Battle of Alam Halfa

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Battle of Alam Halfa
date August 30 to September 6, 1942
place near El Alamein , Egypt
output Commonwealth victory
consequences Final transfer of the initiative to the Allied troops
Parties to the conflict

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) German Empire Italy
Italy 1861Kingdom of Italy (1861-1946) 

United KingdomUnited Kingdom United Kingdom of New Zealand
New ZealandNew Zealand 

Commander

Erwin Rommel

Bernard Montgomery

Troop strength
Panzer Army Africa 8th Army
losses

2910 dead, wounded and missing
55 guns
49 tanks

1750 dead, wounded and missing
67 tanks

Major military operations during the Africa campaign (1940-1943)

The Battle of Alam Halfa ( English Battle of Alam el Halfa ) took place from August 30 to September 6, 1942 near El Alamein in Egypt between units of the Armored Army Africa and the British 8th Army . The aim of this last strategic offensive of the Axis powers in the African campaign (English Western Desert Campaign ) of the Second World War was to crush the British units before they became insurmountable by the expected substantial reinforcements. After a victory in the battle, the German commander General Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was supposed to resume the advance eastward via Alexandria to the Suez Canal . The British Commander in Chief Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery pursued the minimum goal of intercepting the attack by the Axis powers and the maximum goal of weakening the attacking German and Italian units. The battle ended with a defensive success of the British 8th Army, through which the maximum objective was achieved.

Naming

The name- giving toponym of the battle is the Alam Halfa ridge  /علم حلفا / ʿAlam Ḥalfā in the east of the battlefield, which extends roughly 15 km from the coast in an east-west direction and whose highest point is 132 meters above sea level. The German tank advance failed on the second day of the offensive on the expanded positions of the 8th Army located here. In German sources such as the war diaries , on the other hand, there is also the designation as the “second battle of El Alamein”, named after the el-Alamein position, for which there were three battles in July, August / September and October / November 1942 was fought. The last of these battles , usually referred to as the “second battle of El Alamein”, is referred to in these sources as the “third battle of El Alamein”.

prehistory

Advance of the Africa Corps into Egypt by April 25, 1941

In September 1940, the Italian forces in Libya launched an advance into Egyptian territory and were able to capture Sidi Barrani . As a result, the Allies planned a counter-offensive under the code name Operation Compass , in which the Allied troops advanced 800 km into Libyan territory and inflicted heavy losses on the Italian forces. Shortly before the expulsion of the Italians from North Africa, however, the British Prime Minister Churchill issued a halt order and ordered some of the troops to be transported to Greece. There the forces were supposed to support the Greeks in their fight against the Italians.

On February 11, 1941, the first German troops landed in Italian Libya under the code name Company Sunflower . They were supposed to serve as a blocking force against the advancing Allies in order to prevent the loss of the entire colony and to avert the Italian defeat associated with it. However, the troops of the German Africa Corps (DAK) under the Commander-in-Chief General of the Panzer Force Erwin Rommel went to the attack, whereby the British Army could be thrown back again. In April 1941, the German advance was stopped in front of the British fortress and Egyptian border town of Sollum east of Tobruk , which was besieged until November without success.

Burning German Panzer IV , right British Crusader (November 27, 1941 during British Operation Crusader)

In November 1941 the British Operation Crusader was successful and the Africa Corps withdrew to its starting positions in western Cyrenaica . In the spring of 1942, the German and Italian troops began another offensive towards the Egyptian border ( Operation Theseus ), and on June 21 they managed to recapture Tobruk.

The advance ended in the first battle of El Alamein . After eventful battles, the front line remained largely unchanged. In view of the further deterioration in the supply situation due to the intensified Allied submarine attacks, as well as the signs that the Allied troops would be strengthened on a sustained basis, the High Command of the Axis Powers was now looking for a way to force the decision on the North African theater of war in August 1942.

Starting position

German location

After the Axis powers conquered Tobruk on June 21, 1942 as part of the Theseus operation , the United States , which had been at war with the German-Italian declaration of war since December 1941, made strong efforts to strengthen the British position in Egypt, which was also carried out by the Commander-in-Chief of the Panzer Army Africa, Erwin Rommel were known. According to his calculations, new Allied supplies of war material and troop transports around the Cape of Good Hope would take two to three months to reach Egypt. In his memoirs he writes about this situation:

"We therefore had a period of a few weeks in which the huge reinforcements could not yet have reached African soil [...] Therefore we wanted to strike first."

- Erwin Rommel, Commander in Chief of the Panzer Army Africa

Rommel made plans for the offensive similar to the Gazala concept . Problematic from the beginning was the inferiority of tanks and the balance of forces of the air forces. Due to the narrowing of the operative fighting area as a result of geographical conditions, such as the Qattara Depression, no real, far-reaching southern encirclement of the British forces was possible. In addition, Montgomery knew how to use the “ Ultra ” information on the British side and knew how to form a strong defensive front on the most endangered sections. Ultra was intelligence, top-secret information that became available through the decryption of the German encryption code.

Despite his optimistic assessment of the situation, the commander-in-chief of the tank army was aware of the risks and, above all, of the fuel problem of the operation. The historian Reinhard Stumpf describes the German-Italian attack on the south wing as "his last trump card" and also recorded Rommel's horror of the massive Allied material superiority that was soon to come.

Ugo Cavallero , the head of the Italian military command (Italian: Comando Supremo), had similarly optimistic views as Erwin Rommel, but also called for the target of Alexandria, the area around Cairo and the Suez Canal, the Alamein line "occupied just in case" to keep. After that, Cavallero noted that the funds would soon be in place for a successful attack by the tank army and also promised to make all possible efforts to replenish the army. He also held out the prospect of proposing the date given by Rommel to the Duce and made possible delays in the attack date dependent on it.

The discussion about a quick replenishment of the German-Italian tank army began again. Commitments from all important German and Italian command posts as well as the Fuehrer's order of July 14th had been received, which were intended to improve the situation considerably. In fact, the cargo unloaded mainly in Tobruk fell by 43.5 percent in August, instead of an expected increase compared to the previous month, as the British Royal Navy had succeeded in sinking over 50,000 GRT of shipping space, mainly using submarines, an increase of 44,323 GRT compared to July meant. Because of these considerable difficulties, Rommel sent the army chief of staff, Alfred Gause , to Rome . There he should enforce the wishes of the army with the German authorized general at the headquarters of the Italian armed forces Enno von Rintelen and the chief of staff of the Italian Comando Supremo Ugo Cavallero. Rommel also suspected the Italian allies of having acted contrary to the agreement and to their advantage, and instead of having transferred German troops and material to the Italian Pistoia Division, which was inexperienced in the war.

Rommel also called for a further general command (motorized) and the motorization of the entire 164th light Africa division and the army artillery, as well as better personnel replacement and a more extensive reserve of leaders as well as the exchange of troops who had been in the army for more than a year , despite Hitler's negative attitude stood.

On August 15, the Panzer Army Africa reported that the situation had improved due to the replenishment of the weakened units and the arrival of new units. It was also possible to detach some of the rapid units for mobile defense from the front. In addition, the new, extensive field fortifications had been completed and the number of German tanks at the front was 200, although this number should increase to 250 by the end of the month. The food supplies are replenished, ammunition is in sufficient quantities, and the fuel will be enough for a ten-day operation after the contingents that are being transported have arrived.

By the end of August, the Army High Command expected a "certain superiority" of tanks: 450 to 500 German and Italian tanks compared to 400 British tanks. However, this calculation did not take into account that the Italian tanks were significantly inferior to their English opponents. In addition, one reckoned with "a superiority of heavy artillery of 50%" . According to the German assessment, an attack had to be made before the enemy reinforcements arrived.

Finally, on August 28, the German-Italian troops had a total of 234 German and 281 Italian tanks at their disposal, with many of the Italian tanks being worn out and with little combat power. On the Axis side, 350 to 400 tanks were expected on the Allied side, but the British 8th Army was actually able to deploy around 700 tanks, although the American Shermans were missing, whose deployment on the side of the African Armored Army was expected.

On August 17th, German troops in Africa needed the following amount of personnel and material:

  • around 15,000 men (including 6,120 classified as "urgently to be transferred")
  • 130 PaK (in delivery)
  • 210 tanks
  • 175 personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles
  • 1400 motor vehicles.

On August 19, Erwin Rommel asked for 2000 tons of petrol and 500 tons of ammunition to be replenished in Tobruk or Benghazi , otherwise the start of the offensive would have to be postponed. Six days later, there was also a lack of fuel among the Italian fast troops, as a steamer with the required fuel had been sunk. After it became known that the fourth ship relay was due to delayed departure only on 28/29. August could arrive, Rommel realized that the requested supplies would not arrive on time.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Panzer Army Africa decided to start the attack anyway, as the Commander-in-Chief South Field Marshal Albert Kesselring had promised him 1,000 tons of petrol from his inventory as well as the overflight of ammunition already stored in Italy on loan. Due to the considerable problems of supplies, Rommel considered only a "local operation with the aim of defeating the enemy forces in the El Alamein position" as possible.

German planning

Due to the time pressure, Rommel planned an attack against the less developed British south wing "around August 26th" , with the intention of achieving a quick breakthrough on the British front. Bondage attacks were planned in the northern section of the front, while the rapid troops breaking through on the southern front were to advance to the coastal road in order to enclose and destroy the British troops between Alamein and Ruweisat . "Afterwards," Rommel's operational planning ended optimistically, "operations to the east will continue." According to the plan of attack, the Italian XXI. Army Corps with the 102nd Infantry Division Trento , the 25th Infantry Division Bologna and the XXXI. Guastatori Battalion defended the northern section, with the German 164th Light Africa Division being divided into battalions between the Italian units and parts of the Ramcke Jäger Brigade were also available. To deceive the British Army, raid troops were also planned during the first two days of the offensive, and the artillery and heavy infantry weapons were used to simulate a wide-ranging attack.

Farther south stood the Italian Xth Army Corps, which consisted of the 185th Folgore Jägerdivision , the 27th Infantry Division Brescia , 2 battalions of the Ramcke Brigade and six immovable battalions of the Italian XX. Army Corps existed. At the beginning it was also supposed to defend only the section of the front, but the plan said that the position with the general start of the attack on the X day at 10 p.m. was carried out by a strong combat group (three battalions of the Folgore Jager Division and two battalions each of the Ramcke Brigade, XX Army Corps and ID Brescia) should be improved, so that a starting position for the following continuation of the advances to the north on day x + 1 was.

The offensive group in the south had its starting position between the El Taqa plateau and the Ruweisat ridge. Seen from north to south, it consisted of a reconnaissance group (on the edge of the Qattara Depression ), the Africa Corps, the Italian XX. Army Corps (motorized) and the German 90th light Africa division . These troops should start the attack from their own mined positions on the x day at 10:00 p.m. In order to keep the concentration of forces in the southern section of the front secret, the relocations should be carried out quarterly on consecutive nights in order to achieve sufficient camouflage for the troop movements.

However, the lack of fuel was already so great on August 26th that the relocation of the last two quarters by order of the Army High Command did not take place until the nights of August 28th to 29th and August 29th to 30th. To the irritation of the British reconnaissance, the hawser of the tank divisions moved to the previous places of the wheel parts. The German and Italian infantry of the south wing were supposed to break through what was believed to be the weakly mined south wing of the British 8th Army, according to the results of the reconnaissance, and that same night, in cooperation with the Africa Corps and parts of the Italian motorized corps, crossed the area south-west of Reach El Hammam, which was around 40–50 kilometers from the starting point. At the crack of dawn that followed, this group was to turn towards the coastal road and march into the British supply area. As a result, the British armored forces were to be drawn onto these Axis forces and the decision was to be sought in open battle. The attack group was followed by the 132nd Armored Division Ariete , the 101st Motorized Infantry Division Trieste , the 133rd Armored Division Littorio and parts of the Ramcke Brigade and the 90th Light Division. These should shield the north flank, the 90th Division should protect the rear area. After the defeat of the enemy main armored forces, the strike group was supposed to close the pocket around the north wing, in which the main body of the 8th Army stood. In doing so, Rommel relied on the factors of speed, surprise and, according to experience, the slow British reaction time.

British location

The Commander-in-Chief of the 8th Army, Bernard Montgomery, who had taken command in August 1942, believed, like his predecessor Claude Auchinleck , that a German-Italian attack would take place on the south wing, as this was equipped with weaker mine belts.

According to British historian Ian Playfair , it was still necessary for the Allied forces to continue attacks on supplies from the Axis powers. Due to the previous heavy losses at sea, parts of the supplies were flown from Crete to Africa by air. Around 500 air force transport machines were used for this purpose. It was difficult for the British Bristol Beaufighter aircraft to intercept this air traffic, but the Wellington bombers, together with the Liberator bombers , were able to bomb the air base on Crete. There, the attacks caused disorganization and damage in some cases.

At that time Tobruk was the main Axis port in North Africa, and only the largest of the ships used Benghazi, which could only be reached by the Liberator bombers. Therefore, Tobruk was henceforth the main target of the night attacks. If you include the surprise attacks on the secondary ports, the British Royal Air Force flew missions in August 1646, an average of around 50 per day.

Montgomery put a lot of emphasis on ultra-reconnaissance and therefore built a new Ultra Intelligence team on its army staff. After Rommel's assessment of the situation on August 15 was deciphered, to be precise: only two days later he was able to make defensive preparations in peace, since the report revealed not only the intentions to attack but also the focus in the south. The emerging German-Italian offensive preparations on the south wing of the front could also be identified through the aerial reconnaissance.

Before the battle, the British 8th Army consisted of two corps, the XXX. Corps under the command of Lieutenant General William H. Ramsden , which stood in the north, and the XIII. Corps under Lieutenant General Brian Horrocks in the south. The XXX. Corps were subordinate to the Australian 9th, the South African 1st and the Indian 5th Divisions. According to Fritz Bayerlein , the chief of staff of the Africa Corps, the reconnaissance group of the Panzer Army Africa discovered that the South African 1st Division was being held in reserve on the coast.

The XIII. Corps was divided from north to south into New Zealand's 2nd Division, the British 7th Armored Division, consisting of the 7th Motor Brigade and the 4th Light Armored Brigade, with the British in the Alam Halfa position behind them and in the southern apron 44th Division and later the British 10th Panzer Division. The high command of the Panzer Army had correctly assumed that the southern section was protected by the 7th Panzer Division, but it was assumed that the 1st Panzer Division and not the 10th Panzer Division would be ready for mobile use behind the central section of the front. The 44th division on the Alam Halfa ridge remained undetected. Bayerlein writes that the German-Italian reconnaissance discovered that the British 1st Panzer Division and later also the 10th Panzer Division were ready behind the middle of the southern section of the front.

The 10th Panzer Division under Major General Alexander Hugh Gatehouse distributed Montgomery so that the 22nd Panzer Brigade with a strength of 60 M3 Grant tanks, some of which were buried, south of the western end of the Alam Halfa Ridge and the 8th Panzer Brigade . Armored brigade south of the army center. The 23rd Panzer Brigade, consisting of three regiments, stood as a reserve at the east end, so that, in the event of a German-Italian success, it would quickly move like a domino into the gap between the west end of the Alam Halfa ridge and the New Zealand division at Bab el Qattara Could be pushed south. In addition, the 22nd Panzer Brigade leaned against the fortifications of the 44th Division and had a dense network of anti-tank systems in front of them, behind which it was possible to hide and to stab the troops of the tank army at the right moment.

However, there was no real alert on the part of the British forces, since Rommel had only issued the order to attack one day before the start of August 29 for August 30 at 10:00 p.m. and therefore the message had not yet been deciphered. Preparations were therefore only begun when the Royal Air Force noticed the southern movement of the 15th Panzer Division and, in the last light of day, the troop concentrations of the Panzer Army.

It is interesting that Montgomery was already planning its own offensive at this point, which did not take place until October. To this end, he intended to put together a heavily armored corps, for which the headquarters of the X. Corps was newly established in mid-August under the command of Lieutenant General Herbert Lumsden . This was initially in reserve.

Course of the battle

From August 20, von Rommel's subordinate commanders were briefed, and orders from the army to prepare for the attack were issued on August 22 at 8 a.m. With the final attack signal, Rommel waited until the end to clarify the supply situation. The two general staff officers Siegfried Westphal and Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin from the Panzer AOK Africa spoke out against the start of the offensive before the arrival and the completed unloading of the two required tankers, which were to arrive in Tobruk on August 28 and 29. Albert Kesselring, with whom Rommel had come to an agreement after providing 1,500 t of petrol and a further 400 or 500 t of fuel for an emergency, was the decisive factor in the transition to the offensive. Furthermore, Kesselring submitted an offer to supply shortage ammunition, which was already in Italy, to the tank army.

Participating associations of the Axis Powers and the Allies
Structure of the German-Italian offensive group on August 30, 1942
Panzer Army Africa (Field Marshal Erwin Rommel )
Reconnaissance Group (Colonel Erwin Menny )
90th Light Africa Division (Major General Ulrich Kleemann )
German Africa Corps (General of the Panzer Force Walther Nehring )
21st Panzer Division (Major General Georg von Bismarck )
15th Panzer Division (Major General Gustav von Vaerst )
Flak Regiment 135 (motorized)
Anti-aircraft battalion 617 (motorized)
2. Company / Fla. Battalion 606 (motorized)
XX. Italian Army Corps (motorized)
132ª Divisione corazzata “Ariete”
133ª Divisione corazzata “Littorio”
101ª Divisione motorizzata “Trieste”
Breakdown of the British and Commonwealth units involved
Eighth Army (Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery )
XII Corps (Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks )
2nd New Zealand Division (Lieutenant-General Bernard Freyberg )
44th (Home Counties) Division ( Major-General Ivor Hughes)
7th Armored Division (Major-General James Renton)
10th Armored Division (Major-General Alexander Gatehouse)

Axis troops advance

First phase

The course of the battle

The last offensive of the Axis Powers in Egypt started on August 30, 1942 at 10 p.m. when the German-Italian offensive group began their advance from their starting position between the El Taqa Plateau and the Ruweisat Ridge. At the start of the attack, the artillery of the Afrikakorps, the main thrust force, was in a fully filled condition, and 237 German tanks were ready. Only in the rifle regiments were there further personnel deficiencies.

In the northern and central section of the front, the raiding troops ran largely according to the plans of the Army High Command. They found playfair in the sector of the XXX, according to the British historian. Corps took place around midnight, with the strongest attack against the 9th Infantry Brigade being carried out on the Ruweisat Ridge. The troops of the Axis powers were able to achieve brief territorial gains, which the British were able to regain through a counter-attack at dawn on August 31st. During the night, South African associations also carried out small attacks in which they took 56 Italian prisoners.

Meanwhile, the real offensive in the south, which was intended to achieve a breakthrough, was making slow progress. The reasons for this were the sometimes unexpectedly great depth of the minefields and the strong Allied guards in some places. In conjunction with the strong Allied air raids, which dropped two German commanders on the first night, and the difficult terrain, the situation put a heavy strain on the troops. On the night of August 30th to August 31st, Major General Georg von Bismarck , one of Rommel's most gifted commanders and commander of the 21st Panzer Division, died in an air attack in which Walther Nehring, the commanding general of the Africa Corps, was also wounded. For this reason Gustav von Vaerst , the previous commander of the 15th Panzer Division, was selected to represent Nehring as the commander of the Africa Corps. Colonel Karl-Hans Lungershausen took over command of the 21st Panzer Division.

At around 2 a.m., the forces of the offensive group reached the first British minefield. There the German-Italian troops encountered fierce resistance from two units of the British 7th Armored Division , the 7th Motorized Brigade and the 4th Light Armored Brigade, which severely hampered the advance in conjunction with the air strikes. At dawn on August 31, the heads of the Africa Corps were only four instead of the planned 40-50 kilometers east of the British minefields and could not turn north, which is why it was only possible after ten hours of fighting to move the tank regiments east for the upcoming attack . Due to the expected strong air attacks by the Allies, a large staggering in depth was planned.

Second phase

First, Rommel made the decision to go into defense. However, after an orientation, he decided to continue the attack.

According to the new plan, the DAK should be six hours later, at 12 p.m. (after a later change at 1 p.m.) with the 15th Panzer Division on the right and the 21st Panzer Division on the left wing from the northeast in front of the town of Himeimat to height 132 advance of the Alam Halfa ridge. The Italian XX. Army Corps (mot.), Which had already got stuck on the foremost mine bolt due to a failure of the mine detectors, slowly advanced and was supposed to carry out the northern attack, which had the conquest of Alem el Bueib-Alam el Halfa as its goal, together with the 90th light German Africa Division. For the continuation of the attack, the Commander-in-Chief South mobilized all operational dive bombers.

The 15th Panzer Division started moving at 1 p.m., followed an hour later by the 21st Panzer Division, which had also pulled along with the Italian Panzer Division Littorio. Most of the Italian XX. Army corps (motorized) did not attack until 3 p.m.

Two kilometers south of the British 22nd Armored Brigade's section, the 8th Army deployed two squadrons of Crusader tanks to lure Axis forces to the concentration of buried Grant tanks and 6-pounder anti-tank guns .

After initially making rapid advances, the German tanks got into the deeper sand, consuming a lot of fuel. Beginning at 6:30 p.m., the 15th Panzer Division launched a comprehensive attack on Höhe 132, which brought it to tank bases on the slope until 7:50 p.m. When night fell, the commanding general of the Africa Corps, Gustav von Vaerst, stopped the attack.

The troops of the 21st Panzer Division were engaged in heavy fighting with British troops around four kilometers to the west. At 6:30 p.m., the division closed up near Deir el Tarfa, around 25 kilometers from the Egyptian coast. Ultimately, the strategically important height 132 could not be taken, and the Italian XX. Corps (motorized), together with the Littorio Panzer Division, lagged far behind the German units. Troops of the British 8th Army had withdrawn to the north and north-west with minor losses, so that heavy counter-attacks were expected for the next day.

During the following days, the Allies flew so strong air strikes that the units of the Axis powers remained sleepless during the nights. This weakened the fighting ability of the associations.

British counter-offensive and Rommel's withdrawal

Allied counter-offensive

In a briefing on the same night from August 31st to September 1st, Rommel and the commanding general of the Africa Corps, Major General von Vaerst, decided to temporarily switch to defense starting on September 1st. The 15th Panzer Division made one last attempt that morning to conquer Höhe 132. The division was able to advance to the southern edge of the hill by noon, but 100-150 tanks coming from the east led a British counterattack, which could be repulsed. Despite this fact, the acute shortage of fuel was already so noticeable that the offensive operation had to be broken off.

The counterattack was supported by strong British aviation units in permanent attacks, whereby the few German fighters never got close to the heavily secured British bomber units. The German-Italian reconnaissance group suffered great losses during nighttime attacks. A statement by the war diary writer of Flak Regiment 136 resignedly reflects the situation:

“The usual picture of the air situation began at 7 o'clock in the morning. Strong Douglas units in parade flight pelted the troop units. Tommy [improved in: Engländer] did not, with the right of habit, believe that heavy flak batteries could be used on the German side. "

- War diary writer for Flak Regiment 136

Rommel later received the news that the promised tankers, which were supposed to arrive in Tobruk or Benghazi on August 31 and September 1, had not arrived in North Africa because they could be located with the help of British ultra-reconnaissance. As a result, the German motorized units were now exposed to permanent British tank attacks and, above all, permanent British or American bomb attacks in front of the fortified positions without fuel. On September 1 alone, Allied aircraft took off 111 times and dropped 80 tons of bombs during their missions.

At lunchtime on September 1, 1942, after an assessment of the situation and a visit to the Africa Corps, Rommel came to the decision that the offensive should be temporarily halted due to the poor supply situation. According to his plan, the existing gap between the two armored divisions, which was about 5–6 kilometers wide, should be closed by the Africa Corps. On this line reached, the troops should wait for an improvement in the supply situation. The Italian XX. Army Corps (motorized) was also unable to carry out a local advance to the north. Since it was not possible to “move large formations” in the near future with the quantities of fuel available, Rommel considered terminating the offensive prematurely.

During the night of September 2, the Royal Air Force bombarded the offensive group from 10 p.m. to 4:30 a.m. The attacks resulted in heavy casualties, with the bombing being intensified the following night. The main target that night were hawsers, artillery and flak. According to an estimate by the Africa Corps, around 300 machines dropped 2,400 bombs on the German positions. In contrast, the German troops were practically defenseless, as the heavy 8.8 cm FlaK 18/36/37 had no measuring devices and the 2 cm Flakvierling was absolutely inefficient at altitudes of 1500 meters.

After the commander-in-chief of the Panzer Army Africa had learned about the damage to the Italian steamer Abruzzi , which had 611 tons of fuel on board, from air strikes between Benghazi and Derna, he considered a continuation of the offensive impracticable at the moment. Therefore, Rommel decided to break off the offensive and to retreat gradually first to the eastern area in front of the El Taqa-Bab el Qattara line. There, the tank army was supposed to go over to the defensive based on the British minefields.

The air raids peaked on September 3, when eleven major attacks were counted. A total of around 500 Royal Air Force aircraft had 2,500 missions throughout the day, to which 180 USAAF missions were added. After the formation of the 19th Flak Division on August 31, the Allies undertook a total of 64 unit attacks. In these 64 attacks, around 15,600 bombs were dropped on an area 12 to 15 kilometers wide and 8 to 10 kilometers deep, which is an average of 100 bombs per square kilometer.

German-Italian withdrawal

On September 3, German aerial reconnaissance sighted 200 tanks north of the ridge of Alam Halfa, where the British 10th Armored Division was located. To the west of this, in the gap with New Zealand's 2nd Division, were the 22nd and 23rd Panzer Brigades with another 150 tanks. The 23rd Panzer Brigade had been pushed in from the north on August 31 .

The Rommel offensive group could not do anything against this overweight of tanks. The fuel problem remained unsolved and there was no improvement in sight. Therefore, the Italian Comando Supremo approved the withdrawal into the starting positions, if the supply situation did not change fundamentally for the better.

On September 3, the New Zealand 2nd Division under General Bernard Freyberg, together with the British 132nd Infantry Brigade, was supposed to undertake a push to the south, which should cut off the armored army of Africa from the minefields behind. This mission ended in total failure, as the British and New Zealand troops had to retreat to their starting positions with high losses. The New Zealand troops reported 275 dead, missing or wounded, the British 697.

From September 4th, the Allied air strikes became less and the German air force supported the retreat with attacks on the enemy attackers; this was also facilitated by an improvement in the fuel situation, which is why the offensive south wing will be returned to its starting position by September 6th could.

consequences

According to Playfair, the German casualties in the battle of 1859 were dead, wounded and missing, the Italian units lost 1,051 men. Panzerarmee Afrika lost 33 German and 22 Italian guns, 298 German and 97 Italian vehicles as well as 38 German and 11 Italian armored vehicles. On the Allied side, Playfair recorded losses of 1,750 men, 67 tanks and 15 anti-tank guns . The contingent of lost tanks consisted of 31 grants, 5 of which were destroyed in the 22nd and 13 in the 8th tank brigade. The rest was just damaged. In addition, 21 Valentines were lost, which were used as infantry tanks, whereby they were no longer suitable for this task. In general, after Playfair in the Middle East there was no tank strong enough to assault heavily fortified positions: the Valentine was too light for that, and the Matilda tank was too slow for the job. In addition, both were only armed with a 2pdr cannon. After the end of the battle, the Matilda-type tanks were decommissioned, ending a long and important working day for the British armed forces.

The initiative of the Axis forces was finally lost after the defeat, the great British offensive led to the second battle of El Alamein , in which parts of the armored army of Africa were destroyed. The battle marked the final turning point in favor of the Allies in Africa. Then the German-Italian troops withdrew in a disorderly flight from Egypt and occupied parts of Tunisia , where the units were united with other forces to form Army Group Africa . This fought in several battles against the Allied forces landed in North Africa in the course of Operation Torch until their units surrendered from May 9th to 13th, 1943.

However, German troops did not give up the advantage of holding British minefields in their hands and immediately built a new south wing east of the old position based on the Qattara Depression, which protruded to the east like a balcony and was immediately mined under the protection of the tank divisions .

reception

Rommel's last offensive at the Battle of Alam Halfa failed despite a breakthrough by the Allied lines, probably due to the following factors:

  • the own lack of fuel due to the sinking of the supply ships with the help of the British ultra-reconnaissance,
  • the allied tank concentration,
  • the strong air strikes as a result of the Allied air superiority.

The British historian and former Major General Ian Stanley Ord Playfair describes the great distance between El Alamein and Tobruk as another aspect of the fuel problem, in addition to the air strikes on ship supplies. The city was used as the main port for supplying the troops of the Axis powers and was 350 miles from El Alamein, which made the transport of fuel tedious.

Overall, the battle of Alam Halfa can be viewed from the German side as a defeat that could be kept within limits. According to Playfair, the defeat in battle marked the likely end point of the Axis' hope of conquering the Suez Canal.

Ian Playfair describes the outcome as a clear victory in which Rommel was defeated at his own arms. However, he admits that the small operations at Tell el Eisa had achieved little and that the attempt to close the gap in the minefield had failed. Nevertheless, Playfair thinks that the effects on the morale of the troops of the 8th Army are to be assessed as much more important. According to him, belief in the army itself, the Commander-in-Chief and the Royal Air Force reached new heights. The counter-offensive showed the benefit of a concentration of resources made possible by a relatively accurate outlook of Rommel's future operations. Due to this, the enemy striking force on the ground could be crushed by strong fire from field artillery and medium artillery as well as from anti-tank guns and guns from buried tanks, mostly of the Grant type. In addition, a large number of aircraft were used for this endeavor, firing a rain of projectiles and bombs ranging in size from a machine gun caliber to 4,000 pounds for the largest bombs.

According to Playfair, the battle represented the final part in completing the successes at sea against Axis shipping. The overall effect of the permanent attacks by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force was to weaken the tank army. The battle of Alam Halfa had a particularly big impact recently.

According to the reception of Fritz Bayerlein, Chief of Staff of the Africa Corps, the battle showed that the impatient Prime Minister had to bow to the high command, since the start of the new major offensive had been postponed to a much later date than planned. In the operation, the Allied units had to relate the progress made by the previous command under Claude Auchinleck .

The author of the book series The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-1945 Ronald Walker writes that the Battle of Alam Halfa was a test of morale for the New Zealand troops, after which hope returned.

The British Army rated the battle as a limited victory, as the planning of the battle had not provided for the possible destruction of the German-Italian forces for overriding reasons.

The self-confidence of the British 8th Army grew after the successful defense, as the battle marked the British Army's first major joint victory with American forces of the United States Army Air Forces . In addition, this fact of a first joint victory by the Western Allies had a psychological impact on the Allied warfare that should not be underestimated, even though Africa was only a secondary theater for the German Wehrmacht .

Winston Churchill made the statement in his memoir that the 8th Army at the Battle of Alam Halfa had succeeded in pushing the enemy into another supply crisis with minor losses, which brought Rommel into great distress.

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literature

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Individual evidence

  1. ^ A b Ian Stanley Ord Playfair: The Mediterranian and the Middle East. Volume III, September 1941 - September 1942, British Fortune reaches their Lowest Ebb. , P. 390.
  2. ↑ a b c d e Ian Stanley Ord Playfair: The Mediterranian and the Middle East. Volume III, September 1941 - September 1942, British Fortune reaches their Lowest Ebb. , P. 391.
  3. ^ Adalbert von Taysen: Tobruk 1941 - The fight in North Africa , Verlag Rombach, Freiburg 1976 (= individual publications on the military history of the Second World War, vol. 21) . ISBN 3-7930-0180-6 .
  4. ↑ Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean 1942/43 - The operations in North Africa and in the central Mediterranean , p. 654.
  5. ^ A b Erwin Rommel, Lucie Maria Rommel, Fritz Bayerlein: War without hatred. African memoir. , P. 199 f. quoted from Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Region 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 672 f.
  6. ↑ a b c d e f g h i Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Area 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 673.
  7. ↑ a b c d e f Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Region 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 674.
  8. ↑ Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Region 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 672.
  9. ↑ a b c d e Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Area 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 681.
  10. ↑ The German contingent consisted of 93 Panzerkampfwagen III , 71 special versions of Panzerkampfwagen III, 10 Panzerkampfwagen IV and 26 special versions of Panzerkampfwagen IV. On the Italian side, 243 Panzer M and 38 Panzer L were available.
  11. ↑ Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and in the Middle Mediterranean , p. 675.
  12. ↑ Rommel later specified his statement: "[...] to post the British 8th Army in the El Alamein position and to take possession of the area around Alexandria and Cairo." Cf. Erwin Rommel: War without hatred. African memoir. P. 199 f., Quoted from Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Area 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 675.
  13. ↑ (Genio) Guastatori is the Italian term for fighting pioneers which part of the pioneering or Genie force are (ARMA del Genio) .
  14. ↑ a b c d Reinhard Stumpf: The war in the Mediterranean region 1942/43 - The operations in North Africa and in the central Mediterranean , p. 678.
  15. ↑ The Folgore Jägerdivision consisted of paratroopers who, like the Ramcke Jägerbrigade, were originally intended for the conquest of Malta under the code name Operation Hercules .
  16. ^ The reconnaissance departments 3, 33, 580, of the Italian XX. Army Corps and Flak Battalion 612 were combined into a reconnaissance group under the staff of the 15th Rifle Brigade. On September 25, 1942, the Panzer Army Africa submitted an application for reclassification to a reconnaissance brigade , which was postponed to February 1943 by the chief of staff of the OKH , Franz Halder , due to time constraints.
  17. ↑ a b c d e Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Region 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 679.
  18. ↑ Erwin Rommel, Lucie Maria Rommel, Fritz Bayerlein: War without hatred. African memoir. , P. 207.
  19. ^ A b Ian Stanley Ord Playfair: The Mediterranian and the Middle East. Volume III, September 1941 - September 1942, British Fortune reaches their Lowest Ebb. , P. 379.
  20. ^ Ian Stanley Ord Playfair: The Mediterranian and the Middle East. Volume III, September 1941 - September 1942, British Fortune reaches their Lowest Ebb. , P. 380.
  21. ↑ a b Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Area 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Middle Mediterranean , p. 680.
  22. ↑ a b c Rommel's Operation Plan . (PDF 3.5 MB) (No longer available online.) Archived from the original on October 24, 2009 ; accessed on May 2, 2018 (English, original website no longer available).
  23. ↑ a b c d e f Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Area 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 682.
  24. ^ Ian Stanley Ord Playfair: The Mediterranian and the Middle East. Volume III, September 1941 - September 1942, British Fortune reaches their Lowest Ebb. , P. 385.
  25. ↑ a b Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Area 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 676.
  26. ^ Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin: tank battles. A study of the use of tank units in World War II. , P. 137, quoted from Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Region 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 676.
  27. ↑ Later the Africa Corps was reinforced by the motorized artillery under the staff of the 2nd Battalion of Artillery Regiment 115 (motorized). Compare: Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 679.
  28. ↑ For the time being, Corps lacked 6 non-motorized battalions and artillery, as they were used in bondage attacks on the central section. Compare: Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 679.
  29. ↑ a b c d e Ian Stanley Ord Playfair: The Mediterranian and the Middle East. Volume III, September 1941 - September 1942, British Fortune reaches their Lowest Ebb. , P. 386.
  30. ↑ a b c Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Region 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 683.
  31. ↑ a b c d e f g Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Area 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 684.
  32. ↑ The Picci Fassio was sunk by the two tankers and the Abruzzi was damaged.
  33. ↑ a b c d Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Region 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 685.
  34. ↑ a b c d e Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Area 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 686.
  35. ↑ a b c d e f g Reinhard Stumpf: The War in the Mediterranean Area 1942/43 - The Operations in North Africa and the Central Mediterranean , p. 687.
  36. ^ Ian Stanley Ord Playfair: The Mediterranian and the Middle East. Volume III, September 1941 - September 1942, British Fortune reaches their Lowest Ebb. , P. 382.
  37. ↑ Walker's illustration.Retrieved March 8, 2011.
  38. ↑ Winston Churchill: The Second World War , p. 711.
This article was added to the list of excellent articles on November 11, 2011 in this version .