B-52 crash at Fairchild Air Force Base

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B-52 crash at Fairchild Air Force Base
FairchildB52Crash.jpg

B-52 just before impact
Accident summary
Accident type uncontrolled flight into the ground due to pilot error
place Fairchild Air Force Base , Washington , United States
date June 24, 1994
Fatalities 4th
Survivors 0
Aircraft
Aircraft type B-52H ( bomber )
operator United States Air Force
Mark 61-0026
crew 4th
Lists of aviation accidents
Basic structure of a USAF Wing / Group / Squadron with regard to the chain of command.

The B-52 crash at Fairchild Air Force Base on June 24, 1994 was a plane crash during a training flight that killed the four crew members of a USAF B-52 Stratofortress . Bud Holland , the pilot in command of the aircraft stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base with the callsign Czar 52 , flew the aircraft outside of the permitted operational parameters during the accident and lost control. As a result, there was a stall . The machine crashed, hit the ground and was destroyed.

According to the investigation into the accident, the chain of events that led to the crash was mainly due to the personality and behavior of Holland, the reaction or non-reaction of his USAF superiors to it and the sequence of events during the accident.

Today the crash is used as a case study in Crew Resource Management training in military and civil aviation. In the USAF and US Army safety training courses, the crash is often used as an example of the importance of compliance with safety rules and the need to correct the behavior of anyone who violates the safety rules.

crash

On June 24, 1994 at 7:30 am local time ( Pacific Standard Time ), a B-52H bomber crew stationed at Fairchild Air Force Base in Washington prepared for a training flight for a flight demonstration at an upcoming air show . The crew consisted of the pilots Arthur "Bud" Holland (46 years old), Mark McGeehan (38), Robert Wolff (46) and the weapons system officer / radar navigator Ken Huston (41). Holland as the pilot in command, McGeehan as co-pilot and Wolff as safety observer were scheduled for this flight . Holland, McGeehan and Huston had the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and Wolff that of Colonel . Holland was the head of the standardization and evaluation department of the 92nd Bomb Wing, McGeehan was the commander of the 325th Bomb Squadron, Wolff was the deputy commander of the 92nd Bomb Wing, and Huston was the operations officer of the 325th Bomb Squadron.

The mission plan for the flight consisted of a demanding series of low altitude overflights, 60 degree bank turns, a steep climb, and a touch-and-go landing on Fairchild's runway 23. For Wolff, too, this flight was his "fini flight". In this USAF tradition, retiring flight crew members meet their relatives, friends, and co-workers on the airfield shortly after landing from their last flight and are splashed with water. As a result, Wolff's wife and many of his close friends were at the airfield to watch and attend the post-flight ceremony. From the garden of McGeehan's nearby accommodation, his wife and their two youngest sons watched the flight.

The B-52 took off at 1:58 pm and completed most elements of the demonstration without incident. At the end of the exercise profile, in the middle of the preparation for the touch-and-go landing on runway 23, the instruction to take off was given . A KC-135 had just landed and was on the runway. Holland held an altitude of 250 feet (75 meters) above ground (AGL) and radioed the tower for permission to make a 360-degree left turn. The tower controller issued the permit immediately. The B-52 began its 360-degree left turn around the tower roughly in the middle of the runway. Allegedly because of a storage facility for nuclear weapons, the area directly behind the tower was designated as restricted airspace. Holland made an extremely tight banked turn, keeping the low altitude of 250 feet (75 meters) AGL to avoid the restricted airspace. After about three quarters of the turn, at 2:16 p.m., at an angle of more than 90 degrees, the aircraft sank noticeably, hit the ground and exploded. The four members of the crew were killed. McGeehan's attempt to catapult himself out with the ejector seat failed. The impact interrupted the exit process and he could no longer leave the aircraft. No one was physically injured on the ground. The video-recorded crash was featured several times on US news broadcasts.

examination

USAF Brigadier General Orin L. Godsey, chief of security investigations

A safety investigation was immediately called under the direction of Brigadier General Orin L. Godsey, chief of USAF air safety. The Commission published its investigation report on August 10, 1994. A final assessment of the safety investigation was issued on January 31, 1995. The USAF security report was distributed only to personnel of the United States Department of Defense and was not intended for the public. An accident investigation commission called “AFR-110-14 investigation” published its own report in 1995. Unlike the USAF investigation, the AFR-110-14 report was intended for the public.

The AFR-110-14 Inquiry identified several factors that contributed to the crash, including the actual sequence of events, the personality and behavior of Bud Holland, previous control and lack of corrective action by USAF officers Bud Holland, planning and execution of the mission and other environmental and human factors.

Course of the accident

Accelerated stall: The tighter the curve, the greater the lift (green arrow) and thus the angle of attack must be in order to counteract the sum of the forces (magenta) from centrifugal force (red) and weight (blue). If the critical angle of attack is exceeded, the flow will stall, even if the flight speed remains constant.
Trajectory of the B-52 at Fairchild Air Force Base until it crashed

According to the investigation, the indicated airspeed (IAS) before the last curve around the tower was 182 knots (337 km / h). Although Holland increased the engine power after entering the curve, the power increase came too late to maintain the airspeed . Although an airspeed indicator was available to all four crew members , the airspeed could decrease further. Eight seconds before the impact, the aircraft's IAS had reduced to 145 knots (269 km / h), the bank angle of the aircraft exceeded 60 degrees and the aircraft began to stall. Even if Holland or McGeehan gave the spoiler and rudder fully to the right at this point and operated the elevator to straighten the aircraft nose, the tilting could not be stopped. This flight behavior is known under the term “Accelerated Stall”. This occurs when the stall speed ( stall speed) of an aircraft increases without reducing the flight speed. This can occur due to the environmental conditions and / or the current position of the aircraft in relation to its change in position.

As a result of the bank's incline of 60 degrees or more, the minimum speed at this point was 147 knots (272 km / h) IAS. Flying at 145 knots (269 km / h) IAS the aircraft overturned and could no longer be intercepted before the impact because of insufficient altitude.

Holland's behavior so far and the reaction of his USAF superiors

USAF staff testified that Holland had built a reputation for being an "aggressive" pilot who often went beyond the rules of flight safety. These included, for example, flying below the minimum flight altitude and exceeding the permissible bank angle and rate of climb. In addition, he regularly and illegally parked his private vehicle in the no-parking area near headquarters without notifying anyone.

In an earlier incident in 1991, a Dutch-controlled B-52 flew in a circle over a softball field where his daughter was playing a game. Holland started the circle at 2500 feet (760 m) AGL with a 65 degree lean angle. The aircraft nose began to descend and the bank angle increased to 80 degrees. After the aircraft lost 1,000 feet (300 m) altitude, Holland was able to regain control. One witness described the maneuver as a death spiral.

During the Fairchild Air Show on May 19, 1991, Holland was the pilot in command of the B-52 flight demonstration. During the demonstration, Holland disregarded some safety regulations. The permissible bank and pitch angles of the aircraft were not adhered to, the spectators were flown directly over and possibly the safety altitude was not reached. The base and unit commander, Colonel Arne Weinman, watched the demonstration with his staff, but apparently did not intervene.

On July 12, 1991, Holland commanded a B-52 for a " flyover " during the change of command ceremony for the 325th Bomb Squadron in Fairchild. During the demonstration and during the overflight, Holland's aircraft flew at altitudes below 100 feet (30 m) - well below the known minimum flight altitude, banked turns of more than 45 degrees, exceeded the permissible pitch and performed a wing-over . Wing-over was not expressly prohibited, but it was not recommended as it could damage the aircraft. Colonel Weinman and his Deputy Operations Commander Colonel Julich reprimanded Holland but took no official action.

Launch of a B-52H with normal pitch.

On the occasion of the Fairchild Air Show on May 17, 1992, Holland was again the pilot in command of the B-52 flight demonstration. Again, Holland disregarded some safety rules during the air show. He flew a few banked turns with an incline of more than 45 degrees at a low altitude and a climb with a high pitch angle of more than 60 degrees, which he completed with a wing-over. The unit's new commander, Colonel Michael G. Ruotsala, apparently did not act. A week later, the new commanding officer (DO) Colonel Capotosti warned Holland on his own initiative that he (Holland) would have to stay on the ground (be taken out of the air service) if he again disregard the safety rules. Capotosti neither documented his warning, nor did he take official action against Holland.

On April 14 and 15, 1993, Holland commanded a training mission with two B-52s to a bomb training area near Guam in the Pacific Ocean . During the mission, Holland flew its aircraft closer to the other aircraft than the regulations allowed. Holland also asked his navigator to videotape the bombing from inside the bomb bay. That too was against the rules. The navigator later brought the video to three of his USAF supervisors. The first, Lieutenant Colonel Bullock, the commander of the 25th Bomb Squadron, did nothing and may have tried to use the video to blackmail the Navigator to force him to accept a position as a squadron planner. The second, Lieutenant Colonel Harper, the group's deputy operations commander, told the crew member to keep the evidence a secret. The third, the DO, supposedly responded to reports about the video by stating, "Okay, I don't want to know about the video - I don't care."

At the Fairchild Air Show on August 8, 1993, Holland again commanded the B-52 flight demonstration; again with lean angles greater than 45 degrees, overflights at low altitude and a climb with more than 80 degrees pitch. The climb was so steep that fuel flowed out of the vents in the wing tanks. The Wing's new commander, Brigadier General James M. Richards, and his new DO, Col. William E. Pellerin, watched the demonstration but did nothing.

On March 10, 1994, Holland commanded a training mission with a B-52 to the Yakima bomb training area to offer a photographer the opportunity to film the aircraft dropping training ammunition. The minimum permitted aircraft altitude for this site was 500 feet (150 m) AGL. During the mission, Holland's aircraft was filmed crossing a ridge line at 30 feet (10 m) above the ground. Fearing for their lives, the cameramen stopped filming and took cover before the next overflight. This time Holland flew over the ridge at about three feet (1 m). Holland's copilot testified that he had to reach into the controls to prevent Holland from flying the plane into the ridge. Meanwhile, the other two crew members shouted at Holland several times, “Climb up! Climb!". Holland laughed and called one of the crew members a "wimp".

Mark McGeehan, USAF squadron commander, banning any member of his squadron from flying with Holland unless he (McGeehan) was on board the plane himself.

After this mission, the crew decided that they would never fly with Holland again. She reported the incident to the management of the bomber squadron. The squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mark McGeehan, reported the incident to Pellerin and recommended that Holland be taken out of service. Pellerin questioned Holland, gave him an oral reprimand and warned him not to show this behavior again. Pellerin neither documented the incident nor the warning, nor did he notify his superiors, who were not aware of the incident. To protect his crews, McGeehan decided that he would fly as co-pilot on all subsequent missions that Holland commanded. Witnesses said there was "considerable animosity" between Holland and McGeehan after this incident.

In preparation for the 1994 Fairchild Air Show, Holland was again selected as the pilot in command of the B-52 flight demonstration. Holland briefed the Wing's new commander, Col. William Brooks, on June 15, 1994 of the flight plan for the demonstration. The flight profile presented by Holland again contained numerous violations of the safety rules, including large bank angles, overflights at low altitude and flight positions with a large pitch angle. Brooks ordered Holland not to bank angles of more than 45 degrees or pitch angles of more than 25 degrees. During the first training session on June 17, 1994, Holland disregarded these orders several times. Brooks saw this but did nothing. Pellerin, who had flown, told Brooks that “the profile looks good to him; looks very safe, good within the parameters ”. The next training flight on June 24th ended with the crash.

Other factors

The flight display designed by Holland contained a 360-degree curve around the Fairchild airport control tower. Holland had never shown this maneuver in previous air shows. In disregard of Brooks' orders, Holland made a series of 60 degree bank turns and a 68 degree pitch climb during the last flight. There is no evidence that McGeehan or Wolff attempted to intervene when Holland was performing these maneuvers.

As on June 17, 1994, Pellerin was originally scheduled for this mission. However, Pellerin was not available for the June 24, 1994 flight. Wolff was selected as a replacement. As a result of the short notice of his mission, Wolff was unable to attend the briefing before the flight and only boarded the aircraft after the engines had been started. Therefore, Wolff was not aware of the planned mission profile and he had no opportunity to raise objections before the start.

All of the crew members involved in the crash had had little flight time in the months before. The B-52 crew were not aware that the aircraft was crashing until shortly before the impact. This indicated the failure to use any standard methods of intercepting the aircraft after the stall occurred. According to the investigation report, the aircraft would have hit the ground even if the interception measures were properly applied. The altitude was probably no longer sufficient for interception.

Result

The accident investigation concludes that the sequence of events that led to the crash are mainly due to the personality and behavior of Holland. Then there were the reactions of his USAF superiors to his behavior and the course of events during the last flight. Holland's disregard of the rules for the safe operation of the B-52, which he commanded, was justified by the failure of binding and coherent corrective measures by his superior officers. This led him to believe that his last flight, which culminated in the slow 360-degree banked turn around the control tower, could be carried out in an unsafe manner.

During Holland's last flight, other environmental factors came into play - including a new maneuver (the 360-degree curve around the tower), Colonel Wolff's insufficient involvement in flight preparations and the distraction caused by a shootout on Base Four Days earlier with six dead and many injured. In connection with Holland's risky flying style, the circumstances for the occurrence of a crash were favorable. The final factor was the 10 knots of tail wind that pushed the aircraft, which was flying at a steep angle, into the “accelerated stall”, which led to the crash.

Aftermath

On May 19, 1995, in a trial in a USAF military tribunal , Pellerin pleaded guilty to two counts of negligence for his or her failure to act that contributed to the crash. The court sentenced him to a $ 1,500 monthly wage waiver for five months and received a written reprimand. The USAF did not reveal whether any other officer implicated in the chain of events leading up to the crash was receiving disciplinary or administrative action. USAF security standards critics stated that this crash was an example of a number of problems within the USAF with security enforcement.

The accident investigation found that the procedures and rules to prevent such a fall were likely already in place. However, the fact that this crash could happen showed that in at least one case the existing safety rules were insufficient. To emphasize once again the importance of compliance with the safety rules and that the actions of anyone who violates one of these rules must be corrected at any time, the USAF distributed the results of the accident investigation very quickly to all airborne units. Today the crash is used as a case study in Crew Resource Management training in military and civil aviation. In the safety training courses, the fall often serves as an example that the safety rules must be followed above all else.

To depict an aircraft accident, the 2015 film Project Almanac used footage of the Fairchild crash. This created public anger among Wolff and McGeehan's families. Paramount Pictures initially claimed that the video in question shows the FedEx Express Flight 80 crash in Tokyo in 2009. Producer Michael Bay apologized to the relatives and had the footage removed from the theatrical version of the film and the trailers .

swell

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Thompson, Way, Way Off in the Wild Blue Yonder , Kern, Darker Shades of Blue and USAF, AFR 110-14 , p. 2-3. Holland, as head of the standardization and evaluation department, was responsible for the knowledge and implementation of theoretical and practical standards during the flight operations of the bomber squadron.
  2. ^ Piper, Chain of Events , p. 136, Kern, Darker Shades of Blue , and USAF, AFR 110-14 , p. 2-3.
  3. ^ Diehl, Silent Knights , p. 125.
  4. ↑ a b c d Diehl, Silent Knights , p. 125, Thompson, Way, Way Off in the Wild Blue Yonder , USAF, AFR 110-14 , p. 2-3, and Kern, Darker Shades of Blue
  5. ^ Air Force Link, Brigadier General Orin L. Godsey , and USAF, AFR 110-14 , p. 2-3.
  6. ↑ a b c d USAF, AFR 110-14 , all.
  7. ↑ a b USAF, AFR 110-14 , p. 3-4, and Kern, Darker Shades of Blue .
  8. ^ Diehl, Silent Knights , p. 125, Thompson, Way, Way Off in the Wild Blue Yonder , and USAF, AFR 110-14 , p. 3-4.
  9. ↑ a b c Kern, Darker Shades of Blue .
  10. ^ Diehl, Silent Knights , p. 125, Kern, Darker Shades of Blue . The article does not provide any information as to whether this DO Colonel Capotosti or the new DO Colonel William E. Pellerin was.
  11. ^ Air Force Link, Brigadier General James M. Richards USAF biography , Thompson, Way, Way Off in the Wild Blue Yonder , and Kern, Darker Shades of Blue .
  12. ^ Thompson, Way, Way Off in the Wild Blue Yonder , Kern, Darker Shades of Blue , and USAF, AFR 110-14 , p. 3-4.
  13. ↑ Lou Holtz / Upper Ohio Valley Hall of Fame, Lt. Col. Mark C. McGeehan .
  14. ^ Diehl, Silent Knights , p. 126, Thompson, Way, Way Off in the Wild Blue Yonder , Kern, Darker Shades of Blue
  15. ↑ Check-Six.com, The Crash of Czar 52 .
  16. ↑ Michael Bay apologizes, will cut B-52 crash from film . Retrieved December 13, 2016.

literature

  • Alan E. Diehl: Silent Knights: Blowing the Whistle on Military Accidents and Their Cover-Ups . Potomac Books, 2003, ISBN 1-57488-544-8 .
  • Tony T. Kern: Darker Shades of Blue: The Rogue Pilot . McGraw-Hill Professional Publishing, 1999, ISBN 0-07-034927-4 .
  • Joan L. Piper: Chain of Events: The Government Cover-up of the Black Hawk Incident and the Friendly-fire Death of Lt. Laura Piper . Brassey's, 2001, ISBN 1-57488-344-5 .
  • United States Air Force (USAF) : Summary of AFR 110-14 USAF Accident Investigation Board Report 1994.

Web links

Commons : B-52 Crash at Fairchild Air Force Base  - Album with Pictures, Videos and Audio Files