Helmshore railway accident

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In the railway accident at Helmshore on September 4, 1860 at Helmshore station in England, a part of the train that had escaped on a slope collided with a following train . 11 people died.

Starting position

Infrastructure

The Helmshore station was on the railway line from Clifton Junction to Accrington , which had been double-tracked by the East Lancashire Railway and was operated by the Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway (L&YR) at the time of the accident . The station was built on a slope that led from Ramsbottom in the Irwell valley to Baxenden . The Helmshore station itself had a gradient of 10 ‰, the ramp on both sides of the station facility a gradient of 13 ‰. The southern entrance was in a tight curve, which was also in a cut in the terrain. The visibility for a locomotive driver was only about 100 m during the day.

Three special trains

For September 3, 1860, the L&YR offered a special train from Colne to the Bellevue amusement park in Manchester . The latter was supposed to stop at all stations up to Radcliffe en route to pick up travelers . L&YR expected around 1,000 interested parties and provided a train with a locomotive , 24 passenger cars and two conductors . The conductors were also the brakes on the train. The run on the train turned out to be far greater than planned. So had from Burnley a preference with another 18 cars , a locomotive and two Schaffnern run to be able to accommodate all travelers. After both trains left Accrington Station, they were very full. But that was not enough for the travelers who wanted to get on at the following stations. So wagons were put together for a subsequent train so that they could still be transported. The train ran from Accrington, in between also hooked up more cars and finally ran with 31 cars behind a locomotive and was looked after by two conductors / brakemen. A total of 2,453 tickets had been sold. The trains arrived at Manchester-Salford station (today: Salford Central ) at noon .

Return trip

For the return service, the problem arose that on the ramp between Ramsbottom and Baxenden the number of cars that a locomotive could pull up there was limited to 13. L&YR managed to provide only two more locomotives in addition to the three locomotives of the three excursion trains. At 10:45 p.m., the train was sent on its return journey with only 13 cars and one locomotive. This train passed the Helmshore station without any problems around midnight . At 11.10 p.m. the train, which had been used as a follow-up train in the morning, followed with around 1,000 passengers.

the accident

Departure from Manchester

The composition of this second train was not changed, it was only given a second locomotive as a leader . There were four cars with brakes in the train set . However, since the train was only assigned two conductors, the brakes could only operate two at the same time. The occupied brake cars were the fifth after the locomotives and the fourth after the end of the train. On this train, couplings broke on two cars on the way , one in the middle of the train, one between the tender of the second locomotive and the first car. The latter was repaired, the other car in Ramsbottom was decommissioned from the train set. At 12:16 a.m. the train left the station and onto the ramp. The head of operations at L&YR was also on the train.

The third train that returned from Manchester at 11:31 pm, the “main train”, also ran in the same composition as in the morning with 24 cars, but a second locomotive as a leader, also with only two brakes. This train had its own brake car as well as a car unit equipped with Newall's patent brake. It was a unit of three tightly coupled cars, in which a brakeman could operate the brakes of all three cars from each car. In Ramsbottom, the leader locomotive for the ramp was used as a push locomotive at the end of the train. This train hit the ramp at 12:28 a.m.

collision

At 0:30 the second train reached Helmshore station. In the station, the coupling between the 13th and 14th car broke and the 17 cars at the end of the train rolled back down the ramp as a ghost train . The rear brakeman and conductor had released the brake after the train had come to a standstill - which complied with the regulations - had gone to the platform and helped travelers who wanted to get off here. When he heard the clutch break and the train part began to roll backwards, he ran along the escaping car, jumped on the car with the brake and activated it immediately. But since the weather was wet and the tracks were damp, the brake did not have its full effect. Realizing that the collision was inevitable, he jumped off the train just before the collision.

The L&YR operations manager, who immediately noticed that a part of the train was escaping, jumped out of the tenth car in which he was riding, ran to the front locomotive, had it uncoupled, relocated it and wanted to overtake the ghost train on the track in the opposite direction and over one Intercept the switch connection in the middle of the ramp or - if it was too late - at least warn the following third train of the operational danger. But he couldn't do that anymore: the third train had already come too close to the Helmshore station .

This third train took the ramp at about 20 km / h. Due to the poor visibility in the entry curve to the Helmshore station , the train crew of the third train noticed the cars approaching them very late. The engine driver only had a few seconds left, in which he took the steam off the engine, switched to the "reverse" driving position and activated the whistle for the brakes so that they apply the brakes.

The escaped wagons hit the third train about 600 meters south of the Helmshore station at (estimated) about 10 km / h.

consequences

11 people died and 77 others were injured. The last and third from last car of the second train were completely smashed, the penultimate and fourth from last car overturned from the track and came to rest on the embankment. Other cars of this train were damaged - rather slightly. The locomotive and the Schlepptender of the third train derailed and the first two cart climbed on each other and on the tender.

The investigation report came to the conclusion that trains of this dimension (two locomotives with 30 cars), which the author of the report calls “monster trains”, are too heavy and pose too high a risk of a coupling breaking. Such long and heavy train sets were usually only used on excursion trains. The course of the accident was very similar to that of the Round Oak railway accident on August 23, 1858. The investigation report further criticizes the fact that the number of wagons with brakes on the train was too low. He went on to point out that the brakes should stick to their brakes and should not be used to help travelers get in and out. He also criticizes the layout of the Helmshore station on a slope and recommends that stations always be laid out without an incline.

See also

literature

Remarks

  1. ↑ Yolland: Accident , p. 81, points out that in the period of two years - i.e. since 1858 - 25 people had lost their lives and 127 others were injured due to accidents due to the fact that train stations were built on a slope.
  2. ↑ Yolland: Accident , p. 78, once again mentions the one he called “No. 2 “- probably a typographical or printing error .
  3. ↑ This is still required today; see: Sven Andersen: Stuttgart 21 - an individual case with the inclination. In: Eisenbahn-Revue International 2/2015, p. 96f.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Yolland: Accident , p. 80.