First United State Parliament

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The First United Landtag was a full assembly of the provincial estates of all eight provinces of Prussia, convened by King Friedrich Wilhelm IV . Although the United State Parliament could not resolve the Prussian constitutional question, it was of considerable importance for the prehistory of the revolution of 1848 in Prussia and in Germany as a whole. The Landtag set the course for the later political system in Prussia. With the Prussian National Assembly and then the Prussian Landtag , this corporate body became obsolete after 1848.

prehistory

The Prussian constitutional question under Friedrich Wilhelm III.

In the post-Napoleonic period, apart from Prussia and Austria, all states of the German Confederation adopted a constitution . Due to the secularization of ecclesiastical and mediatization of secular principalities in Napoleonic times, the governments were interested in integrating the new territories into their enlarged German states. By giving citizens a limited political say in constitutions and parliaments, their denominational and regional resistance should be overcome.

In Prussia the constitutional problem existed specifically since the Congress of Vienna . In the federal act passed in this context, the individual states of the German Confederation had to grant a “land-based constitution” under Article XIII. Although the Prussian State Chancellor Karl August von Hardenberg had King Friedrich Wilhelm III . urged to establish a conservative constitution and representative parliament, but this met with bitter opposition from a conservative group within the government, represented on both the State Council and the State Ministry. The constitutional promises of Friedrich Wilhelm III. in the years 1810, 1812, 1813, 1815, 1820 and 1821 there was nothing left to do. In Prussia there was no constitution and no state representation until 1848.

Only at the provincial level had the so-called provincial parliaments, composed on the basis of estates, been established. However, the Prussian State Debt Act of January 17, 1820 stipulated that the government was only allowed to take on new debts if these were also guaranteed by the "Reichsstands". The law went back to the Prussian State Chancellor Karl August von Hardenberg. With the law, Hardenberg, in the words of Christopher Clark, placed a “time bomb” that would force the government to reform the constitution in the long term. In the 1820s and 1830s, the National Debt Act did not play a role as the state avoided large borrowing.

The Prussian constitutional question under Friedrich Wilhelm IV.

King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia, portrait by Hermann Biow , daguerreotype from 1847

With the increasing expansion of the railway network in Prussia, however, the government and the military recognized an immense military and economic potential that should be promoted by the state. The state's involvement in railway construction, which not least had the goal of uniting the fragmented territory of Prussia, led to a sharp rise in the government's financial needs in the 1840s. In order to circumvent the legal requirement to convene a parliament, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Had a “standing committee”, consisting of twelve delegates from the provincial parliaments, convened in Berlin for joint deliberation in October 1842. During the negotiations on the government bonds required for the construction of the railway line between Berlin and Königsberg, the joint committees of the estates drew attention to the fact that the approval of an entire state assembly was required for them to be accepted. As a result of this demand, Friedrich Wilhelm IV had the meeting dissolved again on November 10, 1842.

It was not until December 1844 that Friedrich Wilhelm IV made a renewed attempt to solve the Prussian constitutional question in his sense through a corporate form of organization. He decided within three years to call all representatives of the provincial parliaments to Berlin. As monarch, he was ready to give the United Diet the right to discuss the financing of railways, canals and roads. Without her consent, he wanted to forego the ability to levy new taxes or take out loans. With this, the king saw the future state parliament's right to have a say in politics as exhausted. The Landtag should not restrict the power of the monarch, but on the contrary strengthen it again by eliminating constitutional demands.

The king's plans sparked heated debates within the Prussian government about its feasibility. Due to disagreements with the King regarding the United State Parliament, the Prussian Interior Minister Adolf Heinrich von Arnim-Boitzenburg resigned in the early summer of 1845 . Even Wilhelm, the planned successor Prince of Prussia, rejected the estate project. With reference to the will of Friedrich Wilhelm III. he claimed that the United Diet could not be convened without the consent of all royal princes. In an exchange of letters, Wilhelm threatened the king with "resigning his entire position in state life if it were necessary". The Prince of Prussia acted so decisively because he feared that the prerogatives of the crown would be lost to a parliamentary corporation if he inherited the throne. Although Wilhelm found support in military and aristocratic circles, he could not stop the plan of Friedrich Wilhelm IV, so that Wilhelm stopped his resistance in March 1846.

Ultimately, the increasing financial needs of the state led to the royal patent relating to the estate institutions on February 3, 1847. The assembly was to approve a loan of 25 million thalers to finance the construction of a railway line from Berlin to Königsberg called Ostbahn . The patent dated February 3, 1847 reaffirmed the king's idea that he only wanted to appoint state parliaments when his government needed tax increases and loans. On February 8, 1847, the king announced that the assembly would meet on April 11 in the Berlin Palace. The patent and its regulations soon became the subject of public discussion, as many critics did not go far enough with the announcements. Some advocated a boycott of the newly formed United State Parliament. In the end, however, the pragmatic line of the Rhenish provincial parliaments prevailed, which assumed that the state parliament could be developed from the inside out into a real parliament during the negotiations. However, part of the public was convinced that Frederick William IV actually wanted to offer them a Charte constitutionnelle based on the French model. For this reason, the king should feel compelled to clear up such misunderstandings and misjudgments as early as his opening speech.

negotiations

Situation in Berlin

The representatives of the Prussian provinces had traveled to Berlin weeks before the opening of the United State Parliament. Despite the hustle and bustle, the people of Berlin were indifferent and sometimes even hostile to the event. The long winter and the associated crop failure in the previous year 1846 resulted in a shortage of food in the city. At the same time as the negotiations of the United State Parliament in the Berlin Palace, a hunger revolt, the so-called potato revolution, was to break out on the streets of Berlin . On the occasion of the opening of the United State Parliament on April 11, 1847, the Berliners sold so-called “constitutional pancakes”, which were hollow on the inside. Only about a thousand onlookers watched, despite the “almost wintry temperatures”, as the delegates drove in their carriages from the cathedral to the city palace to hear the opening speech of Friedrich Wilhelm IV.

The opening speech of Friedrich Wilhelm IV.

The opening of the United State Parliament on April 11, 1847 took place in the White Hall, the largest room in the Berlin Palace. 613 delegates crowded here, while Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Sat on a throne under a canopy. He began with a half-hour speech, delivered freely and loudly, in which he claimed that the "exposed geographic location" between other major European powers and the history of Prussia would prohibit any written constitution. According to Friedrich Wilhelm IV., Prussia can only survive militarily and politically if it is “guided by a will”. A parliamentary solution, as the following wording makes it clear, contradicted his social concept, in which prince and people would live together in natural harmony and in the awareness of their respective rights and duties assigned by birth:

“It urges me to make a solemn declaration: that no power on earth should ever succeed in moving me to transform the natural relationship between prince and people, which makes us so powerful through its inner truth, into a conventional, constitutional one, and that I will now and never admit that between our Lord God in heaven and this land a written sheet (meaning: a written constitution) penetrates, as it were, as a second providence in order to rule us with his paragraphs and through it the old, holy one To replace loyalty. "

Commenting on the role of the MPs, the monarch said:

“But that's not their job: to represent opinions, to want to bring out opinions of the times and schools. This is completely un-German and, on top of that, completely impractical (...) because it necessarily leads to insoluble conflicts with the crown, which should rule according to the laws of God and the country and according to its own determination, but not according to the will of majorities (meaning: majorities in one Parliament) can and may rule (...). "

The king understood such a political participation of the people as a restriction of his authority based on divine right .

Parliamentary efforts of the Landtag

The United State Parliament was composed of two curiae: The "Lord Curia" represented the interests of princes and landlords with 72 members (not counting the princes of the royal family). In the "Curia of the Three Estates" the landed nobility, urban landowners and large farmers were represented by 537 members. 70 aristocrats, 237 knights, 182 city representatives and 124 peasant representatives belonged to the assembly. Civil servants and the educated middle class, which played a dominant role in the constitutional states of the German Confederation, were not represented in Prussia.

Regardless of this, the majority of the MPs did not see themselves as estates, but as representatives of the Prussian people. On April 20, 1847, the state parliament sent an address to the king. In the document, the MPs called for regular convening. Laws should only come into force with the consent of the United State Parliament. Class discrimination should be eliminated and citizens guaranteed legal protection against arbitrary measures by the state apparatus. If these demands were not met, the state parliament was forced to refuse the spending plans. In the words of historian David E. Barclay, the United State Parliament developed into "a national assembly in its infancy". For the first time, liberal local politicians were given the opportunity to discuss issues that affected the Prussian state as a whole. In this way, early prerequisites for the later emergence of the party landscape were created in Prussia. The publication of the "verbatim protocols with assignment of the speakers' names" and the voting results favored a politicization of the population, even if spectators were not allowed. The most important opposition leaders of the United State Parliament achieved great popularity in Berlin. The writer Adolf Streckfuß complained that "the speeches of Vincke , Camphausen , Beckerath and the other members of the opposition" could already be heard "in every beer house".

Negotiations fail

The longer the negotiations dragged on, the more Frederick William IV began to lose interest in the United State Parliament. Often he only received reports on the meetings, but no longer took part in them himself. He only stated that he did not want to accept any changes in the content of his patent dated February 3, 1847. He is only ready to convene the state parliament again in 4 years. However, the king made no further concessions, which is why the construction of the Eastern Railway was rejected by the state parliament on June 8, 1847 with 363 votes to 179. Although industry in the west and agriculture in the east had great interest in the transport connection, the parliamentarization of Prussia was even more important to the MPs. On June 26, 1847, Friedrich Wilhelm finally dissolved the state parliament.

consequences

The first United Landtag was unable to resolve the Prussian constitutional question. The Rhenish MP Ludolf Camphausen therefore drew the following balance in January 1848:

“One word would have been enough to put an end to the constitutional dispute in Prussia forever; it has not been spoken, the consequences must be borne; but history will be judged between the government and us. "

With the outcome of the First United State Parliament, the government not only lost its ability to act in fiscal policy, but also reinforced doubts about the legitimacy of the existing state order. Censorship, police attacks and social hardship all contributed to Prussia entering a pre-revolutionary stage. Due to the inability to issue bonds, "Prussia financed only a tenth of its railway network from public funds until 1850, while the other states [with a constitution] financed seven-tenths."

After the beginning of the revolution in 1848 , Friedrich Wilhelm convened the Second United State Parliament in April 1848 to anticipate the demand for general representation of the people. The Second United State Parliament decided to convene a constituent national assembly and the corresponding electoral law. At the initiative of Georg von Vincke, the law contained the agreement clause . It stipulated that the National Assembly had to determine the future constitution “by agreement with the crown”, that is, not in its own right, but in accordance with the crown, which had the same rights. Although the counter-revolutionary forces of the royal government initially forced the dissolution of the state parliament on December 5, 1848, they also set up a constitution by the grace of the king . This constitution, which was subsequently changed in numerous points in favor of the monarch, finally came into force on January 31, 1850 and remained so until 1918. Prussia had thus developed into a constitutional monarchy in which the parliament was quite large Could influence the public.

Members

literature

  • Johannes Gerhardt: The first united state parliament in Prussia of 1847. Investigations into a corporate body in the run-up to the revolution of 1848/49 (= sources and research on Brandenburg and Prussian history. Volume 33). Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2007, ISBN 978-3-428-12379-7 .
  • Herbert Obenaus : Beginnings of parliamentarism in Prussia until 1848. Handbook of the history of German parliamentarism. Droste, Düsseldorf 1984, ISBN 3-7700-5116-5 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Wolfgang J. Mommsen : 1848 - The unwanted revolution: The revolutionary movements in Europe 1830-1849. Fisherman. Berlin 2000, p. 19
  2. ^ Elisabeth Fehrenbach : From the Ancien Régime to the Congress of Vienna. Oldenbourg, Munich 2001, ISBN 3-486-49754-5 , p. 133.
  3. ↑ David E. Barclay: Anarchy and Good Will. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-88680-463-1 , p. 44.
  4. ↑ About France 1831–1837. Reports on art and politics. de Gruyter, Berlin 1983, ISBN 3-05-001473-3 , p. 76.
  5. ↑ David E. Barclay: Anarchy and Good Will. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-88680-463-1 , p. 44.
  6. ^ Wolfram Siemann : The German Revolution of 1848/49. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1985, ISBN 3-518-11266-X , p. 23.
  7. ↑ Christopher Clark : Prussia. Rise and fall 1600–1947. Pantheon, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-570-55060-1 , p. 525.
  8. ↑ Christopher Clark: Prussia. Rise and fall 1600–1947. Pantheon, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-570-55060-1 , p. 525.
  9. ^ Franz Herre: Friedrich Wilhelm IV. The other Prussian king. Katz, Gernsbach 2007, ISBN 978-3-938047-22-4 , p. 71.
  10. ↑ Michael Kotulla: German constitutional history: From the Old Reich to Weimar (1495 to 1934). Springer, Berlin 2007, ISBN 978-3-540-48705-0 , p. 416.
  11. ^ David E. Barclay: Anarchy and good will: Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-88680-463-1 , p. 184.
  12. ^ David E. Barclay: Anarchy and good will: Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-88680-463-1 , p. 189.
  13. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. Part: 1: From the end of the Old Empire to the fall of the Weimar Republic. 1st revised edition. Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66080-1 , p. 95.
  14. ^ David E. Barclay: Anarchy and good will: Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-88680-463-1 , p. 190.
  15. ^ David E. Barclay: Anarchy and good will: Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-88680-463-1 , p. 192.
  16. ↑ Ilja Mieck: From the reform period to the revolution (1806-1847). In: Wolfgang Ribbe (Ed.): History of Berlin. Volume 1: From early history to industrialization. Beck, Munich 1987, ISBN 3-406-31591-7 , pp. 407-602, here: p. 600.
  17. ↑ David E. Barclay: Anarchy and Good Will. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-88680-463-1 , p. 191.
  18. ^ Richard Schneider: The Berlin Palace in historical photographs. Lukas, Berlin 2013, ISBN 978-3-86732-164-8 , p. 126.
  19. ↑ David E. Barclay: Anarchy and Good Will. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-88680-463-1 , p. 193.
  20. ^ Frank-Lothar Kroll: Monarchy and divine right in Prussia. In: Peter Krüger, Julius H. Schoeps (ed.): The misunderstood monarch. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. In his time. Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, Potsdam 1997, ISBN 3-930850-67-2 , pp. 45–70, here: p. 48.
  21. ↑ Christopher Clark: Prussia. Rise and fall 1600–1947. Pantheon, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-570-55060-1 , p. 528.
  22. ↑ Wolfgang J Mommsen: 1848 - The unwanted revolution: The revolutionary movements in Europe 1830-1849. Fischer, Berlin 2000, ISBN 3-596-13899-X , p. 82.
  23. ^ Siegfried Heimann: The Prussian Landtag 1899-1947. A political story. Links Verlag, Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-86153-648-2 , p. 20.
  24. ↑ Christopher Clark: Prussia. Rise and fall 1600–1947. Pantheon, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-570-55060-1 , p. 527; David E. Barclay: Anarchy and Goodwill. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-88680-463-1 , p. 191.
  25. ↑ Thomas Nipperdey: German History 1800–1866. Citizen world and strong state. Beck, Munich 1983, ISBN 3-406-09354-X , p. 399.
  26. ↑ Thomas Nipperdey: German History 1800–1866. Citizen world and strong state. Beck, Munich 1983, ISBN 3-406-09354-X , p. 399.
  27. ↑ Thomas Nipperdey: German History 1800–1866. Citizen world and strong state. Beck, Munich 1983, ISBN 3-406-09354-X , p. 399.
  28. ↑ Christopher Clark: Prussia. Rise and fall 1600–1947. Pantheon, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-570-55060-1 , p. 528.
  29. ↑ David E. Barclay: Anarchy and Good Will. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-88680-463-1 , p. 196.
  30. ^ Roland Gehrke: Landtag and the public: Provincial parliamentarism in Silesia 1825-1845. Böhlau, Vienna 2009, ISBN 978-3-412-20413-6 , p. 422.
  31. ^ Rüdiger Hachtmann: Berlin 1848. A political and social history of the revolution. Dietz, Bonn 1997, p. 111.
  32. ↑ David E. Barclay: Anarchy and Good Will. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-88680-463-1 , p. 198.
  33. ^ Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. German history from the end of the Old Reich to the fall of the Weimar Republic. Beck, Munich 2014, ISBN 978-3-406-66049-8 , p. 96.
  34. ↑ David E. Barclay: Anarchy and Good Will. Friedrich Wilhelm IV. And the Prussian monarchy. Siedler, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-88680-463-1 , p. 198.
  35. ↑ Ilja Mieck: From the reform period to the revolution (1806-1847). In: Wolfgang Ribbe (Ed.): History of Berlin. Volume 1: From early history to industrialization. Beck, Munich 1987, ISBN 3-406-31591-7 , pp. 407-602, here: p. 602.
  36. ^ Rüdiger Hachtmann: Berlin 1848. A political and social history of the revolution. Dietz, Bonn 1997, ISBN 3-8012-4083-5 , p. 291.
  37. ↑ Guntram Schulze-Wegener: Wilhelm I. German Kaiser - King of Prussia - National Myth . Middle. Berlin 2015, p. 183.
  38. ↑ Hans-Peter Ullmann, Der deutsche Steuerstaat, Verlag CH Beck, original edition, Munich 2005, ISBN 3-406-51135-X , p. 38
  39. ^ Rüdiger Hachtmann: Berlin 1848. A political and social history of the revolution. Dietz, Bonn 1997, ISBN 3-8012-4083-5 , p. 295.
  40. ↑ Christopher Clark: Prussia. Rise and fall 1600–1947. Pantheon, Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-570-55060-1 , p. 574.
  41. ↑ Review by Dieter Langewiesche at sehepunkte.de , Issue 8 (2008), No. 3
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on January 15, 2018 .