Operation Compass
British Matilda II tank during Operation Compass (December 19, 1940)
| date | December 8, 1940 to February 9, 1941 |
|---|---|
| place | North Africa ( Italian Libya , Egypt ) |
| exit | allied victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
|
|
| Troop strength | |
| 36,000 men, 120 artillery pieces, 275 tanks |
180,000 men, 1,600 artillery pieces, 600 tanks |
| losses | |
|
494 killed, |
400 tanks, |
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The Operation Compass was the first major military operation of the Allies of World War II in North Africa. Between December 1940 and February 1941, British and Commonwealth forces counterattacked the Italian troops in Egypt and later the Italian colony of Libya after the Italian invasion of Egypt . The operation proved extremely successful with the annihilation of the Italian 10th Army . About 130,000 Italian soldiers were taken prisoner of war and thousands of tanks, artillery pieces and planes were destroyed.
background
Italy had declared war on France and Great Britain on June 10, 1940. The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini assumed that the war would only be brief and hoped to be able to satisfy some of Italy's territorial claims through an alliance with the German Empire. In North Africa, on the one hand, these consisted of an expansion of the colony of Italian Libya to the west to include the French protectorate of Tunisia . To the east, Italy sought control over Egypt and the strategically important Suez Canal , as well as establishing a direct land connection to its colonies in East Africa. After France had been defeated in the western campaign and Tunisia belonged to the now allied Vichy France , the Italian expansion goals in North Africa were directed entirely towards Egypt. On September 9, 1940, Italy marched into Egypt with the 10th Army at the request of the Germans , which, due to the poor supply and the slow march speed with the capture of Sidi Barrani, ultimately yielded only small gains in land in Egypt. The numerically clearly inferior Allied troops were able to retreat to Mersa Matruh with only minor losses during the Italian offensive, which lasted only until September 16, and stabilize their position there.
Military starting position
The 10th Army dug into Sidi Barrani at the end of October. Due to the poor supply situation for his troops, Mario Berti shrank from making another advance towards Egypt. The Italian high command, which had originally called for an advance to the Suez Canal , was mainly occupied with the Italian invasion of Greece from October 28, 1940 and exerted little pressure on Berti to resume the advance.
Great Britain faced Italy on three fronts at the end of November 1940: Italian troops from Libya had invaded north-west Egypt, in East Africa they had occupied the Horn of Africa from Italian East Africa , and they had advanced to Greece via Albania . The commander in chief of the Middle East Command Archibald Wavell decided to concentrate his forces on East Africa first. The Italian troops were on the one hand the most exposed and on the other hand posed the greatest threat to the British supply lines across the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal. In the north-west of Egypt, the Italian army was also to be bound by a limited Allied operation initially limited to five days.
Allied attack plan
The Western Desert Force's plan of attack called for a quick and unnoticed advance about 60 km south of the coastal road. The 7th Armored Division and the 4th Infantry Division were then to advance into the gap between the Italian camps Sofafi and Nibeiwa. During a brigadeIf the 4th Division, supported by the tanks of the 7th, were to attack the strongest Italian formation stationed in Nibeiwa, the Maletti group, the remaining troops would cordon off Sofafi and repel possible counter-attacks by the Italian "Kyrene" division stationed there. After the successful capture of Nibeiwa, a second Indian brigade would again attack the two Italian positions near Tummar with tank support. At the same time, the Coldstream Guards from Mersa Matruh were to advance along the coastal road and set fire to the Italian position at Maktula. The Royal Navywould support the attack by bombarding Maktula and Sidi Barrani. If the attacks were successful, Sidi Barrani should be retaken on the second day and the further west possible advance should take place in the following three days.
On November 25th and 26th an exercise was carried out during which the Allied troops tried to storm two camps. Only a few officers knew that this was in preparation for an actually upcoming operation. Another exercise, the soldiers learned, was scheduled for December 7th.
Involved armed forces
Italy
The 10th Italian Army , led by Mario Berti and advanced to Egypt , had ten divisions at the beginning of December 1940, divided into four corps (XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII) and a “Group of Libyan Divisions” (“ Gruppo Divisioni Libiche ”) 150,000 men in total. Only the Maletti group was partially motorized and also had 70 tanks, half of which were light L3 / 35 and half the medium-weight M11 / 39 from Fiat. The remaining infantry divisions were not motorized. The artillery and anti-tank guns carried were mostly of smaller caliber. The 10th Army emerged from the air with around 330 CR.32 and CR.42 aircraft supported.
Mario Berti was on sick leave at the beginning of Operation Compass, so his deputy Italo Gariboldi commanded the army. Berti was finally released from command on December 23rd and General Giuseppe Tellera took over the leadership of the 10th Army.
- 10th Italian Army
- XX. corps
- 60th Infantry Division "Sabratha"
- XXI. corps
- 1st Black Shirt Division “23. March""
- 2nd Black Shirt Division “28. October"
- 63rd Infantry Division "Cyrene"
- XXII. corps
- 61st Infantry Division "Sirte"
- XXIII. corps
- 4th Black Shirt Division “3. January"
- 64th Infantry Division "Catanzaro"
- "Group of Libyan Divisions" ("Gruppo Divisioni Libiche")
- Maletti group
- 1st Libyan Division "Sibelle"
- 2nd Libyan Division "Pescatori"
- Brigata Corazzato Speciale "Babini" (from January 1941)
- XX. corps
Allies
The allied forces (“Western Desert Force”) in Egypt, led by Richard O'Connor , comprised about 36,000 men, divided into two divisions and an additional brigade. Another division was brought in as a replacement from mid-December. The tanks of the Cruiser and Matilda class that were carried were clearly superior to the Italian models. Air support was provided by around 140 Gloster Gladiators .
- Western Desert Force (from 1941: XIII Corps)
- 7th Armored Division (United Kingdom)
- 4th Infantry Division ( British India ) (withdrew to Sudan on December 14th )
- 6th Division (Australia) (participated in the operation from December 14th)
- 16th Infantry Brigade (United Kingdom)
- 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards (United Kingdom)
Course of the operation
The Battle of the Camps or the Battle of Marmarica
preparation
On the night of December 7th and 8th, the two Allied divisions began their advance as planned and unnoticed to the starting position of the attack southeast of Sofafi and Nibeiwa. Only there did the soldiers learn that the announced exercise would actually be the start of the offensive. On December 8th, the Royal Air Force (RAF) began attacking Italian airfields and was able to destroy 29 enemy aircraft. On the night of December 9th, the Shelby Force, an Allied task force of just 1,800 men, took up position east of Maktila. She set up dummy tanks there and was supposed to launch a mock attacklead to the camp at Maktila in order to make the Italian army command believe that the main attack would be carried out along the coastal road. In support of the diversion, the Royal Navy bombed the Italian position at Maktila on December 8 with the HMS Terror and the HMS Aphis , while the HMS Ladybird took Sidi Barrani under fire. Although an Italian reconnaissance aircraft had discovered the Allied divisions in the south on December 8th, this warning of the actual main attack at the instigation of Maletti was ignored.
The first fighting
On December 9th at 5:00 a.m., Allied artillery finally opened fire on Nibeiwa from the east. At about 7.15 a.m., a brigade of the Indian division with tank support advanced from the northwest against Nibeiwa as planned . After just over an hour of fighting, Nibeiwa was taken. Of the 2500 men in the Maletti group, around 2000 were taken prisoner. General Maletti himself was killed in the attack. Of the tanks belonging to the group, 23 M11 / 23 were destroyed, the remainder could be captured along with a large number of other supplies. The British troops had lost only 56 men.
Only a few hours later, at 1:50 p.m., another brigade of the Indian division, with tank support, advanced against the Italian camps near Tummar. Even if the attackers met tough resistance there, the western camp near Tummar could be taken by 4:00 pm. Most of the eastern camp was also taken by nightfall. While the fighting there was still going on, a reconnaissance regiment of the 7th Division advanced in a north-westerly direction to the coast to cut off the road between Buq Buq and Sidi Barrani.
On the night of December 9th to 10th, the remnants of the 2nd Libyan Division withdrew from Tummar to Sidi Barani. The 1st Libyan Division also left its position at Maktila to reposition itself in Sidi Barrani. On December 10, the divisions of the Western Desert Force advanced and sealed off Sidi Barrani. The attack on the city began at around 4:00 p.m. and could be captured by the evening. The remnants of now four Italian divisions withdrew from the city under cover of darkness towards the coast road to the east, but ended their retirement when they encountered the Shelby troop approaching them from Maktila.
On December 11, the remaining Italian defenders on the coast were attacked again and soon surrendered. At the same time a regiment of the 7th Division moved into Buq Buq and brought the city under their control with little resistance. The order to attack the last remaining Italian camp near Sofafi in the south arrived too late on December 11th. The "Cyrene" division stationed there had withdrawn to the west the night before.
Advance to the Libyan border
Until December 15, the Western Desert Force advanced over the Halfaya Pass and was finally able to take Sollum and Fort Capuzzo. An advance command of the 7th Panzer Division had bypassed Bardia and sealed off the road from there to Tobruk . The advance turned out to be more difficult than expected, because on the one hand the road was almost overcrowded with fleeing Italian troops and material left behind, and on the other hand the supply of the troops could only be guaranteed with difficulty. The main reason for this was that around 20 times more Italian soldiers had become prisoners of war than expected.
In total, the British troops took over 38,000 prisoners and captured well over 200 guns and 73 tanks in these first battles for the camps. Four Italian divisions, the 1st and 2nd Libyan, the 4th Black Shirt and the 64th, had been practically destroyed. There were four generals among the prisoners. The Allied forces had lost around 700 men.
This battle of the first day of Operation Compass was (under the name "Battle of the Camps" "The Battle of the Camp" ) in the English historiography one. In Italy the name “Battle of Marmarica”, after the name of the coastal region around Sidi Barrani, became common.
Regrouping of allied troops
After the resounding successes of the first few days, the commander of the Western Desert Force Richard O'Connor was eager to continue the offensive. Instead of the originally planned five-day operation, an advance to Benghazi now seemed possible. Already on December 11th, General Wavell , the Commander in Chief of the British Armed Forces in the Middle East, signaled that the 4th Indian Division was urgently needed for the fight in Italian East Africa . Looking back, O'Connor commented on this demand with the words:
"[This] came as a complete and very unpleasant surprise [...] It put 'paid' to the question of immediate exploitation."
"This was a complete and very unpleasant surprise [...] The question of immediately exploiting the situation was thus settled."
The 4th Indian Division was replaced by the 6th Australian Division on December 14th . This led to an inevitable pause in further offensive operations, but also represented a weakening of the combat strength of the Western Desert Force. The Australian division had no combat experience, had only one regiment of artillery and no armored vehicles.
Advance into Libya
Bardia
Despite these difficulties, the offensive continued, the next target being the port city of Bardia in Libya. In addition to the 1st Schwarzhemd Division stationed there, the remains of all other Italian divisions that had been broken up in the past few days had gathered there. Overall, the well-fortified city was defended by about 40,000 men under General Annibale Bergonzoli and even some tanks of the new type M13 / 40 , which, with their 47 mm cannon, were the first Italian tank model to pose a serious threat to the British tanks. The defense consisted of several lines of barbed wire, an anti-tank ditch in front and a double row of concrete-reinforced defensive positions.
The Western Desert Force, meanwhile in XIII. Renamed Corps, the attack on Bardia took time. Almost three weeks were spent supplying the regrouped troops, sealing off Bardia, and carefully preparing the attack on the city. Finally, on January 3rd, the 6th Australian Division opened the attack on Bardia from the west. They managed to cross the anti-tank trench and give the Matilda II tanks of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment access to the fortress. On the first day, the bridgehead created in this way within the fortress was extended to the second line of defense. On the second day, the 16th Brigade was able to overcome this and take the city of Bardia. The fortress was thus split in the middle and the Italian defense was divided into a southern and a northern sector. On the third day of the attack on Bardia, the northern defensive section surrendered, while the southern section was initially reduced in size in hours of fighting and finally also abandoned. A total of around 40,000 Italians were taken prisoner by the British. In addition, hundreds of guns of all calibers, over 100 tanks and around 700 trucks were captured in the fortress. Sometimes the Italians surrendered to small Allied units by the thousands without major resistance. The losses of the 6th Australian Division in the attack on Bardia amounted to 130 dead and a little over 300 wounded. On the third day of the attack on Bardia, the northern defensive section surrendered, while the southern section was initially reduced in size in hours of fighting and finally also abandoned. A total of around 40,000 Italians were taken prisoner by the British. In addition, hundreds of guns of all calibers, over 100 tanks and around 700 trucks were captured in the fortress. Sometimes the Italians surrendered to small Allied units by the thousands without major resistance. The losses of the 6th Australian Division in the attack on Bardia amounted to 130 dead and a little over 300 wounded. On the third day of the attack on Bardia, the northern defensive section surrendered, while the southern section was initially reduced in size in hours of fighting and finally also abandoned. A total of around 40,000 Italians were taken prisoner by the British. In addition, hundreds of guns of all calibers, over 100 tanks and around 700 trucks were captured in the fortress. Sometimes the Italians surrendered to small Allied units by the thousands without major resistance. The losses of the 6th Australian Division in the attack on Bardia amounted to 130 dead and a little over 300 wounded. In addition, hundreds of guns of all calibers, over 100 tanks and around 700 trucks were captured in the fortress. Sometimes the Italians surrendered to small Allied units by the thousands without major resistance. The losses of the 6th Australian Division in the attack on Bardia amounted to 130 dead and a little over 300 wounded. In addition, hundreds of guns of all calibers, over 100 tanks and around 700 trucks were captured in the fortress. Sometimes the Italians surrendered to small Allied units by the thousands without major resistance. The losses of the 6th Australian Division in the attack on Bardia amounted to 130 dead and a little over 300 wounded.
After this renewed defeat it had become apparent that the Italian position in Libya could not be held for much longer without German support. On January 11th, Hitler issued “Instruction No. 22” in support of the Italians in the Mediterranean region. In the following days, preparations began in the German OKW for the deployment of the 5th light division , equipped with tanks , which was to arrive in Libya in February ( company Sonnenblume ). Previously, the X. Air Corps had already started operations from Sicily against targets in the central Mediterranean.
Tobruk
On the day of the fall of Bardia, parts of the 7th Panzer Division had Tobrukreached and sealed off. By January 9, further Allied troops had advanced to secure the encirclement of Tobruk. Again, the attack was preceded by a waiting period of twelve days in order to build up the troops and to plan the attack. Tobruk's defensive lines were similar to those of Bardia. The city was defended by about 25,000 men, consisting of the 61st Division "Sirte" and garrison troops. A major problem for the Allies turned out to be that after the strenuous advance and the fighting of the previous five weeks, almost all tanks failed and short-term repairs were not possible due to the tense supply situation. During the storming of Tobruk, the artillery therefore played an important role in softening the enemy positions and supporting the infantry advance.
The attack on Tobruk finally began on the morning of January 21st and was again led by the Australian 6th Division. The fighting that lasted the whole day was extremely tough and the Italian defenders managed in places to drive the Australians back by counter-attacks. Nevertheless, large parts of Tobruk were under Allied control by evening. By the afternoon of January 22nd, the last Italian defenses were overrun. About 23,000 Italians were taken prisoner, and about 2,000 more had died in the fighting. The Australian division recorded 400 dead and injured.
Darna
While the Allied troops were besieging Bardia and Tobruk, an additional troop was set up in Italy to defend Italian Libya under the leadership of Valentino Babini . The so-called Special Armored Brigade “Babini” ( Brigata Corazzato Speciale “Babini”, BCS) consisted of volunteers, supported by pioneers trained in tank combat and was equipped with anti-tank mines , artillery and 55 M13 / 40s. The BCS arrived in Benghazi in early January 1941 and, after ten days of preparations, set out east to face the Allied troops.
After the fall of Tobruk, the Allies resumed the advance. While the 6th Australian Division advanced along the coastal road on Darna , the 7th Panzer Division swung onto the route south of the Green Mountain to Benghazi via Mechilione. On the way there, she met BCS units for the first time on January 24th, and although nine M13 / 40s were destroyed, seven of their own tanks, including a cruiser, were also lost. The following day, the 6th Australian Division at Darna Airfield also had contact with the BCS for the first time. Although Darna could already be taken on January 26th, there were several days of continued fighting with the BCS and the 60th Division “Sabratha”. A major attack by the Italians on January 27th could only be repulsed with difficulty. It was only when the Italian troops were threatened with encirclement by Allied troops that they broke off the battle for Darna and withdrew along the coastal road towards Benghazi.
The battle of Beda Fomm
At the end of January, the Italian high command decided to completely evacuate the Kyrenaika . All units were to withdraw via the coastal road to El Agheila . O'Connor knew that the only way to prevent the 10th Army from withdrawing was to cut them off south of Benghazi. While the 6th Australian Division was directly pursuing the Italian troops along the coastal road, the 7th Panzer Division was to hurry south of the Green Mountain to the coast north of Ajdabiya at the highest possible speed .
Since the difficult terrain and the long distance posed a great challenge for the division, it was decided that an advance command with particularly fast vehicles and economical equipment should be dispatched. This ad hoc compiled Combe Force , named after its commander John Combe , consisted of about 2,000 men, equipped with armored wheeled vehiclesand anti-tank guns. Despite all the adversity, the Combe Force reached the coastal road about 20 miles north of Ajdabiya on the afternoon of February 5. Only half an hour after their arrival the first heads of the withdrawing 10th Italian Army arrived. Fighting broke out immediately, but the advance of 10th Army could be stopped. In the evening of the same day, the remaining units of the 7th Panzer Division gradually arrived and blocked the breakout of the Italian troops in the direction of the desert near Beda Fomm.
In the course of February 6, ever larger parts of the 10th Army arrived at the blockade of the Combe Force or Beda Fomm and the fighting intensified. The BCS was supposed to take over the rear protection of the 10th Army and was therefore largely stationed in Benghazi. They too were now set in motion in the direction of the blockade in order to force a breakthrough with their tanks. On February 7th, there was a final Italian attack on the Allied positions. Even if some of the tanks managed to break through the British positions, the march through of the remaining Italian troops was ultimately prevented. The 6th Australian Division had meanwhile taken Benghazi and was now rapidly approaching from the north. The remains of the 10th The Italian army and the BCS surrendered at noon on February 7th. Giuseppe Tellera, commander of the 10th Army, was among the Italians killed in action. O'Connor noted in his field diary:
"I think this may be termed a complete victory as none of the enemy escaped."
"I think this can be called a complete victory as none of the enemies escaped."
On the same day the Allied troops were marched again to occupy El Agheila and to pursue the few remaining Italian troops who were able to move west on other routes.
consequences
After ten weeks, the Allies had advanced 800 km, captured or destroyed 400 Italian tanks and 1292 artillery pieces, and took 130,000 prisoners of war, including 22 generals . Their own losses amounted to 494 dead and 1,225 wounded. Only about 30,000 Italian soldiers had escaped the debacle in Cyrenaica in western Libya.
Despite the overwhelming success that the Allied troops had achieved, on February 9, shortly after the capture of El Agheila, Winston Churchill ordered that the advance should be halted. The meanwhile extremely stretched supply lines, but also the impending Balkan campaign of the German Reich prompted Churchill to be careful. He wanted as many troops as possible to be available in good condition so that they could be transferred across the Mediterranean to Greece if necessary . Operation Compass was over.
Italy suffered a heavy defeat, but was already preparing to retake Cyrenaica. The 5th Army in western Libya was supplied with additional divisions and Operation Sunflower , which began on February 8, 1941, promised German support in the form of the Africa Corps for this project. On March 25, Graziani, who had already left Libya in February, resigned from his post as Governor General of Italian Libya and was replaced by Italo Gariboldi.
literature
- Gavin Long: Australia in the War of 1939-1945. Series 1st Army. Volume I, To Benghazi , chapters 6-11. Australia War memorial: corrected reprint, Canberra 1961. Online edition
- Jon Latimer: Operation Compass 1940: Wavell's Whirlwind Offensive. Osprey: Oxford 2000. ISBN 1-85532-967-0 .
- Indro Montanelli: L'Italia della disfatta. Rizzoli editore: Milan 1982. OCLC 252028214.
sources
- Archibald Wavell: Operations in the Middle East from August, 1939 to November, 1940. Wavell's Official Despatches , in: London Gazette, (Supplement) No. 37609. pp. 2997-3006. June 13, 1946.
- Archibald Wavell: Operations in the Middle East from 7th December, 1940 to 7th February, 1941. Wavell's Official Despatches , in: London Gazette, (Supplement) No. 37628. pp. 3261-3269. June 25, 1946.
- Archibald Wavell: Operations in the Middle East from 7th February, 1941 to 15th July, 1941. Wavell's Official Despatches , in: London Gazette, (Supplement) No. 37638. pp. 3423-3444. July 2, 1946.
Web links
- Operation Compass animated map