Italian invasion of Egypt
Italian soldiers on the march in North Africa (April 1941).
| date | September 9. bis 16th September 1940 |
|---|---|
| place | North Africa ( Italian Libya , Egypt ) |
| output | strategic victory of the allies |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
|
|
| Troop strength | |
| approx. 150,000 men, approx. 1,500 artillery pieces, approx. 500 tanks |
about 30,000 men |
| losses | |
|
> 120 killed, |
<50 dead |
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The Italian invasion of Egypt was an Italian offensive against British- occupied Egypt at the beginning of World War II . It was also the beginning of the armed conflict in North Africa . The initial aim of the offensive was the occupation of the Suez Canal , later only the conquest of Alexandria . The offensive started on September 9, 1940 ended on September 16 with an advance of only about 100 kilometers and the capture of Sidi Barrani , without any major fighting between the two sides.
background
On the afternoon of June 10, 1940, Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano told the British Ambassador in Rome that from midnight onwards Italy would consider itself at war with the United Kingdom. Italy thus entered the Second World War on the side of the German Reich against Great Britain and France . Despite its previous announcement that it would declare war on Italy in this case, the Kingdom of Egypt delayed the step and on June 13, 1940 only broke off diplomatic relations. It only wants to declare war if Egyptian territory is violated or it is attacked militarily. However, since Egypt did not take any further steps against Italy (e.g. the expulsion of the ambassador or the internment of Italian citizens), doubts arose in Great Britain about the reliability of Egypt and its willingness to adhere to the provisions of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty . A short time later, it occupied Egypt, referring to the corresponding clause of the treaty, which allowed such a step to avert a threat to the Suez Canal .
At the time of the declaration of war, Italy had two armies stationed in Italian Libya . The larger of the two, the 5th Army , comprising nine divisions , was stationed in Tripolitania in western Libya and was supposed to secure the border with the French protectorate of Tunisia . The smaller 10th Army was stationed in the Cyrenaica and secured the border with Egypt. After the defeat of France and after Tunisia was under the control of the friendly Vichy France , the 5th Army was reduced to four divisions and these were assigned to the 10th Army, which now comprised ten divisions with around 170,000 men. Much of the equipment, particularly the motorized transport forces, was also relocated east for an impending invasion of Egypt.
As early as June 17, 1940, Great Britain set up the so-called Western Desert Force under the command of Richard O'Connor in response to the Italian declaration of war . It initially comprised all troops stationed in western Egypt, a total of around 10,000 men. O'Connor had an aggressive strategy to secure the border from the start. He had small, mixed task forces composed of tanks, artillery and infantry put together to patrol the border area , attack in contact with Italian forces and regularly carry out small raids on Italian positions near the border. Fort Capuzzo in Libya was captured just a week after the Italian declaration of war .
Preparation of the offensive
On June 28, 1940, the Governor-General was Italian-Libyan Italo Balbo on the approach of his machine on Tobruk by friendly fire killed. Benito Mussolini replaced him with Marshal Rodolfo Graziani , whom he immediately commissioned with a large-scale offensive against Egypt until August 8, with the aim of conquering the Suez Canal . Graziani was extremely critical of such a project. In his opinion, the 10th Army was not adequately equipped and supplied to be able to successfully carry out an offensive over such a long distance. In particular, the motorized transport capacities are far from sufficient, artillery , anti-tank guns and tanks are clearly inferior to the British models . The pros and cons of an offensive were discussed again and again in the following weeks in several conversations and correspondence between Mussolini and Graziani. August 7, 1940, the date originally planned for the start of the offensive, passed without Graziani setting the 10th Army on the march.
Finally, on August 18, a telegram from Mussolini reached Graziani, urging him to attack immediately. The Operation Sea Lion , so the German landing in Britain, was imminent in the next few weeks, and an Italian attack in North Africa could be in this context is crucial. However, concrete goals for the offensive were not mentioned. On August 20, Graziani finally agreed - contrary to the opinion of his own staff - a limited offensive against Sollum and Sidi Barrani .
In response, Graziani ordered Mario Berti , the commander of the 10th Army, to begin the offensive on August 27th. Graziani still hoped that at least some of the necessary equipment would arrive in Libya by then - but this hope was not fulfilled. It was only when Graziani was threatened with recall from Rome on September 8th that he agreed to begin the offensive the next day.
The Allies anticipated the impending offensive and prepared accordingly. Given the numerical superiority of the Italian troops, a direct confrontation at the border was out of the question. The Allied troops, however, were equipped with much better tanks, had a much higher degree of motorization and also controlled the Mediterranean, which ensured a constant supply. Against this background, the plan was made to wear out the Italian army first with a long advance and then to wait at a well-developed defensive position, where it was vulnerable to motorized flank attacks from the desert. It was very likely that the Italian 10th Army would advance into Egypt due to the poor supply situation along the coastal road via Sollum and the Halfaya Pass . There the terrain was too narrow due to the steep slope and the coast to be able to demonstrate the superiority of motorized forces. So the defense had to take place further east. The important railway junction Mersa Matruh appeared to be well suited for this.
Troop strength
The Italian 10th Army, planned for the invasion of Egypt and led by Mario Berti, had nine divisions and further battalions in September 1940, divided into three corps (XXIII, XXI and XXII) as well as two formations called groups (“Group of Libyan Divisions” and “ Gruppe Maletti ”) with a total of 150,000 men. For the transport were the XXIII. Corps was assigned around 1000 vehicles , 650 to the Libyan Divisions group and 450 to the Maletti group. The entire armored force (consisting of light models L3 / 33 and medium-heavy models of the M series) was divided into two large armored divisions and two battalions and attached to the individual corps or groups. The artillery and anti-tank guns carried were mostly smaller calibers . The Italian Air Force supported the operation with the 5th Air Corps, which was reinforced with additional forces from Italy.
-
10th Army
- XXIII. Corps (Generale Annibale Bergonzoli)
- 63rd Infantry Division “Cirene”
- 62nd Infantry Division “Marmarica”
- 1. Black Shirt Division “23 Marzo” (as reserve division)
- Battalion medium tanks (M series)
- three battalions of light tanks (L series)
- XXIII. Corps (Generale Annibale Bergonzoli)
- “Group of Libyan Divisions” (“ Gruppo Divisioni Libiche ”) (Generale Sebastiano Gallina)
- 1st Libyan Division “Sibelle”
- 2nd Libyan Division “Pescatori”
- Battalion medium tanks (M series)
- three battalions of light tanks (L series)
- “Group of Libyan Divisions” (“ Gruppo Divisioni Libiche ”) (Generale Sebastiano Gallina)
- Maletti group
- three reinforced Libyan battalions, reinforced by artillery
- mixed tank battalion (consisting of models from the L and M series)
- Maletti group
- XXI. Corps (as reserve)
- 61st Infantry Division “Sirte”
- 2nd Black Shirt Division "28 Ottobre"
- Battalion medium tanks (M series)
- three battalions of light tanks (L series)
- XXI. Corps (as reserve)
- XXII. Corps (remained in Tobruk)
- 64th Infantry Division “Catanzaro”
- 4th Black Shirt Division “3 Gennaio”
- Battalion light tanks (L series)
- XXII. Corps (remained in Tobruk)
- Italian Air Force (reinforced with forces from Italy on September 9th)
-
5th Air Corps
- 110 (+64) bombers
- 50 (+75) attack aircraft
- 170 hunters
- 6 long-range scouts (+15 scouts)
-
5th Air Corps
The allied forces (“Western Desert Force”) in Egypt, led by Richard O'Connor , comprised around 30,000 men, divided into two divisions , a brigade and a battalion . Most of the forces were concentrated in Mersa Matruh , while the withdrawal was only covered by a smaller part of the troops. The tanks of the Cruiser and Matilda class that were carried were clearly superior to the Italian models. Air support was provided by around 140 Gloster Gladiators .
- Western Desert Force
- 7th Armored Division (United Kingdom), of which a reinforced brigade covered the retreat
- 4th Infantry Division ( British India ), in Mersa Matruh
- 16th Infantry Brigade (United Kingdom), in Mersa Matruh
- 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards (United Kingdom), covered the retreat along the coastal road
- Marine Infantry Company ( Free France )
The course of the offensive
The advance plan was adapted to the limited transport capacities of the 10th Army. The idea of having two divisions marching through the Libyan desert as flank forces was abandoned. The entire army was to advance along the coastal road into Egypt. The aerial warfare over North Africa began on September 9th . While the fighter squadrons were fighting for air sovereignty, British bombers attacked Tobruk and the deployment area of the 10th Army. The Italian bombers concentrated mainly on softening Allied positions along the advance route.
As expected, the advance of the 10th Army proved extremely difficult. A division and the Maletti group got lost in the monotonous terrain, and many trucks were overheated. The allies, hopelessly outnumbered, withdrew slowly and mined the area behind them. By intercepting radio messages they were well informed about the problems of the Italian army and the 11th Hussars, a motorized British reconnaissance regiment, were able to observe the movements of the enemy directly for a few days undetected.
On September 13th, Fort Capuzzo could be retaken by the 1st Black Shirt Division and it was only on this fourth day after the start of the Italian invasion of Egypt that the Italian 10th Army actually crossed the border to Egypt. On the same day, the Coldstream Guards stationed in Sallum came under heavy fire from the advancing Libyan 1st Division, but were able to retreat towards the Halfaya Pass in good time before the enemy arrived.
In the days that followed, the advance of the Italian troops remained extremely slow, without the two armies coming into any significant clash. The two Libyan divisions, also with camel riders provided Spahis regiments decreed and thus comparatively were quite mobile, formed the spearhead of the invasion force. A dangerous situation for the British did not arise until September 16, when a large group of Italian tanks threatened to cut off the retreat of the Coldstream Guards due to a flank movement . However, together with the 11th Hussars, which rushed quickly, the tank attack could be repulsed and all Allied troops finally gathered at Mersa Matruh as planned.
Graziani was aware that his forces would not be sufficient to defeat the Allied formations massed there. So he stopped his troops after the capture of Sidi Barrani. Maktila , about 16 km east of it, was also occupied and a total of nine camps were set up in the vicinity, in which the Italian troops dug themselves. Graziani justified this step towards the Italian high command with supply bottlenecks and again demanded more transport units, including for the first time - probably to illustrate his needs clearly - 600 mules . Graziani ignored all further instructions from Mussolini to resume the advance. This ended the Italian invasion of Egypt about 100 km behind the Egyptian-Libyan border and about 130 km before Mersa Matruh.
consequences
The immediate military consequences of the Italian advance for the theater of war in North Africa were manageable, and the number of casualties on both sides was rather low. The Italian armed forces had more than 120 dead and 410 injured . Less than 50 men were killed in the fighting on the British side. The situation had not fundamentally changed for the land or naval forces . Since the British forces could not be involved in major combat operations, the Italian superiority in material and men remained largely ineffective. The weak British forces were able to withdraw in an orderly manner to a new line of defense at Mersa Matruh.
It looked different for the air force . Italian bombers were now able to operate with fighter escort all the way to Mersa Matruh . In return, the loss of the airfields at Sidi Barrani reduced the range of British fighters by around 100 miles (185 km) and British bombers lost an important refueling base. From then on, the bombing of Benghazi was only possible with great difficulty, the relocation of air forces between Malta and Egypt now had to take place by sea. These restrictions reinforced the view of the British High Command that the assertion of air superiority was of paramount importance to the situation throughout the eastern Mediterranean . Corresponding efforts to expand the air fleet and air defense equipment as well as the establishment of a radar early warning system were subsequently significantly increased.
The coastal road from Sollum to Mersa Matruh was badly damaged by the advance of troops, bombings and targeted sabotage . In addition, the British had often filled in wells or salinated wells before they left , and destroyed barracks and facilities. This represented a noticeable restriction for the supply of the advanced Italian troops, which ran almost entirely over this connection. For this reason alone, Graziani clearly rejected Rome's demand for a resumption of the offensive on September 17, 1940. Graziani ignored all demands of the Italian high command to resume the offensive in the following weeks, most recently on October 26th by Mussolini himself. Two days later, on October 28, the Italian invasion of Greece began , diverting the attention of political leaders from what was happening in North Africa.
The military situation in North Africa remained largely unchanged at first until the British finally launched a counterattack on December 8, 1940 with Operation Compass to recapture the lost territories. This proved to be so successful that the entire Cyrenaica could finally be occupied and by the beginning of February 1941 the Italian 10th Army was almost completely wiped out.
The German alliance was initially irritated by the halting of the Italian advance in September 1940, as they expected an advance into the Nile Delta , which would have fundamentally endangered the position of Great Britain in all of Egypt. However, the consequences for the German war strategy did not arise until a few months later, on January 11, 1941, in the light of the unfavorable developments of the Italian invasion of south-eastern Europe and the British counter-offensive in North Africa. The "Instruction No. 22" included, among other things, the company Sonnenblume , a German support force led by General Erwin Rommel for the Italian troops oppressed in North Africa.
literature
- Philip Jowett: The Italian Army 1940-45 (2): Africa 1940-43 , Men-at-Arms. Osprey Publishing: Oxford 2000. ISBN 1-85532-865-8 .
- Gavin Long: To Benghazi (= Australian War Memorial [Hrsg.]: Australia in the war of 1939-1945. Series 1 - Army . Volume 1 ). Australian War Memorial, Canberra 1961, OCLC 872538251 , Victory at Sidi Barrani, S. 131–142 ( gov.au [PDF; accessed December 12, 2018]).
- Mario Montanari: Sidi el Barrani (Giugno 1940-Febbraio 1941) (= Ufficio Storico [ed.]: Le operazioni in Africa settentrionale . Volume 1 ). Stato maggiore dell'esercito, Roma 1985, OCLC 603722101 .
- Ian Stanley Ord Playfair , CJ Molony, George Marquis Stewart Stitt, SE Toomer: The early successes against Italy: (to May 1941) . In: Her Majesty's Stationery Office (Ed.): History of the United Kingdom in the Second World War - Military Series (= The Mediterranean and Middle East . Band 1 ). Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London 1959, OCLC 881708088 , Chapter XI. The Italians make a move into Egypt, p. 205-222 ( ibiblio.org ).
- Gerhard Schreiber , Bernd Stegemann , Detlef Vogel: The Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe. From the "non belligeranza" of Italy to the entry into the war of the United States (= Military History Research Office [Hrsg.]: The German Reich and the Second World War . Volume 3 ). Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1984, ISBN 3-421-06097-5 , first part, III.1.c) The offensive against Sidi Barrani, p. 239-249 .
swell
- Archibald Wavell: Operations in the Middle East from August, 1939 to November, 1940. Wavell's Official Despatches , in: London Gazette, (Supplement) No. 37609. pp. 2997-3006. June 13, 1946.
Individual evidence
- ↑ Playfair, p. 109.
- ↑ Playfair, p. 121.
- ↑ Schreiber, p. 240.
- ↑ Schreiber, pp. 240–242.
- ↑ All information on the organization of the Italian troops according to Schreiber, pp. 243–245.
- ↑ Italian military historiography gives slightly different figures for the air forces at the beginning of the operation, these are: 110 bombers, 135 fighters, 45 attack aircraft, 6 long-range reconnaissance planes and 4 torpedo planes (quoted from Schreiber p. 245 from Africa Settentrionale ); Playfair speaks less concretely of " [...] there were about 300 serviceable bombers, fighters, and ground attack aircraft, apart from reconnaissance units, the Colonial Air Force, and a number of transport and air-sea rescue aircraft. «(P. 207).
- ↑ Schreiber, p. 247.
- ↑ Playfair, pp. 212-215.
- ↑ Schreiber, pp. 247-248.