De duck et essentia
De ente et essentia (“About beings and beings”) is one of the early works of the philosopher Thomas Aquinas . It belongs to the Opuscula , the smaller works, and was created around 1255 . Thomas dedicated it to “ad fratres socios”, meaning the confreres. In it, Aquinas explains the basic concepts of Aristotelian metaphysics . In addition to other modifications, it establishes connections with Christian theology . In particular, it explains the terms substance and form , substance and accident , as well as genre , species and species- forming difference . In addition to Aristotle, Thomas also discusses Boethius , the Arab philosophers Avicenna and Averroes, and the Jewish Neoplatonist Avicebron .
Table of contents
prolog
Thomas explains here the motivation of his treatise. “ Being ” and “being” are first grasped by reason . But because "a small mistake at the end of a great beginning is," these two concepts and their relation to the "logical terms" genus (must genus ), type ( species ) and difference ( differentia ) be clarified first. With regard to the method, the investigation must progress from the compound, the being, to the simple, the essence.
Chapter 1
The first chapter is about what the terms “being” and “being” mean. “Being” is the broader term. It has two meanings:
- than that which is classified by the ten highest genera, the categories (real being)
- as the "truth of a statement" (logical being).
According to the second meaning, something that does not really exist can also be a being; z. For example, negation and privation (the absence of a quality or ability, e.g. "blindness") of something are stated.
The essence now relates to beings in the first meaning. The following aspects of "beings" can be distinguished:
- that by which and in which "being has being" ( essentia )
- that on the basis of which a being belongs to a certain type and genus: its definition or "whatness" ( quiditas )
- that by which a being is determined in terms of being: its form ( forma )
- the principle of action inherent in every being: its nature ( natura )
The essence is found primarily in the substances , in the accidents only in “certain respects”. Thomas differentiates between simple (e.g. God) and compound substances (e.g. man). Since the simple substances are the cause of the compound substances, they also have a "more excellent being"; the essence is also present in them “in a truer and more excellent way”.
Chapter 2
Here Thomas explains why the essence of compound substances must consist of their two components, form and matter. Matter is eliminated as the sole essential component because it is neither a “principle of knowledge” nor can the type or genus of a thing be determined by it, both of which are constitutive for the concept of essence. But the form cannot be called “essence” alone, since otherwise the definitions of “natural” and “mathematical” things would not differ from one another.
In the following, Thomas examines the various functions of matter. In the case of the individual , the "designated", that is, the "considered under certain dimensions" matter is the principle of individuation (e.g. "this bone and this flesh"). The species, on the other hand, contains matter as “not designated” (“bones and meat in general”). In this respect, the essence of the individual differs from that of the species only in terms of the “designation” of its matter content ( materia signata ).
As between the individual and the species, there is a relationship of designation and non-designation between species and genus. The genus contains the species as "not designated". The “designation” of the species occurs through the “constitutive” difference ( differentia constitutiva or differentia specifica ). The constitutive difference does not come from outside the species, but is already implicit in the genus. For example, the type “human” (understood as “sensible beings”) is already included in the “living beings” species. It is “denoted” by the attribute “rationality”; this represents at the same time - in an analogous sense - the "form" of the species "human". The "sensuality" on the other hand is the explicit characteristic of the superordinate species "living beings". It forms - understood in an analogous sense - the "material" component of the human species.
Chapter 3
The central theme of this chapter is the relationship between the concept of species, which is decisive for the definition of an individual, and the concept of essence. Thomas distinguishes between the following essential concepts:
| Essential concept | "Components" | example | features |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Entity as part ( per modum partis ) | +: Form, non-displayable matter -: displayable matter, being (excluded) |
humanity ( humanitas ) | cannot be stated by the individual (≠ species term) |
| 2. Entity as a whole | man ( homo ) | can be expressed by the individual | |
| 2.1 in absolute consideration ( absoluta consideratio ) | +: Form, displayable matter (implicit) -: accidents, being (is excluded (abstract), not excluded) |
man as ( qua ) man | does not contain the determination of plurality (≠ species term) |
| 2.2 in consideration with his being in something ( secundum esse quod habet in hoc vel in illo ) | |||
| 2.2.1 in the subject ( esse in singularibus ) | +: Form, displayable matter (implicit), accidents (implicit), being in the object | does not contain the definition of the unit (≠ species term) |
|
| 2.2.2 in the intellect ( eat in anima ) | +: Form, displayable matter (implicit), accidents (implicit), being in the intellect | contains the determination of the unit | |
For Thomas, what is characteristic of the concept of species is that it can be expressed by the individual and contains both the definition of unity and plurality. The characteristic of predictability is not to be found in an understanding of the essence as a mere principle that only takes into account a "part" of the individual object and excludes its concrete being (1). So z. B. Humanity ( humanitas ) cannot be predicated by Socrates.
It is therefore crucial for Thomas that the species term refers to the individual object as a whole (2). Here again an absolute and a relative approach can be distinguished from one another. The absolute point of view ( absoluta consideratio ) (2.1) corresponds to the peculiar consideration for the definition of a single object. It asks what is peculiar to the species as ( qua ) species - e.g. B. for man as man - and is therefore identical to the question of whatness ( quiditas ). But since it excludes the concrete realization of the individual object with its accidental properties (such as the skin color of Socrates), this essential concept lacks the element of multiplicity and therefore does not fully express what is meant by the species concept. This always includes the different realization of the general - like the type of "human" in Socrates and Plato.
According to Thomas, the unity expressed in the concept of species is not simply found in the individual objects (2.2.1). These only contain certain features that serve as the “foundation” ( fundamentum in re ) for the “connecting and separating reason” (DEE 3, 52), from which a common “image” ( imago ) of the individual objects can be formed.
Only through the performance of the human intellect is the general concept of species created in the last instance (2.2.2). In doing so, however, the reference to the respective individual objects from which the concept of species was abstracted always remains of importance. Due to the factual basis that differs from person to person, for Thomas - directed against Averroes - the general terms do not have a universal meaning, but only a meaning that is uniform for the individual (DEE 3, 49f.).
Chapter 4
The fourth chapter deals with the so-called “simple” substances ( substantiae simplices ), which are not composed of matter and form, but contain no matter and are therefore also referred to by Thomas as “separate” substances ( substantiae separatae ). These substances include the human soul or spirit , angels , demons and God . Except for God, however, these substances are also composed in a different sense, insofar as they consist of form and being , which are related to one another like potency and act .
The essence of simple substances is identical to their form. At this point Thomas clearly distinguishes between being and essence. An object (e.g. a phoenix ) can be defined by the being without it having to exist. The knowledge of the being of the object to be defined is an activity of reason which differs from the definition.
The form of the simple compound substances serves as a limitation principle for Thomas. For being, which in itself is unlimited, it represents a finite measure in which being can participate in being. In this way Thomas creates a hierarchy of simple substances. At the lowest level is the human soul, which is only capable of knowledge in connection with a material body.
In contrast to the Jewish Neo-Platonist Avicebron ( Shlomo Ben Yehuda ibn Gabirol ), Thomas is of the opinion that the human soul also has no material components. He justifies this with the fact that an object can only be recognized with regard to its form aspect and the recognition of a form by the human soul itself is only possible if it is itself a form. However, as the lowest simple substance, the soul is connected with the material insofar as it is peculiar to connect with a material body to form a compound substance. Although the human soul is indeed the form of the body and thus an essential part of the human being, it itself again has an essence that is different from its being. The human soul relates to its acts (volitional and rational activities) potentially. It passes over into its acts by being active in material things for which the body serves as a material medium.
While matter represents the principle of individuation for the human soul, this is the form for all higher simple substances. These simple substances can also be more or less similar to one another, depending on which genus they belong to (such as the seraphim or cherubim ).
Since, according to Thomas, it is not possible that the being of a thing is caused by its form itself (DEE 4, 71), it must have the being of another. This first cause of being is God for Thomas. While being is added to the essence for all subordinate simple substances and thus a distinction can be made between “being like this” (quod est) and “being” (quo est), the essence of God as the highest simple substance ( substantia prima simplex , cf. DEE 1, 63) identical to being ( aseity ). This divine substance can only be one, since it is a perfect being and any reproduction would only be possible through additions to a - in itself limited, imperfect - being (DEE 4, 68).
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 is essentially a summary of the previous three chapters. Thomas once again systematically differentiates between the various forms of realization of the being in the three substances.
With the “first substance”, God, essence is identical with being. Thomas describes the first substance as an individual, but it no longer belongs to a species or genus (DEE 5, 81). Rather, the first substance stands above all genera and possesses all of their properties - in a “simple” unity and thus a higher level. Thomas emphasizes that the (infinite) being of the first substance is not identical with the (finite) being of the other substances.
In the case of the “immaterial rational substances” (angels, souls etc.) being and being are indeed different from one another, but the being is free of matter. Its being is one received from the first substance, but finite being due to the limitation of its form. Its individuation principle, the species, is unknown to us by its nature, since we cannot even deduce it from its effects (DEE 5, 85).
A special case is the human soul, whose "beginning" - but not its continuation - is tied to the respective body. Her individuation is also linked to the respective body, which she does not lose after its end (DEE 5, 84).
The substances “composed” of matter and form are limited in two ways. On the one hand with regard to being limited by form, on the other hand with regard to being shaped by matter. In contrast to the immaterial substances, each species occurs here in many individuals.
Chapter 6
The last chapter is dedicated to the accidents (properties). Its essence is imperfect in comparison with the substance composed of matter and form, which is reflected in the fact that its being depends on the substance to which it belongs. The substance generally precedes the accident (in terms of its being), therefore the connection of the accident with it does not cause a substantial, but only a "secondary being" ( esse secundum , DEE 6, 96). The accident contributes nothing to the constitution of a thing in its substantial being.
Thomas discusses a commonality between accidents and form: in order to exist, both are dependent on something else: form on matter and property on its “carrier”, that is, on a thing to which the property belongs. If, for example, Socrates has the quality of having a beard, then this quality cannot exist without Socrates. Nevertheless, there is again an essential difference, because just as the form cannot exist alone, its “complement”, matter, cannot exist alone either. In the case of bearer and quality, the dependence is different in that the bearer can very well exist without the quality (Socrates will continue to exist even if he removes his beard).
Thomas differentiates between accidents that depend on the form of the substance (e.g. human laughter, DEE 6, 103) and those that depend on its material (e.g. the black skin color of Ethiopians, DEE 6, 101). The accidents that follow matter are individual, while those that follow form belong to the species or genus.
Another distinction - going back to the Aristotelian philosophy of nature - concerns that between properties which receive their reality through the causes inherent in the substance itself and those which they owe to an external cause (DEE 6, 104). The heat is caused by its bearer, the fire itself, while something from outside must be added to the disposition of the bearer in order to realize the property “ transparency ” (namely the light from the sun). With this distinction Thomas anticipates the modern doctrine of dispositions to a certain extent .
general overview
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| Legend: essential components (potency) , being as an actuating principle | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Individual evidence
- ↑ See Horst Seidl, in: Thomas von Aquin, About Beings and Essence , p. XXIX
- ↑ See e.g. B. Albert Keller : Sein , p. 102. In: Hermann Krings , Hans Michael Baumgartner , Christoph Wild (Hrsg.): Handbuch Philosophischer Grundbegriffe. Kösel, Munich 1973-74.
- ↑ According to the principle "like is recognized by like"
- ↑ The distinction goes back to the Aristotelian metaphysics X 9. In the scholastic tradition, the accidents that depend on the form and are therefore generally definable are also referred to as proprien (cf. Horst Seidl, in: Thomas von Aquin, About Beings and Essence , p. 108f).
- ↑ See Horst Seidl, in: Thomas von Aquin, About Beings and Essence , p. 109
literature
Comments (until 1914)
- Armandus de Bellovisu († 1333); Depressed 1472
- Heinrich von Gorrichem / Gorkum († 1431)
- Gerhardus de Monte († 1480)
- Johannes Versorius († 1480)
- Petrus Crockart / of Brussels († 1514); Depressed 1509 and 1514
- Thomas (Cardinal) of Cajetan / de Vio († 1534); Screeched 1491
- Raphael Ripa († 1611); Depressed 1598 u. 1626
- Hieronymus Contarini; Depressed 1616
- Giuseppe (Cardinal) Pecci († 1890); Published in magazine 1882
- Emile Brunetau; Depressed 1914
Critical Editions
- L. Baur, in: Opuscula et textus historiam ecclesiae eiusque vitam atque doctrinam illustrantia. Series scholastica et mystica edita curantibus M. Grabmann et Fr. Pelster . Aschendorff, 1926
- Leonina Edition: Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera omnia, Tomus XLIII . Roma, 1976 (see also online version: http://visualiseur.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9495t )
German translations
- Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence. Translation, introduction, and notes . Ed .: F. Meister. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1935. X, 75 ff.
- Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia. The being and the essence . Ed .: FL Beeretz; K. Allgaier. Stuttgart, 1987
- Thomas Aquinas, On being and essence (De ente et essentia). Latin-German. With introduction, translation and commentary . Ed .: H. Seidl. Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1988. LXII, 134 ff.
- Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence. German-Latin edition. Translated and explained . Ed .: R. Allers. Hegner, Vienna, 1936; Olten, Cologne, 1953; Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt, 1980 a. 1991. 166 ff.
- Thomas Aquinas, De ente et essentia. About beings and beings. Latin-German . Ed .: W. Kluxen; P. Hoffmann. Freiburg im Breisgau - Basel - Vienna, 2007. 111 ff.
Secondary literature
- Joseph Bobik: Aquinas on Being and Essence: A Translation and Interpretation , University Press, Notre Dame 1965, various reprints, most recently 2004, ISBN 0268006172 .
- Martin Grabmann : The text "De ente et essentia" and the metaphysics of being of St. Thomas Aquinas , in: Mittelalterliches Geistesleben , Vol. 1, Munich, 1975. pp. 314–331.
- Wolfgang Kluxen : Thomas von Aquin: The being and its principles , in: Basic problems of the great philosophers , ed. v. J. Bacon. Göttingen 1972.
- Horst Seidl: Analytical structure; Main aspects; Problems of interpretation; , in: Thomas von Aquin - About being and essence , Hamburg, 1988. S. X - LVII.
- Clemens Stroick: An anonymous commentary on the Opusculum De ente et essentia by Thomas Aquinas (Studia Friburgensia. NF 65), Friborg 1985, ISBN 3-7278-0320-7
Web links (texts, comments, miscellaneous)
- Text in German on zeno.org
- Text: Latin, unknown
- Text: Latin, Leonina, Paris, 1976
- Text: Latin / English, Robert T. Miller, 1997 (based on Leonina, 1976)
- Text: English, Gyula Klima, 2006
- Commentary: Latin, Thomas Cajetan, 1491 ( Memento of May 28, 2014 in the Internet Archive )
- Text structure: Gyula Klima
- Ludger Jansen: The structure of substances in Thomas Aquinas (PDF; 286 kB)