Prussian National Assembly
The Prussian National Assembly emerged from the first general and equal elections in Prussia after the March Revolution of 1848 . Their task was to draw up a constitution for the Kingdom of Prussia. The Prussian National Assembly met from May 22 to September 1848 in Berlin in the building of the Sing-Akademie zu Berlin behind the Neue Wache and from September to November in the Schauspielhaus on Gendarmenmarkt . On November 9, 1848, the government ordered the expulsion of the Prussian National Assembly to Brandenburg an der Havel , and on December 5, 1848 it was dissolved by royal order. The democratic constitution it had drawn up was rejected by the government, but many basic articles were adopted in the constitution imposed by King Friedrich Wilhelm IV in December 1848 and in the revised constitution of 1850.
Elections and tasks of the National Assembly
The main goal of King Friedrich Wilhelm IV and the liberal March Ministry under Ludolf Camphausen when calling for elections for the National Assembly was to steer the often spontaneous and unpredictable revolutionary movement into controllable channels through legalization. The reconvened United State Parliament decided that the next National Assembly would aim at an "agreement [between Parliament and the King] on the Prussian constitution". This expressly forbade Parliament's own draft.
The electoral law provided for general, equal and indirect elections. All men who were older than 24 years, lived at their place of residence for more than six months and did not receive poor relief had the right to vote. No major German state had as broad a voting right as Prussia. The primary elections took place on May 1, 1848 (simultaneously with those for the German National Assembly). The electors so determined decided on May 8 and 10, 1848, on the composition of Parliament.
|Members of the Prussian National Assembly 1848/49|
|Civil servant (sum)||186|
|Farmers / landowners||73|
|all in all||393|
|Siemann, German Revolution 1848/49, p. 140|
The composition of the parliament differed significantly from that of the Frankfurt National Assembly . Professors, but also freelance lawyers, were rarely represented in Berlin, journalists, full-time publicists or writers were completely absent. Unlike in Frankfurt, there were craftsmen, farmers (46) and large landowners (27) among the MPs. Judges were also more represented than in Frankfurt. As in Frankfurt, however, the civil servants in the broadest sense (including teaching, administration and justice) formed the largest number of members.
Overall, the National Assembly in Berlin was much more influenced by the lower middle class and less by the educated middle class than the assembly in Frankfurt. It played a role here that the better-known personalities in the constituencies tended to be sent to Frankfurt. In contrast, the Berlin deputies were considered closer to the people.
As in Frankfurt, different parliamentary groups soon formed in Berlin . The external reason was the question of whether the MPs should go to the royal palace for the opening of the National Assembly . While the liberal and conservative right saw no problem in this, it was a matter of principle for the democratic left . The MP Temme emphasized that the MPs “were elected representatives of the Prussian people and not as servants of a monarch. It is the right of the people everywhere and therefore parliamentary custom that the prince goes to the representatives of the people in their meeting room, not the other way around, that they come to his court. "
However, multiple splits and the lack of official memberships make the picture of the individual parliamentary groups confusing and membership figures can therefore only be an approximation of reality. Overall, the Prussian National Assembly was clearly more radical and positioned to the left than its counterpart in Frankfurt. The actual conservative right to the new Kreuzzeitung of the brothers Ludwig Friedrich Leopold and Ernst Ludwig von Gerlach was as good as not represented at all, so that the "right" was formed by old Prussian liberals who formed the core of the pre-March and during the United State Parliament Had formed opposition and were striving for a strictly constitutional state. This included Rhenish citizens such as Camphausen and Hansemann , East Prussian aristocrats and Westphalian Catholics such as Johann Friedrich Joseph Sommer . In terms of its political orientation, this group roughly corresponded to the Frankfurt casino . The Harkort faction (named after Friedrich Harkort ) split off from the right , but did not differ significantly from their constitutional-liberal positions.
|Fractions in the Prussian National Assembly in 1848|
|designation||Number of members|
|all in all||400|
|Siemann, German Revolution 1848/49, p. 141|
In the center on the right, the democratic liberals and advocates of constitutionalism with a strong parliamentary component - roughly comparable to the Württemberg court . The left center agreed on many points with the actual left and politically corresponded roughly to Frankfurt's Westendhall . This group played a key role as it was able to form a majority with the left.
The left itself was divided into a parliamentary wing and a republican-actionist wing. Overall, the left was more open to a democratic-parliamentary monarchy than the Frankfurt Deutsche Hof and Donnersberg . Even if the left by no means had a majority and also lost votes on important issues, it shaped the negotiations much more than in Frankfurt.
The leading individuals in parliament, Benedikt Waldeck and Jodocus Temme, were also representatives of the left and often determined the course of negotiations. Only Karl Rodbertus , the leader of the left center, could stand up to them .
Petitions and outside influence
Parliament did not act in a vacuum; instead, various groups tried to influence the decisions. This included reporting in the politicizing press. In addition, there was the formation of various kinds of interest groups. In addition to these rather indirect attempts at influence, there were also numerous petitions from groups and individuals. By August 1848 alone, 6,000 petitions had been received. This amount could only be handled by a specially set up committee, which also complained about work overload. Especially in the first phase up to June 1848, petitions on the agricultural question dominated with almost 60%. In the second phase, the school question and the churches took center stage. Trade and business issues as well as tax problems were also important.
Debates about the recognition of the revolution
In the first few weeks, Parliament was mainly occupied with its constitution , debates on the rules of procedure and other preparatory activities. The prelude to political debates in the narrower sense was Ludolf Camphausen , who, in the last session of May, demanded a kind of vote of confidence for his government in the form of an address to the king. Behind this was the government's goal to present itself as fully responsible to parliament. She made her remaining in office dependent on the approval of the house. However, the consequence was that the debate not only contributed to the formation of factions, but also hardened the fronts of parts of the MPs to the government. Last but not least, the demonstration of responsibility led to the king's distrust, who rightly feared that he might refuse any "orders" with reference to his responsibility to Parliament. The ministers therefore fought on two fronts simultaneously, one against the opposition in parliament and the other against the king and his camarilla .
The first conflict-laden debate in parliament followed the motion of Julius Berends , who on June 8th demanded that “the high assembly, in recognition of the revolution, wanted to declare on record that the fighters of March 18 and 19 did something for the fatherland The motion aimed to clearly highlight the upheaval in the revolution and was directed against the statements of the government, which repeatedly emphasized the continuity with the pre-revolutionary period. Ultimately, this was based on the fundamental recognition of a “right to revolution” and “popular sovereignty.” Camphausen took the opposite position. In the sense of his earlier statements he called the revolution, which he called the incident, an important cause of the changes, but it did not overturn the entire constitution of the state. In the days that followed, the debate continued when MP Sommer von der Right called the motion a “precupation” (sic!). This led to a tightening of the motion on the left. Johann Jacoby tried to mediate. On the one hand, he agreed that the debate was inopportune. On the other hand, it has now broken out and therefore a decision has to be made. He emphasized that there were still strong forces outside Parliament who wanted to reverse the previous developments. "For the sake of the truth, for the sake of the peace of the country, we must oppose this party decisively: (...) by fully recognizing the revolution in all its consequences." Subsequently, a compromise proposal by the deputy Zachariä was tabled, which amounted to return to the agenda. The vote ultimately showed that 196 MPs were in favor of moving on to the agenda, while 177 voted against. Ultimately, the assembly had evaded the crucial question of whether the parliament stood in the continuity of the pre-revolutionary period or was based on revolutionary law.
Relationship to the Frankfurt National Assembly
A debate on the relationship to the Paulskirche parliament began early on in the Prussian National Assembly . The trigger for the dispute over the relationship with the Frankfurt National Assembly was the establishment of a provisional central authority and an imperial corruption by the German parliament, without agreement with the monarchs of the German states. As a result, on July 7, 1848, Johann Jacoby submitted what appeared to be a contradictory application. On the one hand, he criticized the Frankfurt decision to appoint an imperial administrator who was not responsible to parliament, but on the other hand he also stated that the Paulskirche assembly had the right to do so. The Camphausen government argued in reverse. She welcomed the creation of a quasi-monarchical head, but denied the Frankfurt National Assembly the right to do so.
Despite all the criticism of the crown, the right also pleaded democrats like Waldeck and Johann Jacoby for a leading role for Prussia in Germany. They rejected a Habsburg hegemony. The left, for example, harshly criticized the decision of the Frankfurt National Assembly to appoint an imperial administrator who was not responsible to parliament in the person of Archduke Johann . This appeared to her as the introduction of an Austrian hereditary empire through the back door. But the supposedly weak parliamentary control of the head of state was also fundamentally criticized. Waldeck declared downright pathetically: "We want to put the sword, which we have wielded victoriously for Germany for so long, into the lap of the National Assembly, gladly hand it over to the central head of Germany (...) We do not want to entrust the sword of Frederick the Great to him. ”How little the Prussian National Assembly valued the attempt by the Frankfurt parliamentarians to create a unified nation-state is shown by parliament's only cautious criticism of the government decision, the Prussian army not, as by the Reich Minister of War ordered to pay homage to the imperial administrator. How great the mistrust was towards the "Frankfurters" is also shown by the criticism of the emergency measures after the Frankfurt riots in September . This culminated in Waldeck's motion to resolve that decrees of the (German) central government , which could also affect internal affairs of the federal states, should only come into force after the approval of the federal state parliaments. The Prussian Paulskirche MP Jodocus Temme seconded: "We did not fight for the freedom that we achieved, only to throw it away to a parliament in Frankfurt am Main." Statements like these led to a deterioration in the relationship between the two parliaments.
The Camphausen government is overthrown
In connection with the Berlin Zeughaussturm , the meeting room of the National Assembly was at times threatened by demonstrators. One day later, on June 15, 1848, the commander of the Berlin vigilante group had to admit that he was not in a position to guarantee the protection of the assembly. A short time later, he sent several battalions to protect the Singakademie, but Camphausen indicated that the vigilante would not be enough to guarantee public safety. The only possible support was the army, which was demonstratively withdrawn after the March events. In the National Assembly Leberecht Uhlich proposed that parliament should not need the protection of armed men, but should place itself under the protection of the Berlin population. The motion passed through parliament without any problems and represented a heavy defeat for the Camphausen government. It coincided almost with the problems of the draft constitution presented by the government. The king had described this draft, which was supported by the conservative side, as a "miserable work", and for the left it did not go far enough. Camphausen opposed the motions of Waldeck and others for a constitutional commission of parliament. Parliament decided to set up a commission with 188 votes to 142. The attempt by Camphausen to win MPs from the center groups to support the government course failed. After Hansemann had suggested that he resign, Camphausen resigned. He was followed by Rudolf von Auerswald as prime minister.
The central task of the Berlin National Assembly was originally to agree a constitution with the king. The crown assumed a more or less smooth approval of a draft of the liberal “March Ministry”, which, after Camphausen's resignation, was under the leadership of the East Prussian liberal Rudolf von Auerswald . In addition to this, the Rhenish liberal David Hansemann played a key role. The model for the government draft was the liberal Belgian constitution of 1831, which was considered to be one of the most liberal and modern of its time and had a particularly strong influence on Rhenish liberalism.
The draft contained a catalog of basic rights (for example personal freedom, equality before the law, exercise of civil rights regardless of religious affiliation and, with slight restrictions, freedom of the press, the right to petition and the confidentiality of letters). Only the right of assembly should be more strictly regulated. However, the very strong position of the king was problematic for parts of the National Assembly. He was to remain in command and retain the right to fill positions in the army and bureaucracy. In addition there was the right to ordinances and the decision about war and peace. The proposed two-chamber system and the king's absolute right of veto were also viewed critically . However, the draft also provided for the oath on the constitution of the king, the military and civil servants, the parliament's budget rights, the inviolability of members of parliament and even diets.
Even if the draft was in large part quite capable of consensus, the majority not only wanted to agree, but also claimed the right to work out their own proposal. While the right (ie the pre-March liberals) stuck to the principle of an agreement with the crown, the Berlin Assembly emphasized more clearly than the German National Assembly the principle of “popular sovereignty” and the fundamental break with the past through the March Revolution. This contrast was already evident at the beginning of the meeting and, according to the representation of MP Sommer (right center), was the decisive reason for the consolidation of the right and left parliamentary groups. The previously loose groups then looked for an ideological "flag" under which they could gather. “In the earlier meetings of the constitutional club [the somewhat contradicting contemporary designation of the democratic left] Temme, von Kirchmann and Waldeck had advocated the view that the kingship was extinguished de jure by the revolution and that it would only be tolerated by the people until the constitution was completed will only be established by the people through the constitution. We [the right-wing] took up this flag, we brought up the question of whether we were sent to negotiate a constitution, where two independent parties face each other, with their own rights, or whether the crown would only regain legal rights through an agreement with us . "
The fact that, at the beginning of the deliberations, the assembly did not make the government draft of May 22, 1848, edited by the King himself, as the basis of the discussion, suggests that the Democrats are more important. Instead, a separate constitutional committee was set up. This drafted a parliamentary draft which, after the committee chairman Benedikt Waldeck, became known as the Waldeck Charte . However, in the end, the assembly was less “left” than often claimed. In the decisive vote on October 16, 1848, a clear majority of 226 against 110 deputies rejected a unilateral adoption of a constitution without the consent of the king.
The Left failed in its attempt to implement a unicameral system instead of the parliamentary bicameral system of the House of Representatives and the first chamber (mansion), as provided for in the government draft. However, the left successfully opposed the attempt to design the first chamber as a noble mansion. Instead, the Waldeck charter emphasized the professional character, and representatives of the municipalities should also be added. In order to reform self-administration at the municipal level, a free municipal, district and district order was adopted.
The catalog of fundamental rights in particular went well beyond the original government draft. This included a free press right. In addition, on Waldeck's suggestion, the National Assembly passed a Habeas Corpus Act in anticipation of a future constitution .
Differences mainly concerned the question of power. In addition to the Landwehr and line troops, the charter provided for a people's armed forces dependent on parliament. However, the Democrats were unable to prevail over the Liberals on the question of the military constitution. At the request of the Liberals, only a milder vigilante law was passed. In addition, the parliament demanded a say in foreign policy. Instead of an absolute veto, the monarch was only given a suspensive veto. In addition, there were numerous anti-feudal provisions and a strong right of scrutiny for parliament, for example through committees of inquiry vis-à-vis the government appointed by the king.
The Waldeck Charte thus aimed at the arcane realm of royal power. The unintended consequence was that the anti-revolutionary agitation of the conservative associations received a boost and counter-revolutionary plans for overthrow gradually took on clear outlines. With the king, the draft and in particular the abolition of the nobility and the deletion of the addition "by the grace of God" reinforced the rejection of the revolution.
Overall, the draft constitution included a catalog of fundamental rights, the future legislature was to form a bicameral parliament. The House of Representatives should be determined in general, equal and secret elections. The judiciary was defined as “independent, not subject to any authority other than the law” and the existing judicial law was reformed. The state budget came under the control of parliament.
The mistrust that the Prussian National Assembly harbored towards Frankfurt also had a political background. While the decision on the revolution was already being carried out by force in Vienna , the Frankfurt parliament did little to act against the counter-revolution.
In Berlin, the disputes took place as a constitutional struggle of the National Assembly, although extra-parliamentary movements also played a role here. More clearly than in Frankfurt, the National Assembly in Berlin tried to fight the king and the government for superior authority over the military. The starting point was a violently suppressed demonstration in the city of Schweidnitz . The actions of the army were often interpreted in public as the beginning of the counter-revolution. At the request of the senior teacher Dr. On August 9th, Julius Stein passed the parliament with a large majority to demand a decree from the Minister of War prohibiting officers from all reactionary efforts and obliging them to a constitutional legal status. Otherwise the officers would have to quit duty.
This decision not only provoked the determined opposition of the right and the right center, but was also the cause of the failure of the upper-class state ministry around v. Auerswald and Hansemann, because they refused to sign the requested decree. The resignation proved the power of practical parliamentarianism, but also strengthened the counter-revolutionary forces. As early as September, the king had specific plans that largely coincided with later developments.
At the latest since the National Assembly had removed divine right from the constitution on October 12, the reactionary camarilla around the brothers Ernst and Ludwig Gerlach gained influence over Friedrich Wilhelm IV and urged him to fight against the National Assembly. The resignation of the ministry ultimately triggered the “coup d'état” from above. The king appointed General v. Wrangel on September 13th as “Commander in Chief in the Marches” with the aim of militarily enforcing the counter-revolution. In contrast, the newly appointed cabinet under General v. Pfuel relatively uninfluential politically.
In October 1848 the revolutionary unrest in Berlin and Prussia increased again significantly. On the 16th there was barricade fighting in Berlin between workers and the vigilantes supported by craftsmen, plus the meetings of a revolutionary counter-parliament, the second Democrats' Congress and the news of the violent suppression of the revolution in Vienna. Related to this was a failed application by the Prussian National Assembly to the government to take direct steps for the revolutionaries in Vienna.
In this crucial phase for the future of the National Assembly, Parliament was deeply divided, as the debate on those killed in the riots shows. The right-wing liberal MP Sommer wrote about this to his wife: Die Linke “had demanded a solemn burial of the dead from both parties and a grave at state expense, as well as support for the bereaved at state expense. Waldeck demanded this in a brilliant speech - in which he referred to the terrible misfortune that Wrangel might have moved in - as proof of the people's reconciliation. Sommer rose up against it with an almost courageous speech, describing the terrorism practiced so far by the unrestrained excesses of those workers against the good citizens ... "While the left still believed that it had the reins of action in hand, statements like these show that the liberal right was prepared to come to terms with the king and the military out of concern for “law and order”.
The public excitement was a legitimation for the counter-revolution in Berlin too. On November 1, the king appointed a clearly anti-revolutionary cabinet under Prime Minister Count von Brandenburg . On November 9th, the seat of parliament was moved to the city of Brandenburg . Parliament itself declared this step illegal and continued its deliberations. However, since the vigilantes refused to protect the assembly militarily, the parliament had no means of power. Instead, calls were made for passive resistance and tax refusal . This provided a welcome pretext for the government to impose a state of siege and martial law, to disband the vigilante group, to ban all parties and to restrict freedom of the press and assembly. The military finally cleared the hall in which the National Assembly sat. MEPs like Waldeck could only protest symbolically: “Get your bayonets and stab us! A traitor who leaves this hall. "
Obliged constitution and dissolution of parliament
The call to refuse taxes was only obeyed in a few places; in many places the desire for "peace and order" was too great. In Brandenburg only a rump parliament met, as many leftists did not want to participate in this farce. The session lasted only a few days, since on December 5, 1848, the king passed a constitution without an agreement with the assembly and dissolved the national assembly. The constitution imposed by the king was viewed positively, especially among the moderate liberals, as at first glance it largely corresponded to the Waldeck Charter. In this way, too, universal and equal suffrage was guaranteed. On closer examination, however, it becomes clear that the changes, especially in the area of emergency ordinance law, strengthened the influence of the crown. In this context, the introduction of the absolute instead of a postponing veto was particularly important for the king. The king's “ divine right ” was also restored. While the Democrats around Waldeck continued to reject this constitution as unlawful and the extreme conservative right condemned it sharply as a kneeling before the zeitgeist, it was not difficult for the liberals to come to terms with it. The focus was on the hope that an independent monarch in a constitutional system could better protect the existing social order than a purely parliamentary system.
The actions of the government and the stance of the right sparked outrage among the population. In the new elections in January 1849 for the second chamber of the new parliament, there was a shift to the left. Instead of the moderate liberals, democrats were elected in many places in the western provinces. At the same time, especially in the eastern provinces on the right, alliances between conservatives and liberals developed. This alliance got a total of 46% of the vote, the Democrats were almost as strong with 44%, while the center received only 8.5% of the vote.
But as early as May 1849, the chamber was dissolved, as it had recognized the imperial constitution passed by the Frankfurt National Assembly as legal. In the opinion of the crown, however, the Prussian parliament had exceeded its powers. New elections were therefore scheduled for June 1849. With the help of an emergency ordinance, the general and equal right to vote was replaced by a three-class right to vote . The classes formed according to tax revenue each made up a third of the electorate, so that the political influence of the wealthy voters was many times greater than that of the poorer groups of voters. In protest against this measure, the democratic left did not participate in this and subsequent elections during the reactionary era of the 1850s. While the victorious reaction in Austria abolished the constitution imposed by the emperor in 1849 without replacement barely a year later and thus restored the absolutist form of government, Prussia remained a constitutional state and a constitutional monarchy despite all the restrictions .
- Negotiations of the constituent assembly for Prussia. Leipzig, edition 1 / 1848-502 (?) / 1848.
- Klaus Herdepe : The Prussian constitutional question 1848. Neuried 2002.
- Wolfram Siemann : The German Revolution of 1848/49 . Darmstadt 1997. v. a. Pp. 140-143, pp. 170-175.
- Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. German history 1806–1933 . Bonn 2002.
- Hans-Ulrich Wehler: German history of society. Second volume: From the reform era to the industrial and political “German double revolution” 1815–1848 / 49 . Munich 1987. v. a. P. 752ff.
- Wolfgang J. Mommsen: 1848. The unwanted revolution. The revolutionary movements in Europe 1830–1849 . Frankfurt 1998.
- Felix Feldmann: The Prussian National Assembly- A Chance for German Democracy? Warendorf 2007.
- Protocols of the Prussian State Ministry (Acta Borussica Volume 4 / I (1848–1858))
- Protocols of the Prussian State Ministry (Acta Borussica Volume 4 / II (1848–1858))
- Various texts in documentarchiv.de
- Review of the Prussian National Assembly of 1848 and its luminaries. Eichler, Berlin 1849 (online edition)
- Revolution in Berlin
- First Prussian National Assembly
- Stories from the Berlin March Revolution
- Prussian Assembly in: Encyclopedia of 1848 Revolutions
- on the revolutionary events in Berlin in the spring of 1848 cf. for example Hagen Schulze: Der Weg zum Nationstaat. The German National Movement from the 18th Century to the Founding of the Empire . Munich 1985, pp. 9-48, March Revolution in Prussia
- Wolfram Siemann: The German Revolution of 1848/49. Darmstadt 1997, p. 87.
- Siemann, Revolution, p. 140, Hans-Ulrich Wehler: Deutsche Gesellschaftgeschichte. Second volume: From the reform era to the industrial and political “German double revolution” 1815–1848 / 49. Munich 1987, p. 752.
- Description of the pictures: Carl Mittermaier , David Hansemann , Maximilian von Schwerin-Putzar , Rudolf von Auerswald , Benedikt Waldeck , Friedrich Römer , Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann , Ludolf Camphausen , Hermann von Beckerath , Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch , Carl Theodor Welcker
- Quoted from Wilfried Reininghaus, Axel Eilts: Fifteen Revolution Months. The province of Westphalia from March 1848 to May 1849. In: Wilfried Reininghaus, Horst Conrad (Hrsg.): For freedom and law. Westphalia and Lippe in the revolution of 1848/49. Münster 1999, ISBN 3-402-05382-9 , p. 49.
- Mommsen, unwanted revolution, p. 251 f., Siemann, Revolution, p. 141. An eyewitness report on the formation of factions: Summer to his wife, May 26, 1848. Abgedr. in: Clemens Plassmann: Heinrich Sommer. 1841-1863. Krefeld 1951, p. 89 f., Wolfgang J. Mommsen: 1848. The unwanted revolution. The revolutionary movements in Europe 1830–1849. Frankfurt 1998, p. 251.
- Herdepe, pp. 246-255.
- Herdepe, pp. 216-218.
- Quoted from Siemann, p. 142.
- Herdepe, p. 222.
- Herdepe, pp. 219-222.
- Herdepe, pp. 225-235.
- Heinrich August Winkler: The long way to the west. German history 1806–1933. Bonn 2002, p. 112.
- Winkler, Weg nach Westen, p. 113.
- Herdepe, p. 234.
- Herdepe, pp. 239–242.
- Herdepe, pp. 242–245, the government's draft constitution in full
- Sommer to his wife of May 26, 1848, printed in Plassmann, p. 90 f.
- Die Charte Waldeck in the wording Siemann, Revolution, p. 142 f., Online edition: Manfred Botzenhart: Franz Leo Benedikt Waldeck (1802–1870). In: Westphalian pictures of life. Münster 1985. Vol. 12, page 4. , Mommsen, unwanted revolution, pp. 206, 254.
- Text of the Stein motion
- Combat program of Friedrich Wilhelm IV.
- Sommer to his wife of October 18, 1848. Abgedr. in: Plassmann, p. 100.
- Online edition: Manfred Botzenhart: Franz Leo Benedikt Waldeck (1802–1870). In: Westphalian pictures of life. Münster 1985. Vol. 12, p. 6 , Siemann, Revolution, pp. 170-175, Winkler, Weg nach Westen, pp. 114 f.
- Constitution of December 1848
- Winkler, Weg nach Westen, pp. 115 f., P. 132, Mommsen, unwanted Revolution, pp. 255–260.