Third Ladoga battle

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Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger" of the 502 heavy tank division near Mga (August 1943). The few tanks were used as "fire brigades" at the focal points of the front.

The Third Ladoga Battle , also the Battle of the Sinyavino Heights , took place south of Lake Ladoga on the Soviet-German Eastern Front during the Second World War . In Soviet historiography it is called Mga operation (Мгинская операция), less often Operation Brusilov (Операция Брусилов).

The Red Army began an offensive on July 22, 1943 to completely relieve Leningrad, which was enclosed on the land side, against Army Group North of the Wehrmacht . The aim was to take the rail connection to the metropolis, especially the Mga railway junction with the Sinyavino Heights upstream. By the end of the operations on September 25, 1943, it was only able to achieve minor successes, but, like the German side, suffered high losses. The operational goal of the Soviet army command was not achieved with the assertion of both the strategically important ridge and the settlement of Mga by the German units. However, the losses hit the German side harder than the Soviet side.

background

Leningrad civilians leave their house after it was destroyed in a German bombing (December 1942).

After the start of the German attack on the Soviet Union , the troops of the German Army Group North under General Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb (1876-1956) approached the Leningrad area in late summer 1941 . From August 25th they advanced again and on September 8th captured the town of Schluesselburg on Lake Ladoga . Leningrad was thus cut off from the rest of the USSR and should be conquered in a further step. After its own forces had weakened, Army Group North stopped its attacks on the city itself at the end of September and began to siege and starve it . This marked the beginning of the Leningrad blockade , which was completed by Finnish forces in the north of the city.

The Leningrad Front of the Red Army tried several times to break through the German positions south of Lake Ladoga, which were often referred to as the "bottleneck". This led to several unsuccessful battles in October 1941, from January to May 1942 (→ Volkhov battle ) and in August / September 1942 (→ First Ladoga battle ). Despite heavy fighting and great losses, it was not until January 1943 that the Red Army succeeded in breaking the "bottleneck" on the shores of Lake Ladoga and reestablishing a land connection to Leningrad (→ Second Ladoga Battle ). However, the narrow breakthrough had no efficient road or rail connection and was still within the reach of the German artillery , which fired from the Sinyavino Heights (around the Sinyavino settlement ) that dominated the area . Thus the blockade of the city was in fact still in place.

As part of Operation Polarstern (February 10 to April 1, 1943), the Soviet troops had already launched an unsuccessful attack. The plans of the Soviet Stawka on this section of the front were directed against the northern part of the bottleneck and the Sinyavino Heights located there. South of the heights ran an efficient railway line coming from the east through the Mga traffic junction to Leningrad. With the capture of this city and the clearing of the rail link, the blockade of Leningrad was to be finally lifted. In addition, the German troops at this point on the eastern front were to be bound by the attack so that they could not be relocated to the other focal points of the front in the south, namely to the battle in the Kursk Arc . After the German offensive was brought to a standstill at Kursk on July 12 and 13, 1943, the Stawka therefore ordered the commanders of the Leningrad Front and the Volkhov Front to take the offensive.

Forces and preparations

Soviet planning

Front line in the north of the Eastern Front (May 1942 - January 1943)

In the Second Ladoga Battle , the Stawka's goals had not been achieved. From March 1943, there was a standstill along the entire eastern front, as both sides had exhausted themselves in the previous operations, especially in the southern sector. However, both wanted to regain the strategic initiative in the summer. Based on the experience of the completed fighting, Stalin and the leadership of the Red Army planned to first fend off the German summer offensive, which they suspected at Kursk, and only then to initiate their own offensive operations. For the Soviet forces in the Leningrad area, this meant that strong units were initially pulled out there in favor of the Kursk sector, including the entire 11th, 27th, 53rd and 68th Army, so that the fronts here were weakened.

The commanders of the front made their own preparations for further operations with the remaining units. The Leningrad Front under Colonel General LA Govorov (1897–1955) assembled nine rifle divisions, one tank brigade and two other tank regiments in its reserves, while the Volkhov Front of Army General K. A. Merezkov (1897–1968) behind its positions four rifle divisions, three tank brigades and one tank regiment. According to the Stawka, there was a Soviet superiority of 2: 1 on the Leningrad front and a ratio of 1.3: 1 on the Volkhov front, which made a new offensive seem possible.

The aim of the offensive was to push the German units back so far that they would no longer be able to re-establish the complete blockade of Leningrad by a new offensive to Lake Ladoga. Army General Merezkow states in his memoir that in the spring of 1943 the signs of a German offensive to restore the blockade increased. Furthermore, the narrow land connection to the city should be widened in order to guarantee a regular supply. For this reason, the aim of the offensive was not only to conquer the Sinyavino Heights, but also to conquer the Mga railway junction. For this purpose, the operation was designed as a pincer attack, through which the German XXVI. Army Corps should be rubbed in the "bottleneck". The German 18th Army would thus suffer a heavy defeat and the Red Army would gain a good starting point for further offensive operations. As a further side effect, the attack would also tie up German troops and reserves that could otherwise be relocated to the focal points of the eastern front in the central and southern sectors. In 1943, the Soviet military leadership chose the names of famous military leaders in Russian history for the code names of their individual summer offensives, and so the offensive of the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts was named Operation “Brusilov” (after General AA Brusilov ).

The main attack was to be carried out by Major General MP Duchanov's 67th Army from the Leningrad Front and Lieutenant General FN Starikov's 8th Army from the Volkhov Front. The 67th Army was to attack between the Neva and the town of Sinyavino, take the Sinyavino Heights and then advance on Mga. If their attack was successful, an attack by the 55th Army (Major General WP Sviridow ) further west should support him by also advancing on Mga. In the east the 8th Army had the order to break through the German positions between the places Gaitolowo and Lodwa and then to advance on Mga. With fewer partial forces, however, the 8th Army was supposed to meet the 67th Army at the Sinyavino Heights immediately after its breakthrough. These plans came as little surprise to the German leadership. The former commander of the German Grenadier Regiment 284, Hartwig Pohlman, later judged: “All in all, no new thoughts and goals, no generous, surprising planning, but a continuation of the second Ladoga battle, as the German leadership had been expecting since June but could not prevent it by taking any countermeasures, because it lacked the means. "

German location

Field Marshal General Georg von Küchler

The German Army Group North, which had been commanded by General Field Marshal Georg von Küchler (1881–1968) since January 12, 1942 , had in the previous months repeatedly to deliver troops to the threatened southern sections of the Eastern Front, so that to cover the 750 km front line on July 20, 1943 only 44 divisions and brigades as well as three security and one training division in the rear front area were available. The troops, including all rear supply services, numbered 710,000 men, 360,000 of whom belonged to the front units. The artillery consisted of 2,407 guns. There was no tank division among these formations because they were used in the area of Army Group Center to attack Kursk. Only 40 ready-to-use tanks were therefore in the area of ​​Army Group North. These were combined in the heavy tank division 502 (three companies ) and the assault gun brigade 912 (three companies) and should be used in the following battles as "fire brigade" at the focal points of the front. The units of Air Fleet 1 , which was supposed to support the Army Group, were also weakened . At the same time it was only able to mobilize six fighters for daytime operations.

The Army Group comprised two large formations, namely the 18th Army ( Gen. East Georg Lindemann ) in front of Leningrad and south of it the 16th Army (Gen. East Ernst Busch ). In the focus area of ​​the planned Soviet attack - in the "bottleneck" - was the XXVI. Army Corps of the Gen.d.Inf. Ernst von Leyser (1889–1962) was employed. This included the 212th , 1st , 11th , 69th , 290th , 23rd and 5th Mountain Divisions . Only the 28th Jäger Division and the 121st Infantry Division were in the reserve of the Army High Command (AOK) 18 . With these forces, the Army Group was considerably inferior to the units opposing them. The Foreign Armies East department assumed that it alone faced 734,000 Soviet soldiers at the front, behind whom a further 491,000 soldiers were held in reserve. In addition, in its report it assumed 209 Soviet tanks and at least 2,793 guns in the front line, which could be reinforced by a further 843 tanks and 1,800 guns from the reserve.

course

The attack of the 67th Army

Course of the first Soviet attacks July 22 to August 22, 1943

As early as July 1, 1943, the Soviet side had begun making artillery ready for the attack. Immediately after the order from the Stawka to begin the offensive, the targeted bombardment of the German positions at Sinyavino began on July 12. The focus of the attack was on the 30th Guards Rifle Corps of General Simonjak (45th, 63rd and 64th Guards Rifle Divisions) east of the Neva. It should first take Arbuzowo and then proceed to Mga. For this purpose it was supported by the 30th Guards Tank Brigade and the 220th Tank Brigade as well as the Guards Tank Regiments 29 and 31. To the east of this, the 90th, 268th, 43rd and 123rd Rifle Divisions attacked the German positions on the Sinyavino Heights in order to tie them up there. The first wave of Soviet attacks alone comprised 75,000 soldiers and 120 tanks in this sector, initially facing only the German 23rd, 11th and 290th Infantry Divisions with fewer than 35,000 men.

On July 22, 1943 at 4:30 a.m., devastating Soviet artillery fire began along the attack front, followed by bombing raids by the 13th Air Army. At 6:05 a.m. the first Soviet attack formations advanced. At the head of the 30th Guards Rifle Corps, the 63rd and 45th Guards Rifle Divisions advanced against the positions of the 23rd German Infantry Division. In doing so, they achieved a break-in between the German 23rd and 11th Infantry Divisions, which even counterattacks immediately scheduled could not close. General Duchanow put the 30th Guards Tank Brigade into this gap, which extended the penetration to two kilometers in depth and breadth by evening. On the other hand, the German leadership quickly deployed individual parts of the 121st Infantry Division, which were supported by the 2nd Division of the Nebelwerfer Regiment 70 and the 2nd Company of the Heavy Panzer Division 502 (with Panzerkampfwagen VI "Tiger" ). They managed to seal off the Soviet intrusion.

The German AOK 18 deployed the army reserves the following day. They moved further parts of the 121st Infantry Division as well as the 28th Jäger Division to the break-in points and sealed them off. From July 26th there was again fierce fighting, in which the Soviet troops tried in vain to achieve a breakthrough. It was particularly a hindrance that the already achieved incursions were still flanked in the east by the Sinyavino Heights. Colonel-General Goworow therefore shifted the focus of his attacks from August 1st to these heights, which were defended by the German 11th and 290th Infantry Divisions. The German defenders preferred the difficult and wooded terrain and the elevated location. In spite of this, the attacking Soviet units initially gained a few territories, some of which were lost again due to German counter-attacks. However, the 11th Infantry Division suffered such great losses that it had to be replaced by the 21st Infantry Division on August 10th after 20 days of fighting. By then, she had fired 95,000 shells (2,315 t) in the fighting alone.

Other German divisions were soon exhausted and had to be replaced. For this purpose, Army Group North had to resort to temporary help. So it released the 121st Infantry Division from the association of the 16th Army in order to replace the 28th Jäger Division with it at the beginning of August. On the 23rd and 24th, she withdrew from the blockade front in front of Leningrad. July the 58th Infantry Division and used them to counterattack against the Soviet 30th Guards Rifle Corps. Although the division's attack on August 4 was supported by a few Panzerkampfwagen VI “Tiger” vehicles, it made slow progress, as Soviet artillery from across the Neva effectively intervened in the fight. In the attack strip of the 2nd Battalion / Grenadier Regiment 220 alone, the impacts of 80 volleys of 18 shells each were counted in five hours. In the days that followed, the Soviet attacks subsided. For this purpose, the German positions were once again fired intensively by artillery. The attacks on all sections did not begin again until August 12 and continued until August 22 without a decision.

In general, the Soviet advance turned out to be extremely difficult and soon it turned into a veritable positional war in which the gains in terrain were measured in meters. During the fighting, the Soviet Air Force dominated the airspace. Only five days after the start of the battle did the Wehrmacht move an additional group of hunters (fewer than 25 machines) to this section, but this too did little and was soon withdrawn. Under the impression of the stubborn German defense, Colonel General Goworow decided not to carry out the attack of the 55th Army on Mga from the west.

The attack of the 8th Army

Ernst von Leyser, Commanding General of the XXVI. Army Corps

The attack by the Soviet Eighth Army on Mga from the east had similar difficulties to overcome. Here the attack in the Voronovo area took place over a width of almost 14 kilometers. To this end, Merezkow formed two attack groups, each divided into two waves. One group each was to advance north and south of the Volkhov – Mga railway line . The northern group consisted of the 18th and 378th Rifle Divisions in the first, the 379th and 239th Rifle Divisions in the second wave. The four divisions of the first wave each received a tank regiment for their support, and in the second wave the 16th and 122nd tank brigades were kept ready to take advantage of any breakthrough through the enemy position. On the left flank, the 265th and 382nd Rifle Divisions, as well as the 1st and 22nd Rifle Brigades, were to conduct a relief attack. On the right flank, this task fell to the 372nd Rifle Division. Army General Merezkow, however, kept the 286th and 58th Rifle Divisions in reserve. In addition, a diversionary and bondage attack was to be carried out at Pogostje and Kirischi in order to cover the flank of the main attack column. In total, the first wave of attacks had 80,000 men and 250 tanks. In the main attack strip (50,000 men and 150 tanks) this meant a superiority of 5: 1 over the German defenders.

The Soviet preparatory fire lasted six days before the troops started the attack on July 22nd at 6:35 a.m. The advance came to a halt after the first German line had been taken. The 5th Mountain Division and the 132nd Infantry Division offered heavy resistance on this section of the front . In addition, the Soviet tanks got stuck in the swampy terrain. At the end of July Army General Merezkow had to withdraw the bled-out 18th and 256th Rifle Divisions from the front and replace them with the 379th and 165th Rifle Divisions. On the German side, for lack of other reserves, the 121st Infantry Division was withdrawn from the fighting near Arbuzowo and moved to the section of the 132nd Infantry Division. The latter had withstood all attacks so far and was now relocated to reinforce the 5th Mountain Division. These first battles were interpreted by the German leadership as an advance that was hardly to be taken seriously. Such attacks did not begin until August 2, which led to a tense situation on the German side. The Soviet 122nd Panzer Brigade and the 32nd Guards Panzer Regiment advanced until shortly before the town of Slavyanka before they were stopped there by August 8th by Wehrmacht units brought up there.

On August 9, Army General Merezkow moved his attacks to the section south of the railway line and concentrated there on the German bridgehead east of the Nasija River near Poretschje. To capture the bridgehead, on August 11 he pulled together the 256th and 374th Rifle Divisions and the 35th and 50th Guards tank regiments. These attack forces could count on the support of the 378th, 364th and 165th Rifle Divisions, which were already deployed around the bridgehead. In the bridgehead there were already heavily damaged parts of the 5th Mountain Division. The attack by the Soviet units initially gained ground and soon afterwards the Poretschje base was taken. But then parts of the 132nd Infantry Division arrived, which stabilized the situation and started a counterattack. Another attack by the Soviet units on August 12 threw back the German troops, some of which were involved in hand-to-hand fighting . Army General Merezkow deployed his last reserves, the 311st Rifle Division and the 503rd Independent Tank Battalion on August 13th. Although these new forces managed to break into the German lines again, this was also cleared up in a German counter-attack. Ultimately, both sides were completely exhausted from the previous fighting. As a result, the Germans evacuated the bridgehead on the night of 14-15 August, but the breakthrough to Mga hoped for by the leadership of the Volkhov Front had not materialized. On August 16, the worn and almost worn out German 132nd Infantry Division was withdrawn and replaced by the 1st and 254th Infantry Divisions. During its use in the bridgehead, it had destroyed 24 Soviet tanks. The fierceness of the fighting is illustrated by the fact that ten of these tanks were eliminated by light weapons in close combat.

On August 17, the Soviet artillery ammunition provided for the offensive ran out. The long-distance airmen , who had carried out around 100 daily attacks on the German hinterland from July 29 to August 12, were also withdrawn. So the fighting gradually subsided in the following days. On August 22nd at 2:40 p.m. the Stawka issued an order to stop the offensive in view of the failure. It stated that the Leningrad and Volkhov Fronts had fulfilled the task set for them, inflicted a defeat on the enemy and tied up their reserves.

The second offensive in September

On the orders of the Stawka, the front commanders Goworow and Merezkow prepared a new offensive only a few weeks after the failure of their first operations. This time the goals were much more narrowly defined and now only included taking the Sinyavino Heights.

A German tank of the type VI "Tiger", probably the heavy tank division 502, in rough terrain

The Leningrad Front had refreshed the 30th Guards Rifle Corps in the Leningrad area and then relocated it to the area south of Shlisselburg. There it was temporarily subordinated to General Duchanov's 67th Army. The plan was to use this unit to attack the Sinyavino Heights directly from the north. To the left of the corps it was to be supported by the 43rd and 123rd Rifle Divisions, and to the right by the 120th, 124th and 196th Rifle Divisions. In addition, the 11th and 268th Rifle Divisions were already regularly standing in front of the Sinyavino Heights. The 8th Army of the Volkhov Front under General Starikov was to support the offensive with an attack between Voronovo and Gaitolovo. General Starikow again formed two attack groups. The first included the 372nd, 379th and 265th Rifle Divisions and the 58th Rifle Brigade. This was to attack at the interface between the German 290th and 254th Infantry Divisions. The second attack group with the 18th, 378th, 256th and 311st Rifle Divisions was to advance against the positions of the 5th Mountain Division near Voronovo.

On the morning of September 15, 1943, the attack began again. On this occasion, the Red Army implemented a new artillery concept. So far she had shot at the enemy positions and then moved her fire to the rear room. In this short interval between the exchange of fire, the German soldiers, who had previously hidden in shelters, occupied their defensive positions. This time the Soviet artillery did not pause in their fire and the Soviet infantry was already moving forward. The attack of the 30th Guards Rifle Corps with its three divisions was more successful than a few weeks earlier. The German infantry divisions 11 and 290 were surprised by the new artillery concept, and so the Soviet attack units succeeded in gaining several hundred meters of terrain on the Sinyavino Heights. But the AOK 18 brought the 28th Jäger Division as well as the infantry divisions 215 and 61. With this measure, the German leadership quickly sealed off the Soviet intrusion. In the days that followed, the units of the Soviet 67th Army continued to run against the German defense in order to advance into the lowlands to Mga. However, these attempts were unsuccessful. The attack by the Soviet 8th Army from the east also barely gained ground. The northern attack group failed to break into the positions of the 5th Mountain Division and the attack by the southern group was quickly sealed off. On September 18, 1943, the Stawka therefore again approved the cessation of offensive operations. On September 24th, the fighting for the heights flared up again briefly before the front stabilized again.

Consequences and evaluation

The extremely small gains made by the Red Army in these operations had been bought with disproportionately high losses. According to official information, the Soviet casualties amounted to 79,937 soldiers in the phase from July 22nd to August 22nd alone, of whom 20,890 men were considered dead or missing. During the same period, the armed forces lost 26,166 men, of which 5,435 soldiers were dead or missing. No precise figures are available for the second offensive. It is certain, however, that the Soviet casualties from September 15 to 18 amounted to more than 10,000 men.

The aim of the Soviet operations - to wipe out the XXVI. Army corps, pushing back the German lines, regaining the railway junction Mga and tying up German reserves - were only achieved to a small extent. The city of Mga was still under German ownership. The XXVI. Army corps had suffered losses, but was still at the front as a combat unit. The German lines had only been pushed back a few hundred meters in some sections, but the gains in terrain included a substantial part of the Sinyavino Heights. One of the main goals of the offensive, tying up German reserves, was unsuccessful in that Army Group North made do with its own resources by pulling divisions out of unattacked sections of the front in order to throw them at the hot spots. Even more: from July to November 1943, 13 divisions were successively transferred from the Army Group to the Army Groups Center and South. By conquering a large part of the Sinyavino Heights, however, the danger that the German troops could later advance as far as Lake Ladoga was eliminated and the provisional supply of Leningrad was secured. However, the major objectives of the operations were only achieved with the large-scale offensive in January and February 1944 in the Leningrad-Novgorod Operation , which pushed Army Group North back several hundred kilometers and reconnected the city of Leningrad to the regular rail network.

As noted by American historian David M. Glantz , Soviet and Russian historiography tends not to address failures (or unsuccessful ventures) or to trivialize them. The Mgaer Operation (Мгинская операция), as the offensive from July 22nd to August 22nd in Russia is called, is rarely mentioned in publications on the Second World War. For example , the official history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (6 vols.) , Published in the 1960s, completely ignores these battles. In other publications, the fighting was presented as an insignificant relief offensive, which was only intended to tie German forces to this part of the Eastern Front, which was also achieved. Even today, this is the official version, which can be found on the pages of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation . Against this, however, speak the extensive forces that were expended, the disproportionate losses as well as the main thrusts of the armies of the center of gravity, which were aimed at breaking up the German XXVI. Army Corps and the removal of the "bottleneck" aimed.

The description in the memoirs of Army General Merezkow is contradictory: On the one hand, he emphasizes that he did not consider the available forces to be sufficient, on the other hand, the aim of the operation was not to conquer terrain. He also explains that the German troops had already been worn out by the massed artillery deployment in the first days of the battle. Although no operational goals had been pursued, Merezkow criticized the abortion of the offensive and thus indicated that an operational breakthrough should actually be achieved:

“Another strong pressure and the German front at Mga would have collapsed. […] If I had known about the enemy’s position, I would have flown to headquarters and have called for reinforcements to continue the operation. "

- KA Merezkow

In German publications, the defensive success in July and August is mostly emphasized, but the subsequent partial Soviet success in September is neglected. Even the most recent account by the historian Karl-Heinz Frieser does not mention him at all. Ultimately, it remains to be seen that a modern review in the form of a monograph is still outstanding.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ On these operations: Ernst Klink: Die Operationsführung. In: Horst Boog, Jürgen Förster, Joachim Hoffmann , Ernst Klink, Rolf-Dieter Müller , Gerd R. Ueberschär : The attack on the Soviet Union (= Military History Research Office [ed.]: The German Reich and the Second World War . Volume 4 ). 2nd Edition. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1987, ISBN 3-421-06098-3 , pp. 540–559 ( limited preview in Google Book Search).
  2. ↑ Fundamental to the extermination strategy against Leningrad: Jörg Ganzenmüller : Das besiegerte Leningrad 1941–1944. Paderborn / Munich 2005, pp. 13–82.
  3. ↑ On these operations: David M. Glantz: Battle for Leningrad. Lawrence 2002, pp. 87-304.
  4. ↑ a b c David M. Glantz : Battle for Leningrad. Lawrence 2002, p. 306.
  5. ^ KA Merezkow: In the service of the people. Berlin (East) 1972, p. 350.
  6. ^ David M. Glantz: Battle for Leningrad. Lawrence 2002, pp. 306-308.
  7. ↑ Владимир В. Бешанов: Ленинградская оборона , Москва 2005, p. 424 (German VV Beschanow: The Defense of Leningrad )
  8. ^ A b David M. Glantz: Battle for Leningrad. Lawrence 2002, p. 308 f.
  9. ↑ Hartwig Pholman: Volkhov - 900 days battle for Leningrad. Bad Nauheim 1962, p. 98.
  10. ↑ a b Werner Haupt : Leningrad - The 900-day battle 1941–1944. Friedberg 1980, p. 194.
  11. ↑ All figures and evidence, see: Karl-Heinz Frieser: The evasion of Army Group North from Leningrad to the Baltic States. P. 278 f.
  12. ^ Karl-Heinz Frieser: The evasion of Army Group North from Leningrad to the Baltic States. P. 280.
  13. ^ Report of the Foreign Army East Department of July 20, 1943, figures from: David M. Glantz: Battle for Leningrad. Lawrence 2002, p. 306.
  14. ↑ Werner Haupt: Leningrad - The 900-day battle 1941-1944. Friedberg 1980, p. 193.
  15. ↑ a b Hartwig Pholman: Volkhov - 900 days battle for Leningrad. Bad Nauheim 1962, p. 98 f.
  16. ^ David M. Glantz: Battle for Leningrad. Lawrence 2002, pp. 309-311.
  17. ↑ a b c d Karl-Heinz Frieser: The evasion of Army Group North from Leningrad to the Baltic States. P. 282.
  18. ^ A b David M. Glantz: Battle for Leningrad. Lawrence 2002, p. 311.
  19. ^ David M. Glantz: Battle for Leningrad. Lawrence 2002, p. 309.
  20. ↑ "It has remained a secret to this day why the two Russian armies did not begin their major attacks on the same day." Werner Haupt: Leningrad - The 900-day battle 1941–1944. Friedberg 1980, p. 194.
  21. ^ David M. Glantz: Battle for Leningrad. Lawrence 2002, pp. 312-314.
  22. ^ KA Merezkow: In the service of the people. Berlin (East) 1972, p. 352 f.
  23. ↑ Quotation of the order in English translation, in: David M. Glantz: Battle for Leningrad. Lawrence 2002, p. 314.
  24. ^ David M. Glantz: Battle for Leningrad. Lawrence 2002, p. 315 f.
  25. ^ David M. Glantz: Battle for Leningrad. Lawrence 2002, pp. 317-319. Glantz's account of a complete conquest of the Sinyavino Heights is probably exaggerated. It is represented exclusively by him and is not even mentioned in Soviet publications and memoirs.
  26. ↑ Hartwig Pholman: Volkhov - 900 days battle for Leningrad. Bad Nauheim 1962, p. 101 f.
  27. ↑ Григорий Ф. Кривошеев: Россия и СССР в войнах ХХ века. Москва 2001.
  28. ^ David M. Glantz: The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944. Lawrence 2002, p. 321.
  29. ^ Karl-Heinz Frieser: The evasion of Army Group North from Leningrad to the Baltic States. P. 283.
  30. ^ David M. Glantz: The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944. Lawrence 2002, p. 467.
  31. ↑ For example: П. Я. Егоров: Мгинская операция 1943. pp. 201f; AA Grechko: History of the Second World War 1939–1945. Vol. 7, Berlin (Ost) 1976, p. 198. In the latter, it is even claimed that the German leadership had planned an offensive against Leningrad for the summer of 1943, which was prevented by the battle. It was just a game of ideas by the OKH and Gfm. von Küchlers for whom no troops were available. Realistic implementation of these plans would only have been possible if “Enterprise Citadel” and its follow-up operations had been successful, cf. Henrik Lunde: Finland's War of Choice - The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II , Havertown 2011, p. 243 f.
  32. ↑ "Главным считался не захват территории, а нанесение пр-ку макс, потерь. ... Однако цель операции в основном была достигнута. ", See: Website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation ( Memento from August 2, 2012 in the web archive archive.today )
  33. ^ KA Merezkow: In the service of the people. Berlin (Ost) 1972, pp. 350-353.
  34. ^ KA Merezkow: In the service of the people , Berlin (East) 1972, p. 353.

literature

  • Karl-Heinz Frieser : The evasion of Army Group North from Leningrad to the Baltic States. In: ders. (Ed.): The Eastern Front 1943/44 - The War in the East and on the Side Fronts. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Munich 2007, pp. 278–339 (= The German Reich and the Second World War. Vol. 8), ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2 .
  • David M. Glantz: The Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence / Kansas 2002. ISBN 0-7006-1208-4 .
  • Werner Haupt : Leningrad - The 900-day battle 1941–1944. Podzun-Pallas-Verlag, Friedberg 1980. ISBN 3-7909-0132-6 .
  • Григорий Ф. Кривошеев: Россия и СССР в войнах ХХ века. Олма-Пресс, Москва 2001. (German: GF Krivošeev: Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century ) ( online version )
  • KA Merezkow: In the service of the people. (1st edition) Military Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin (East) 1972.
  • Hartwig Pholman: Volkhov - 900 days of battle for Leningrad. Podzun-Verlag, Bad Nauheim 1962.
  • П. Я. Егоров: Мгинская операция 1943. In: Советская Военная Энциклопөдия. Vol. 5, Москва 1978, pp. 201-202. (German PJ Jegorow: Mgaer Operation 1943)
This article was added to the list of excellent articles on December 3, 2008 in this version .