History of the Philosophy of Religion

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Under the history of the philosophy of religion , the basic philosophical positions in the field of the philosophy of religion are presented in a historical perspective. For a systematic overview see there.

historical overview

Although statements about religion and God or the gods can be traced back to the beginnings of philosophy, the philosophy of religion is a product of the Enlightenment . It developed in the 18th century out of an effort to understand the essence of religious belief from reason and without recourse to claims to revelation.

Deism , which is particularly strongly represented in England and which rejected the belief in revelation and emphasized the moral character of religious regulations, can be regarded as the philosophy of religion of the Enlightenment . Gotthold Ephraim Lessing - next to Hermann Samuel Reimarus main representative deistic philosophy of religion in Germany - then realized the revealed religion in the process of "education of the human race" as a necessary transition stage. In his work The Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason (1793), Immanuel Kant continued the Enlightenment emphasis on the moral content of religion by introducing God as the postulate of practical reason. Friedrich Schleiermacher, on the other hand, tried to provide a justification for religion based on the “feeling of absolute dependence”. GWF Hegel ( lectures on the philosophy of religion ) turned against him with a speculative system in which religion is knowledge of the divine spirit of itself in the finite spirit, so that God governs all world events and comes to himself in the thinking of man.

The second half of the 19th century was dominated by criticism of religion, v. a. with Ludwig Feuerbach , Karl Marx , Friedrich Nietzsche and Sigmund Freud .

At the turn of the 20th century, a series of religious-philosophical drafts were developed that still shape the current discussion today. Based on the psychology of religion ( William James ), Neo-Kantianism ( Hermann Cohen ) and the concept of a “religious a priori” ( Ernst Troeltsch , Rudolf Otto ), attempts were made to defend the reality of religious experience. Positivism and language criticism formed the starting point for the new approach to the " analytical philosophy of religion ". While Alfred Jules Ayer , referring to the criteria of meaning of logical empiricism, asserted the senselessness of religious statements, other authors from the field of analytical philosophy ascribed a pragmatic ( Ronald William Hepburn ) or ethical ( Richard Bevan Braithwaite ) meaning to religious language . A second mainstream linked to the late philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and tried to show the independence of religious " language games ".

Important stations

Augustine

Augustine

Augustine Confessiones are among the classic writings of Western religious philosophy. Their motto is "Faith that seeks insight". It is Augustine's concern to trace the path to an intellectually responsible and personally acquired faith based on his own life story and to look at it from a general point of view.

Faith as an act of knowledge and will

A basic question of the Confession is that of the priority of prayer and knowledge of God: "But who calls you without knowing about you?" "Or are they called to you so that they know you?" Augustine comes to the conclusion that the question cannot be decided because it formulates a wrong alternative: God is known by being worshiped. The God of whom he knows in faith is the God whom he calls on in prayer: "I will seek you Lord with my calling, and I will call you by believing in you" (Conf. 1,1,1 ).

Faith is not only an act of knowledge but also of will. It requires approval of what has been recognized and the decision to follow the path that follows from it. People experience this decision as liberation for what they actually want. The way to faith, however, is also dependent on personal biography and to this extent a work of providence: "The Lord guides man's steps, and only in this way will man choose the way of the Lord" (Conf. 5: 7, 13 after Ps 37:23).

Talking about God

Augustine speaks about the nature of God in an anthropomorphic language. He uses the superlative and the antithesis as linguistic means. God is "the most merciful and the righteous, the most hidden and the most present". “You love, but without a surge; you are zealous and calm ”. But these pictorial ascriptions remain problematic for Augustine: "And what is said now [...] what does someone say when he says something about you" (Conf, 1,4,4). Basically, man is “dumb” when he tries to say something meaningful about God. Nevertheless, he is forced to speak: "And woe to those who keep silent about you, where the talkative are still mute". This semantic skepticism is ultimately absorbed by the love that is expressed in the act of speaking prayer, addressing God.

Encounter with God

The encounter of God takes place in which for Augustine the simultaneous immanence and transcendence of God is shown. In prayer the believer wants on the one hand to go beyond himself and meet God, on the other hand to call God into himself. God is in man insofar as he is the cause that man is. Conversely, however, man is also in God, insofar as God is omnipresent: “But now I am too, so what else do I ask that you come into me, who I would not be if you were not in me? […] Or rather, wouldn't I be if I were not in you […]? ”(Conf. 1,2,2,).

For Augustine God can be found everywhere - in heaven as in the underworld: “If I go up to heaven, you are there; if I go to bed in the underworld, you are present ”. But the omnipresence of God is not enough to meet him; he can be with us without us being with him (“You were with me, I was not with you”, Conf. 10,27,38). In order for us to really come to God, we have to want to hear His answers to our questions. God's calling is unmistakable, which Augustine expresses in strong metaphors: “You called and screamed and tore my deafness; You flashed, shone and chased away my blindness, you smelled, and I breathe in and now I thirst for you ”(Conf. 10,27,38). Nevertheless we can flee from God, whereby this ultimately represents an escape from ourselves: “You stood before me; but I had also left myself and did not even find myself, let alone you ”. The flight takes the life force from man, which he only experiences in the full sense when he repented: “They should turn back, and see, you are there in their heart, are in the hearts of those who profess you, throw you in the arms "(Conf. 5,2,2).

The religious life

For those who have chosen the path of faith, life has lost its everyday matter of course: “Under the gaze of your eyes I have become a question, and that is my misery” (Conf. 10,33,50). Determination for God does not protect against temptation. Augustine gives an example of the lust for killing, which is based on the ambiguity of human nature: the dog chasing a rabbit, the lizard that snaps at the fly, the spider that wraps around it. The believer can cure this sick pleasure by trusting God and foregoing justification: “You first healed me from the addiction to justify myself in order to then also be gracious to all my other sinfulness and all mine To heal weaknesses […] By fear of you you have bowed my arrogance and accustomed my neck to your yoke ”(Conf. 10,36,58).

Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas is primarily known for his evidence of God. These should show the compatibility of religious belief with natural reason. For him, however, religious belief is not limited to theoretical knowledge of the existence of God, but is at its core a virtue and to this extent is located in practical reason.

The evidence of God

The proofs of God are supposed to secure the scientific nature of theology by starting from a philosophical definition of the word "God" and showing that the definition exists. Thomas asks whether the statement “God is” is understandable in itself ( per se notum ). He comes to the conclusion that they will be considered ( in se is) reasonable, "because the predicate is the same as the subject; for God is his being ”. Viewed in and of itself ( per se ), however, it is not understandable "because we do not know about God what he is" (S.th. I 2.1). Since we have no knowledge of the nature of God, in order to know whether God is, we have to rely on the way of proof. Thomas wants to do this "in five ways" (S.th. I 2,3):

  1. from movement (ex parte motus) : We perceive that something is moving in the world. Everything that is moved is moved by someone else. The series of those who move cannot be continued indefinitely. Hence it is necessary to come to a first mover that is not moved by anyone else.
  2. From the effective cause (ex ratione causae efficientis) : We find an order of effective causes in the world. But nothing can be the effective cause of itself. The series of effective causes cannot be continued indefinitely. Hence, it is necessary to come to a first causal cause that is itself and of everything else
  3. from the possible and necessary (ex possibili et necessario) : From the experience that something arises and disappears, we see that it can be or not. But it is impossible that what cannot be, always is. But if all that beings could not be either, then once there would have been nothing, and consequently it would also be nothing now. So it is impossible that everything that is cannot be either; rather, there must be what is necessary.
  4. from the degrees of perfection (ex gradibus) : Experience shows us that positive determinations (good, true, being, etc.) apply to things to different degrees. A more or less is only said of things insofar as they approach each other to different degrees which contains most of this being. So there must be something in which these determinations are realized to the highest degree and which is their cause.
  5. From teleology (ex gubernatione rerum) : We observe that beings who have no knowledge - like natural bodies - are active for the sake of a goal. But what has no knowing strives towards a goal only if it is directed by some knower. So there is something knowing by which all things of nature are directed towards one goal.

Each of these approaches is based on facts of experience which, in Thomas' argument, cannot be both true and their conclusion, the existence of God, false. These are deductive proofs that state a necessary condition for the empirical fact to be explained.

Religious belief as a virtue

For Thomas, through the proofs of God, we only recognize God's relationship to the creatures (S.th. I 12,12). In addition, here human reason is always at the mercy of error (S.th. I 1,1). For Thomas, natural knowledge of God cannot reach the religious phenomenon and cannot represent the basis of faith.

Faith is a virtue for Thomas , i. H. an attitude that shapes a person's life from the ground up and is a necessary condition for a successful life. Thomas takes over from Aristotle the thesis that happiness is the goal of human life. It is the perfect and self-sufficient good ( perfectum et sufficiens bonum , S.th. I II 5,3), which excludes all evil and fulfills all desires and longings. But this is not possible in this life, since many evils cannot be avoided and goods, like life itself, are perishable (S.th. I II 62). A life according to the philosophical virtues of Aristotle cannot therefore fulfill man's striving. The natural desire ( desiderium naturale ) of the human being for happiness cannot remain unfulfilled (S.th. I 12,1). Only the theological virtue of faith reveals an absolute meaning to man. Belief includes “the content that directs us to eternal life, e. For example: there are three persons, the omnipotence of God, the mystery of the incarnation of Christ ”(S.th. II II 1,6 ad 1).

For Thomas, faith is the first of all virtues. But he is bound to other attitudes. Thus the fear that stands in the way of faith can be removed through the virtue of valor, or the pride through which the intellect refuses to submit to the truth of faith can be removed through the virtue of humility.

The theological virtues (faith, hope, love) have priority over the philosophical virtues, since their object is the ultimate goal. Love and hope have their ultimate goal in the will, and faith in the intellect. But since the ultimate goal must be in the intellect earlier than in the will, faith is necessarily the first of all virtues. It enables one to grasp the supernatural principles, the Articles of Faith. But only the will can strive for the highest good. The virtue that enables him to do so is love ( caritas ). Thomas therefore calls love “form of faith” (S.th. II II 4,5). Only faith perfected through love ( fides formata ) is a virtue, but not faith without love ( fides informis ). In the act of love the will experiences its essential affinity ( conformitas ) with the thing presented in the articles of faith. In a sense, it brings about a kind of spiritual union between the will and its supernatural goal (S.th. I II 62,3).

Reason and belief

According to Thomas, there is a twofold relationship between human reason and faith. Reason can precede the will to believe and provide the appropriate reasons for it. In this case, reason diminishes the merit of faith, since man should believe because of the authority of God and not because of the insight of human reason. But reason can also follow the will; because man loves the truth believed in the authority of God, he thinks about it and looks for reasons for it. Such a justification does not contradict the faith, but rather increases its merit.

The insights of philosophy are fundamentally external to theology, since they do not proceed from the highest principles of theology, the articles of faith. Theology can, however, use philosophy to clarify and develop its own content (S.th. I 1,5 ad 2). It is a tool to interpret the Articles of Faith and to show the relationships between them. Moreover, what is known by natural reason can more easily lead to what is above reason. The philosophical arguments do not prove belief, but for Thomas belief and science must not contradict each other either (S.th. I 1,6 ad 2).

Immanuel Kant

Immanuel Kant

In the philosophy of religion, Kant's name is primarily associated with his criticism of the evidence of God. For Kant, however, this was by no means associated with a rejection of faith and religion. Rather, he was concerned with “picking up knowledge in order to make room for faith” (Immanuel Kant: AA III, 19).

The questions of the philosophy of religion are of the greatest importance to Kant. If there were no God, “all our duties would dwindle because there was an inconsistency in the whole, according to which well-being did not agree with good behavior, and this inconsistency would excuse the other. I should be righteous to others; but who will guarantee my rights? ”(Immanuel Kant: AA XIX, 130).

Kant develops a religion of reason. For him, the concept of God is not a metaphysical one, but a "moral concept" (Immanuel Kant: AA V, 138). Religion “is not the basis of morality, but vice versa” (Immanuel Kant: AA XIX, 150).

God as a postulate

The answer to the second Kantian question, "What should I do?" This commands him to act according to the mandatory practical laws (cf. e.g. KrV, A 807 / B 835) and to make a contribution to realizing a “moral world” in which all actions are in accordance with the moral law . At the same time, however, the human being is a being who longs for and needs happiness. This striving must not be the motive for moral action. But it is the subject of the third Kantian question “What may I hope?”.

For Kant, it is a postulate of pure practical reason that those who act morally must be able to hope to participate in happiness. The connection between morality and happiness, however, is at best accidental in the world of the senses (cf. Immanuel Kant: AA V, 115); nature does not pay attention to the worthiness of people to be happy. A supreme cause must therefore be presupposed, which is at the same time the moral lawgiver and the cause of nature. This is “a being who through understanding and will is the cause (hence the author) of nature, ie God. Hence the postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good (the best world) is at the same time the postulate of the reality of a highest original good, namely the existence of God ”(Immanuel Kant: AA V, 125).

Theodicy

Kant understands by “ theodicy ” the “defense of the highest wisdom of the author of the world against the accusation which reason raises against the world for what is contrary to its purpose” (Immanuel Kant: AA VIII, 255). For Kant, the term actually represents a mendacity, because he does not uphold “the cause of God”, but “the cause of our presumptuous, but in this case misunderstanding its limits” (Immanuel Kant: AA VIII, 255). Nevertheless, if he wants to remain sincere, religious belief must be able to give an answer to the objections raised against him.

Kant differentiates between three types of "improper" or evil in the world:

  • the evil of evil: it is that which is absolutely contrary to its purpose, which cannot be approved either as an end or as a means, and which contradicts the holiness of God
  • The evil of pain: it is that which is conditionally contrary to the purpose, which, although never as an end, can be approved as a means: it contradicts the goodness of God
  • the evil of injustice: the disparity between crimes and punishments in the world: it contradicts the justice of God
The inability of previous attempts at theodicy

The traditional strategies for solving the theodicy problem all turn out to be untenable for Kant.

According to Kant, there are three strategies for solving the problem of evil :

  • It is denied that there is evil. The morally bad is only a violation of human wisdom. Divine wisdom judges according to other, incomprehensible rules (1)
  • The reality of evil is admitted and the Creator is excused that he could not have prevented it because it results from the finitude of man (2)
  • Man is to be blamed for evil, but not God. God only allowed evil, but not approved or willed it (3)

Kant objects that the denial of evil contradicts our moral feelings. The moral bad is in itself abhorrent and can therefore never be a means to a good end (to 1). What results from man's finitude cannot be attributed to him and consequently cannot be judged morally (to 2, 3).

Against the problem of pain as a physical evil, it is argued that by struggling with the adversities man should become worthy of the glory in another life. Kant objects, on the other hand, that there is no reason for future bliss to be preceded by an examination period.

The answer to the problem of injustice is that every crime already entails a punishment due to the bad conscience associated with it (Immanuel Kant: AA VIII, 261). Kant objects to the fact that the virtuous transfers his conscientiousness to the unscrupulous criminal.

Suffering from injustice in the world should continue to allow virtue to grow, which Kant rejects with the hint that at least one can expect reward for virtue and punishment for vice for the end of life, which is not the case, however.

Furthermore, it is said that in this world good and bad result from how man with his skill applies the laws of nature; the correspondence of good and bad to the moral behavior of man remains reserved for a future world. Here Kant points out that this answer leaves the realm of theoretical reason; "For what other guide has reason for its theoretical conjecture than natural law" (Immanuel Kant: AA VIII, 262).

Doctrinal and Authentic Theodicy

Kant compares the intention that God pursues with the evil in the world with a legal text. This can be interpreted in a doctrinal and authentic way. While the philosophical attempts to understand God's purpose are doctrinal, in that they seek to infer the will of the legislature from the wording of the text, the authentic interpretation is carried out by the legislature himself. Kant finds a model for such an authentic theodicy allegorically in the story of Job. Job's friends are representatives of a doctrinal theodicy. They believe that they can explain all evils in the world from divine justice, namely as “punishments for crimes committed” (Immanuel Kant: AA VIII, 265). In contrast, Job expresses his trust in the “unconditional divine counsel” (Immanuel Kant: AA VIII, 265) and does not speak about things “which are too high for him and which he does not understand” (Immanuel Kant: AA VIII, 266 ). He prefers sincerity of heart to discernment and has the honesty to openly admit his doubts.

Pure religion of reason and revelation

For Kant, the Christian religion of revelation can be traced back to the content of a pure religion of reason and does not go beyond it. He explains this using the example of the inexplicability of evil. So reason is only able to explain an action by previous actions. In doing so, however, it misses the phenomenon of evil, which must be viewed as a free act and not as a natural effect. Similarly, in the biblical account of the Fall, the first beginning of evil is not ascribed to man, but to a “spirit of originally exalted destiny” (Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 44).

For Kant, the figure of Jesus is the example of a perfect human being who can serve as a model for imitation. This archetype of perfection is always already in us, so that it is not necessary to “still hypostatize it in a special person” (Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 64). For Kant, only a person can serve as an example for imitation; he therefore rejects the dogma of the supernatural origin of Jesus.

The ethical community

For Kant, when confronted with others, people always run the risk of being challenged by hostile tendencies such as envy, lust for power and greed. This tendency can only be counteracted by a community that aims to promote the good. Kant calls this an “ethically common being” or an ethical state (Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 94). He distinguishes it from the “legal common being”, the political state. While the latter is content with the legality of actions, an ethical community demands their morality, i. that is, what is morally right is done for its own sake. The legislature of the ethical community must be able to prescribe an attitude, to see through it and to sanction it. This is identical to the concept of God as a “moral ruler of the world” (Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 99).

Because of his sensual nature, man is unable to fully realize the ethical community in this world. On the way to the kingdom of God, the unity of people under the laws of virtue, he is dependent on the actually existing religions and churches (Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 151).

Belief in revelation and reason

For Kant, belief in revelation represents a form of belief that is deficient compared to belief in reason. It is based on historical facts and can therefore only have a temporally and spatially limited spread. In this sense it is accidental and therefore cannot “be viewed as unifying people in general” (Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 104). Because of human weakness, “for the highest concepts of reason and reasons, there is always something sensually durable, some kind of confirmation of experience, etc. the like ”(Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 109) but it is a necessary vehicle for the belief in reason. This only demands compliance with the duties towards people.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein expressed himself on the subject of religion primarily in the form of aphorisms and reflections. These can be found mainly in his conversations with his student Maurice O'Connor Drury and the Mixed Notes published from his estate . In addition, essential parts of his main works can be viewed as preparation for a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of religion.

Philosophy and religion

For Wittgenstein, the realm of religion cannot be grasped with the means of metaphysics. For Wittgenstein, philosophy has the task of removing the intellectual narrowness created by metaphysics: “There is a latent metaphysics that underlies all natural sciences and even the formulations of everyday language, and this metaphysics must be exposed and put out of the way become "(PR 126f.). We have to make this unconscious metaphysics conscious and thus free ourselves from its claim.

In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein describes philosophy as a “ladder” on which one rises above its propositions and which one throws away after one has ascended on it (TLP 6.54). The philosophy is to "limit the unthinkable from within through the thinkable" (TLP 4.114). Wittgenstein calls the area beyond this limit the “ethical” or “mystical”. It is "not how the world is [...], but that it is" (TLP 6.44). Wittgenstein describes this experience as astonishment, which can be described with formulations such as: “How strange that something exists at all”, or “How strange that the world exists” ”(LE 14).

The religious language

Religious language works with symbols that cannot be resolved into an argumentative philosophical system. An essential characteristic of religious language is the attitude of awe. This distinguishes them from the language of philosophy, which is why z. In Plato's speech about the gods , for example, “the awe that one feels everywhere in the Bible does not arise ” (PR 221). The attitude of reverence is expressed in the language of prayer. Separated from this attitude, religious language becomes "villainy" (PR 120).

Characteristics of belief

For Wittgenstein, belief needs no justification by a philosophical proof; every attempt to make Catholicism "a philosophical system [..] is offensive" (PR 148). Faith springs from the longing for redemption: “People are religious to the extent that they do not believe that they are so imperfect as they are sick. Every halfway decent person believes himself to be highly imperfect, but the religious thinks himself miserable ”(VB 513). Because it is the heart that needs to be redeemed, belief cannot be a matter of the mind; it is "belief in what my heart, my soul needs, not my speculating mind" (VB 496). Only a certain belief and no philosophical speculation can redeem: "But if I really should be redeemed - I need certainty - not wisdom, dreams, speculation - and this certainty is faith" (VB 541).

Religious belief is more than the approval of a doctrine: “A good doctrine does not have to grasp you; it can be followed like a doctor's prescription. - But here something has to be grasped and turned around ”(VB 525). Christianity says “that all good teaching is of no use. One has to change one's life ”(VB 525).

Religious belief is “a trust” (VB 551). He opens up a dimension of depth and inner silence: "Religion is, so to speak, the deepest calm seabed that remains calm no matter how high the waves go" (VB 525).

The Christian faith is not primarily based on the historical truth of the four Gospels, but is “the result of life” (VB 494). The historical message wants to let people see something and only life can give him the experiences that enable him to do so.

The concept of God

Like faith, the concept of God can only be understood as the “result of life”. There can be no “grammatical description” of the word “God”. It can only be understood through “a kind of collection of examples” (VB 566f.). This must describe the experiences in human life such as sin, despair and suffering. They “do not show us an object to God like a sensory impression, nor do they suggest it. Experiences, thoughts - life can force this concept on us ”(VB 571).

The rite

Faith is essentially expressed through religious rites. These are rooted in the terminology of the late Wittgenstein language games and in a certain way of life that is the foundation of our knowledge. Life forms are factual human behavior given by nature or culture, which are not justified and cannot be justified. Wittgenstein describes man as a “ceremonial animal”: people perform “apart from actions that could be called animal, eating, etc.” also those “that could be called ritual” (BFGB 35).

See also

literature

Philosophy bibliography : Philosophy of Religion - Additional references on the topic

Introductions and manuals

  • Paul Copan, Chad Meister (Ed.): Philosophy of Religion. Classic and Contemporary Issues, VCH Wiley 2007, ISBN 1-4051-3989-7 . Chapter on religious experience; Religion and (natural) science; Reformed Epistemology; Religious theological pluralism; God proof types; Naturalism; Divine qualities; Freedom; Concealment of God; Brief overviews of continental, eastern, feminist religious philosophy.
  • Paul Copan, Paul K. Moser (Eds.): The Rationality of Theism. Routledge, London 2003, ISBN 0-415-26332-8 . Chapter on Religious Language and Verificationism; Belief, evidentalism, and epistemological fundamentalism; Inspiration and knowledge of God; (Natural) science and theism; Types of proofs of God; Religious experience; Arguments based on consciousness theory; Wonder; Coherence of basic theistic assumptions; Problem of evil.
  • William Lane Craig (Ed.): Philosophy of Religion. A Reader and Guide. Rutgers UP, New Brunswick, NJ 2002. Exemplary essays, most of which are standard reading, by leading experts v. a. analytical philosophy of religion on topics of religious epistemology, natural theology (especially types of proof of God), coherence of theistic basic assumptions (omniscience etc.), problem of evil, soul and eternal life, topics of Christian theology (trinity, hell, prayer, etc.).
  • Brian Davies (Ed.): An introduction to the philosophy of religion. 3rd ed. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford et al. a. 2004, ISBN 0-19-926347-7 . Collection of classic texts, e.g. B. by Plato, Anselm of Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant and others. a. m., as well as classics of analytical religious philosophy, z. B. Flew, Ayer, Swinburne, Mackie, Plantinga and the like. a. m., sorted by topics such as philosophy and religious beliefs, talk of God, evidence of God, divine properties, problem of evil, morality and religion, eternal life.
  • Hermann Deuser: Philosophy of Religion . Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-11-016190-8 .
  • Peter Fischer: Philosophy of Religion. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2007, ISBN 978-3-8252-2887-3 .
  • Anthony Kenny : What is Faith? Essays in the philosophy of religion. OUP, Oxford 1992, ISBN 0-19-283067-8 .
  • Franz von Kutschera : Reason and Belief , Berlin 1991.
  • Winfried Löffler : Introduction to the philosophy of religion. WBG 2006, ISBN 3-534-15471-1 .
  • William E. Mann (Ed.): The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of religion. Blackwell Pub., Oxford u. a. 2005, ISBN 0-631-22129-8 . (Blackwell philosophy guides; 17)
  • Michael Joseph Murray, Michael C. Rea: An introduction to the philosophy of religion. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge u. a. 2008. (Cambridge introductions to philosophy)
  • Willi Oelmüller , Ruth Dölle-Oelmüller: Basic course in philosophy of religion. W. Fink, Munich 1997.
  • Michael L. Peterson et al. a .: Philosophy of religion. Selected readings. Oxford Univ. Press, NY 1996, ISBN 0-19-508909-X .
  • Louis P. Pojman: Philosophy of religion: An anthology. Wadsworth, Belmont 1986.
  • Philip Quinn; Charles Taliaferro (Ed.): A Companion to Philosophy of Religion. Oxford 1999, ISBN 0-631-19153-4 .
  • Friedo Ricken : Philosophy of Religion . Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2003, ISBN 3-17-011568-5 .
  • William Wainwright J. (Ed.): The Oxford handbook of philosophy of religion. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford et al. a. 2005, ISBN 0-19-513809-0 . (Oxford handbooks in philosophy)
  • Christian Weidemann: The indispensability of natural theology , Freiburg i. Br. 2007, ISBN 3-495-48279-2 Dissertation on linguistic-philosophical, epistemological, phenomenological and moral objections to the possibility of natural theology, which was awarded the Karl Alber Prize 2007 . Dealing with noncognitivism, Wittgenstein, Pascal, Kant, pragmatism and the reformed epistemology.
  • Keith E. Yandell: Philosophy of religion: a contemporary introduction. Routledge, London a. a. 1999, ISBN 0-415-13213-4 . (Routledge contemporary introductions to philosophy)

Trade journals

see list of philosophy journals # Religionsphilosophie

Web links

Societies and organizations

Individual evidence

Abbreviations

Augustine
Conf. Confessions - Confessions , lat./dt. trans. by Joseph Bernhart, Frankfurt 1987
Thomas Aquinas
S.th. Summa Theologiae , Edition Leonina Vol. IV-XII / Summa Theologiae, complete, unabridged Latin / German Edition, Salzburg 1933-
Immanuel Kant
AA Kant's collected writings , ed. from the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, 9 vols., Berlin 1902–1923 (ND 1968)
KpV Critique of Practical Reason , AA Vol. 5, 1908
KrV Critique of Pure Reason , A = 1st edition (1781), AA vol. 3, 1904, B = 2nd edition (1787), AA vol. 4, 1903
MVT On the failure of all philosophical attempts at theodicy , AA Vol. 8, 1912/23 (ND 1968)
RGV Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason , AA Vol. 6, 1907 (ND 1968)
Ludwig Wittgenstein
BFGB Comments on Frazer's Golden Bough , in: Joachim Schulte: Lecture on Ethics, in: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Lecture on Ethics, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, 29-46
BlB The Blue Book , in: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Work Edition, Vol. 5, Frankfurt a. M. 1984
LE Lectures on Ethics, in: Philosophical Review 74 (1965) 3-12, trans. by Joachim Schulte: Lecture on ethics, in: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Lecture on ethics, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, 9-19
PR Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein , Maurice O'C. Drury, in: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections , ed. von Rush Rhees, Totowa, NJ 1981, pp. 91-111; German translation: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Portraits and Conversations , trans. by Joachim Schulte, Frankfurt a. M. 1984, pp. 117-141
TLP Tractatus logico-philosophicus , in: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Werkausgabe, Vol. 1, Frankfurt a. M. 1984
VB Mixed remarks , in: Ludwig Wittgenstein: Werkausgabe, Bd. 1, Frankfurt a. M. 1984
  1. ^ Ricken, Friedo (2003): Philosophy of Religion. Kohlhammer (p. 311) ISBN 978-3-17-011568-2
  2. ^ Ricken, Friedo (2003): Philosophy of Religion. Kohlhammer (p. 333) ISBN 978-3-17-011568-2
  3. ^ Ricken, Friedo (2003): Philosophy of Religion. Kohlhammer (p. 317) ISBN 978-3-17-011568-2
  4. ^ Ricken, Friedo (2003): Philosophy of Religion. Kohlhammer (p. 336) ISBN 978-3-17-011568-2
  5. ^ Ricken, Friedo (2003): Philosophy of Religion. Kohlhammer (p. 293) ISBN 978-3-17-011568-2
  6. ^ Ricken, Friedo (2003): Philosophy of Religion. Kohlhammer (p. 296) ISBN 978-3-17-011568-2
  7. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 19  / KrV, B XXXI.
  8. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA XIX, 130  / Reflexion 6674.
  9. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA V, 138  / KpV.
  10. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA XIX, 150  / Reflexion 6759.
  11. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA V, 115  / KpV.
  12. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA V, 125  / KpV.
  13. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VIII, 255  / MVT.
  14. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VIII, 255  / MVT.
  15. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VIII, 261  / MVT.
  16. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VIII, 262  / MVT.
  17. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VIII, 265  / MVT.
  18. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VIII, 265  / MVT.
  19. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VIII, 266  / MVT.
  20. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 44  / RGV.
  21. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 64  / RGV.
  22. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 94  / RGV.
  23. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 99  / RGV.
  24. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 151  / RGV.
  25. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 104  / RGV.
  26. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 109  / RGV.