War crimes trials in Manila

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The war crimes trials in Manila were carried out by the American colonial power until December 31, 1946, then by Filipino military tribunals against Japanese military personnel (as war criminals of categories B and C ) or their assistants for war crimes committed during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines .

American-directed proceedings

In May 1945 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) set up the War Crimes Investigation Detachment in Manila , which was renamed the Legal Section, Manila Branch on July 1, 1946 . On August 16, 1945, the executive order No. 64 signed by President Sergio Osmeña . This created a National War Crimes Office within the Philippine Army , which had to keep in touch with American agencies. Until the end of 1946, the Americans carried out all proceedings before military tribunals ( military commission ) themselves. The categorization of Japanese war criminals of the UNWCC's FEC was essentially followed .

The members of the American military commissions judged more severely than their colleagues in other places. They sentenced 195 (90.7%) out of 215 defendants in 97 trials, 92 of which were death sentences and 20 acquittals .

Yamashita

The trial of the “Tiger of Malaya” General Yamashita Tomoyuki , who inflicted the shameful defeat of February 1942 on the British, was the first war crimes trial against a Japanese officer. Yamashita had been caricatured as a "barbaric ape" by British propaganda throughout the war. The process was strongly influenced by thoughts of revenge. Yamashita had been the commander of the 14th Army Group and chief of the Kempeitai since October 1944 . During the American invasion that soon followed, his retreating groups led to cruel rioting. Just three weeks after his surrender he was charged on September 25, the first trial date was October 8, 1945. In front of five generals, 123 counts were charged at the actual hearing on October 28. Most of the 2900 pages of "evidence" related to naval units that Yamashita was only subordinate to for the duration of their combat operations on land. The death sentence was passed on December 7, 1945. After it was confirmed by General MacArthur on February 4, 1946 , Yamashita was hanged on February 23, 1946 . The US Supreme Court called had declared that it was not responsible for reasons of state. Yamashita's conviction was not because he was a commander, but because he was a Japanese commander. In the proceedings against Admiral Toyoda Soemu it became apparent that he and not Yamashita was responsible for the misdeeds of the naval units .

Responsibility of a commander in chief

Of interest, the process is not only for elucidating the processes, but especially because of the newly developed concept of command responsibility ( command responsibility ) of officers. It states that an officer can be held accountable for any crime committed by subordinates in his area of ​​responsibility, even if he has neither ordered, nor had knowledge of it. This idea, new in international law at the time, turned out to be a tried and tested means to easily prosecute commanders. However, it led to lively debates among lawyers, who soon realized that the consistent implementation especially against US commanders, resp. the President as Commander in Chief could have far-reaching consequences. The dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki can definitely be interpreted under international law as an inadmissible terrorist attack on the civilian population. Already during the trial of the My Lai massacre it became apparent that the US military is unwilling to accept this idea. It is also one of the most important reasons for the USA not to join the International Criminal Court , since if implemented consistently, ministers such as Henry Kissinger , Donald Rumsfeld or President George W. Bush will also find themselves guilty of the atrocities committed under their command in Vietnam and Fallujah would be. Such exceptions have meant that war crimes trials are often viewed as pure victors' justice .

Homma

The proceedings against the commander-in-chief for the conquest of the Philippines, Homma Masaharu , began in December 1945. Unlike Yamashita, he could not defend himself by saying that his troops would have been difficult to control in a chaotic retreat. As part of command responsibility , he was accused of being responsible for the bombing of Manila after it had been declared an open city , the Bataan death march with 17,200 dead and the refused surrender of the troops on Corregidor under the command of Major General Jonathan Wainwright in 1942. The death sentence was passed on February 11th and Homma was executed on April 3rd after the US Supreme Court ruled again that it was incapable of jurisdiction.

Procedure for independence

The Commonwealth of the Philippines gained independence on July 4, 1946. Although the structures created by the colonial power could continue to be used, certain modifications were inevitable. The territory had been involved in the deliberations of the members of the UNWCC and the Far Eastern Sub-Committee on War Crimes (FEAC, later FEC) in Chongqing since February 1946 . The vice chairman of Committee No. 5 ( War Crimes ) was a Filippino. Delfin Jaranilla was a judge at IMTFE .

organization

The executive order No. 64 of 1946 was changed to July 29, 1947 by executive order No. 68 revoked. Trials now had to take place before military tribunals that were sworn in on the Philippine President. The structure of these tribunals did not differ from those used by SCAP in Yokohama . The judges - at least three - of the tribunals were officers who had to be qualified to belong to a court-martial and should normally have the same or higher rank than the accused. Although one member was specifically to be appointed as a “law member”, none of the judges generally had any legal training. The office of the “law member” was important because he had the final and final word in questions of legal doubt. The formalities and the provisions for taking evidence continued to be based closely on American models. It was expressly excluded that the defense acted “on higher orders”; it could only be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance. Questions of procedure did not have to be dealt with if this would have impaired the speed of the procedure. These guidelines did not meet with the unanimous approval of lawyers, especially the member of the Supreme Court Gregorio Perfecto criticized them.

The indictment was represented by lawyers from a special unit of the Philippine Army, with civil lawyers occasionally joining them. The new government was able to take over the evidence gathered by the Legal Section, Manila Branch . Interpreters and recorders were provided by the National War Crimes Office .

Military public defenders, who were under the responsibility of Captain Pedro Serran , were added to the defendants . Furthermore, they were allowed to choose civil lawyers (mostly from Japan). The defendants had no legal right to express concern of bias against a judge .

Revision

All convictions were to be submitted to the National War Crimes Review Board . Death sentences had to be confirmed by the president.

Processes

In the trials in the Philippines, witness testimony could be used more often than elsewhere, since the country itself had been occupied. There have been several cases in which defense lawyers and prosecutors have even fought, such as: B. in the case of the (later acquitted) Kempeitai Commander of Luzon Lt. Matsuta Junzo.

Kempei officers on a train, 1935

The first negotiations under Filippino direction began in Manila in November 1947. Including the first mass negotiation in which 13 officers were accused of devastating two villages on Cebu in 1944. The verdicts were delayed until in February 1949 the Review Board upheld the twelve death sentences.

The Japanese higher ranks were almost all charged under the command resposibility concept. The occupation commander of Manila, Lieutenant General Yokoyama Shizuo, who was charged with 35,000 civilians killed under his command, and the chief of the Kempeitai , Major General Maska Kenshichi.

General Yamashita's predecessor, Kuroda Shinegi , was found guilty after an 11-month trial of his forces killing 2,800 Filipinos and torturing and torturing several others. Surprisingly, however, he was only sentenced to life imprisonment.

After 113 days of trial, 14 members of the Navy were convicted of committing atrocities in Infania ( Quezon ). In a separate process, the responsible Admiral Furuse Takesue was negotiated. He was one of the few defendants who pleaded "guilty". To atone for the 152 killed, he was hanged.

American troops in Mindanao captured a group of Japanese soldiers in February 1947. 31 of them were accused of cannibalism , and twelve of them confessed. Although the case was ready for hearing in June, it wasn't heard until September 1949. Ten defendants were sentenced to death and four were given life sentences. There were also three acquittals, nothing is known about the whereabouts of the others.

The last judgment was pronounced on December 31, 1949. A total of 169 defendants had been tried in 72 cases. 133 (78.7%) were found guilty, of which 25 were sentenced to death and 17 were sentenced to life imprisonment. The first local executions took place in August 1948. Local collaborators were not negotiated. There were eleven acquittals, in 25 cases there was no conviction for formal reasons, 182 also accused were released without trial and repatriated for lack of evidence. The implementation of the proceedings was hampered and often delayed by the national and fiscal crises shortly after independence and the start of the Hukbalahap ( Huks ) struggle for freedom .

literature

  • Philip R. Piccigallo: The Japanese on Trial. Allied was crimes operations in the East. 1945–1951 . University of Texas Press, Austin TX et al. a. 1979, ISBN 0-292-78033-8 , (Chapters 4 and 11 "The Philippines").
  • Ann Marie Prevost: Race and War Crimes. The 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita… In: Human Rights Quarterly 14, 1992, ISSN  0275-0392 , pp. 303-338.
  • Frank Reel: The Case of General Yamashita . Octagon, New York 1971, ISBN 0-374-96766-0 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Prevost (1992), p. 307.
  2. ↑ US Supreme Court; In re Yamashita 327 US 1 (1946)
  3. ^ Prevost, Ann Marie; Race and War Crimes. The 1945 War Crimes Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita…; Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 14 (1992), pp. 305, 319ff
  4. ↑ Prevost (1992), pp. 305f, 324f
  5. ^ US vs Toyoda . LS Doc No. 101 H at 4 (judgment of September 6, 1949 IMTFE Yokohama )
  6. ^ Prevost (1992), pp. 330ff
  7. ^ Röling, Bernard ; The Law of War ...; Leyden 1961; especially pp. 380-2
  8. ↑ Prevost (1992), footnote 127, p. 328f
  9. ↑ cf. Cockburn, Alexander; St. Clair, Jeffery; Whiteout; London, New York 1998, ISBN 1-85984-897-4 , pp. 100, 173, 235-8, 251
  10. ↑ US Supreme Court; Homma vs. Styer; 327 US 759 (1946)
  11. ↑ in executive order No. 68
Japanese name: As is common in Japan, the family name comes before the first name in this article . So Yamashita is the family name, Tomoyuki the first name.