National Khmer Liberation Front

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National Khmer Liberation Front
Flag of the Khmer Republic.svg
The KPNLF chose the flag of the former pro-American Republic of Khmer as its flag .
Party leader Son Sann
founding October 9, 1979
resolution 1993
Alignment Anti-communism

The National Liberation Front of the Khmer (English Khmer People's National Liberation Front , KPNLF; French Front national de libération du peuple khmer , FNLPK) was a political organization established in 1979 for the resistance against the regime of the People's Republic of Kampuchea established by Vietnam . People's Republic of Kampuchea , PRK) in Cambodia . The 200,000 Vietnamese troops who supported the PRK, and the defections of Khmer Rouge had the brutal regime of Democratic Kampuchea of Pol Pot overthrown and the Cambodians were initially welcomed as liberators by the majority. However, due to the historical rivalry between the two countries, members of the KPNLF and other organizations feared that Vietnam would attempt to subjugate the country and began to oppose their military presence.

Origins

On January 5, 1979, was in Paris Committee for a neutral and peaceful Cambodia (Engl. Committee for a Neutral and Peaceful Cambodia , French, CNPC. Comité pour un Cambodge Neutre et Indépendant , CCNI) formed consisting Son Sann (a leading Cambodian neutralists, ex-President of the National Bank of Cambodia and Prime Minister from 1967 to 1968), Sim Var, Yem Sambaur, Hhiek Tioulong, Nong Kimmy, Thonn Ouk and Chai Thoul. It issued a six-point statement condemning the Khmer Rouge and "North Vietnamese aggression", compliance with the 1954 Geneva Accords and the 1973 Paris Peace Conference , an immediate ceasefire in Cambodia and the establishment of a democratic one elected government called for a referendum.

The anti- Democratic Kampuchea camps on the Thai-Cambodian border; 1979–1984 (black the camps of the KPNLF)

Vietnam invaded Democratic Kampuchea in December 1978 and advanced to Phnom Penh on January 6, 1979 . The royal Thai government then submitted an offer to Son Sann to support a non-communist resistance force. For his part, Son Sann flew to New York to ask Prince Norodom Sihanouk (who was at the United Nations General Assembly ) to lead the KPNLF. Sihanouk refused and refused to give any support at all.

In August 1979 Son Sann went with his sons (Son Soubert and Son Monir) as well as Neang Chin Han (former director of the Executive Cabinet under President Lon Nol ), Suon Kaset Sokhomaly, Colonel Thou Thip, Colonel Ea Chuor Kim Meng, who were all from France , Suon Sophat and Buon Say to Thailand. The KPNLF was proclaimed on October 9, 1979 in Sok Sann, a camp in the jungle of the Cardamom Mountains , which comprised "almost 2000 men" and was a fusion of 13 rather heterogeneous groups such as Khleang Moeung (500 men), Cobra (led by Colonel Prum Vith), the Khmer Islam movement, the nationalist movement, Oknha Son Kuy, Kauv Tjlok, the Khmer neutralist movement, the Black Indra, the United Free Khmer, ASW, Tonle Bassak and the movements in Prey Veng and Kompong Thom . In the following month, the first shipment of 3,000 rifles arrived from Beijing. Son Sann took over the leadership of the KPNLF together with an executive committee and a military council.

The KPNLF thus formed the right-wing, pro-Western, anti-communist political faction against the People's Republic of Kampuchea, which was installed and supported by Vietnam. US President Ronald Reagan approved the provision of aid to the KPNLF to force an end to the Vietnamese occupation. In 1982 the US government initiated a secret CIA aid program for non-communist resistance (NCR) amounting to $ 5 million a year, supposedly for self-defense purposes only. That amount was increased to $ 8 million in 1984 and to $ 12 million in 1987 and 1988. In late 1988, the United States reduced CIA funding back to $ 8 million after reportedly withdrawing $ 3.5 million from the Thai military . At the same time, the Reagan administration gave the fund more flexibility, allowing the NCR to buy U.S. arms in Singapore and other regional markets. In 1985, the United States established a separate, open Utility for NCR that after one of his main sponsors, the Democratic members of the House of Representatives Stephen J. Solarz , as Fund Solarz became known. The open aid program channeled approximately $ 5 million in humanitarian aid to the NCR through USAID .

Political arm before the Paris Peace Treaty

KPNLF flag, taken from the flag of the former Khmer Republic (1970–1975)

Since its inception, the KPNLF has relied on international financial aid to maintain its civilian camps and conduct military operations. Sann played a crucial role in acquiring the aid funds and raising international awareness of the concerns of the KPNLF. He went on a fundraising trip to the United States and Europe in 1982 . Sann was very popular because of his calm, humble demeanor and engaging personality. In addition to Sann's travels, the KPNLF emphasized its status as the first non-communist anti-PRK faction in Cambodia. This favored financial aid by appealing to Western forces who were interested in driving out the Vietnamese but did not support the Khmer Rouge.

In order to increase its political clout and legitimacy, the KPNLF joined forces with the Khmer Rouge (officially called the Democratic Kampuchea Party at the time ) and with Prince Sihanouk's National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia ( FUNCINPEC , French for Funcinpec Party together), the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea ( coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea to form CGDK). Although both the KPNLF and the FUNCINPEC did not agree with the philosophy and methodology of the Khmer Rouge, they joined the CGDK because the CGDK received increasing legitimation and recognition from abroad, as the Cambodians apparently put their differences aside and banded together to remove a foreign occupier.

Military arm

In February 1979, General Dien Del and Nguon Pythoureth flew to Thailand to form the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF), the military arm of the KPNLF. The two went from camp to camp and convinced the local leaders to join. Ready to fight under Son Sann were Chea Chhut (in Nong Chan), Prum Vith, ex-colonel of the Khmer National Armed Forces, Ta Maing and Om Luot (in Nong Samet). In mid-1979 there were 1,600 armed KPNLAF soldiers.

From 1981 to 1992 (except during some power struggles) the KPNLAF was commanded by Sak Sutsakhan. In each individual unit, however, the commander was relatively autonomous, which inevitably led to great confusion and limited efficiency for large battles. General Sak had the difficult job of coordinating the actions of the units. On the other hand, the advantages of this organization were more flexibility and mobility of the armed forces. For larger operations, however, the KPNLAF occasionally joined forces with other separatist forces. For example, on March 28, 1986, the CGDK carried out a successful attack on Battambang , the second largest city in Cambodia.

Large-scale military operations after the Vietnamese dry season offensive 1984–1985 became impossible for the KPNLAF. These attacks were devastating but not completely crippling. Even after the enormous loss of around 30% of its soldiers and their materials, the KPNLAF was still able to carry out guerrilla operations until the end of its existence .

Internal power struggles before the Paris peace treaty

As with many political groups, there was internal party struggles within the KPNLF, including two particularly violent ones: those before the Paris Peace Treaty of 1991 and those after the United Nations-supported elections of 1993 .

The first confrontation entered the public eye at the end of December 1985. On one side stood Son Sann, the chairman of the faction, and on the other the challengers, led by military commander Sak Sutsakhan, his chief of staff Dien Del and party members Abdul Gaffar Peang Meth and Hing Kunthorn. The dissidents accused Sann of refusing to attack the Vietnamese along with Sihanouk's forces and of interfering in military affairs, both of which reduce the military impact. They also accused Sann of being undemocratic and “ruling with an iron fist”.

On January 2, 1986, the dissidents issued a statement that they had taken control of the faction. Dien Del and Sutsakhan had formed the "Provisional Central Committee of Salvation," which was to lead the party. Sann then issued a counter-declaration that Dien and Sutsakhan's actions were both illegal and contrary to the spirit of the party, but that they would continue to be welcome in the party if they gave up the divisive action. On the other hand, Sann was of the opinion that disciplinary measures were necessary against Abdul Gaffar Peang Meth and Hing Kunthorn. He said he had the support of the United States, ASEAN and China (the three main donors of the CPNLF).

The clashes continued, however, as neither side could defeat the other. Over time, the Thai authorities began to worry whether the KPNLF was still capable of waging war against the PRK, given its divided leadership. Therefore, in March 1986, they supported the formation, without the knowledge of Sutsakhan and Sann, of a ten-member provisional military committee to direct the military operations of the CPNLAF until the end of the conflict. Members of the committee were Dien Del from the Sutsakhan camp and the new head of Sann's command committee Prum Vith.

The dispute was eventually settled in such a way that Sann retained the presidency and many of the associated civilian powers and Sutsakhan remained the military leader of both the faction and joint operations between KPNLAF and FUNCINPEC. However, the truce did not last , and after the Paris Peace Treaty was implemented, Sutsakhan founded the Liberal Democratic Party as a split from the KPNLF.

After the Paris Peace Treaty

In 1991 France and Indonesia called for a peace conference on the civil war in Cambodia. All four factions in Cambodia participated, as did the United Nations and many other foreign nations (e.g. the United States, the Soviet Union , China, and the United Kingdom ). The aim of the conference was to establish a united, peaceful and neutral democracy in Cambodia. On October 23, 1991, all parties involved signed the Paris Peace Treaty .

The agreement called for UN-led elections in 1993 to determine the future government of Cambodia. In the period between the signing of the agreement and the elections Cambodia by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (Engl. United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia , UNTAC) managed. The peace agreement stipulated that all four factions must work together with UNTAC in order to gradually disarm their armed forces. All factions did so except for the Khmer Rouge, which protested against it, withdrew from the peace process in early summer 1992 and then did not take part in the elections.

When the military faction was now converted into a political party, a name change was made. The Khmer National Liberation Front became the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP). The name change meant no change in the platform or structure of the KPNLF, with the exception of the discontinuation of the military arm KPNLAF and the loss of the previous split of the Liberal Democratic Party from Sak Sutsakhan. The BLDP was also headed by Son Sann. In the 1993 UN-approved elections , she won 10 out of 120 seats in the National Assembly.

Because neither the FUNCINPEC still emerged from the PRK Cambodian People's Party (Engl. Cambodian People's Party , CPP) achieved an absolute majority, the BLDP was accepted as a minority partner in the coalition government with FUNCINPEC and the CPP where they should contribute to the sharing of power and occupy important positions (e.g. Ieng Mouly was Minister of Information and Kem Sokha was Chairman of the Rights Commission ).

Internal power struggles after the Paris Peace Treaty

As in early 1986, there were disagreements between two groups in 1995. This time it was not a conflict between military and political control, but a dispute between the two politicians Son Sann and Ieng Mouly.

It was common knowledge that Sann and Mouly had been at odds on various issues for years. The main points of conflict were Sann's strict rejection of the Vietnamese, his order, in Mouly's opinion, to boycott the 1993 elections, and Mouly's doubts as to whether the Cambodian monarchy should participate in the new democracy.

Despite these and many other differences, Mouly and Sann reached a kind of standstill agreement on power-sharing after the 1993 elections. In return for Sann remaining chairman of the party, Mouly was given the party's only cabinet post, the Ministry of Information. At least the two agreed that it was better to keep the BLDP together than to separate it, which would have lost its parliamentary seats and its position of power-sharing.

This settlement did not last long, however, and the argument continued. First, Sann consistently supported anti-Vietnamese legislation, which angered Mouly and his supporters and ensured that tensions between the two groups remained. It culminated when Sann's supporters announced that Mouly had been expelled from the party. Mouly's side immediately reacted in the same way, stating that on the contrary, Sann and not Mouly had been removed from the party.

After all, that is exactly what happened. On July 9, 1995, Ieng Mouly convened a special BLDP congress to elect a new leadership. With Son Sann and his supporters absent, Mouly was unanimously elected president by Congress. Shortly after the Congress, however, the BLDP disbanded. Mouly founded the Buddhist Liberal Party , Sann's supporters the Son Sann Party . However, the two parties did not win a seat in the 1998 parliamentary elections and were subsequently dissolved.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Justin J. Corfield: A History of the Cambodian Non-Communist Resistance, 1975-1983. Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University , Clayton (Victoria, Australia) 1991, p. 9.
  2. ^ Daniel Bultmann: Inside Cambodian Insurgency. A Sociological Perspective on Civil Wars and Conflict. Ashgate, Farnham 2015, ISBN 978-1-4724-4307-6 .
  3. ^ A b c Justin J. Corfield: A History of the Cambodian Non-Communist Resistance, 1975-1983. Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Clayton (Victoria, Australia) 1991, p. 10.
  4. ^ Jacques Bekaert: Kampuchea: The Year of the Nationalists? Southeast Asian Affairs, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 1983, p. 169 ff.
  5. ^ Justin J. Corfield: A History of the Cambodian Non-Communist Resistance, 1975-1983. Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Clayton (Victoria, Australia) 1991, p. 11.
  6. ^ A b Russell R. Ross: The Khmer People's National Liberation Front. In: Cambodia. A Country Study. Library of Congress Country Studies , Washington 1987 (background information on the KPNLF).
  7. ↑ Michael Johns: Cambodia at a Crossroads. In: The World and I. February 1988.
  8. ↑ Cortland Robinson: Refugee Warriors At The Thai-Cambodian Border ( Memento from July 17, 2011 in the Internet Archive ). In: Refugees Survey Quarterly. Vol. 19, No. 1, 2000 (PDF; 4 kB).
  9. ↑ Elizabeth Becker: The Quiet Cambodian. In: The New Republic . 186, No. 2, 2000, pp. 18-19.
  10. ^ A b c Rodney Tasker: Up Against the Odds. In: Far Eastern Economic Review . 131, No. 3, 1986, p. 22 f.
  11. ^ Rodney Tasker: The Reality of Coalition. In: Far Eastern Economic Review. 133, No. 28, 1986, p. 11 f.
  12. ^ Cambodia: Christmas offensive of the Vietnamese occupiers. In: The time . 4th January 1985.
  13. ↑ Trevor Findlay: Cambodia. The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC (= Sipri Research Report. No. 9). Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995, p. 3.
  14. ↑ Aurel Croissant : The political systems of Southeast Asia. An introduction. Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden 2016 ( limited preview in the Google book search).
  15. ↑ Trevor Findlay: Cambodia. The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC (= Sipri Research Report. No. 9). Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995, p. 84.
  16. ↑ a b c d e f Matthew Lee: Divided We Fall. In: Far Eastern Economic Review. 158, No. 30, 1995, p. 31.