounted.

Aftermath and results

When, by conventional military wisdom, the Germans should have been retreating east, they were attacking west by Hitler's order. The result was the near encirclement of the German armies in the Falaise pocket a few days later.

Sources