Operation Battleaxe
Soldiers of the 4th Indian Division
| date | June 15. bis 17th June 1941 |
|---|---|
| place | North Africa ( Italian Libya , Egypt ) |
| output | Failure of the Allied offensive, tactical victory for the Axis powers |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
|
|
| Troop strength | |
| 20,000 soldiers 190 tanks 98 fighters 105 bombers |
13,200 soldiers 196 tanks 130 fighters 84 bombers |
| losses | |
|
969 fallen, wounded and missing |
1270 killed, wounded and missing |
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The Operation Battleaxe (original code name: Operation Bruiser ; sometimes called Battle of Sollum called) was a military company of the Allies in North Africa during the Second World War . It was the second attempt to relieve the city of Tobruk , which had been besieged by the Axis powers since April 1941 . The operation failed after only three days, with the British 8th Army suffering heavy losses of tanks and material and ultimately only barely escaping being encircled and destroyed. As a result of the failure, Archibald Wavell was recalled as Commander in Chief of the Middle East Command and replaced by Claude Auchinleck .
background
Italy had declared war on France and Great Britain on June 10, 1940. The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini assumed that the war would only be brief and hoped to be able to satisfy some of Italy's territorial claims through an alliance with the German Empire. In North Africa , on the one hand, these consisted of an expansion of the colony of Italian Libya to the west to include the French protectorate of Tunisia . To the east, Italy sought control over Egypt and the strategically important Suez Canal , as well as establishing a direct land connection to its colonies in East Africa . After France had been defeated in the western campaign and Tunisia belonged to the now allied Vichy France , the Italian expansion goals in North Africa turned entirely to Egypt. On September 9, 1940, Italy finally invaded Egypt with the 10th Army , and the war in North Africa began.
Course of the war in North Africa
However, the invasion was not very successful and, due to the poor supply and equipment of the troops, it only came to a halt a little more than 100 km behind the Egyptian-Libyan border. On December 8, the Allies launched a counter-offensive with Operation Compass . Originally limited to just a few days and aimed at driving the Italian army out of Egypt, it turned out to be so successful that the advance into Libya was continued. By the beginning of February 1941, the Allied troops had occupied Cyrenaica up to and including El Agheila and almost completely wiped out the 10th Italian Army.
The complete capture of Italian Libya did not occur, however, because parts of the Allied troops deployed in North Africa were needed to ward off the impending Balkan campaign of the German Reich in April 1941. While the Allies withdrew troops to defend Greece from February 1941 , Germany secretly shipped its first troop contingents to Tripoli in the so-called company Sonnenblume and founded the German Africa Corps . Only a few weeks after his arrival, the Afrikakorps commanded by Erwin Rommel and the Italian divisions in Libya started another offensive. The few and mostly inexperienced Allied troops quickly withdrew from Cyrenaica.
In the course of April, the Axis powers had again advanced to the Halfaya Pass on Egyptian territory. Only the strategically important deep water port of Tobruk was still held by an Allied occupation. After a series of attacks on Tobruk in April and early May 1941 had failed, Rommel prepared for a longer siege of the city in order to save his limited resources . The Allied High Command in the Middle East under Archibald Wavell began planning and preparing a counter-offensive to regain control of Cyrenaica and to relieve the besieged city. The first counter-offensive, called Operation Brevity , started on May 15, but was able to achieve little more than recapturing the Halfaya Pass (and only until May 27). At the same time (May 20 - June 1, 1941) the airborne battle for Crete was fought, which, should the German Reich be successful, would significantly improve air support and supplies to the Axis powers. On the basis of a radio message from Friedrich Paulus intercepted with Ultra , in which he reported his visit to the front with Rommel and described his position in front of Tobruk as weak, the Allies assumed that the Africa Corps could be defeated quickly with a large-scale offensive.
Prepare for the offensive
Allied plans
On May 28, Archibald Wavell issued the orders for Operation Battleaxe. This envisaged three attack spikes, one of which was to advance along the coast to the Halfaya Pass, the second along the large steep slope to Fort Cappuzo and Sollum, and the third to advance to the Hafid ridge and the German armored forces suspected there. They should then be wedged between the last two attack wedges and destroyed. As soon as the enemy forces immediately at the front were overcome, the Allied army would march north and begin the liberation of Tobruk. In the following weeks, the entire Kyrenaica should finally be occupied.
Strong air forces were deployed to North Africa to support the operation. These were to begin three days before the start of the ground offensive with the attacks on the enemy's supply lines as well as on Benghazi , the main supply port of the Axis powers. Major General Noel Beresford-Peirse , the commandant of the XIII. Corps was given operational command of the offensive. Major General Frank Messervy commanded the two infantry spearheads the east and Major General Michael O'Moore Creagh the 7th Armored Division and its supporting forces in the west of the operation area. The start of the operation was originally scheduled for June 7, but had to be postponed to June 15, as the new tanks intended for the attack did not arrive in Alexandria until June 9 .
Preparation of the Axis Powers
After Operation Brevity in May 1941, the failed first attempt by the Allies to relieve Tobruk, Rommel realized how vulnerable the front line along the Libyan-Egyptian border was. To strengthen them, he had additional minefields and anti-tank positions built along the coastal road. The 15th Panzer Division was to defend the border in the south . Through intercepted British radio communications that were accidentally sent unencrypted, Rommel learned of the plans for the imminent second Allied offensive on June 8th. In response, he had the 5th light division moved to positions south of Tobruk, so that it could quickly intervene as a mobile reserve in possible battles on the front line if necessary . On the night before the offensive began, Rommel had Tobruk bombarded intensively with artillery to prevent the local garrison from intervening in the fighting.
Involved armed forces
Allied forces
While the planning of the operation was under the direction of the British Commander-in-Chief in North Africa, Archibald Wavell, Major General Noel Beresford-Peirse finally led the operational command of the XIII. Corps. The two spikes aimed at Fort Capuzzo and the Halfaya Pass were led by Major-General Frank Messervy , while the bulk of the armored forces gathered in the Hafid Ridge-aimed attack spire were under the command of Major-General Michael O. 'Moore Creagh stood. The ground troops comprised a total of around 20,000 men and around 190 tanks, of which around 90 were cruiser tanks (around 40 older models Cruiser MKI-IV and 50 newer models MKVI). Both the 4th Indian Infantry Division and the 7th Panzer Division were understaffed. The 4th Indian Division had only one of its brigades, the 11th Indian Infantry Brigade, while the other two, the 7th and 4th Indian Infantry Brigades, were stationed in Syria and East Africa . To compensate for this, the 22nd Guards Brigade and the 4th Brigade of the 7th Panzer Division were assigned to her for the operation. The 7th Panzer Division also had only two of the usual three brigades.
In addition, the armed forces for this operation were supported by a strong air force, the so-called Desert Air Force . It comprised six bomber squadrons and eight fighter squadrons (105 and 98 aircraft) and was under the command of Arthur Coningham with headquarters in Maaten Baggush .
- XIII Corps, Major General Noel Beresford-Peirse (3rd day: Archibald Wavell)
- 4th Indian Infantry Division, Major General Frank Messervy
- Division troops
- 11th Indian Brigade
- 22nd Guards Brigade
- 4th Armored Brigade
- 7th Armored Division, Major General Michael O'Moore Creagh
- Division troops
- 7th Armored Brigade
- Support group
- 4th Indian Infantry Division, Major General Frank Messervy
Axis powers
Most of the troops stationed in Cyrenaica were tied up in the siege of Tobruk . Securing the border line between Libya and Egypt was taken over by parts of the Italian Trento Division and the German 15th Panzer Division. The Italian division took over the security of the Sollum / Fort Capuzzo area, while the armored division was stationed west and south along the border. The strategically important Halfaya Pass was held by a mixed German-Italian troop under the command of Captain Wilhelm Bach with around 900 men, consisting of the Trento division (400 men) and the 104th Rifle Regiment (500 men) of the 15th Panzer Division composed. Shortly before the start of Operation Battleaxe, Rommel moved the 5th Light Division to a standby position south of Tobruk so that it could be used as a mobile reserve if necessary. In total, the Axis powers were able to deploy just over 13,000 men to repel Operation Battleaxe, as well as 196 tanks (of which 89 light, 107 medium and heavy tanks), 130 fighters (60 German, 70 Italian) and 84 bombers (59 German, 25 Italian).
- German Africa Corps, Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel
- 15th Armored Division
- 5th light division
- 102nd Motorized Division “Trento”
Course of the operation
day 1
Operation Battleaxe initially started as planned. As planned, the Allied air forces repeatedly attacked enemy supply columns and airfields. Due to the strong escort, the Axis powers were initially only able to counter-attacks sporadically. Overall, the three Allied attack wedges were able to advance largely unhindered into the intended attack positions.
Attack on the Halfaya Pass
In the east, at 5:15 a.m., the so-called Coast Force , commanded by Brigadier Reginald Savory, attacked the positions of the Axis powers at the Halfaya Pass . The lead was formed by the 2nd Battalion of the Highlander Regiment as well as 13 tanks of the 4th Panzer Regiment and an artillery battery. This was followed by two Indian battalions, smaller parts of the 4th Panzer Regiment and some 25 pounder guns.
At 5:40 a.m., the British artillery should have opened fire on the German and Italian troops to provide protection for the advancing tanks and infantry, but the battery got stuck in the soft sand. The attack was initially postponed to 6:00 a.m., but finally started without artillery support. The Axis powers succeeded in repelling all attacks of the Highlander Regiment in their well-developed positions. The 4th Panzer Regiment, in particular, suffered heavy losses, so that by the afternoon only two of the 13 tanks were still operational. The attacks of the following troops were also repulsed with great losses for the Allies.
The capture of Fort Capuzzo
The Allies reached the strategically important position of Fort Capuzzo at noon on the first day. They quickly managed to overcome the defenders and take the fort. The defenders had to retreat to the positions of the 15th Panzer Division north of Capuzzo . Rommel had forbidden large-scale counter-attacks. Rather, the British should be prompted to pursue them through selective, rapid attacks with immediate retreat. His goal was to separate the British tanks from their own troops and destroy them individually. During this first day of the fighting, the Allies strengthened their positions in Fort Capuzzo, so that there were only too few skirmishes with only minor losses on both sides. As a reaction to the establishment of the British in Fort Capuzzo, Rommel moved the 5th Light Division to Sidi Azeiz in order to be able to react more quickly to possible advances in the direction of Sollum.
Attack on the Hafid ridge
The most southern attack wedge of the Allies was equipped with the new type of Crusader tanks and was supposed to overcome the position of the 15th Panzer Division on the Hafid ridge - a formation of three adjacent ridges. They arrived there at around 9:00 a.m., but were surprised to find that the ridge was mainly defended by infantry and well-dug anti-tank guns. The British Crusader tanks , which had insufficient anti-infantry armament, got into heavy fighting during an initial frontal attack. From close range, two Crusaders could be eliminated by anti-tank guns, the remaining Allied tanks then quickly withdrew.
The next attack on the first ridge was on the flanks. Although the defenders were surprised by this, they initially managed to repel this attack as well. Nevertheless, they then retreated towards the second ridge. The Allied tanks immediately started to pursue the defenders who were supposedly defeated. But it quickly became clear that this was a well-prepared feint. The anti-tank guns of the Axis Powers had taken up position again shortly after the second ridge, out of sight of the pursuing pursuers. As soon as the British tanks crossed the ridge, the guns took them under fire from very close range. In a few minutes, eleven Crusader tanks were destroyed and another six badly damaged. Although the defenders suffered heavy losses, the pursuers had to withdraw. When about 30 German tanks from the 5th Light Division were advancing from the west, it was clear to the Allies that they would no longer be able to capture the ridge that day. The falling darkness finally ended all further fighting that day.
day 2
After the first day, it became clear to the Allies that the offensive would fall well short of its goals. Only the capture of Fort Capuzzo was successful, while all other goals were missed. In addition, the Allies had suffered immense tank losses: At the end of the day, the 7th Armored Brigade only had 48 of the original 90 cruiser tanks, the 4th Armored Brigade had lost around half of its almost 100 Matilda tanks. Nevertheless, Beresford-Peirse hardly changed the original plan of operations. The 11th Infantry Brigade was supposed to keep trying to capture the Halfaya Pass, while the 4th and 7th Armored Brigades were now supposed to grapple and rub down the German 5th Light Division , which had advanced southward .
Rommel, in turn, knew of this plan and planned to send the Light Division further south until it was finally to turn east at Sidi Omar, push through the enemy lines and advance from the southwest to the Halfaya Pass. The 15th Panzer Division would meanwhile remain in front of Fort Capuzzo to tie up the Allied troops there.
Halfaya Pass
The 11th Infantry Brigade resumed its attacks on the Halfaya Pass on the second day, but again without making any significant progress. In the course of the day it was only possible to encircle the defenders and thus cut them off from any supply. Contrary to the instructions of Beresford-Peirse, the remaining Matilda tanks were not withdrawn, but remained on site as a reserve for a possible penetration through the line of defenders.
Counterattack on Fort Capuzzo
At 6 a.m., the commander of the 15th Panzer Division, Major General Walter Neumann-Silkow, began a counterattack on Fort Capuzzo, which had been captured by the British the day before. He had his tanks lined up in two rows and attacked Capuzzo from two sides. The attack went bad from the start. The tanks quickly came under fire from British 25 pounder cannons and Matilda tanks buried in fortified positions. By 10 a.m., 50 tanks were no longer operational, and the attack was finally called off at around 12 p.m. The Allies then occupied the grounds of the barracks near Sollum to prevent the attackers from bypassing and possibly connecting to the defenders of the Halfaya Pass.
The ongoing battle on the western flank
By the dawn of the second day the 5th Light Division had advanced south to the western edge of the Hafid ridge. East of the front line, the British 7th Armored Brigade followed this movement and was supported by the 7th Support Group from Sidi Omar . As they moved south, the two forces engaged in constant skirmishes that were unfavorable to the Allies. The British tanks did manage to take out a number of unarmored German vehicles. However, they could do little against the German tanks in particular. The 5th Light Division repeatedly used the significantly higher firing range (approx. 2750 m) of their tanks. At a great distance, they took the Allied 25-pounder cannons under fire, so that the enemy tanks had to advance without support. The comparatively small firing range of the British tanks of only about 460 m left enough time to take them under effective fire. When the British tanks finally got close enough, the heavy German tanks quickly retreated behind a screen of anti-tank guns, while the lighter ones made a sideways evasive and encircling movement. In the course of the day the Allies again suffered great losses in their armored forces. Further failures due to technical failure in the hostile environment exacerbated this development.
At the end of the day, the 7th Armored Brigade finally had to break out of the fighting. A last German attack at 7 p.m. ended with further heavy losses on the British side and was only ended by the falling dusk.
Day 3
On the third day at 4:30 in the morning, the German tank units finally launched a broad attack. While the 5th Light Division met the 7th Armored Brigade from 6 a.m. and drove them back to Sidi Suleiman by 8 a.m., the 15th Panzer Division left its positions in front of Fort Capuzzo to advance south of it to the Halfaya Pass. Major General Messervy interpreted the movements as a further attack on his positions and therefore did not allow the 4th Armored Brigade to move south as planned to reinforce the 7th Brigade. The continued attacks and the lack of reinforcements from Fort Capuzzo put Major General Creagh on alert. He sent a message to Beresford-Peirse asking for his presence and orders. Wavell, who was at Bedesford-Peirse when the news arrived, took command of the operation and flew to Creagh's command post. This radio message was also overheard by the Germans and confirmed Rommel's assumption that the Allied troops were on the verge of collapse and that the attack would have to be intensified.
At that time, the 5th Light Division and the 15th Panzer Division, which attacked from the southwest and northwest, respectively, were only about 14 km away from the Halfaya Pass. At 10 o'clock on their advance eastwards they met the remaining Matildas of the 4th Armored Brigade, which had finally united with the remaining Crusader tanks and the artillery of the 7th Armored Brigade and the 7th Support Group. The tanks had formed a defensive shield to cover the retreat of the 22nd Guards Brigade and 11th Indian Infantry Brigade to the Creagh command post.
At 10:45 am, Messervy contacted Creagh by radio. This time all radio communications were conducted in Hindi , as both commanders suspected that the radio communications had been bugged by the Germans. Messervy announced that he had given his infantry orders to retreat from Capuzzo to the Halfaya Pass. Wavell and Beresford-Peirse, who arrived at the command post around noon, confirmed the withdrawal in view of the grave situation. The British tanks finally managed to hold off the German advance long enough to allow the accompanying infantry to retreat behind the Halfaya Pass.
consequences
Just a few hours after the offensive began, it became clear that the Allies had clearly underestimated the resistance of the Axis powers. The reinforcements of the front line ordered by Rommel only a few weeks earlier and the flexible positioning of the two armored divisions enabled them to cushion the attack comparatively well. The intercepted Allied radio traffic provided Rommel with an important tactical advantage that enabled him to take the initiative on the second day. Only the clear assessment of the situation and the withdrawal on the third day prevented the Allied troops from being encircled and destroyed.
Archibald Wavell was subsequently held responsible for the failure of the operation and had to give up his position as commander in chief of the North African theater of war to Claude Auchinleck . Erwin Rommel was promoted to General of the Panzer Force , not least because of the successful defense against the British offensive in July 1941 .
The British experienced the combat strength of their Crusader tank. He lacked due to the armament with a 40 mm gun and so forth absence of explosive shells (HE) to combat the ability German anti-tank guns effective. Due to its own weak armor, the Crusader was almost defenseless against German anti-tank weapons.
The later built Crusader III therefore received a more powerful cannon; thus its combat strength approached that of the German Panzer III J and Panzer IV F2 .
The Crusader was superior to the Italian tanks M11 / 39 and M13 / 40 .
Individual evidence
literature
- John Delany: Fighting the Desert Fox: Rommel's Campaigns in North Africa April 1941 to August 1942 . Arms & Armor: Cambridge 1998. ISBN 978-1-58097-018-1 .
- Jon Latimer: Tobruk 1941: Rommel's Opening Move , pp. 76-85. Osprey: Oxford 2001. ISBN 978-1-84176-092-6 .
- Henry Maule: Spearhead general: The epic story of General Sir Frank Messervy and his men in Eritrea, North Africa and Burma . Oldhams Press: London 1961.
- Alan Moorehead: Desert War: The North African Campaign 1940-1943 . Penguin: London 2001. ISBN 978-0-14-027514-8 .
- Barrie Pitt: Crucible of War: Western Desert 1941 , New Edition. Paragon House: St. Paul 1989. ISBN 978-1-55778-232-8 .