Thorpe railway accident

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The Thorpe railway accident was the head-on collision of two trains on a single-track line of the Great Eastern Railway on September 10, 1874 between the stations of Norwich-Thorpe in the county of Norfolk in England and Brundall . 25 people died.

Starting position

On the evening of September 10 1874 was mail train with passenger transport for London road. It consisted of a locomotive , a tender and 14 wagons , some from Lowestoft and some from Yarmouth . In the opposite direction there was an express train that was pulled by a steam locomotive and carried a tender and 15 passenger cars . The timetable envisaged for the section that the mail train in the crossing station Brundall wait for the oncoming express train and let happen should, before he continued his journey. That evening the express train was delayed.

As long as the trains ran in the specified timetable , this ensured operational safety in the single-track section. In the event of deviations from the timetable, be it delays or unscheduled, additional trains, the two responsible dispatchers coordinated with each other by telegram which train was allowed to travel the route first. This was done in the form that the receiving station of the train telegraphed consent to the departure of the train in the exit station. While this process at the station master at Brundall station was united in one hand, the procedure at the much larger Norwich-Thorpe station was more complicated: the dispatcher there instructed the telegraph operator to inquire in Brundall whether the line was free and had to submit the request sign - as well as the incoming reply. Only then was he allowed to hand over a written driving order to the engine driver if necessary .

the accident

Due to negligence in communication between the dispatcher and the telegraph operator in Norwich, Brundall station received approval to allow the mail train to enter the single-track line. The approval was not signed by the dispatcher, who therefore relied on the telegraph operator not to send it without checking it again when he revised his decision and sent the express train on the line. The telegraph operator had nevertheless sent the approval and given the “signature” in the telegram. In addition, the reply from Brundall that the mail train had set out on the route remained unprocessed for six minutes in the telegraph operator's office before it was passed on to the dispatcher. In these six minutes the express train arrived in Norwich and was also given permission to continue. Thus, both engine drivers had a command in hand, went out on the line and tried to gain time at the highest possible speed in order to reduce the delay and to hinder the supposedly waiting, oncoming train as little as possible. It was already dark, raining, and the scene of the accident was on a slight curve, so that the locomotive crew could not recognize the mutual peak signals until shortly before the collision and could no longer brake.

The locomotives met at around 9:45 p.m. It was subsequently estimated that the mail train was traveling at around 50 km / h and the express train at around 35 km / h. When the trains met, the express locomotive was pushed onto that of the mail train and the first wagons of both trains were smashed against this obstacle. The wreckage of the vehicles piled up like a pyramid . Only the last carriages of both trains remained on the track , the last of the express train on a wooden bridge that crossed the Yare .

consequences

25 people died, including both locomotive crews, and 75 more were injured. This was the most serious head-on collision between two trains on a single-track line in Great Britain up to that point.

rating

The investigation put the blame for the accident on the dispatcher at Norwich-Thorpe station and the telegraph operator there, as both were responsible for communication errors that ultimately led to the collision. The investigative commission recommended - despite the associated problems in operation - for security reasons the telegraphic train detection system should be supplemented with a "relay system", in which each block section is only given a single travel command in the form of an object, e.g. B. a marked rod or a brand is assigned and only the train may enter the corresponding block section, the locomotive staff is in possession of the item. The disadvantage of this system is that every train needs a return train that transports the object back before another train can be sent back on the route in the same direction.

The accident showed that route safety in the train notification procedure entailed relatively high risks if there was a communication error - which could never be ruled out - by those involved and that technical safety measures were necessary to ensure that only one train was ever in a block section . At that time only the "relay system" was known for this. The "relay system" was not used between Brundall and Norwich because of the numerous special trains that carried fresh fish from the coast irregularly, but frequently and only in one direction (as well as the empty trains in the opposite direction) and then had no direct return train. who was able to return the drive command in question.

Caused by this accident and the well-known disadvantages of the "relay system", the engineer Edward Tyer developed the Electric Tablet System , in which only the train driver who is in possession of a key that is given to him before entering the block is allowed to enter a block . As long as he is in possession of the key, no second key can be removed from the security system. After driving through the block, it is put back into the system when you exit. Only then can a key be released from the system, with which another train driver is allowed to enter the block - optionally on one of the two terminals in the station terminating the block as required.

See also

literature

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Investigation report on the accident (PDF file; 1.87 MB), p. 13.
  2. ^ Investigation report on the accident (PDF file; 1.87 MB), p. 15.
  3. ↑ Faith.

Coordinates: 52 ° 37 ′ 30.7 ″  N , 1 ° 20 ′ 38.5 ″  E