Battle for Arawe

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Battle for Arawe
Part of: Pacific War
US Army soldiers go ashore at Arawe shortly after sunrise, December 15, 1943
US Army soldiers go ashore at Arawe shortly after sunrise, December 15, 1943
date December 15, 1943 to February 24, 1944
place Arawe , New Britain
Casus Belli Construction of a bridgehead for further operations on New Britain
output allied victory
Territorial changes the Japanese troops are pushed back far
consequences Continuation of the Allied offensive
Parties to the conflict

United States 48United States United States Australia
AustraliaAustralia 

Japanese EmpireJapanese Empire Japan

Commander

Julian W. Cunningham

Komori Masamitsu

Troop strength
4,750 ≈ 1,000
losses

118 dead
352 wounded
4 missing

304 dead
3 prisoners

Battle of New Guinea (1942–1945)

The Battle of Arawe , also known as the Battle of Cape Merkus , took place between Allied and Japanese forces during the Pacific War . It marked the beginning of the Battle of New Britain and was part of the Allied Operation Cartwheel . The aim was to divert attention from the landing at Cape Gloucester later that month . The Japanese armed forces were expecting an enemy landing in western New Britain and were still busy reinforcing their positions there when the landing at Arawe began. After a month of sporadic fighting, the Allies succeeded in driving the outnumbered Japanese out of the Arawe area.

The original aim of the Battle of Arawe was to divert the Japanese and to capture a port for PT speedboats . Since such a port was later considered unnecessary at this point, it was never built. At the time of the landing there were only weak Japanese forces waiting for reinforcements in the area. The first landing on December 15, 1943 was a success despite various organizational difficulties. The American troops were able to quickly build and fortify a beachhead. Japanese air units repeatedly attacked the Allies on a large scale in the days after the landing. At the end of December, the ground units of the Japanese army began an extensive counterattack, which was repulsed. In mid-January, after more infantrymen and tanks landed, the American troops carried out their own brief attack, with which they pushed the Japanese back. These withdrew towards the end of February in the course of a general evacuation of western New Britain.

Historians disagree as to whether the landing at Arawe was necessary. While some see it as a useful diversion for landing at Cape Gloucester, others argue that the entire battle for New Britain was unnecessary and that the troops deployed could have done more elsewhere.

background

Military situation

In July 1942, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) decided that the main objective in the allied command areas South Pacific Area (SPA) and Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) was the capture of the important Japanese base Rabaul on the eastern tip of New Britain. From August onwards, American and Australian forces carried out a series of offensives in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands in order to push back the Japanese units there and establish airfields within reach on Rabaul. Despite strong resistance, the Japanese did not succeed in stopping the Allied offensives in the long term.

In June 1943, the large-scale Allied offensive Operation Cartwheel began with the aim of eliminating Rabaul. During the next five months, American-Australian troops under the command of General Douglas MacArthur advanced along the northeast coast of New Guinea and captured the strategically important town of Lae and the Huon Peninsula . American units under the command of Admiral William F. Halsey proceeded in parallel, starting from Guadalcanal , on the Solomon Islands and established an airfield on Bougainville in November . As early as June, the JCS had come to the conclusion that an actual conquest of Rabaul need not be a priority, since the Japanese base could be neutralized by a sea blockade and repeated air strikes. MacArthur was critical of this decision, but ultimately had to bow to the judgment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), who at the Quadrant Conference in August concluded that the JCS were correct in their assessment.

The area where Operation Cartwheel ran

The Japanese General Headquarters assessed the situation in the Southwest Pacific at the end of September 1943 and saw the Allied offensives as an attempt to penetrate the northern Solomon Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago through the outer strategic defensive ring and in the following months to advance in the western and central Pacific to the inner one . In order to prevent this or at least to slow down the enemy advance, strategically important locations were identified and specifically reinforced with troops. Since the Japanese considered Rabaul to be one of the main targets, strong units were stationed there. At that time the Japanese positions in western New Britain consisted of smaller airfields at Cape Gloucester and several intermediate stations where smaller ships sailing between New Britain and New Guinea could hide from Allied air raids.

On September 22, 1943 MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) gave the Alamo Force under Lieutenant General (Lieutenant General) Walter Krueger the order to secure western New Britain and the surrounding islands. The order had two goals: firstly, to establish bases for PT speedboats and air units and, secondly, to secure the Vitiaz Strait and the Dampier Strait between New Britain and New Guinea for Allied convoys that supported the operations on the north coast. For this purpose Cape Gloucester and Gasmata on the south coast of New Britain were to be conquered. This part of the Battle of the Island was code-named Operation Dexterity . The 1st Marine Division was selected for the landing at Cape Gloucester and part of the 32nd Infantry Division for Gasmata .

Even before the operations began, there was discussion among senior Allied commanders about the advisability of landing in western New Britain. Lieutenant General George Kenney , Commander of the Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific, spoke out clearly against a landing and justified this with the fact that his airmen did not need the airfields at Cape Gloucester. The existing bases in New Guinea were sufficient to support the planned operations in the region. In contrast, assisted Vice Admiral (Vice Admiral) Arthur S. Carpender , Commander of the United States Seventh Fleet (7th Fleet) and Allied Naval Forces in the Southwest Pacific and Rear Admiral (Rear Admiral) Daniel E. Barbey , Commander of Task Force 76 ( TF 76) the Cape Gloucester Landing to keep both sides of the straits there occupied. Like Kenney, they refused the operation at Gasmata because the location was too close to the Japanese airfields near Rabaul and a landing would involve such incalculable risks. The concerns of Kenney and the naval officers, together with intelligence reports about a reinforcement of the garrison there, led to the cancellation of the plans against Gasmata.

On November 21st, the GHQ, Kenney, Carpender and Barbey met in Brisbane and decided to land a smaller unit at Arawe. There they also decided on three fundamental strategic goals for the landing. First, the Japanese were to be persuaded, among other things, to withdraw troops from Cape Gloucester, a base for PT speedboats and a defensive ring to permanently secure the beachhead should be created. Starting from this defensive ring, contact with the marines at Cape Gloucester should be established as soon as possible after their landing. The speedboats from Arawe were supposed to prevent Japanese small ship traffic on the south coast of New Britain and thus prevent the transfer of troops and material across the sea.

terrain

Terrain map of the area around Arawe

Arawe and its surroundings are located on the south coast of New Britain, about 160 km from the western tip of the island. Geographically defining is Cape Merkus, which ends in the L-shaped Arawe peninsula. Several smaller islands known as the Arawe Islands lie southwest of the cape.

At the end of 1943, the Arawe Peninsula was overgrown with coconut palms, which were part of the Amalut plantation. Marshy terrain dominated further inland. The coastline consisted of limestone cliffs on most sections, which allowed landings only in a restricted area. A small unused airfield was 4 miles east of the peninsula and a coastal path stretched from Cape Merkus to the Pulie River, where it split into a coastal path and an inland path. The area west of the peninsula was undeveloped and consisted of jungle and swamps, which made it much more difficult for troops to move. A stretch of beach called House Fireman in the west and the coast near the village of Umtingalu in the east of the peninsula were identified as being best suited for landing.

leader

Planning

The Alamo Force was responsible for coordinating plans to invade western New Britain. It set December 15 as the date of the landing at Arawe, as this was the earliest possible time the airfields around Nadzab in New Guinea would go into operation , from where air support was to be flown. It was also so far in the future that there was enough time for the planned troops to adequately prepare for the mission. Since he thought Arawe was only weakly defended, Krueger decided to use fewer troops than was planned at Gasmata. The unit, which was given the name of the Director Task Force, was concentrated on Goodenough Island , where it had to hand over all equipment that was not immediately required for the upcoming fighting. Logisticians recommended that the attacking forces bring food for 30 and ammunition for three days of intense fighting. After landing, supplies were to be increased to 60 days of rations and six days of general ammunition excluding anti-aircraft guns, which should be kept for ten days. The landing was to be made from fast ships that could be unloaded quickly in order to withdraw quickly from the coast.

The commander of the PT speedboats in the Southwest Pacific, Morton C. Mumma , considered the establishment of a base for his boats at Arawe to be unnecessary, as he already had sufficient capacities in the region and the Japanese coastal transports usually used the north coast. He presented this assessment to Barbey and Carpender, who subsequently agreed with him. They decided that instead of this, six speedboats should patrol every night from Dreger Harbor in New Guinea and Kiriwina along the south coast east of Arawes and that Arawe itself should only set up facilities for refueling the boats in an emergency.

Brigadier General (Brigadier General) Julian W. Cunningham , who led the Director Task Force, issued the landing command on 4 December to his troops. He defined the goal that the Arawe Peninsula and the surrounding islands should be occupied immediately. The main part of the troops was to land on House Fireman Beach at daybreak. Two company-sized units should make several smaller landings about an hour before the main landing. One was supposed to occupy the island of Pilelo, as a Japanese reconnaissance station and defense positions were suspected there, which could dominate the natural harbor of Arawes. The second unit was supposed to land at Umtingalu and block the coastal path east of the peninsula. After the erection of a beachhead, night patrols landed amphibiously were to advance westward in order to establish contact as quickly as possible with the marines landing a few days later. The US Navy officers on the planning staff expressed concerns about these patrols because a night landing at Lae in September had proven to be very complicated.

Armed forces

The Director Task Force concentrated around the US Army's 112th Cavalry Regiment. This regiment had been in the Pacific since August 1942, but had not yet come to combat missions. In May 1943 it was officially unsaddled and converted into an infantry unit. On the 23rd, she was part of the forces that occupied Woodlark Island without a fight . Due to its character of a cavalry regiment, it was smaller and weaker than the regular infantry regiments, as it only had two battalion-sized squadrons instead of three full-fledged battalions. The squadrons were slightly smaller than a standard battalion and more lightly armed. The Director Task Force was supported by the 148th Field Artillery Battalion (148th Field Artillery Battalion) equipped with M2A1 howitzers and the 59th Engineer Company (59th Engineer Company). Other combat units were the 470th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion (Automatic Weapons), most of the 236th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion (Searchlight), a company of the 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion (1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion) and a dog squadron. A battalion of the 158th Infantry Regiment was deployed as a reserve. A number of other support units should arrive at Arawe after the landings are complete. Cunningham also requested a battery of 90 mm anti-aircraft guns , but they were not available. The US Navy would land a unit parallel to the combat troops and leave it there until the bridgehead was finally secured.

Movements of Japanese forces in western New Britain in late 1943 and early 1944, and the positions of the Allied landings

Support for the Director Task Force should come from Allied air and naval units. The naval forces were withdrawn from the TF 76 for this purpose and consisted of the American destroyers Conyngham , which provided Barbey's flagship, Shaw , Drayton , Bagley , Reid , Smith , Lamson , Flusser and Mahan . The destroyers Humphreys and Sands were to be used for transport. The remaining naval units included the Australian Landing Ship, Infantry Westralia , the dock landing ship Carter Hall , the destroyer mother ship Rigel , three LSTs , two speedboats, two submarine fighters and three tugs. Air forces of the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) were to assist the landings under the command of the Fifth Air Force (5th Air Fleet). However, it was already foreseeable that these units would only be available to a limited extent after December 15, since they were supposed to be carrying out strategic attacks against other Japanese bases.

Australian coastal observers who were already hidden on the island were reinforced in September and October 1943 in order to report possible attacks from Rabaul on the landing troops and to gather information about troop movements and transport units. In total, the troop already in New Britain was reinforced by five more, one of which was discovered and eliminated by the Japanese on the way to Gasmata. By the end of October, all remaining coastal observers had taken up positions in their designated positions.

At the time of the landings, the area around Arawe was only defended by a small Japanese unit, but their reinforcements were already on their way. The unit was formed from two temporarily formed companies of the 51st Division and consisted of 120 seamen and soldiers. The outstanding reinforcements came from the 17th Division , which had been transferred from China to Rabaul in October to defend western New Britain. The convoys carrying them had been attacked by American submarines and bombers, killing 1,173 men. The 1st Battalion of the 81st Infantry Regiment was given the task of defending Cape Merkus on arrival. The battalion's reorganization dragged on after the ship carrying it was sunk until December, which is why it did not move towards its destination earlier. In addition, two of his rifle companies had to surrender most of their heavy weapons to the 8th Regional Army in Rabaul. The advancing battalion ultimately consisted of his headquarters, two rifle companies and a machine gun platoon . When the Allied landings began, the battalion under the command of Major Komori Masamitsu was four days' march from Arawe. A company of the 54th Infantry Regiment as well as some engineers and other smaller units should also move to Arawe. General Matsuda Iwao , who had his headquarters near Cape Gloucester, was in command of the troops . The air units in Rabaul had been weakened in the preceding months by Allied attacks and the relocation of the 7th Air Division to New Guinea. The 11th Air Fleet of the Japanese Navy had around 100 fighters and 50 bombers at the time of the landings in Rabaul.

Preparatory operations

Since the Allies had only a few maps of New Britain and the exact positions of Japanese positions were also unknown, they flew intensive reconnaissance missions in the time before the landings to take aerial photographs and deployed small reconnaissance teams with PT speedboats. One such team explored Arawe on the night of December 9th and 10th and reported that there were few Japanese troops there. The discovery of the American soldiers by the Japanese at Umtingalu led to the reinforcement of their defense positions there.

Operation Dexterity was preceded by intensive air strikes to destroy the Japanese air forces at Rabaul. From October 12 to early November, the Fifth Air Force flew regular air strikes on the airfields in the vicinity of the city and on ships lying in the port. On November 5th and 11th, carrier-based aircraft of the US Navy attacked Rabaul to prevent interference maneuvers against the Allied landing on Bougainville from being carried out from there .

Preparatory air strikes began in western New Britain on November 13th. In order not to draw the attention of the Japanese, only a few attacks were carried out on the area around Arawe, which were supposed to appear random. In contrast, Gasmata and the Ring Ring and Lindenhafen plantations on the south coast were badly hit. The first attack on Arawe took place on December 6th and a second on the 8th. Both had sparse defensive fire. Heavy air strikes began on December 14th. Allied aircraft flew 273 sorties against the south coast that day. On the night of November 29th and 30th, the Task Force 74.2, consisting of four American and Australian destroyers, fired at Gasmata and the surrounding area.

In early December, the Director Task Force was concentrated on Goodenough Island. The 112th Cavalry Regiment was assigned to land on November 24th and transported from Woodlark to Goodenough. By December 2nd, it had completely arrived on the island. A training run for the complete landing took place on December 8th on the island and revealed that there were problems with the coordination of the individual landing waves and that not all officers were adequately trained in amphibious warfare . The imminent start of operations did not allow any countermeasures. The units were equipped with new infantry weapons such as the Browning Automatic Rifle , submachine guns , bazookas and flamethrowers on Goodenough . However, there was insufficient training on these new weapons.

The landing forces embarked on the afternoon of December 13th, and the convoy left around midnight. At Buna he met with most of his escort and from there drove in a diversionary maneuver to the north in the direction of Finschhafen before setting course for Arawe after sunset on December 14th. Shortly before he anchored there, a Japanese aircraft spotted him on the 15th at around 3:30 a.m., whereupon the 11th Air Fleet began preparations for an attack.

battle

Tactical map of the Allied landings at Arawe

Landings

Shortly after arriving at Arawe, the Carter Hall launched LVTs and the Westralia landing craft, which were steered by specially trained Army and Marine infantry personnel. Both ships left the coast at 5 a.m. for New Guinea. The destroyers used for the transport made fast about 900 m from Umtingalu and Pilelo and disembarked the landing soldiers of the A and B Company in rubber boats.

The A Company heading for Umtingalu did not succeed in landing because it came under heavy fire at around 5:25 and sank twelve of its 15 inflatable boats. Since they could not make out exactly whether their own soldiers still on the water were in the line of fire, the Shaw deployed in support did not begin to open fire on the Japanese before 5:42 a.m. After that, however, she succeeded in extinguishing the enemy fire with two targeted volleys of her 130 mm guns. The surviving Americans were taken out of the water by smaller boats and brought back to their ships. They later ended up on House Fireman Beach. They lost twelve dead, four missing and 17 wounded.

In contrast to Umtingalu, the landing on Pilelo was successful. Originally it was supposed to take place near Paligmete in the east of the island, as a Japanese radio station was suspected there. After the A Company came under fire, the landing was moved to the west coast to avoid being shot at. After landing without resistance, the B Company advanced east and met a small Japanese unit near the village of Winguru on the north coast, which had holed up in two caves and took the Americans under fire. Ten soldiers were deployed to clear this out, while the rest of the company continued to advance on Paligmete. The village had neither the presumed radio station nor a Japanese occupation and could thus be taken without a fight. The majority of the troops then went back to Winguru and attacked the Japanese there with bazookas and flamethrowers. An American and all seven Japanese died in the exchange of fire. RAAF soldiers landed on Pilelo that same day and set up a radar station there within 48 hours and put it into operation.

The regiment's 2nd Squadron landed on House Fireman beach. Difficulties in getting the LVTs into formation delayed the landing, which is why the first wave did not hit the beach until 7:28 a.m. instead of 6:30 a.m. as planned. Between 6:10 and 6:25 am, American destroyers bombed the Japanese positions with around 1,800 rounds, and then North American B-25s flew over the area for some time. Due to the delay in the landing, there was initially no cover fire and the LVTs came under machine gun fire. As a result, the SC-742 and two DUKW launched missiles were able to stop the fire. The other landing waves were also delayed, but the soldiers of the first wave were able to hold on to the beach, as they encountered little resistance there. It was originally planned to land on the first four more waves every five minutes. In fact, the second wave did not go ashore until 25 minutes after the first and the three following waves together again 15 minutes later. Within two hours of the landings, all major Allied ships with the exception of the Conyngham had withdrawn from the area. This continued to rescue survivors of the unsuccessful landing attempt at Umtingalu and left the coast later that day.

After the landing, the American troops quickly managed to secure the peninsula. A raid force sent to the tip of the peninsula encountered only scattered resistance from Japanese guards. More than 20 Japanese were killed while clearing a fortified cave in the east of the peninsula, and the remaining local units withdrew to the east. At around 2:30 p.m., the 2nd Squadron reached the peninsula base and began building a main line of defense there. By the end of the day, 1,600 Allied soldiers had gone ashore. The two Japanese companies stationed at Arawe withdrew in an orderly fashion towards the northeast and established positions at Didmop am Pulie, about 13 km from the main line of defense. The naval personnel that Umtingalu had defended withdrew in a disorderly manner.

The ships in front of Arawe had been attacked by Japanese airplanes at around 9 a.m., before they were retreating. Eight Aichi D3A dive bombers , escorted by 56 Mitsubishi A6M fighter planes, circumvented the Allied fighter protection from 16 Lockheed P-38s and attacked the landing craft, which were just bringing the first supplies ashore. The bombs dropped did not hit any of the boats. The Japanese did not suffer any losses themselves. In a second attack at around 11:15 a.m., an A6M was shot down by a P-38 and at around 6:00 p.m. four P-38s pushed away a formation of 30 A6Ms and 12 Mitsubishi G4Ms and Ki-21s . In this last attempt at attack, two A6Ms were lost, but the pilots were able to save themselves.

Air strikes and the construction of a beachhead

While the ground troops encountered no resistance in the following days, there were repeated air strikes on the supply convoys. The second convoy, calling at Arawe on December 16, lost the transport ship APc-21 in continued attacks . The sub-fighter SC-743 , the mine sweeper YMS-50 and four LCTs were damaged, leaving 42 dead and wounded. Another convoy was attacked three times by dive bombers on December 21 when it was being unloaded at Arawe. At least 150 Japanese planes were used that day. Air strikes were also carried out on December 26th, 27th and 31st. In most cases, the coastal observers deployed provided an advance warning time of 30 to 60 minutes, which enabled the Allied air forces to frequently launch successful interception missions. At least 24 Japanese bombers and 32 fighters were shot down over and near Arawe between December 15 and 31. At the same time, Allied airmen launched attacks on the airfields of Rabaul and Madang in New Guinea, which they suspected to be the starting point of the Japanese attacks against Arawe. On December 17, 19 and 23, 14 Japanese fighters were shot down over Rabaul. In addition to the air strikes, traffic jams and poor coordination at the House Fireman beach section also hampered the Allied supplies. The men deployed for unloading were inexperienced and too few, which is why some transporters left again without being fully unloaded.

Two American trucks at Arawe, December 1943 or early 1944

The heavy losses of the Japanese air forces in the fighting over Arawe, Cape Gloucester and Rabaul meant that from January 1, 1944, they only flew minor night attacks. Often they were already being used to capacity by Allied attacks on their own bases, which lasted through January and February. After the installation of 90-mm anti-aircraft guns near Arawe on February 1, there were hardly any Japanese attacks. Overall, the attacks could neither stop the Allied supplies nor significantly disrupt them. In the three weeks after the landing, 5,703 t of supplies and 541 artillery pieces and vehicles were brought to Arawe. On February 20, the permanent withdrawal of the Japanese naval aviation forces from New Britain to Truk took place , which practically ruled out any serious air threat to New Britain.

Following the landing, the 59th Engineer Company set up the first facilities for logistics processing in the area. Due to the air raids, an underground military hospital, which was completed in January 1944, was given top priority. In April it was replaced by an above-ground hospital with 120 beds. The planned facilities to support the PT speedboats were built on Pilelo, including a refueling pier and scattered fuel bunkers. A 52 m long pier was also built on House Fireman Beach between February 26 and April 22. It was geared towards the handling of smaller ships, while three additional jetties for LCTs were built slightly to the north. On January 13th, a 280 by 30 m airfield was leveled in order to launch aircraft for artillery observation from there. It was later enlarged and paved with coral sand. A total of 8 km of all-weather roads and a number of fresh water wells were built. On Pilelo, a seawater desalination plant supplied the soldiers with fresh water. A continuing shortage of building materials delayed many of the projects and forced the pioneers to improvise and recycle waste.

The ground forces strengthened their defensive positions in the weeks following the invasion. Since all weapons and other equipment not worn on the body had been lost in the failed attempt to land at Umtingalu, replacement was dropped by parachute over the bridgehead on the afternoon of December 16. The A Company received an additional 50 men replacement personnel. In the days following the landing, the B Company was almost completely relocated from Pilelo to the mainland. In order to have a clear field of fire, the troops cleared the vegetation in front of their main line of defense and laid land mines there. A network of telephone cables was also laid. A loose reserve line of defense was established closer to Cape Mercus and patrols controlled the coasts to prevent Japanese raiders from entering the rear area. They encountered between ten and twenty Japanese and killed them near Cape Mercus. In addition, a number of observation posts were set up in smaller villages, strategically important points on the peninsula and some offshore islands. Umtingalu was secured by a small squad of American soldiers who also laid a connecting path from there to the main line of defense.

Japanese response

The commander of the Japanese 17th Division , Lieutenant General Sakai Yasushi , ordered the reinforcement of the troops at Arawe immediately after he was informed of the landings there. But he did not consider it the expected main attack on western New Britain. Komori received orders to hasten the march of his troops. The 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment, stationed at Cape Bushing, 40 miles east of Arawe on the south coast of New Britain, was also deployed to repel the attack. The battalion left one of its infantry companies behind as a cover force when marching off. Komori received the command of all troops deployed at Arawe, which were referred to as the Komori combat group. The battalion of the 141st Infantry Regiment, deployed in the first section by sea, landed at the village of Omoi on the night of December 18 and proceeded from there overland to meet Komori near Didmop. The battalion needed a total of eight days for the eleven kilometer route, as it got lost more often and interrupted the march as soon as American troops were suspected to be nearby. Komori had already arrived in Didmop on December 19 and integrated the soldiers arriving from Umtingalu into his unit. From the reports of these soldiers he concluded that the number of enemy forces at Arawe had been significantly overestimated, which is why he decided on December 20 to counterattack their positions.

American soldiers after a patrol, December 1943

After the bridgehead was established, the Director Task Force sent a series of reconnaissance patrols into the surrounding jungle. Cunningham was given the task of gathering information about the Japanese positions in western New Guinea, which is why he sent a raid in two landing craft west on December 17 to explore the area on the River Itni . At Cape Peiho , 32 km west of Arawe, this troop encountered eight Japanese barges on December 18, which were carrying parts of the 1st Battalion of the 141st Infantry Regiment. After a brief gun battle, the Americans were forced to abandon their landing craft and return to Arawe along the coast. On the same day landing craft moving near Umtingalu came under fire from Japanese barges, but were able to withdraw. More barges were spotted near Arawe on December 23rd. Since he feared the attack of strong enemy formations on his positions, Cunningham asked Krueger on December 24th whether the 2nd Battalion of the 158th Infantry Regiment could be landed and placed under his command. Krueger approved this and sent three of the four battalion companies to Arawe. The first arrived on December 27, the other two in early January.

After reorganizing his forces while waiting for the 1st Battalion, Komori began advancing on Arawe on December 24th. He reached the airfield to the north in the morning hours of the following day. On the same morning, parts of his unit succeeded in luring two powerful raiders north-east of Umtingalu, transported in trucks, into an ambush. The troops withdrew to the village and reinforced the troops already there. Throughout the day, they fought off repeated attempts by the Japanese to encircle the place, killing at least three of them. Since Cunningham believed this to be the vanguard of a much larger enemy unit advancing from Gasmata, he finally gave up the place and pulled the soldiers behind his main line of defense. Around 10:30 p.m., around 50 Japanese attacked them. While they were initially able to break through in several places and clear out some defensive nests, they were finally repulsed by mortar fire . The Americans recorded one death and eight wounded and estimated that they had hit twelve Japanese.

On the nights of December 26th and 27th, 15 soldiers attacked the eastern corner of the defense line. They caused only minor losses and could both be repulsed by fire from light mortars. On December 28, Cunningham sent a company the size of a company in the direction of Umtingalu, but they withdrew after coming under fire from light mortars and snipers. Another patrol heading west lost six men to rifle and machine gun fire before they too withdrew. On the same day, Komori sent a squad of twenty to thirty soldiers to take down the American mortar positions. The soldiers bypassed the defense line to the west by wading through the swamp there, but were spotted before they reached dry land again. The Americans then took action against this group and killed 17 attackers by rifle and mortar fire.

The 1st Battalion arrived in the Arawe area on the afternoon of December 29th. In early January it launched a series of unsuccessful, minor attacks against the Americans before retreating to positions 350 to 500 meters north of their positions. There they built a network of shallow trenches and foxholes that were difficult to spot in the area. The approximately 100 Japanese positioned on this line, including their six machine guns, routed regularly to avoid targeting the American mortars and artillery.

American counterattack

An American raid troop localized the Japanese defensive positions on January 1, 1944. A company deployed against this same morning had to withdraw under heavy fire with three dead and 15 wounded. Another attack by the Japanese was repulsed on January 4, killing three Americans and sustaining 21 wounds. This attack was carried out without artillery support in order to exploit a possible surprise effect. In addition, several landing craft were supposed to carry out a mock attack on Umtingalu. Further attacks on January 6th, 7th and 11th did not produce a breakthrough either; the Americans could only get a rough idea of ​​the structure and strength of the Japanese defenses. Cunningham and his staff officers carried out these attacks on a limited scale, as they understood they had already achieved the mission objectives at Arawe and wanted to avoid unnecessary losses.

USMC tanks support a US Army advance, January 16, 1944

On January 6th, Cunningham requested further reinforcements, including tanks, in order to be able to break through the Japanese lines. Krueger approved this as well, sending the F  Company of the 158th Infantry Regiment and the B  Company of the 1st Tank Battalion of the United States Marine Corps (USMC), arriving on January 10 and 12, respectively. On the 13th and 15th, tanks and two companies of the 158th Infantry Regiment trained in combined arms combat while raiding parties from the 112th Cavalry Regiment continued to scout Japanese positions. At that time, the Komori Kampfgruppe had recorded losses of 65 dead, 75 wounded and 14 missing, which it had sustained in its own offensive actions and as a result of the attacks by the Americans. In addition, she suffered from supply shortages and an outbreak of dysentery among her ranks.

On January 16, the Director Task Force launched a major attack on the Japanese positions. In the morning one had season severe Consolidated B-24 Liberator Bomber 136 each 450 kg bombs dropped on it, while 20 B-25 roamed over the field and attacking targets on sight. After heavy preparatory fire from artillery and mortars, the American tanks advanced on the enemy together with two companies from the 158th Infantry and one company from the 112th Cavalry Regiment. The tanks acted as a spearhead, each followed by a squad of infantry. The troops of the infantry regiment and three tanks were initially kept in reserve, but at around 12 p.m. they were set off to clear Japanese positions that had been bypassed. By 4:00 p.m. the attack had reached its goal - the removal of the Japanese line of defense - and Cunningham ordered a retreat to its own lines. Two tanks that were no longer roadworthy were blown up by their crews beforehand. American pioneers began the following day to destroy the Japanese fortifications. The Americans assumed they had killed 139 Japanese in the battle, while they themselves recorded 22 dead and 64 wounded.

After the attack, Komori withdrew his troops to the airfield to defend it. Since this played no role in the plans of the Americans, they did not proceed against it, which is why in the following weeks there were only random skirmishes with patrolling raiders or occasional ambushes on both sides. The supply problems, including food, favored the spread of diseases among the Japanese. Attempts to deliver supplies by sea were often thwarted by PT speedboats, and Komori's combat group did not have enough porters to bring in sufficient supplies by land. For these reasons, Komori came to the conclusion that the presence of his troops was not serving any purpose and informed his superiors on February 8 that the supply problems threatened to eliminate them. These ordered to hold the positions anyway and tried to motivate them by two mentions of their defensive achievements around the airfield.

consequences

The landing of the 1st Marine Division on December 26th at Cape Gloucester was successful. The marines were able to capture the airfields there - the main target of the landing - on December 29, against only light Japanese resistance. Heavy fighting broke out in the first two weeks of January as they set about extending their bridgehead south and east to secure Borger Bay. After this was successful, encounters with the Japanese were only occasional and light, whereupon raiding parties combed the area intensively in order to locate the main body of the Japanese units. On February 16, raiding parties from Cape Gloucester and Arawe met for the first time near the village of Gilnit. On February 23, the Japanese units at Cape Gloucester received the order to withdraw to Rabaul.

Retreat routes of the Japanese armed forces from western New Britain

The following day, February 24, the same order was issued to Komori as part of the general Japanese withdrawal from western New Britain. They immediately began withdrawing from their positions to the north in order to join forces with other units via the routes there. The Americans were not aware of the withdrawal until February 27, when an attack near Arawe failed. The Director Task Force then set up additional observation posts along the coast and increased the radius of their patrols. Komori fell behind the main body of his troops with his staff officer and two soldiers and was killed in an ambush by the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines near San Remo on April 9th.

The Japanese troops at Arawe suffered heavier losses than their allied opponents. The Director Task Force lost 118 dead, 352 wounded and four missing between December 15 and the end of major combat operations. Most of these casualties were recorded by the 112th Cavalry Regiment with 72 dead, 142 wounded and the four missing. 304 men died on the Japanese side, three were taken prisoners of war.

In the period immediately after the Japanese withdrawal, the Director Task Force initially remained with Arawe. Following general guidelines, she strengthened her defensive positions and switched to general training. Some soldiers were given leave from the front in Australia or home leave in the United States. Patrols continued to roam the area in search of dispersed Japanese. In April 1944, parts of the 40th Infantry Division arrived to take over the occupation of the area. At the beginning of June the order to march to New Guinea was given to the 112th Cavalry Regiment, whereby the Director Task Force was dissolved. From June 8, it embarked and cast off in the direction of Aitape in New Guinea, where it later fought in the Battle of the Driniumor . The 40th Infantry Division stayed with Arawe until November 1944 when it was replaced by the Australian 5th Division .

Historians disagree as to whether the fighting at Arawe was justified from an Allied perspective. The official historiography of the USMC concludes that the binding of two experienced Japanese battalions at Arawe made the landing at Cape Gloucester easier. In contrast, Samuel Eliot Morison concludes in his History of United States Naval Operations in World War II that Arawe has shown little value because the Allies did not use the natural harbor and the forces stationed in the garrison could have been used more sensibly elsewhere can. Official US Army historiography concluded that although the landings of Arawe and Cape Gloucester may not have been necessary to eliminate Rabaul or advance into the Philippines, they did bring certain advantages and did not result in unusually high losses.

Remarks

  1. ^ A b James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 83.
  2. ^ A b c Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, p. 343.
  3. ^ Robert W. Coakley: American Military History. 1989, pp. 504-507.
  4. ^ Robert W. Coakley: American Military History. 1989, pp. 510-511.
  5. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, pp. 224-225.
  6. ^ Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, pp. 324-325.
  7. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, pp. 272-273.
  8. ↑ a b c d John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 277.
  9. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, pp. 273-274.
  10. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 274.
  11. ↑ Kevin C. Holzimmer: General Walter Krueger. Unsung Hero of the Pacific War. 2007, p. 117.
  12. ^ A b Samuel Eliot Morison: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier. 2001, p. 372.
  13. ^ A b Gordon L. Rottman: World War II Pacific Island Guide. A Geo-Military Study. 2002, p. 186.
  14. ^ A b Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, p. 334.
  15. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 283.
  16. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, pp. 274-275.
  17. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 279.
  18. ^ Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, p. 335.
  19. ^ A b c Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, p. 336.
  20. ^ Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, pp. 334-335.
  21. ^ Daniel E. Barbey: MacArthur's Amphibious Navy. Seventh Amphibious Force Operations 1943-1945. 1969, p. 101.
  22. ^ Gordon L. Rottman: World War II US Cavalry Units. Pacific theater. 2009, pp. 21-22.
  23. ^ Gordon L. Rottman: World War II US Cavalry Units. Pacific theater. 2009, p. 13.
  24. ^ Gordon L. Rottman: World War II US Cavalry Units. Pacific theater. 2009, p. 24.
  25. ^ Daniel E. Barbey: MacArthur's Amphibious Navy. Seventh Amphibious Force Operations 1943-1945. 1969, pp. 101, 103-104.
  26. ↑ G. Hermon Gill: Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945. 1968, p. 338.
  27. ^ A b Samuel Eliot Morison: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier. 2001, p. 374.
  28. ^ Samuel Eliot Morison: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier. 2001, p. 373.
  29. ↑ G. Hermon Gill: Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945. 1968, pp. 335-336.
  30. ↑ Eric Feldt: The Coastwatchers. 1991, pp. 341-349.
  31. ^ A b c Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, pp. 339-340.
  32. ^ Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, pp. 327-328.
  33. ↑ Normal Japanese infantry battalions had a headquarters, battalion troops directly subordinate to this, four infantry companies, a machine gun company and a gun platoon or a gun company. Gordon L. Rottman: Japanese Army in World War II. Conquest of the Pacific 1941–42. 2005, pp. 29-31.
  34. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 280.
  35. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, pp. 281-282
  36. ^ A b c John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 287.
  37. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, pp. 276-277.
  38. ^ Gordon L. Rottman: US Special Warfare Units in the Pacific Theater 1941-1945. 2005, p. 37.
  39. ^ Samuel Eliot Morison: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier. 2001, pp. 374-375.
  40. ^ Bernhardt L. Mortensen: Rabaul and Cape Gloucester. 1950, pp. 318 and 328.
  41. ^ Bernhardt L. Mortensen: Rabaul and Cape Gloucester. 1950, pp. 332-335.
  42. ↑ G. Hermon Gill: Royal Australian Navy 1942-1945. 1968, pp. 336-337.
  43. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 66.
  44. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 67.
  45. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, pp. 66-67.
  46. ^ A b Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, p. 338.
  47. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 284.
  48. ^ Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, pp. 338-339.
  49. ^ A b c John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 285.
  50. ↑ The author Norman Mailer , who later fought with the regiment in the Philippines, dedicated a section in his book The Naked and the Dead to the unsuccessful attempt at landing. James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 275.
  51. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 71.
  52. ^ A b George Odgers: Air War Against Japan 1943-1945. 1957, p. 127.
  53. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, pp. 285-286
  54. ^ Daniel E. Barbey: MacArthur's Amphibious Navy. Seventh Amphibious Force Operations 1943-1945. 1969, pp. 101, 106-107.
  55. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, pp. 286-287.
  56. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 73.
  57. ^ Samuel Eliot Morison: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier. 2001, p. 376.
  58. ^ A b c Bernhardt L. Mortensen: Rabaul and Cape Gloucester. 1950, p. 336.
  59. ↑ Ikuhiko Hata with Yasuho Izawa and Christopher F. Shores: Japanese Naval Air Force Fighter Units and Their Aces 1935–1945. 2011, p. 65.
  60. ^ A b c d Samuel Eliot Morison: Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier. 2001, p. 377.
  61. ↑ a b Ikuhiko Hata with Yasuho Izawa and Christopher F. Shores: Japanese Naval Air Force Fighter Units and Their Aces 1935–1945. 2011, p. 66.
  62. ^ Edward J. Drea: MacArthur's Ultra. Codebreaking and the War against Japan. 1942-1945. 1992, p. 91.
  63. ↑ According to Hara, the naval aviators stationed in Rabaul lost three fighters on the 16th, four on the 21st, five on the 26th and four each on the 27th and 31st. On the 31st, Cape Gloucester was attacked in addition to Arawe. Ikuhiko Hata with Yasuho Izawa and Christopher F. Shores: Japanese Naval Air Force Fighter Units and Their Aces 1935–1945. 2011, p. 66.
  64. ^ Bernhardt L. Mortensen: Rabaul and Cape Gloucester. 1950, pp. 337-338.
  65. ^ Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, pp. 340-342.
  66. ^ Bernhardt L. Mortensen: Rabaul and Cape Gloucester. 1950, p. 341.
  67. ↑ Ikuhiko Hata with Yasuho Izawa and Christopher F. Shores: Japanese Naval Air Force Fighter Units and Their Aces 1935–1945. 2011, pp. 66-69.
  68. ↑ Ikuhiko Hata with Yasuho Izawa and Christopher F. Shores: Japanese Naval Air Force Fighter Units and Their Aces 1935–1945. 2011, p. 69.
  69. ^ Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces, Pacific 1951 192
  70. ^ Bernhardt L. Mortensen: Rabaul and Cape Gloucester. 1950, p. 335.
  71. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 75.
  72. ^ Charles A. Willoughby (Ed.): Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. 1966, pp. 237-238.
  73. ^ A b Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, p. 342.
  74. ^ A b James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 77.
  75. ^ A b John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 288.
  76. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 78.
  77. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, pp. 78-79.
  78. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 79.
  79. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, pp. 79-81.
  80. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, pp. 81-82.
  81. ^ Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, p. 392.
  82. ^ A b c John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 289.
  83. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 82.
  84. ^ A b James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 84.
  85. ^ Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, pp. 392-393.
  86. ^ Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, p. 393.
  87. ^ A b Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, p. 394.
  88. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, pp. 289-294.
  89. ^ Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, p. 403.
  90. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 294.
  91. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, pp. 84-85.
  92. ^ Henry I. Shaw, Douglas T. Kane: Isolation of Rabaul. 1963, p. 427.
  93. ^ A b c James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 85.
  94. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 106.
  95. ↑ United States Army Center of Military History: Combat Chronicle of the 40th Infantry Division. Retrieved August 28, 2013.
  96. ↑ James Scott Powell: Learning Under Fire. A Combat Unit in the Southwest Pacific. 2006, p. 107.
  97. ^ Gavin Long: The Final Campaigns. 1963, p. 241.
  98. ↑ John Miller junior: CARTWHEEL. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, pp. 294-295.

literature

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Web links

Commons : Battle for Arawe  - Collection of images, videos and audio files
Japanese name: As is common in Japan, the family name comes before the first name in this article . So Komori is the family name, Masamitsu the first name.