Hitler's speech at the Düsseldorf Industry Club

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Hitler's speech to the Industrie-Club Düsseldorf was a speech by Adolf Hitler on January 26, 1932 in the Parkhotel Düsseldorf to representatives of the German economy, in which he presented important elements of his conception of history and people and his thoughts on the "resurgence" of Germany .

prehistory

During his Ruhr campaign in 1926 and 1927, Hitler had already given five speeches to business leaders in the Ruhr region with whom he had unsuccessfully tried to get the Ruhr industrialists to support the NSDAP. Only Fritz Thyssen confessed to National Socialism and also supported the party financially. At the end of 1931 he suggested inviting Hitler to the Industry Club, which sparked considerable internal conflicts there. The statutes actually excluded political lectures, but in autumn 1931 the Social Democrat Max Cohen had been invited. Thyssen then insisted that a National Socialist be invited as well . Jost Henkel then initially invited Gregor Strasser , who was considered a moderate National Socialist in the mining industry and who therefore regularly received a monthly amount of 10,000 Reichsmarks from spring 1931 . Thyssen reported to Hitler about the invitation to Strasser. The party leader decided to speak himself.

The background was the bad image that the NSDAP had among many managers and entrepreneurs. Many of the subordinate party batches, not a few of whom took socialism seriously in the party name, openly speculated about the creation of credit to put an end to the deflationary policy that was always welcomed by the employers . A few weeks before Hitler's speech, in November 1931, the Boxheim documents had caused a sensation in which the Hessian National Socialist Werner Best had announced, among other things, the abolition of all private incomes in the event of a violent takeover. Admittedly, Hitler had spoken out in favor of the so-called Wagemann Plan , named after Ernst Wagemann , the director of the Reich Statistical Office , who without consulting the Brüning government wanted to combat deflation, which was harmful to the economy, by moderately increasing the amount of money. To this end, he proposed the introduction of a second type of money that should no longer be subject to the coverage requirement of the gold currency standard . Outwardly, however, he was concerned with seriousness in monetary policy, which is why he had given the foreign press a much-noticed interview in December and emphasized that in the event of a takeover of power, he did not want to touch private debt.

procedure

Parkhotel Düsseldorf

The interest in the event was extremely high with an audience of 650. Karl Haniel , the chairman of the Düsseldorf Industry Club at the time, wrote to Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach on January 20, 1932, on his advice that he had not received an invitation: “The rush of club members to the Hitler lecture actually exceeded our wildest expectations and Unfortunately, the largest hall of the Parkhotel cannot be made larger than it is ”.

Information about Hitler's visit had leaked to the social democratic and communist press in advance, which is why there were violent demonstrations in front of the hotel on January 26 by communists, social democrats and union members against the feared alliance between big industry and the NSDAP. For many listeners, the way into the hotel was like " running the gauntlet ", Hitler himself entered the building unmolested through a side entrance.

The event began at around 6 p.m. in the hotel's large ballroom, which was full. Many guests had to stand, for those arriving late, the event was broadcast over loudspeakers in a neighboring room. After a greeting from Mayor Robert Lehr ( DNVP ), Hitler climbed a provisionally erected platform for his approximately two and a half hour speech. Haniel then thanked the speaker and Thyssen made a few closing remarks, which he concluded with “Heil, Herr Hitler!”. The assembly did not want to join the call. Albert Vögler wanted to start the usual discussion with a few questions, but was interrupted by Thyssen, who declared the event over. Hitler left the hotel and Hermann Göring took the place of the common dinner at meetings of the Industry Club .

Paul Kleinewefers , the 27-year-old managing director of a small mechanical engineering company in Krefeld, was able to attend the event because his father had lent him his membership card. In his 1977 memoirs, he reports that at the end of the speech there was "uninhibited constant applause". The social democratic and communist newspapers, which paid great attention to the event, reported something similar. Other participants reported, however, that the assembled entrepreneurs had reacted "noticeably cautious". The later Hitler biographer Konrad Heiden judged that “the reaction of the majority was lukewarm or even negative”. The day after the speech, Thyssen, Vögler and Ernst Poensgen met with Hitler, Göring and Röhm at Thyssen 's Landsberg Castle . In April 1932 Goering spoke again in front of the industrial club.

The historian Karsten Heinz Schönbach evaluated a report by the police chief of Düsseldorf. After him, "almost all the syndicates and directors of the largest plants" were present. The report noted that the lecture made a "deep impression" and was "received with great applause" and came to the conclusion:

"The words of thanks that Mr. Landrat aD Haniel and Mr. Thyssen uttered showed that Hitler spoke from the soul to everyone."

content

All statements about the content of the speech are subject to the reservation that an authentic source does not exist. The stenographic transcript was destroyed at that time. However, it is known that there were noticeable deviations between this transcript and the wording published by the NSDAP.

In his speech, Hitler mainly spoke about his image of history and of man . He did not differ significantly from his explanations in this regard in his book Der Weg zum Wiederaufstieg of the summer of 1927. He did not mention the anti-Semitism of the NSDAP and its 25-point program interspersed with socialist elements . He also did not say a word about current economic policy issues, such as how the global economic crisis could be combated or how the major banks, which were de facto nationalized during the banking crisis , should be dealt with. Rather, he explained in detail and with numerous historical examples his thesis that it is above all a matter of politics and the will effective in it , less of the foreign policy framework such as the Versailles Treaty . This surprising finding was a swipe at the Reich Chancellor Heinrich Brüning , who was still supported by the Reich Association of German Industry and to whom the payment break in reparations payments was generally credited as a great merit. The ultimate cause of the German misery is not at all the world economic crisis, which Hitler declared in social Darwinian terms as a natural overproduction crisis , but a lack of unity and uniformity among the people. In this context he polemicized decisively against democracy . The underlying idea of ​​the equality of all people means “a majorization of genius, a majorization of ability and personality value”. With this avowal of inequality between people, Hitler linked a social Darwinist understanding of the affirmation of private property and income differences among the people. The class struggle must be overcome, otherwise Bolshevik chaos threatens . What is needed is a belief and an ideological program such as that offered by his party. If this were to restore Germany's unity and strength, then the economic upturn would come back on its own. Hitler had no magic formula at hand for such a resurgence, but he held out three different possibilities: One was to gain new export markets in the classic liberal sense; Next he mentioned the strengthening of the German internal market in terms of purchasing power theory as advocated by the Social Democrats; A domestic economic self-sufficiency , which was feared by the business leaders who are still oriented towards the world market , he described as "very difficult" to achieve; Thirdly, he named the conquest of new living space , as it actually corresponded to his program set out in Mein Kampf .

The British historian Richard J. Evans refers to two topics that Hitler noticeably failed to mention: he did not mention his ardent anti-Semitism at all, and he also avoided any statement about the specific means by which he would lead the world economic crisis in the event of a government takeover fight think.

reception

The event has long been considered a political breakthrough for Hitler. It is often cited to show that big industry has made a massive contribution to the rise of the NSDAP . The memoirs of Fritz Thyssen , edited by Emery Reves , are often cited as evidence , in which it says:

"This speech made a deep impression on the assembled industrialists, and as a result a number of significant donations flowed from the sources of heavy industry into the coffers of the NSDAP ... In the last few years before the seizure of power, the large industrial associations made ongoing contributions."

The Mannesmann lawyer Wolfgang Pohle, who organized the defense of the Ruhr industry in the Nuremberg Trials , repeatedly assessed Hitler's Düsseldorf speech in the Krupp Trial (Case X) "as a sheer failure for the National Socialist movement" in order to deny any closeness between Krupp and National Socialism . In the 1950s and 1960s, this intention also prevailed in the West German historiography of the company history and the role of industry in the Third Reich as a whole, which was controlled and promoted by the company itself, while oppositional positions from the USA and the GDR were unable to assert themselves in West Germany.

The historian Reinhard Neebe assessed the 1981 speech as an important step in the recognition of the National Socialist movement by heavy industry . Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach had to intervene personally with Karl Haniel in order to get a place for the managing director of the Reich Association of German Industry (RDI), Jacob Herle . Krupp's argument that, as chairman of the RDI and head of the Krupp operations, he “had to be kept fully informed about such questions” meant, according to Neebe, “no general approval of the NSDAP's program and did not imply final approval for Krupp and the RDI leadership Turning away from Brüning, however, showed that National Socialism had meanwhile become an important factor in the strategic planning of large-scale industry. "

Other researchers could see no greater success of Hitler in the speech. Gerhard Schulz stated as early as 1975 that the effect of the speech had not been "that the industrial club 'hurried into the Hitler camp with flying colors'". The American historian Henry Ashby Turner also did not believe that the big businessmen would have wanted Hitler to come to power after the speech. It was not even important for Hitler to get them on his side, but "that he was simply trying to neutralize big industry." As Thomas Trumpp has worked out, Hitler's anti-socialist statements in particular met with the interest of the audience, the hoped-for financial donations remained however off. The publicist Andreas Schlieper emphasizes that even after the speech the NSDAP did not play a central role in the political calculations of the top of the industry. They favored a right-wing constellation, if not necessarily with the NSDAP, which they believed they could use and thereby drain. The military historian Hans Erich Volkmann points out that the lack of clarity among the industrialists about what the NSDAP was planning to do in terms of economic policy after the seizure of power persisted even after the speech. According to Richard J. Evans, the industrialists were “disappointed” by Hitler's generalities, that the NSDAP had not started to finance the NSDAP through large-scale industry beyond individual cases, which was also due to the continuation of the Nazis' agitation critical of capitalism after the speech. However, with the speech of the NSDAP, Hitler also gave “an honorable face”, which made it easier for the industrialists to support the party financially after the transfer of power .

According to the historian Karsten Heinz Schönbach, Hitler mainly spoke about the causes of the economic and political crisis in Germany and the world and promised the economy a "resurgence" to a great power and economic expansion. Schönbach points to the agreement of Hitler's statement:

"Because it was not the German economy that conquered the world and then came the development of German power, but also with us it was the power state of the economy that created the general prerequisites for later prosperity."

attentive to the remarks of the managing director of the Central European Business Conference Max Hahn . He had stated that “the position of German industry in the world economy cannot maintain” if the German “economic area cannot be expanded” - which “cannot be achieved without new foreign policy development”. After Schönbach, Hitler summed up the problem of the German economy by stating:

"At that time, our inner situation helped shape the worldview from which we suffered so much: the world distribution without Germany."

Text output

  • Adolf Hitler: Lecture to West German economists at the Industrie-Klub in Düsseldorf on January 27, 1932 . 1st edition Eher-Verlag , Munich [April] 1932 (30 pages; basis of later editions).
  • Max Domarus : Hitler. Speeches and proclamations 1932–1945 . Volume 1: Triumph . Half Volume 1: 1932-1934 . Süddeutscher Verlag, Munich 1965, p. 68 ff.
  • Henry Ashby Turner (Ed.): Legend and Reality. Hitler's speech to the Düsseldorf Industry Club on January 26, 1932 . Industrie-Club, Düsseldorf 2001 (special edition, 73 pages).
  • Speech in front of the industry club in Düsseldorf . In: Hitler. Speeches, writings, orders. February 1925 to January 1933 . Volume 4: From the Reichstag election to the Reich presidential election. October 1930 – March 1932 . Part 3: January 1932 – March 1932 . Edited and commented by Christian Hartmann. Saur, Munich 1997, ISBN 3-598-22005-7 , pp. 74-110 (scientific reference edition).
  • In: Hans Magnus Enzensberger u. a. (Ed.): Class register, 3. A reader on the class struggles in Germany 1920–1971. Luchterhand collection sl 81, 1973, pp. 77–79 (slightly shortened).

literature

  • Volker Ackermann: Meeting place for the elites. The history of the Düsseldorf Industry Club. Industrie-Club Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf 2006, ISBN 3-7700-1236-4 .

Remarks

  1. ↑ a b c Also on the following Henry A. Turner: The big entrepreneurs and the rise of Hitler . Siedler, Berlin 1985, p. 260.
  2. ^ A b Thomas Trumpp: To the financing of the NSDAP by the German big industry. Attempt to take stock. In: Karl Dietrich Bracher u. a. (Ed.): National Socialist Dictatorship. A balance sheet . Bonn 1986, ISBN 3-921352-95-9 , p. 144.
  3. ^ On the Wagemann Plan Henry A. Turner: The Big Entrepreneurs and the Rise of Hitler . Siedler, Berlin 1985, p. 318 f .; Rainer Meister: The great depression. Constraints and room for maneuver in economic and financial policy in Germany 1929–1932 . transfer Verlag, Regensburg 1991, pp. 343-351.
  4. ↑ Volker Ackermann: Meeting place for the elites. The history of the Düsseldorf Industry Club . Industrie-Club Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf 2006, p. 124.
  5. ↑ Quoted from: Thomas Trumpp: On the financing of the NSDAP by large German industry. Attempt to take stock. In: Karl Dietrich Bracher u. a. (Ed.): National Socialist Dictatorship. A balance sheet . Bonn 1986, p. 144.
  6. ^ Henry A. Turner: The big entrepreneurs and the rise of Hitler . Siedler, Berlin 1985, p. 261.
  7. ^ Henry A. Turner, Die Großunternehmer und der Aufstieg Hitler , Siedler, Berlin 1985, pp. 266 and 485.
  8. ^ Paul Kleinewefers: Year 1905, A Report . Stuttgart 1977, p. 76.
  9. ^ Henry A. Turner: The big entrepreneurs and the rise of Hitler . Siedler, Berlin 1985, p. 264.
  10. ↑ Ernst Poensgen: Hitler and the Ruhr industrialists. A look back . Typescript, 1945, quoted from: Willi Eichler: Europe speaks , Heft 61, London 1945 ( online , PDF; 84 kB).
  11. ^ Georg Franz-Willing: The Hitler Movement 1925 to 1934 . Preussisch-Oldendorf 2001, p. 336.
  12. ↑ Quotation from Karsten Heinz Schönbach: The German Corporations and National Socialism 1926–1943 . Berlin 2015, p. 239.
  13. ↑ Quotation from Karsten Heinz Schönbach: The German Corporations and National Socialism 1926–1943 . Berlin 2015, p. 237.
  14. ↑ Volker Ackermann: Meeting place for the elites. The history of the Düsseldorf Industry Club . Industrie-Club Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf 2006, p. 136.
  15. ↑ Harold James : Germany in the Great Depression 1924-1936 . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1988, p. 272.
  16. ^ Henry A. Turner: The big entrepreneurs and the rise of Hitler . Siedler, Berlin 1985, p. 261 ff.
  17. ^ Richard J. Evans: The Third Reich. Vol. 1: Ascent . Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Munich 2004, p. 341 f.
  18. ↑ For example in Louis P. Lochner: The Mighty and the Tyrann. German industry from Hitler to Adenauer. Franz Schneekluth, Darmstadt, p. 107.
  19. ^ For the first time: Fritz Thyssen: I Paid Hitler . Hodder and Stoughton, London 1941.
  20. ↑ Quoted here from: The armaments monopoly again at the lever of power ( Memento from November 19, 2010 in the Internet Archive ). In: Braunbuch.de (after Braunbuch. War and Nazi criminals in the Federal Republic and West Berlin. State, economy, administration, army, justice, science . Ed. By the National Council of the National Front of Democratic Germany, 3rd edition, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Democratic Republic, Berlin 1968.)
  21. ↑ Kim Christian Priemel: The special way in court. Applied history in the Nuremberg Krupp trial. In: Historical magazine . Volume 294, 2012, No. 2, pp. 391-426, here p. 415.
  22. ↑ Kim Christian Priemel: The special way in court. Applied history in the Nuremberg Krupp trial. In: Historical magazine. Volume 294, 2012, No. 2, p. 422 f.
  23. ↑ Reinhard Neebe: Big Industry, State and NSDAP 1930-1933. Paul Silverberg and the Reich Association of German Industry in the Crisis of the Weimar Republic (=  critical studies on historical science . Volume 45). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1981, ISBN 3-525-35703-6 , p. 119. ( PDF ; 7.44 MB).
  24. ↑ Krupp to Haniel, quoted from Reinhard Neebe: Großindustrie, Staat und NSDAP 1930–1933. Paul Silverberg and the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie in the crisis of the Weimar Republic . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1981, p. 119 ( PDF ; 7.44 MB).
  25. ↑ Reinhard Neebe: Big Industry, State and NSDAP 1930-1933. Paul Silverberg and the Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie in the crisis of the Weimar Republic . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1981, p. 120 ( PDF ; 7.44 MB).
  26. ↑ Gerhard Schulz: Rise of National Socialism. Crisis and Revolution in Germany. Propylaea, Berlin 1975, p. 716.
  27. ^ Henry A. Turner: The big entrepreneurs and the rise of Hitler. Siedler, Berlin 1985, p. 270.
  28. ^ Andreas Schlieper: 150 Years of the Ruhr Area. A chapter of German economic history. Düsseldorf 1986, ISBN 3-590-18150-8 , p. 133.
  29. ↑ Hans Erich Volkmann: On the European Dimension of National Socialist Economic Policy. In: ders .: Economy and Expansion. Basic features of the Nazi economic policy. Selected Writings. Edited by Bernhard Chiari . Oldenbourg, Munich 2003, p. 66.
  30. ^ Richard J. Evans: The Third Reich. Volume 1: Ascent. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 2004, p. 342.
  31. ^ Karsten Heinz Schönbach: The German Corporations and National Socialism 1926–1943. Berlin 2015, p. 232 ff.
  32. ^ Max Hahn: Autarky or space economy. In: People and Empire. Berlin 1932, No. 3, p. 133. Quoted from Schönbach, p. 235.