Azerbaijani-Turkish relations

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Azerbaijani-Turkish relations
Location of Turkey and Azerbaijan
TurkeyTurkey AzerbaijanAzerbaijan
Turkey Azerbaijan

The relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Turkish Republic have long been very welcoming and have cooled somewhat since the 2000s.

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkey and the Soviet Union were allies. The Soviet Union was ready to take Turkish interests into account in the South Caucasus, not least for this reason Nagorno-Karabakh became part of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic . After the Second World War , Turkish policy turned towards the west, and not least Turkey joined NATO . During this time it did not pursue any active policy towards the Turkic peoples in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and in some cases it even remained in the dark about the situation of the Turkic peoples in the Soviet Union.

The collapse of the Soviet Union hit Turkey unprepared. However, it gave Turkey the opportunity to strengthen its bridging function between the West and the Turkic peoples, to open up new sales markets for Turkish products and new energy supply markets. The US encouraged them on this path.

After Azerbaijan declared independence on November 9, 1991, Turkey was the most important and culturally closest country. It was the first state to recognize the young republic; Turkey took this step with the other Soviet republics only a few weeks later. In Ankara there was already talk of a Turkish world from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China. The development of mutual relations was slow until 1992 because the first president of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mütəllibov , acted very carefully. The priorities for Turkey in this phase were maintaining Azerbaijani independence, a Turkey-friendly government in Baku , preventing Russian domination in the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan's sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh and a share in the Azerbaijani oil business.

The second president of Azerbaijan Abulfas Eltschibei acted in a decidedly pan-Turkish way, but was also erratic and destabilizing. Turkey was involved in his overthrow insofar as it thwarted Russian plans to bring Surat Huseynov to power and in his place helped Heydər Əliyev to take power. As a result, agliyev acted very independently from Turkey. He expanded relations with the western states and other Muslim countries, sent the Turkish military advisers home and introduced visa requirements for Turkish citizens. Only later, when he had consolidated his position, did he announce in front of the Turkish parliament in 1995 that Turkey and Azerbaijan were one nation in two states .

In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict , Turkey initially acted as a mediator and put the conflict on the OSCE's agenda . Despite all the sympathy for Azerbaijan, the then Turkish president saw no reason for intervention because there was no legal basis for this and Azerbaijan had not asked for an intervention either. The massacre of Azerbaijanis in the city of Chodjali sparked anti-Armenian demonstrations in Turkey. After the Armenian advances into Azerbaijani territory in 1992, more voices rose in Turkey calling for intervention against Armenia. Troops marched on the border with Armenia and a trade embargo was imposed on Armenia. Whether arms were delivered to Azerbaijan, as Armenia claims, is controversial; if arms were delivered, they were only small quantities. In any case, Turkish personnel trained the Azerbaijani army. The reasons for the Turkish reluctance are different. The dominant ideology of Kemalism in Turkey at the time allowed interventions abroad only in the event that Turkey was directly threatened. It was therefore unclear whether there would have been enough support within Turkey for a military operation in the Caucasus. The risk of dragging Russia and Iran into the conflict was great; Russia made specific threats. The Armenian influence on politics in the US and Europe could have jeopardized Turkey's plans to join the EU or led to US measures against Turkey; Turkey also feared an escalation similar to the Cyprus conflict . Last but not least, the Turkish military was busy with actions against the Kurds in their own country and after the genocide of the Armenians from 1915 they did not want to undertake another campaign against Armenia. Although the Azerbaijani leadership understood the Turkish attitude, it damaged Turkey's image in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Azerbaijan grew suspicious when Turkey allowed western aid convoys to pass through to Armenia. After all, Turkey remained Azerbaijan's only ally in the war against Armenia, especially under President Suleyman Demirel .

In 1994, a coup by the Russian special police OMON , in which high-ranking representatives from Turkey were involved, failed . Prime Minister Tansu Çiller had to travel to Baku to apologize for the activities of an uncontrollable right-wing group . Although Turkish President Demirel had warned his colleague Əliyev, relations between the two states were badly damaged. In 1995 Azerbaijani President Heydər Əliyev gave a speech in front of the Turkish parliament, in which he described Turkey and Azerbaijan as one nation in two states. After the December 1995 elections in Turkey, Turkish interest shifted to the Middle East.

At the end of the 1990s, Turkey reassessed its relationship with the South Caucasus. Thanks to American support, it was in a stronger position and tried to distinguish itself as a regional power. Azerbaijan and Georgia played a key role in expanding Turkish influence. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline , which these three states built to the exclusion of their powerful neighbors Russia and Iran, was an important element in this. Iran, who wanted to prevent the construction of this pipeline, put pressure on Azerbaijan, Iranian naval boats harassed Azerbaijani exploration ships in the Caspian Sea in 2001 and Iranian warplanes invaded Azerbaijani airspace. Turkey sent ten fighter planes to Baku, which officially took part in a ceremony. This visit ended the Iranian aggression.

The Turkish financial crisis and the retirement of President Demirel resulted in a slow withdrawal of Turkey from its Caucasus activities. After the participation of the AKP in government, Turkish foreign policy changed. Turkey shifted its interests back to the Middle East, recognized Iran's right to atomic energy, helped Syria out of its isolation and established better relations with Russia. The Azerbaijanis, secularized Shiite Muslims, were less important to the Turkish Islamists. All of this resulted in a cooling of relations between Ankara and Baku; In general, the emphasis on brotherhood among Turkic peoples waned as Islamic conservatism grew stronger in Turkey. At the same time, Azerbaijan gained self-confidence.

When Turkey's energy corridor through the South Caucasus was threatened after the Russian Georgian War in 2008, Turkey launched a stability initiative with Russia, but without the West and Iran. The Turkish stance and its new relationship with Russia worried Azerbaijan. With the Nabucco project , Turkey caused a lot of confusion and further worries in Baku; Turkey was too dependent on Russian gas for this project.

Talks to normalize relations between Turkey and Armenia began in 2008, with Ankara also considering lifting the embargo, although the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was not yet resolved. Baku was alarmed because Armenia still occupies one sixth of Azerbaijani territory. Lifting the embargo would have meant giving up the leverage on Armenia to withdraw from Azerbaijan. In Azerbaijan it was stated that they were isolated and that Turkey was no longer an ally.

Culture

In the first decade after independence, Azerbaijan was looking for its own identity and, due to the great similarity of the Azerbaijani language with the Turkish language, found a lot in common with Turkey. The consumption of Turkish television and the newly won freedom of travel contributed to this, but also the Turkish government system of the 1990s, which was heavily secularized, slowly democratized and cultivated strong ties to the West. This was an attractive role model for the Azerbaijanis. In addition, numerous business people from Turkey came to Azerbaijan who were well versed in markets characterized by corruption and overregulation.

At the same time, Turkey felt itself to be a much larger and more populous country, which was also the center of the Ottoman Empire , than Azerbaijan's big brother. However, Azerbaijanis considered themselves more modern, proud of their lower illiteracy rate, higher proportion of citizens with higher education and the greater influence of the western world on their lifestyle. They were skeptical of the numerous Turkish business people, especially when the Turks broke their promise to treat each other on an equal footing.

Web links

Commons : Azerbaijani-Turkish Relations  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 363 .
  2. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 364 .
  3. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 365 .
  4. ^ A b c Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 366 .
  5. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 367 .
  6. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 368 .
  7. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 369 .
  8. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 370 .
  9. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 371 .
  10. ^ A b c Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 360 .
  11. ^ A b c d Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 359 .
  12. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 372 .
  13. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 374 ff .
  14. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 362 .
  15. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 379 f .
  16. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 380 .
  17. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 383 .
  18. ^ Svante E. Cornell: Azerbaijan since independence . Sharpe, Armonk, NY 2011, pp. 389 .