Micropolitics

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According to Oswald Neuberger (1995), micropolitics is the arsenal of those everyday “small” power methods with which power is built up and used within organizations (see also Blickle & Solga, 2006).

introduction

The term introduced by Horst Bosetzky (1972) based on Tom Burns (1961/1962) in the German-speaking area makes it clear that employees in organizations pursue self-interests beyond the organizational goals in the sense of a power struggle ("strategic obstinacy"; "self-related interests") ) and help to shape the social structures and human conditions in institutions . Micropolitics is neither a privilege of the organizational elite nor an expression of an inefficient or even criminalized company structure. "Viewed objectively, micropolitics works from the boardroom to the factory floor" (Schütz, 2015).

Micropolitical processes are particularly favored if a (central) controlling authority is missing or the objectives in the institution are not defined clearly enough. Under the extreme conditions of anomie , a dissolution of the rules, culture and traditions of an organization accompanied by communication problems, micropolitical activities have to fill the vacuum created by the creation of new individual interests in certain informal centers of power. However, micropolitics also make an important contribution in well-structured, functional organizations, since only through them can frozen procedures, rules and guidelines be adapted to everyday work and modernization processes can be implemented against resistance.

Micropolitical approaches can also be viewed as a series of games (Crozier & Friedberg (1979); Mintzberg (1983)). The formal and informal rules of the game form the starting point for micro-political action, but the actions of those involved also change and redefine the rules again and again.

In general, micropolitics is an essential part of organizations, playing along is ultimately an expression of wisdom and assertiveness, especially if one wants to achieve something beyond self-interest for the organization itself (“selfless interest”).

Nevertheless, micropolitical activities in organizations can only be communicated to a very limited extent. When it comes to internal and external presentation, organizations generally tend to make micropolitics taboo as much as possible, to marginalize them or to promote strategic activities in a targeted manner that are intended to curb or prevent corresponding tactics (e.g. regulatory via behavioral guidelines, compliance standards, etc.). The situation arises that precisely those who try to curtail the rampant micropolitical activities in a responsible position regularly use micropolitical instruments and methods themselves. A pronounced formalization of work processes, the strong emphasis on the regulatory framework, and pronounced hierarchical structures can tend to strengthen the relevance of micropolitics (Schütz, 2015). Resistance to planned organizational change also often makes use of micro-political strategies, as does attempts to enforce this change against resistance.

Micropolitical analyzes can often be used to explain unintended effects, e.g. B. for the failure of organizational reform and change processes. It is hardly possible to control micropolitical strategies in already highly politicized organizations such as public administration.

Objectives of micropolitics

Goals pursued are common

  • advancement in the organization, promotion,
  • better pay,
  • the expansion of one's own room for maneuver and design options ,
  • the expansion of the financial, material and human resources and status symbols available to one in the facility (Bosetzky, 1972),
  • but also the attempt to evade control of oneself or one's own performance . The micropolitically relevant phenomena also include alcoholism and its concealment, pretending to be sick ( absenteeism ) or internal dismissal .

Characteristic micropolitical methods and tactics

The most common practices include:

  • the involvement of superiors , higher authorities who exercise their influence and their relationships, take sides for you;
  • the information control : This means filtering, retention or Fine of information, spreading of rumors to draw others into doubt the credibility, the spreading of insider information to third parties launching trial balloons ( "Surely you soon in one want to change another department! ");
  • the control or extension of rules and norms by interpreting and extending them in your own interest. It is precisely through bureaucratism in organizations that ambiguities can be deliberately created, through which one's own position of power is secured and responsibilities expanded (service knowledge).
  • (covert) formation of coalitions ( cliques ), lobbyism ;
  • favoritism through attracting a following, rope team ;
  • shaping loyal employees through recognition, reward, or even promotion to gain gratitude and allies; Rewards must also be assessed as such by the recipient
  • the use of the means of power available to one up to the threat of sanctions ;
  • general forms of self-portrayal or bluff such as feigned security, apparent imperturbability, exploiting ambiguous formulations, feigning one's own size and strength through to the use of foreign words or the casual demonstration of apparent professional competence;
  • the charisma , the personal attraction that acts as a model and role model for others and is used specifically for this purpose;
  • the use of expert knowledge and professional competence from factual conviction to "expert battles" and dominance fights between knowledge carriers ( micropolitics of knowledge )
  • the creation of pressure to act by emotionalising situations, by creating favorable moods; This also means motivating and ideologizing other people through inspiring appeals and visions.

Main forms of micropolitical games

Power building games are for example

  • the sponsor-protégé game : a person attaches himself to a rising star in the organization or to a person who has already achieved a position of power. The hope is that those who fight for their followers will be paid for with an all- round loyalty .
  • The alliance game : In this one tries to establish a network of like-minded people of equal rank and to form coalitions .
  • The budget game : By demanding ever greater material and human resources , one tries to expand one's own importance and position. The relative budget shares thus become an indicator of the distribution of power in the organization.
  • The expert game : In this game, one's own (indispensable) expertise is emphasized in order to become indispensable and to expand one's own influence.
  • the dominance game : to intimidate others, an existing influence is widely displayed.

Games that focus on resistance to others use either

  • a subtle delaying tactic or
  • from aggressive resistance to open mutiny or rebellion. An extreme and risky variant for the players is the young Turkish game : a younger generation of high-ranking junior employees fundamentally question the existing form of organization only in familiar meetings in order to finally plan and execute an effective conspiracy to disempower the old elites. If the old circles of power and their followers fail, they will leave the institution.

Often, organizations can find rival camps made up of leaders with different allegiances. In the worst case, this can lead to the division of organizations. The administration of companies (formal authority of the “line”) and the experts (information power of the “staff”) often compete for priority .

Case studies of a micropolitical game: the dominance game and bossing

The dominance game is particularly popular with executives in relation to aspiring employees. In order to discipline them and keep them small, in phases of appraisals, impending salary demands or career ambitions, employees are assigned a task in which they are very likely to be overwhelmed, make a mistake or fall into a trap. At the crucial moment, the employee is criticized and exposed in front of witnesses. This has provided evidence that his positive self-view was unfounded.

Bossing goes far beyond that in that an employee is supposed to be pushed out of his position by his superior. In addition to disempowering the person concerned, the aim here can also be the release of a position without dismissal.

Preventing micropolitical phenomena

Counter-strategies to prevent or counteract micropolitical phenomena that are becoming independent are:

  • Bundling of design competence in organizational management, which is supplemented by the skillful use of one's own micro-policy and the accumulation of internal information (e.g. knowledge of the special features of employees, their connections to one another ...)
  • Disclosure of decision-making processes
  • Reporting and controlling in order to create transparency with regard to the achievement and fulfillment of agreements and goals
  • clear communication channels with clear contact persons to bundle information
  • clear regulation of competencies and powers
  • open conflicts
  • Principle of seniority : Promotion strategy based on age, whereby as many employees as possible can achieve higher promotion positions in the course of their professional activity or the length of stay in individual functions does not differ too much from one another. In this way, inappropriate manipulation of promotions is suppressed and the employee can develop free of pressure to adapt and repressive promotions (vs. opportunistic behavior). The big disadvantage, however, is that individual achievements cannot be appreciated enough and the organization, especially in management positions, is outdated; flexible personnel management is not possible. It is also conceivable that a competitor tries to force a promoted person out of the coveted position again ( bullying as a form of micro-politics).

Individual evidence

  1. B. Weißbach: Expert Worlds and Management Practice. In: ARBEIT, 10th year (2001), issue 2.

literature

  • Gerhard Blickle, Marc Solga: Influence, Conflicts, Micropolitics . In: Heinz Schuler (Ed.): Textbook of Personnel Psychology. 2nd Edition. Hogrefe, Göttingen 2006, ISBN 978-3-8017-1934-0 , pp. 611-650.
  • Horst Bosetzky: The instrumental function of transportation . In: Verwaltungsarchiv 63 (1972), pp. 372–384.
  • Horst Bosetzky: Machiavellianism, power accumulation and micropolitics . In: Zeitschrift für Organization 46 (1977), pp. 121-125.
  • Horst Bosetzky: Management role: micropoliticians . In: Wolfgang H. Staehle (Ed.): Handbuch Management. The 24 roles of the excellent manager. Gabler, Wiesbaden 1991, ISBN 3-409-19934-9 . Pp. 286-300.
  • Horst Bosetzky, Peter Heinrich, Jochen Schulz zur Wiesch: People and organization: aspects of bureaucratic socialization. A practice-oriented introduction to the sociology and social psychology of administration . Stuttgart 6th edition 2002 (Deutscher Gemeindeverlag), pp. 214–233. ISBN 3-555-01238-X
  • Horst Bosetzky: Micropolitics and leadership . In: Alfred Kieser (Hrsg.): Short dictionary of leadership. 2nd Edition. Poeschel, Stuttgart 1995, ISBN 3-7910-8043-1 . Pp. 1517-1526.
  • Martin Brüggemeier, Anke Felsch: Micropolitics. In: Die Betriebswirtschaft, Vol. 52 (1992), H. 1, pp. 133-136.
  • Martin Brüggemeier et al .: Analysis of innovation processes in the context of e-government - A micropolitical arena model. In: Wirtschaftsinformatik, Volume 47, Issue 5 (2005), pp. 347–355.
  • Tom Burns: Micropolitics: Mechanism of Institutional Change . In: Administrative Science Quarterly (1961/62), H. 6, 257-281.
  • Michel Crozier, Erhard Friedberg: Power and Organization. The pressures of collective action. Athenaeum, Königstein / Ts. 1979, ISBN 3-7610-8211-8 .
  • Peter Heinrich , Jochen zur Schulz Wiesch (Ed.): Dictionary of micropolitics. Leske + Budrich, Opladen 1998, ISBN 3-8100-2013-3 . Opladen 1998 (Leske and Budrich).
  • Ralf Krause, Marc Rölli: Micropolitics. An introduction to the political philosophy by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari Turia + Kant, Vienna 2010, ISBN 978-3-85132-619-2
  • Willi Küpper : Micropolitics . In: Georg Schreyögg, Axel von Werder (Hrsg.): Concise Dictionary Corporate Management and Organization, Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel 2004 (4th edition), Sp. 861-870, ISBN 3-7910-8050-4 .
  • Willi Küpper, Günter Ortmann (Ed.): Micropolitics. Rationality, Power and Games in Organizations , Westdt. Verl., Opladen 1988, ISBN 3-531-12018-2
  • Willi Küpper, Anke Felsch: Organization, power and economy - micropolitics and the constitution of organizational systems of action , Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag 200, ISBN 3-531-13466-3 .
  • Henry Mintzberg : Power in and around organizations. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1983, ISBN 0-13-686857-6
  • Oswald Neuberger: Lead and let lead . Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart 2002, ISBN 978-3-8252-2234-5 .
  • Oswald Neuberger: Micropolitics and Morality in Organizations. Challenge of order 2nd edition. Lucius & Lucius, Stuttgart 2006, ISBN 978-3-8252-2743-2 .
  • Frank Nullmeier, Tanja Pritzlaff, Achim Wiesner: Micro-Policy-Analysis. Ethnographic political research using the example of university politics. Campus, Frankfurt am Main 2003, ISBN 3-593-37281-9
  • Marcel Schütz: The power of employees. What micropolitics do in companies. In: Frankfurter Rundschau, July 24, 2015, p. 17.
  • Peter Wasem: Micropolitics as a source of added value: An attempt at micropolitical clarification of the science of personnel development. 1st edition, GRIN Verlag, Leipzig 2007, ISBN 3-638-68942-5