Company Theseus

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Company Theseus
Provisional road sign near Tobruk, August 1942.
Provisional road sign near Tobruk, August 1942.
date May 26 to June 21, 1942
place Cyrenaica , Italian Libya
output Axis victory
Parties to the conflict

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) German Empire Italy
Italy 1861Kingdom of Italy (1861-1946) 

United KingdomUnited Kingdom United Kingdom British India South African Union Free France Poland
British IndiaBritish India 
South Africa 1928South African Union 
Free FranceFree France 
PolandPoland 

Commander

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) Erwin Rommel Ettore Bastico
Italy 1861Kingdom of Italy (1861-1946)

United KingdomUnited Kingdom Claude Auchinleck Neil Ritchie
United KingdomUnited Kingdom

Troop strength
90,000 men,
565 tanks,
400 aircraft 		110,000 men,
around 1200 tanks (849 at the beginning and 350–400 later as reinforcements)
190 aircraft
losses

3,360 men killed, wounded or taken prisoner on the German side; Italian losses unknown, but lower; approx. 400 destroyed tanks

50,000 men killed, wounded or captured; 1188 destroyed tanks

Major military operations during the Africa campaign (1940-1943)

Operation Theseus (often referred to as the Battle of Gazala ) was the cover name for an offensive by the Axis powers during the Africa campaign in World War II . The aim of the military enterprise was the encirclement of the Allied army, which was buried in fortified positions between Gazala and Bir Hakeim, and the capture of the Tobruk fortress . The successful offensive led to the further advance of the German-Italian troops as far as El Alamein and thus the furthest eastern advance of the Axis powers in North Africa during the Second World War.

background

Italy had declared war on France and Great Britain on June 10, 1940. The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini assumed that the war would only be brief and hoped to be able to satisfy some of Italy's territorial claims through an alliance with the German Empire. In North Africa these consisted on the one hand of an expansion of the colony of Italian Libya towards the west around the French protectorate of Tunisia . To the east, Italy sought control over Egypt and the strategically important Suez Canal, as well as establishing a direct land connection to its colonies in East Africa . After France had been defeated in the western campaign and Tunisia belonged to the now allied Vichy France , the Italian expansion goals in North Africa turned entirely to Egypt. On September 9, 1940, Italy finally invaded Egypt with the 10th Army .

Course of the war in North Africa

However, the invasion was unsuccessful and, due to the poor supply and equipment of the troops, it only came to a halt a little more than 100 km behind the Libyan-Egyptian border. On December 8, the Allies launched a counter-offensive with Operation Compass . Originally limited to just a few days and aimed at driving the Italian army out of Egypt, it turned out to be so successful that the advance into Libya was continued. By the beginning of February 1941 the Allied troops had occupied the Cyrenaica up to and including El Agheila and almost completely wiped out the Italian 10th Army.

The complete capture of Italian Libya did not occur, however, because parts of the Allied troops deployed in North Africa were to be used to repel the impending Balkan campaign of the German Reich in April 1941. While the Allies withdrew troops to defend Greece from February 1941 , Germany secretly shipped its first troop contingents to Tripoli in the so-called company Sonnenblume and founded the German Africa Corps . Only a few weeks after his arrival, the Afrikakorps commanded by Erwin Rommel and the Italian divisions in Libya started another offensive. The few and mostly inexperienced Allied troops hastily withdrew from Cyrenaica.

In the course of April, the Axis powers had again advanced to the Halfaya Pass on Egyptian territory. Only the strategically important deep water port of Tobruk was still held by an Allied occupation. After a series of attacks on Tobruk in April and early May 1941 had failed, Rommel prepared for a longer siege of the city in order to save his limited resources . The Allied High Command in the Middle East under Archibald Wavell began planning and preparing a counter-offensive to regain control of the Cyrenaica and relieve the besieged city. The first counter-offensive - called Operation Brevity  - began on May 15th, but could achieve little more than recapturing the Halfaya Pass (and only until May 27th). At the same time (from May 20 to June 1, 1941) the airborne battle for Crete was waged, which, if the German Reich had been successful, would have significantly improved air support and supplies to the Axis powers. A second Allied offensive launched on June 15 - Operation Battleaxe  - failed with great losses of tanks, with the Allied troops barely escaping encirclement and destruction. After this failure, Archibald Wavell was replaced as Commander in Chief of the Middle East Command by Claude Auchinleck .

With an offensive launched in November 1941 - called Operation Crusader  - Auchinleck finally succeeded in relieving the besieged city of Tobruk and bringing the entire area up to the Egyptian-Libyan border under Allied control. A renewed occupation of the remaining Kyrenaika failed because of a quickly initiated counter-offensive by Rommel, which finally led to a stalemate at the beginning of February at the Allied defense belt near Gazala. Both sides were too weakened by the previous fighting and respective supply difficulties to be able to start further attacks. They dug themselves in and initially refrained from further offensives.

Military starting position

After the heavy fighting between November 1941 and February 1942, the strengths of both sides were exhausted, so that further offensives were initially not possible. Overall, the Allies were in a more advantageous position: On the one hand, their units were in well-developed positions against the German and Italian troops at Gazala, and on the other, their supply routes were significantly shorter. For the Axis powers, the supply of troops remained a constant problem due to the British dominance in the Mediterranean, which only improved slightly after the conquest of Crete and the blockade of Malta . Rommel's only hope for a shortening of the supply routes was an early capture of the deep water port of Tobruk.

Rommel's plan of attack

Rommel planned to bypass the well-developed Allied positions between Gazala and Bir Hakeim with his fast motorized troops to the south. The Italian armored division " Ariete " on the innermost position of the pivoting movement and then the German 21st and 15th Panzer Divisions should then turn to the north and advance into the rear of the British 8th Army . Bir Hakeim was to be overrun by the 21st Panzer Division. Only if the resistance there turned out to be too tough should the Italian "Ariete" division take over the fight against the position in response to the radio command "Venezia" so that the entire advance would not stall. The 90th Africa Light Division, reinforced by additional artillery and anti-aircraft battalions, was to take part in the bypass on the outermost flank. The Italian X. and XXI. Corps were to attack the Allied positions at Gazala head-on at the same time in order to distract from the evasion movement. Only the Italian 101st Division “Trieste” would not be involved in the diversionary attack, but should instead open a corridor further south through the enemy mine belt to ensure supplies for the tank divisions. About one day was set for the whole maneuver, so that on the second day of the offensive the Allied troops could be attacked in their defensive positions from two sides. The armored divisions were to receive support from the 15th Rifle Brigade , which landed behind the Allied troops with a ferry and was supposed to demine and occupy the Via Balba. The 90th light division should meanwhile occupy the airfield at El Adem and possibly bind allied reinforcements brought in from the east. By the evening of the second day of the attack, most of the Allied troops should have been wiped out. Subsequently, a coup d'etat or an attack on Tobruk lasting a maximum of two days was expected.

Despite great efforts to keep the company secret, the British were aware of the upcoming offensive through Enigma . However, neither the exact date nor the direction of attack of the enemy troops were known. Within the British leadership, Winston Churchill , Claude Auchinleck and Neil Ritchie also had very different ideas about when an attack was to be expected and what Rommel's plans were.

Involved armed forces

Axis powers

A German Panzer Command III in front of the Gazala Line, April 1942

At the beginning of the operation the Panzer Army Africa was able to bring a total of 565 tanks into the field, 281 of them Panzer III with a short 5 cm cannon ( 5 cm KwK 38 L / 42), another 19 Panzer III with a 5 cm long cannon ( 5 cm KwK 39 L / 60) and 40 Panzer IV with 7.5 cm cannon ( 7.5 cm KwK 37 L / 24). The remaining 225 tanks were various Italian models. Around 460 aircraft were available immediately in the area of ​​operation, 400 of which were immediately operational. 192 of these were German aircraft, made up of 135 fighters (95 operational) and 64 dive fighter aircraft of the Ju 87 type (54 operational). The remaining 261 aircraft were various Italian fighter and bomber models. In the event of an emergency, almost 1,000 more aircraft stationed in Greece, Crete and Sicily could have been activated.

Allies

In the run-up to the Battle of Gazala, the British received US arms deliveries, especially American M3 / Lee Grant tanks. Thanks to the 75 mm gun, the British had for the first time in the North African campaign a range and penetration power that were on a par with German tanks. Since the British had planned an offensive at Gazala themselves and were building up forces for this purpose, additional tanks arrived during Operation Theseus and were used as reinforcements in the battle. At the beginning of the battle, the Allies had 849 tanks at their disposal, consisting of 167 Grants, 149 US Stuart tanks and 257 British Crusader , 166 Valentine and 110 Matilda II tanks. The Desert Air Force had around 320 aircraft, of which only 190 were operational.

Middle East Command Claude Auchinleck

Course of the operation

Defensive Line Bypass (May 26-27)

History of the Theseus company

Operation Theseus began on May 26, 1942 with heavy artillery bombardment of the central Allied positions. At 2 p.m. the Italian divisions launched a frontal attack on the enemy lines. There were also small groups of German soldiers and tanks among the Italian units. Rommel intended to make the enemy believe that the tank army was attacking Africa in its full strength. This calculation worked in so far as the Allies immediately relocated troops from the parts of the defense line further south to the north. Under cover of darkness, the armored formations of the Axis powers began their evasion movement around 10 p.m.

At first, the maneuver went unnoticed and the troops advanced to the southern end of the defense line at Bir Hakeim. In the early morning hours of May 27th, however, there was heavy fighting between parts of the 3rd Indian Brigade defending there and the "Ariete" division and parts of the 21st Panzer Division. Only after a three-hour battle and heavy losses did the Axis forces succeed in overrun the defenders. The remnants of the Indian Brigade withdrew to Bir al Gubi. Then the division "Ariete" proceeded to attack Bir Hakeim, which was defended by the Free French Brigade. Up until June 11th, it withstood all attempts by the Axis powers to take the oasis in the so-called Battle of Bir Hakeim .

Farther east, the German 15th Panzer Division met the British 7th Army Brigade, which was advancing to support the Indian troops. Not least because of the American Grant tanks with their 75 mm guns now used by the Allies , the German Panzer Division suffered a number of losses, but was finally able to prevail. The 4th Armored Army Brigade eventually withdrew to El Adem. On the farthest side of the evasion movement, the 90th Africa Light Division encountered the 7th Motorized Brigade and was finally able to push them to the east in the direction of Bir el Gubi . The light division then continued their advance north in the morning, soon encountering and capturing the headquarters of the British 7th Armored Division. Among the prisoners was also the division commander Frank Messervy , who, however, disguised himself as an adjutant and was able to escape a little later. The 90th Light Division initially continued its advance on El Adem and finally met the 4th Armored Brigade, which had withdrawn from the fighting with the 15th Panzer Division only a few hours earlier, but was now refreshed with reinforcements . The battles that followed were tough and heavy losses, so that the light division withdrew about 5 km to the south in the evening.

The results of the company's first two days were mixed for both sides. The Axis powers had clearly missed their goals - to cut off allied troops stationed on the Gazala Line. The 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions had advanced far, but at the same time they had lost about a third of their tanks and the other units of the encircling force had stayed behind. The 90th light division faced unexpectedly strong armored forces, the “Ariete” division could neither take Bir Hakeim nor achieve the intended position and there was no longer any contact with the “Trieste” division. Overall, the armored forces of the Allies had been significantly underestimated. The advanced troops were cut off from supplies, too widely dispersed and surrounded on all sides by more or less strong enemy formations. The only positive thing to note was that large quantities of Allied supplies could be captured and the enemy command structure had been severely shaken by the attacks. The prevailing opinion among the command staff of the Panzer Army Africa was that the company had failed and that one had to get back to the starting position as soon as possible.

In the "sausage kettle"

From May 28, the Axis attack came to a halt everywhere in the south. The reinforcements brought in by the Allies blocked any further advance north. At the same time, the Free French Brigade at Bir Hakeim put up bitter resistance and repulsed all attacks by the Italian "Ariete" division day after day. In addition, the Royal Air Force intensified its attacks on Rommel's association. Wedged between Allied troops in the north and east and the Free French troops at Bir Hakeim, the way to the west blocked by a dense mine belt and thus cut off from all supplies, the situation of the Axis powers became increasingly desperate. In the English-language literature, the term "the Cauldron" ("the copper cauldron" or "the witch cauldron") was later coined for this position of the Axis powers during the company, while the German side spoke of the "sausage cauldron".

In this situation, Rommel decided to concentrate his troops in the far west of the pocket in order to prepare a safe bridgehead for the Italian "Trieste" division - which was still working on clearing a supply route through the mine belt north of Bir Hakeim. The 150th Brigade of the British 50th Infantry Division, standing at the position to be secured, was overrun on May 30th. In the end, two corridors could be secured by the defensive belt and the tank troops were supplied with supplies. Even with the supply situation improved again, it was initially not possible to continue the advance northwards. The Free French Brigade continued to hold Bir Hakeim and on June 1st and the following days were able to repel further attacks by the Ariete division - this time supported by the 90th Africa Light Division.

After the apparently successful defense against the bypass force, Claude Auchinleck urged 8th Army commander, Neil Ritchie, to undertake an immediate counter-attack (code name Operation Aberdeen ). In the north, the Italian divisions, which were operating without significant tank support, were to be pushed back and in the south the basin around the enemy tank divisions was to be tied up by further attacks. Ritchie was far less optimistic about the situation and initially gathered more troops at El Adem before launching the counterattack on June 5 at 2:50 a.m. After an initially good advance, the Allied units encountered strong resistance. The Allied tank brigades deployed in the south suffered great losses and in the early hours of the afternoon the advance had come to a standstill. In this situation, Rommel launched a counterattack. The "Ariete" division and the 21st Panzer Division advanced eastwards and the 15th Panzer Division advanced northwards. It was possible to force the Allied tank brigades to retreat and to overrun several field command posts. The Allied infantry , artillery and reconnaissance units remaining in the pocket were thus cut off from any support by tanks and were overrun one after the other on the following June 6th. The Allied XIII also succeeded against the Italian divisions in the north. Corps did not record any significant gains in land.

In the days that followed, up to June 10, Rommel repeatedly made rapid advances to the north and east in order to nip in the bud the development of another major wave of attacks. At the same time he concentrated the majority of his troops on capturing Bir Hakeim, still held by the Free French Brigade, which posed a constant threat behind the bypass troops and endangered the supply lines . Despite all efforts, it was not until June 10 that the French defensive positions were penetrated deeply. Although encircled, Major Kœnig managed to slip through enemy lines and move west with the majority of his troops (around 2,700 of the original 3,600) on the night of June 11th. When Bir Hakeim was captured by the Axis powers in the morning hours of June 11, they captured around 500 French soldiers, most of whom were too seriously injured for the nightly outbreak.

After taking Bir Hakeim, Rommel let his troops advance east and north again. By June 13th, the allied units in the so-called "Knightsbridge Box" and at El Adem were pushed back. This opened the way to Tobruk for the Axis Powers as well as the possibility of the Allied XIII. Corps, still involved in undecided fighting with the Italian divisions off Gazala, fell in the rear.

8th Army withdraws

In view of the situation, on June 14, Auchinleck ordered the Gazala Line to be abandoned. The troops were to form a new line of defense against Tobruk between Acroma in the north, El Adem and Sidi Rezegh . Even the retreat turned out to be difficult, as the coastal road did not offer sufficient capacity for the movement of all divisions and brigades. Two brigades of the 50th Infantry Division therefore had to fight their way through the lines of the Italian divisions "Brescia" and "Pavia" before starting their retreat to the east in a wide arc on the path that Rommel's bypass troops had taken. With this, these two brigades fell out of the Battle of Tobruk, because they had to leave their heavy weapons behind and not much can be achieved in the fight against tanks with infantry weapons.

Even if the withdrawal to the new positions was initially successful, they could not be held. On both June 15 and 16, the Axis powers occupied central points in defense. On June 17th, Auchinleck had no choice but to order the further retreat of the 8th Army, first to Marsa Matruh , 160 km further east, and later to El Alamein, 160 km further behind . As in the previous year, the Tobruk garrison was supposed to withstand the expected siege for at least a while and bind the troops of the Axis powers.

The case of Tobruk

German motorized units advance in Tobruk

The defense of Tobruk was transferred to the South African 2nd Division, which was supported by two other infantry, one tank and one anti-aircraft brigade. However, before the defense of the port city could be adequately organized, the Axis powers reached the city. Rommel wanted to deceive the defense of Tobruk by, as in 1941, pushing the motorized troops past the town. This also succeeded and the motorized units turned the Africa Corps and pushed into the defensive positions of the Tobruk fortress from the other side. As early as June 20, the attack on the British and South African defenders from the south-east began, whose associations were split in the further course of the fight. The cooperation of the German-Italian troops worked perfectly. For example, the attack leaders of the 21st Panzer Division worked with flares to mark the frontline of the Stukas. The dreaded eight-eight also took bunkers under direct fire. The grueling battle, which was costly for both sides, continued into the night. The following day, the Allied commander, Major General Hendrik B. Klopper, with about 35,000 men, surrendered and surrendered himself prisoner.

consequences

Immediately after taking Tobruk, Erwin Rommel was promoted to field marshal . Neil Ritchie, however, was released from command of the 8th Army, which Auchinleck now personally took over. The Panzer Army continued its advance into Egypt without delay; the retreating Allied troops could not, however, be prevented from reaching their intended new line of defense at El Alamein . Auchinleck had the retreat covered by small, powerful troops, which repeatedly delayed the pursuit.

Even if the Theseus company is considered to be one of Rommel's greatest military successes, his troops suffered heavy losses, especially in tanks. The Armored Army Africa was not supposed to recover from this weakening of armored forces. In the following fighting off El Alamein between July and November 1942, the weakness of the armored forces was a major factor in the defeat of the Axis powers.

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ cf. Stump pp. 598-599
  2. ↑ cf. Stump p. 600
  3. ↑ cf. Stump p. 602/603
  4. ↑ cf. Stump p. 612/613