Operation Reckless
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| date | April 22, 1944 to April 26, 1944 |
|---|---|
| place | Hollandia |
| output | American victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
|
High Command: Douglas MacArthur |
Ground Defense High Command: Kitazono Toyozo |
| losses | |
|
124 dead, |
over 3,300 dead, |
1942
Rabaul -
1. Salamaua-Lae -
Operation MO -
Coral Sea -
1. Buna-Gona -
Kokoda Track -
Milne Bay -
Goodenough -
2. Buna-Gona -
Operation Lilliput
1943
Wau -
Bismarck Sea -
I -
2. Salamaua – Lae -
Finisterre -
Cartwheel -
Bougainville -
Huon -
Dexterity / Arawe -
Bombing of Rabaul
1944 - 1945
Admiralty Islands -
Emirau -
Take Ichi convoy -
Reckless -
Persecution -
Wakde-Sarmi -
Biak -
Noemfoor -
Driniumor -
Sansapor -
Morotai -
Aitape – Wewak
The operation Reckless was a subsidiary of the South West Pacific Area Headquarters under General Douglas MacArthur in the Pacific theater during World War II . It included the landings in Tanahmerah Bay and Humboldt Bay as well as the subsequent battle for the Japanese-occupied Hollandia in Dutch New Guinea .
prehistory
The Japanese took the area around Hollandia in early April 1942. About a year later, they began building three airfields on the plain of Lake Sentani , as well as a fourth near Tami on the coast east of Humboldt Bay. The base at Hollandia, which was occupied by units of the Japanese 4th Air Army, had the second largest size after the Rabaul base on New Britain, which had already been established .
In the meantime, the bay at Hollandia had been developed into a large reloading point for supplies. The American secret service also determined that further large-scale relocations of troops by the 18th Japanese Army from East New Guinea to Hollandia were planned. General MacArthur and his planning staff therefore decided to take the area before Hollandia was turned into a fortress .
The planned Japanese troop transfers and supplies for Hollandia began in March 1944. A complete infantry regiment with the most modern equipment was embarked in Palau. However, on their way to Hollandia, they came into the line of fire of an American submarine . With the exception of a few who were rescued by an escort destroyer , the regiment was lost with many armored vehicles and other equipment. Around 15,000 Japanese were stationed in the Hollandia area, but this included the entire ground crew of the air units , the naval service crews and more than 1,000 wounded. The commanding officer in Hollandia, Major General Kitazono Toyozo , had about 3,000 defensible soldiers available.
In support of the planned landings, Mac Arthur demanded the use of aircraft carriers , whose fighter planes should bomb the Japanese bases the day before. Since his command did not have its own porters available, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz , Commander in Chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas , was instructed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deploy Task Force 58 for the operation. Land-based attacks should also be flown. For this purpose, a Japanese-occupied airfield near Aitape , in the Australian-administered part of New Guinea, was to be taken (→ Operation Persecution ).
After the air support for the operations was secured, detailed logistical and tactical planning could begin. D-Day , the day on which the operation began, which had already been set for April 15, 1944, was postponed to April 22. The reason was the flood conditions on the northeast coast of New Guinea, the operations of the aircraft carriers to be planned by Admiral Nimitz, as well as the supply problems at the time in the south-west Pacific.
The plan envisaged that the air, sea and land forces, supported by Task Force 58, should secure the landing areas at Hollandia and Aitape, thereby isolating the Japanese 18th Army in eastern New Guinea. In Hollandia the construction of a large air force base and a logistics base was planned that could accommodate up to 150,000 soldiers.
The contribution of Task Force 58 was collectively referred to as Operation Desecrate Two and, in addition to the deployment of a Task Group to directly support the landings, also included air strikes by another Task Group against the Japanese airfields in the Wakde / Sarmi area .
The battle
On 30./31. March 1944, Task Force 58 carried out the planned attack on the Japanese base on the Palau Islands as part of Operation Desecrate One . On the one hand, this served the purpose of eliminating Japanese ground and air units and preparing for the Hollandia campaign. The latter was mainly achieved by the fact that the Japanese warships fleeing the attack withdrew from the area towards the west. Land-based American and Australian warplanes have meanwhile flew long-range missions from bases in eastern New Guinea and the Admiralty Islands to other destinations in the eastern Caroline Islands . In addition, a number of Japanese air force bases in western New Guinea were largely neutralized. In Hollandia in particular, more than 300 Japanese fighter planes, most of them still standing on the airfields, were destroyed.
That was the situation when on April 17th the Rabaul Naval Communication Center issued a warning of an imminent enemy landing on the coast of New Guinea. Intercepted American radio messages indicated an increasing concentration of Allied air units on the Admiralty Islands , which were being transferred from Lae , Nadzab and Finschhafen . In addition, a large number of enemy ships were observed that had set course for the Bismarck Sea and exchanged many tactical radio messages. Two days later, a reconnaissance plane launched from the Caroline Islands sighted an Allied fleet of aircraft carriers north of the Admiralty Islands. On the same day, another machine announced the sighting of a large fleet on Vitiaz Strasse , consisting of 30 transporters, two cruisers and ten destroyers, and was escorted by an aircraft carrier. On April 20, two large fleet concentrations with four carriers and a landing convoy were reported north of the Ninigo Islands , around 370 km north of Wewak .
Tanahmerah Bay
On the morning of April 22, the task forces with the landing units of the 24th Infantry Division , which was under the command of Major General Frederick A. Irving , anchored about nine kilometers from Tanahmerah Bay. At around 5 a.m., the soldiers boarded the landing craft, which were heading for the designated landing points. At 6:00 a.m., the heavy cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS Shropshire opened fire on the beaches for 45 minutes. Meanwhile, allied destroyers were approaching the coast to continue firing on selected targets inland. Task Force 58 fighter jets bombed the few intact Japanese fighter jets on the surrounding airfields at dawn. Since a Japanese resistance in the landing area was not expected, the other planned flight operations could be canceled.
When the first wave reached the beach, the landing craft armed with heavy machine guns opened fire on the hinterland, but apart from a few shots from the flanks and a smaller island in the bay, there was no resistance from the Japanese side. These positions could be quickly identified and eliminated by the destroyer escorts, so that there were no casualties or wounded among the landing forces on the American side . Within a short time, three battalions had gone ashore and secured the bridgehead to the west and east. Due to the large number of winding and crossing paths, it was difficult for the Americans to find the right way inland in the direction of Lake Sentani to the airfields. It took them almost an hour to do this.
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When General Irving went ashore at 9:30 a.m. and had the situation and the difficult terrain explained to him, he changed the landing plans for the entire operation. Especially the deep and boggy swamp behind the beaches caused serious problems when crossing. The planned construction of a connecting road between the two landing beaches Red Beach 1 and 2 was dropped and so it was not possible, as planned, to set any equipment in the direction of the airfields. Since the hinterland at Red Beach 1 allowed the fastest advance, a shuttle service for the replenishment goods from Red Beach 2 was set in motion, which transported the goods stored there on the beach over water to Red Beach 1 over two days.
In contrast to the location in Tanahmerah Bay, the 41st Infantry Division found significantly better routes in Humboldt Bay that led inland. Therefore, the management staff under General Eichelberger decided to divert the supplies planned for the third day of the operation for the landing beaches in Tanahmerah Bay to Humboldt Bay. The Humboldt Bay was declared the primary landing zone.
Meanwhile, smaller units of the US 24th Infantry Division had advanced far towards Lake Sentani without encountering Japanese resistance. It was not until the following night, when the units were encamped in Kantomé, that a smaller group of Japanese attacked the left flank and kept the Americans awake for most of the night before giving up their venture and retreating.
The Japanese commander in Hollandia, General Inada, decided due to the hopeless defensive situation to withdraw with his men about 400 km west to Sarmi . He assembled his units in the Genim area , divided them into many small squadrons and ordered them to go to Sarmi.
The American units, which still assumed more than 10,000 Japanese defenders around the airfields on Lake Sentani, were caught in heavy rains on April 23, which made advancement on the narrow paths even more difficult. The guns in particular, which were to be brought into the front lines, repeatedly sank into the deep morass, so that the schedule got mixed up. General Irving therefore decided to rally the troops at Sabron and Dazai . Since the weather did not change the following day either, a supply flight from the air was initially out of the question. Around noon on April 23, a small supply base was set up near Dazai to provide food and ammunition. A supply chain to Mariboe and Jangkena could be built over the Takari Mountains . The weather did not improve on April 25th either and General Irving was forced to cancel planned drops of supplies via Dazai. Despite these unplanned setbacks, the main force advanced behind the advance patrols towards the Japanese airfields. After they had fired at known and suspected Japanese positions with artillery, the advance stopped about 900 m from a branch of the Dejaoe River. Here there was a brief skirmish with Japanese soldiers who were holed up at a ford . After the Americans had managed to cross the Dejaoe, they were taken under fire from a hill; but the Japanese position could be quickly explored and eliminated with mortar fire .
Meanwhile, the troop supply had to be organized from the coast by handcart, as bad weather continued to make it impossible to drive on the paths with vehicles. A supply from the air was still out of the question. Despite this disastrous supply situation and with no supporting artillery in the first rows, General Irving decided to issue the order to advance. This was not least due to the fact that he had received information that spoke of the Japanese moving away from the airfields.
On the morning of April 26, the main American force crossed the Dajaoe River. At a plantation, a small Japanese group resisted briefly from a bunker and some Japanese were driven out of a sawmill near Ebeli , so that at noon the airfield north of Lake Sentani came into view. With very little Japanese resistance, the Americans took the airfield until 3:30 p.m.
After the rain finally subsided, twelve B-25s were dropped off at Dazai. Vehicles with light artillery, ammunition, supplies and medical equipment were now advancing towards the airfields over the rapidly drying ground. Patrols of the 21st US Infantry Regiment made contact at 4:45 p.m. east of the airfield near Weversdorp with units of the 41st US Infantry Division, which had landed in Humboldt Bay.
Humboldt Bay
The planners divided the coastline in the Humboldt Bay into four landing sections; White Beach 1 to 4. These were occupied by the 41st Infantry Division on the morning of April 22nd at 7:00 am, after artillery from light cruisers and destroyers as well as aircraft from Task Force 58 had bombed the beaches. There was no Japanese resistance during the bombing or the landings. All units reached the beaches quickly, established a bridgehead and reached Cape Pie and Cape Tjeweri in the south of the bay just 45 minutes after landing . To the north of the landing beaches was a hill called Pancake Hill . From there, the entire landing area of the 41st US Infantry Division could be overlooked. With a few Japanese gunfire, the hill was captured around 8:00 a.m. There the Americans found an intact Japanese anti-aircraft gun still covered by the weather protection , which indicates that the Japanese had actually been completely taken by surprise by the landings.
At around 2:30 p.m. all landing sections were secured and in the northern section the American units were on a hill ( Jarremoh Hill ) within sight of the city of Hollandia. General Fuller decided not to take the city until the next day, since the Japanese lying there should first be put under artillery fire to facilitate their own advance. The infantry attack began at 7:30 a.m. on April 23. The Americans had completely taken Hollandia by 11:15 a.m. - without any Japanese resistance.
Meanwhile, the units landed at White Beach 4 were advancing inland to the airfields north of Lake Sentani. Shortly after landing, they took the town of Pim against light Japanese resistance. Towards evening Suikerbrood Hill and Jautefa Bay were in American hands. Supplies of weapons and food were brought to White Beach 1 and 2 by an LST shuttle service from HMAS Westralia .
On April 23 at 8:00 a.m., the American units began their advance to the airfields. A skirmish occurred near the Borgonjie River with about 150 Japanese who launched an uncoordinated attack on the advancing American right flank. Without further resistance worth mentioning, the Americans reached the vicinity of the Brinkmans Plantation by the afternoon, where they discovered a large storage area for the Japanese. Since they suspected Japanese positions west of this place, which was confirmed by aerial reconnaissance, the commander requested an air strike and the American soldiers were instructed to hold their current position for the time being. When heavy rain set in at around 3 p.m., which lasted for hours and made the paths from the beaches to the inland virtually impassable, the next day began to show an eminently poor supply and replenishment situation for the advancing battalions. In addition, Japanese planes attacked the supply depots at the White Beach 1 landing strip on the night of April 23rd to 24th.
The poor supply situation led to a reduction to half a day's ration on April 24th . Smaller Japanese groups repeatedly attacked the advancing units on the right flank, so that support for the soldiers lying in the front line was still a long way off. In the further course of the day the 34th Infantry Regiment of the 24th Division was transferred from Tanahmerah Bay to Humboldt Bay. Therefore, a company and a battalion lying in reserve at White Beach 3 could also be ordered inland.
With the men who were now additionally available, the Americans were able to advance to Lake Sentani on April 25 using LVTs and cross over to Nefaar to support the troops sent there. The vehicles were loaded at 10:00 a.m. and reached the landing point at Nefaar shortly before noon without having come under Japanese fire. Together with the troops that had moved over land, they began to scout the area around Nefaar and to advance to the Cyclops airfield.
The expected strong resistance from the Japanese did not materialize, but the sudden onset of artillery fire on the airfields in the afternoon brought the advance to a standstill. The fire came from the 24th US Infantry Division on the one hand, but also from Japanese positions in the north of the airfields. Difficulties in communication led to the fact that the fire of the 24th Division was not stopped until late in the evening and the units of the 41st Division first prepared for their night defense.
On April 26, units of the 24th US Infantry Division took the Cyclops airfield until shortly after 8:00 a.m. and the larger Sentani airfield at around 12:15 p.m. Only a few scattered Japanese offered brief resistance. The merger with the 24th US Infantry Division succeeded at Weversdorp around 4:45 p.m. and the main American armed forces reached the airfields at nightfall. That ended the actual Reckless operation.
Closing operations
After conquering the airfields, another goal of the Americans was to interrupt the escape routes of the retreating Japanese units and to secure the surrounding area. This included the Cyclops Mountains to the north, the Tami Airfield to the east of Humboldt Bay and Demta Bay to the west of Tanahmerah Bay. These operations concluded on June 6th and killed about 800 Japanese soldiers.
The airfields under American control
After the runway was repaired, the Sentani airfield was used as a larger base for three combat squads of the 475th Fighter Group (Satan's Angels) with fighter planes, light and heavy bombers. The tower code during the war was Bolster . After the end of the war, the Dutch took over the place. It is still in operation today (→ Jayapura Airport ).
The Hollandia airfield was expanded with two runways after the capture of American pioneers and operated until July 1, 1945. Today it is almost completely overgrown and can only be seen from the air.
After repairs, the Cyclops airfield could only be used for smaller aircraft and was no longer used after the end of the war. Today it is also almost completely overgrown and can only be seen from the air.
literature
- John N. Bradley: The Second World War: Asia and the Pacific . West Point Military History - Square One Publishers 2002, ISBN 978-0-7570-0162-8 .
Web links
- US Army in WW2 - Approach to the Philippines (Chapter II - Planning and Preparation for the Hollandia-Aitape Operation)
- US Army in WW2 - Approach to the Philippines (Chapter III - The Hollandia Operations)
- MacArthur Reports: Chapter X - Western New Guinea Operations - p. 261 ff
- The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia - Hollandia
- British Pathe historical archive: Attack on Hollandia (Video)