Battle for Wakde-Sarmi

Battle of Wakde-Sarmi
(also Battle of Lone Tree Hill)

date	May 17, 1944 to September 2, 1944
place	Wakde , Maffin Bay , Sarmi
output	Allied victory

Parties to the conflict
United States 48 United States	Japanese Empire Japan
Commander
Douglas McArthur , Walter Krueger , Jens A. Doe , Edwin D. Patrick , Clarence S. Ridley , Franklin C. Sibert	Teshima Fusatarō , Hachiro Tagami , Soemon Matsuyama , Naoyasu Yoshino , Shigeru Yamada
Troop strength
approx. 20,000	approx. 15,000
losses
400 dead, 1,500 injured, 15 missing	14,870 dead

Overview - Pacific War

The Battle of Wakde-Sarmi , also Battle of Lone Tree Hill called, was an Allied landing operations on the coastal strip near the Maffin Bay and Sarmi to assume the barrier island Wakde and safeguard the coastal strip between Arare and Sarmi in Netherlands New Guinea during the Pacific War in Second world war .

prehistory

From Cape D'Urville , the distance west across the bay to Manokwari on the Vogelkop Peninsula is about 400 kilometers. There are many islets and islets across from the northern entrance to Geelvink Bay . The Schouten group includes Biak , Supiori , Owi and Mios Woendi ; Yapen , Mios Noem and Noemfoor are south and west of the Schoutens. Many of the islands are large enough to accommodate airfields, some of which were built by the Japanese . The Allies focused on Biak. The area on the southeastern shore of this island is well suited for airfields, and the Japanese had started building airfields there in late 1943.

Biak is about 525 kilometers northwest of Hollandia . The city of Sarmi is located on the mainland of New Guinea about 290 kilometers southeast of Biak and 230 kilometers northwest of Hollandia. Before the Second World War , Sarmi was the seat of the local Dutch East India government and a small trading center. In the final months of 1943, the Japanese began to occupy the Sarmi region to establish supply, troop and air bases, as the region was to be an important defense structure on Japan's main strategic line of defense during the retreat. About 10 kilometers east of Sarmi, the Japanese built the Sawar airfield, which was operational until April 1, 1944. 6.5 kilometers further east, on the coast of Maffin Bay, the Japanese began hastily building another runway in early 1944. About 32 kilometers east of Sarmi and about 3 kilometers off the coast are the Wakde Islands, Insumar and Insumanai .

Wakde was captured by the Japanese in April 1942 during their occupation of Dutch New Guinea. The airfield built on Wakde was discovered during American reconnaissance flights in February 1943. By the following September this had been equipped with a radio station and quarters for around 1,000 men. There were also defensive caves and shelters , 20mm anti-aircraft cannons and machine guns . Two tanks of the type 95 Ha-Go Light of the tank unit of the 36th Division of the Japanese Army were stationed on Wakde.

The Japanese situation

When the Japanese withdrew their main strategic line of resistance to the west against Wakde-Sarmi in late 1943 and early 1944, Lieutenant General Teshima Fusatarō's 2nd Army had been instructed to hold this area at all costs and to use the 36th Division for this purpose , minus the 222nd Infantry on Biak. But after the loss of Hollandia in April, Wakde-Sarmi had become an important area with no protection from the east, north or south. The next base to the west was the island of Biak, about 320 km away, which was only partially developed. Since the area around Wakde-Sarmi could no longer be defended, the imperial headquarters informed the 2nd Army on May 2 that the main strategic line of resistance in the New Guinea area should be withdrawn to the Biak-Manokwari line.

Following the Take Ichi Convoy disaster , Lieutenant General Korechika Anami , commander of the 2nd Regional Army , recommended a series of restructuring measures for Western New Guinea. He suggested moving the 219th Infantry from Palau to Biak and sending another regiment of the 35th Division from Halmahera , where their remains had finally landed after the disaster, to New Guinea. General Anami also had plans to send a regiment from the 32nd Division to Biak to reinforce the 222nd Infantry, or at least move the division to the Vogelkop Peninsula. He also suggested moving the 2nd Amphibious Brigade , a recently organized unit trained in small boat transport and amphibious warfare, from the Philippines to Manokwari or Biak. However, the imperial headquarters was aware that these plans were not feasible due to a lack of available ships. Therefore, it only authorized the concentration of the 35th Division in Sorong , which was completed by the end of May. The 32nd Division was stationed in Halmahera and reorganized there. The new line signified a strategic retreat of over 965 km from the Wakde-Sarmi area since March 1944. Biak and Manokwari in front of the new line were to be held as outposts as long as possible. The armed forces of the Wakde-Sarmi area were effectively written off as losses and instructed to hold out as best they could.

The yuki unit

The entire force in the Sarmi area was called the Yuki unit. The Matsuyama Force, commanded by Colonel Soemon Matsuyama , the commanding officer of 224th Infantry, was in Armopa , about halfway between Sarmi and Hollandia, when the Allies landed on the mainland across from Wakde on May 17. Almost at the same time as the Matsuyama troops withdrew to Hollandia, General Tagami divided the Wakde-Sarmi area into three defense sectors:

The right sector: The island of Wakde and 21 km of coastline from Tementoe Creek West to the Woske River . Defended by 300 men under Lieutenant Colonel Kato.

The middle sector: West about 7 km to Sawar Creek with the Sawar airfield. Defended by about 2,500 men under Colonel Naoyasu Yoshino.
The left sector: From Sawar Creek about 10.5 km to the west to Tevar Creek . Defended by about 2,500 men under Major General Shigeru Yamada.

In addition to these defense sectors and the Matsuyama Force, there were a number of independent units operating under the Yuki group; Patrols on the coast far west of Sarmi and at points deep inland.

The total Japanese troop strength in the Sarmi region, including the temporarily absent Matsuyama force, was about 11,000 men. Of these, just over half were trained and effective combat troops. The most accurate estimates made by the Allies before May 17 were a total of 6,500 Japanese, of whom about 4,000 were considered combat troops.

Allied planning

Originally it was planned to take Wakde during the Hollandia operation, which was then discarded. However, the area around Wakde-Sarmi quickly moved back into the focus of the Allies, as the Japanese built more airfields there and concentrated troops and supplies . Indeed, the Allied Air Forces believed that an early capture of the Wakde-Sarmi region after the capture of Hollandia was a prerequisite for further movement towards the Philippines . When the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered General MacArthur to provide air support for operations in the Central Pacific in March 1944 , the occupation of both the Wakde-Sarmi area and the island of Biak became an important part of the strategy.

During the Hollandia operation, MacArthur conferred with his staff in order to complete the preparations for the operation of the Wakde Islands as quickly as possible. On April 29, he informed the War Department that he would attack positions in the Wakde region around May 5, with the primary goal of “getting more airfields for the air force forward.” In addition, small naval bases were to be wiped out to prevent enemy attacks on the Hollandia area and to support later own attacks on the Vogelkop Peninsula.

The Wakde-Sarmi Operation

It was decided to use a division in Sarmi without a regimental combat team and to use the regimental team for the conquest of Wakde. The 163rd regimental combat team of the 41st Division (TORNADO Task Force) was instructed to secure a beachhead in the Toem-Arare region, to occupy the island of Wakde and to protect the expansion of the necessary base. Wakde was too small an island to be able to land all the necessary combat and supply troops directly without serious overload. Since Toem was in the immediate vicinity of enemy coastal artillery , which may have been stationed on Wakde, it was planned to land in Arara first and from there to take position for the Wakde invasion.

Plan changes

Preparations for the Wakde-Sarmi operation quickly neared completion in the first week of May. The three combat teams of the 41st Division had been relieved in Hollandia and Aitape and were unloading their supplies. Naval units gathered in the two designated staging areas . Allied air forces had started bombing the targets before the attack.

Admiral Barbey , in charge of coordinating naval planning, suggested on May 4th that D-Day should be postponed to May 21st and gave two reasons for the postponement:

Higher tides on May 21st in the Wakde area than on May 15th and
Due to high bottlenecks in the loading of troops, equipment and supplies in the Hollandia area, proper and complete preparation is not possible.

General Krueger , who was responsible for coordinating all planning for the Wakde-Sarmi operation, immediately convened a conference of representatives from the ALAMO Forces , Allied Air Forces and Allied Naval Forces to discuss Admiral Barbey's proposal. The conference attendees, who met on May 6, decided that the operation could begin on May 16 at the earliest (one day after the date already set), but that important strategic considerations could no longer be made. So May 21st would be preferable. Such a delay would greatly reduce the congestion in Hollandia and give the Allied air forces time for many more attacks against the target area. General Krueger immediately informed General MacArthur of the recommendations made at the conference.

To clarify the details of this revised concept, a new planning conference was held on May 9th at the headquarters of the ALAMO armed forces. Conference attendees included General MacArthur's chief of staff; the commanders of the ALAMO armed forces, the allied air and naval forces and representatives of the Advanced Echelon of the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh Amphibious Force . After extensive discussion, the conference participants decided that the proposed Wakde-Biak operation could be performed. The forces originally planned for Wakde-Sarmi were considered sufficient. A regimental combat team was considered strong enough for the Wakde phase and it was expected that the rest of the 41st Division could occupy the airfields on Biak. Finally, the conference decided to set D-Day for Wakde to May 17th and Z-Day for Biak to May 27th.

At the same time, Japanese shipping and port facilities in Surabaya on Java were to be bombed by aircraft from the aircraft carriers USS Saratoga and HMS Illustrious (→ Operation Transom ).

B-25 Mitchell bombed Wakde in May 1944 .

course

The HMAS Shropshire bombed on May 16, the Sawar Airfield

The Japanese positions on Wakde had been hit by American carrier aircraft on April 21, 1944 in preparation for the Hollandia invasion . The only resistance was scattered anti-aircraft fire . Further attacks were carried out by land-based bombers starting April 28, supplemented by bombing by Berkey's Task Force 75 from April 29 . The weather then prevented flight operations until May 13, when the Fifth Air Force again launched heavy attacks against Wakde and Biak.

A landing flotilla consisting of two troop carriers and 11 LCI s took off from Aitape on May 15 with the 163rd Regimental Combat Team, and the entire assault group assembled in Hollandia on May 16, secured by cruiser troops under Crutchley and Berkey. The Allies rightly suspected that the Japanese Navy was preparing for a decisive battle in the Philippines or the Mariana Islands and would not make serious efforts to prevent the operation.

Tagami had meanwhile sent about 800 of his men to Wakde and distributed a further 1,700 along the coast opposite the island, the rest between Sawar and Sarmi.

The landing at Arare

The first landings on May 17 on the mainland surprised Tagami. Japanese positions were bombarded by five light cruisers and ten destroyers for nearly an hour , followed by rocket bombardment of the landing beaches by two LCIs. A beachhead was quickly secured and artillery deployed to support the landings planned for the next day on Wakde. Landings also took place on Insumanai Island south of Wakde, where mortars and heavy machine guns were set up.

Commanding Brigadier General Jens A. Doe of the 41st Infantry Division and his 1st Lt. Rob D. Trimble during the Arare landing

The bridgehead stretched about 4 miles west of Arare to the River Tor and east almost equidistant from Tementoe Creek. Between these two waters there is a hard sandy beach that was about 250 meters deep and only interrupted by a small stream. Behind this stretch of coast was a low, somewhat swampy area that was covered with jungle undergrowth and dense rainforest. This area extended around four to ten km inland to the foothills of mountains. The men of the landing units found a coastal path that in some places was almost the width of a road and ran along the beach.

During the landing, the 3rd Battalion of the 163rd Infantry spread out on the bank and quickly secured the Arare bridgehead. Company A of the 116th Engineer Battalion and the 27th Engineers were the next units on land and a little later the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 163rd Infantry followed. The 2nd Battalion, under the protection of the 3rd, immediately moved east towards Tementoe Creek, and shortly thereafter the 3rd reached the River Tor.

The next destination was Insumanai, the smaller of the Wakde Islands. This undefended island was captured in preparation for the impending attack on the larger Wakde Island. The only significant resistance came from the Japanese garrison on Wakde, which opened fire on May 17th with mortars and machine guns. Meanwhile, on the mainland, General Tagami ordered his dispersed forces to return to the Sarmi region.

Towards evening all units were prepared for the night and had buried themselves. The final details for the capture of Wakde the next morning were discussed and decided at headquarters. The artillery stationed on the mainland, the group on Insumanai and some of the offshore ships were to fire on Wakde all night. At 7:15 a.m. on May 18, Fifth Air Force planes were scheduled to launch an hour-long bombing of Wakde. Heavy sea and artillery fire was planned at 8:30 a.m., first on the planned landing beach on the south bank of Wakde and then on the north side of the island. The landing itself was planned for 9:00 a.m. in six waves.

Conquest of Wakde

The Conquest of Wakde (Operation Straightline)

USS LCI-340 and other landing units in the Tor / Toem area

The core of the Japanese garrison on Wakde was the 9th Company of the 3rd Battalion of the 224th Infantry. This company was reinforced by a platoon of mountain artillery with 75 mm cannons and a few mortars , as well as light and heavy machine gun troops; a total of around 380 men. In addition, there were 140 naval men and a battery from the 53rd anti-aircraft battalion, most of whose weapons had long been dismantled. Some units for the airfield and service personnel brought the entire Japanese strength of the island to almost 800 soldiers.

The guns of the Japanese defenders were made of lightweight mortars or rifles and a few heavier weapons, such as 20-mm anti-aircraft guns , machine guns and machine guns of caliber 50 from damaged Japanese aircraft. Apparently none of the Japanese 75mm mountain guns survived the preliminary bombing of the island of Wakde.

American soldiers on the beach at Wakde

The first wave of LCVPs with Company B on board received Japanese rifle and machine gun fire from about 300 meters from the beach. Nevertheless, they landed on Wakde at 9:10 a.m. Shortly afterwards, two tanks were landed. A third had a defect and another fell from the loading ramp of the LCM into the water. The enemy fire increased more and more from the flanks, but the bridgehead was quickly secured. The two tanks swiveled west with the B and F companies to expand the position. Company C advanced north towards the runway and Company A destroyed a Japanese machine gun position on a small hill in the southeast. As Company C pushed further into the interior of the island, the Japanese resistance increased and they got caught in a crossfire . It took a few hours and required the help of tanks to take the enemy shelters, which were very well hidden under fallen coconut trees and undergrowth .

Meanwhile, Company B reached the airfield. Shortly afterwards, company F. After some fighting south of the runway and the destruction of the Japanese bunkers there , Company C was on the airfield at around 11:30 a.m. Company F was held up to the northwest by enemy machine gun fire.

The units continued to advance to the north coast of Wakde until 1:30 p.m., as Japanese resistance from three bunkers had to be broken on the way there. Only in the north-west did the Japanese try to put up stubborn resistance. Only by means of heavy artillery fire from the mainland and new weapons supplies, which arrived late at noon, the Japanese succeeded in eliminating all but dispersed groups.

American units in cover on Wakde

It was precisely these groups that troubled the Americans with their suicidal attacks until May 20th. The repair work on the runway that had begun the day before was interrupted again and again.

The airfield was ready for action around noon on May 21st. The first planes landed on the island that afternoon, two days earlier than planned. Within a few days, the runway was sufficiently repaired and enlarged so that Wakde could support the Biak operation on May 27 and the advance on the Mariana Islands in mid-June.

The Kumamba Islands , 16 km north of Sarmi, were occupied on May 19 without Japanese resistance and a radar station was set up there for early warning for Wakde.

Japanese response after landing

General Tagami ordered the Matsuyama troops back to Sarmi on May 17th after the Allied landings. About 250 deaths occurred in Allied air strikes, and on that day right-wing defense forces in the Toem-Arare area fled via the Tor River and Tementoe Creek. The following conquest of Wakde cost Tagami the entire island garrison of 800 men. The further Allied air and sea bombing contributed to the fact that the Yuki group probably lost over 1,000 men from May 17 to 20. The food and ammunition supplies had also been largely destroyed. On May 19, the 2nd Army ordered him to counterattack.

Tagami's plan called for a pincer movement, with the Matsuyama force in Masi-Masi , about 7 km east of Tementoe Creek, to attack Allied positions in Toem, and on the western flank the newly organized unit from the central sector to attack the Toem- Area from the south and southwest. The time was set for the night of May 25th to 26th.

Meanwhile, the reorganizing right-wing forces gathered on the west bank of the Tor River to prevent Allied advance towards the Maffin and Sawar airfields.

Lone Tree Hill

Extension of the mainland bridgehead

During the capture of Wakde, the Allied units on the mainland side limited themselves to patrols and the improvement and expansion of the roads. In addition, a supply convoy arrived, which was unloaded without incident. No enemy units could be made out on the eastern flank beyond Tementoe Creek. Meanwhile, the western flank was ready to cross the River Tor and scout out enemy activity there. This was postponed until the afternoon of May 18 after General Doe believed that Wakde had been largely secured. Then a battalion set up a bridgehead on the west bank in preparation for a crossing for the rest of the crew. The next day, evidence was found that the Japanese intended to keep the terrain west of the river. Two organized and well-armed enemy patrols were found near Maffin No. 1, a local beach village about 3 km past the River Tor, and another enemy patrol was at Maffin No. 2, a hamlet about 2, 5 km upstream. One day later, the Japanese unsuccessfully opened fire on the bridgehead with mortars and machine guns. The ALAMO Force informed the TORNADO Task Force, based on new information received, that the Japanese were planning a major counterattack against the Toem-Arare bridgehead. There was heavy artillery fire around the morning of May 21, but there was no attack.

General Krueger was now of the opinion that Wakde would not be secure until further information about Japanese intentions could be obtained. Accordingly, he ordered the TORNADO Task Force to launch a rapid offensive attack in the direction of Sarmi, 25 km west of the gate, in order to put the enemy on the defensive.

This was a disastrous decision based on the sparse, incomplete information available to General Krueger about the strength and planning of the Japanese armed forces at the time. It should spark a protracted and bitter struggle. However, the fighting should not be conducted under the direction of General Doe or the 163rd Regimental Combat Team. The command of the TORNADO Task Force was given to Brigadier General Edwin D. Patrick . He decided with the 158th Infantry "Bushmasters" under the command of Colonel J. Prugh Herndon to start the advance to the west ordered by the ALAMO Force. On May 23, elements of the recently arrived regiment began to relieve the 3rd Battalion of the 163rd Infantry at the mouth of the gate.

Advance west

Advance to Lone Tree Hill May 23-26, 1944

On the morning of May 23rd, L Company of the 158th Infantry advanced westward from the bridgehead at the gate. The plan was to expand the bridgehead to the west. To this end, a roadblock in Maffin No. 1 should also be set up. The entire battalion was supposed to assemble in this village and prepare for the attack that was planned on May 24 in daylight to the west towards Sarmi. This attack was to be supported by the rest of the 158th Infantry, which was to cross the gate on the 24th and 25th.
About 1.8 km west of the gate, L Company encountered very strong resistance on May 23. With the help of two companies advancing further, a 400 m wide front could be formed against the Japanese. A breakthrough against the Japanese was impossible. Only after a 15-minute support bombardment around 7.15 a.m. on May 24th did the companies advance further. Together with a flamethrower detachment from Company B of the 27th engineers, two tanks reached the lines of Company K at around 10:00 a.m. With this, the infantrymen managed to overrun the Japanese defenses. Company L reached the outskirts of Maffin No. 1 at 2:00 p.m.

Enemy positions on the west bank of the Tirfoam River west of Maffin No. 1 prevented L Company from crossing by means of intense machine gun fire. This continued up the Tirfoam, so that tank support was requested. Four tanks were then sent forward. As a result, fierce fighting developed. The Japanese infantry managed to damage three tanks so badly with an anti-tank gun that they had to be withdrawn. A flank maneuver by the US armed forces was repelled in the evening.

Meanwhile, the Japanese expanded their advance south of the 158th Infantry towards Toem and Arare. A maneuver that the TORNADO task force did not yet know about. At the same time, the delay in the action at Tirfoam gave the Yuki group enough time to move into the hills south and east of the Maffin area.

Under artillery and mortar fire from the banks of the river on suspected enemy defenses west of the river, the retreat of the 158th Infantry began on May 25 to a point 350 meters east of the Tirfoam. A bridge that crossed the Tirfoam about 200 meters inland was reached by a battalion around 9:15 a.m. Since the Japanese defenses were largely abandoned, there was hardly any resistance. Only a few gunfire disrupted the advance. Companies B and C crossed the bridge at 11:15 a.m. without incident and at noon the entire 2nd Battalion followed. Colonel Herndon set his next target on Lone Tree Hill, a prominent hill that rose from the flat coastal plain about two kilometers to the west.

First fights on Lone Tree Hill

Lone Tree Hill was named after a single tree that was depicted on top of the hill on the map used by the TORNADO Task Force at the time. In fact, the hill's coral mass was covered with dense rainforest and jungle undergrowth . Lone Tree Hill was approximately 53 m high, 1.2 km long from north to south, and 1.1 km wide from east to west. The north side sloped steeply towards Maffin Bay. A short, winding stream flowed through the eastern slope of the hill, which the 158th Infantry referred to as the "Snaky River".

Some unspecified hills were named " Mount Saksin ", including a particular peak that was about 2 km south of Lone Tree. General Tagami had moved his headquarters there. As the 158th Infantry advanced on the 24th, elements of the Yuki Group and Right Sector Force moved toward Hill 225 and Lone Tree Hill. Hill 225 was west of Lone Tree Hill and was named "Hill 225" for its height in feet . There the Japanese quickly built strong defensive positions. Together with the natural terrain barriers in the area, these effectively guarded the land approaches to the Maffin Strip, which was less than 1 km west of Lone Tree Hill.

On May 25, the Americans advanced with two battalions and were on the Snaky River by evening. Until then, they still didn't realize how strong the Japanese really were on Lone Tree Hill. The plan for May 26th was to capture the hill and a local village at the eastern end of the pass and, if possible, penetrate the Woske River , 2 km west of the hill.

Two destroyers, supported by a 15-minute artillery bombardment, fired on the supposed positions of the Japanese on the morning of the 26th until 8:45 a.m. Shortly afterwards the infantry attack began. Since this was moved too far to the east and they had to go through deep jungle, the Japanese had time to retreat to their defensive positions. The Americans could only advance about 1 km during the day and the Japanese still held the entire hill. It was now clear how strongly the hill was defended, but this was not yet known at headquarters. So the order for May 27th was that both hills be captured and the two units advance further west.

After another bombing of Japanese positions by a destroyer and land-based artillery on the morning of the 27th, Company F started another advance on hill 225. It was only discovered late the next day that they were actually on the east side of Mount Saksin, about 700 meters east of their reported location. Company B, meanwhile, was under heavy machine gun and mortar fire from hidden enemy positions on the southern and southwestern slopes of Lone Tree Hill. Company E tried to come to the rescue, but also came under fire. A patrol of Company F found meanwhile that the Japanese positions were limited to a very narrow area. Company A patrolled the west bank of the Snaky River and scouted the eastern edge of the hill. This turned out to be unoccupied. The enemy fire that morning had apparently come from the beach below the north face of Lone Tree Hill. That way, the company could dig in at the top of the hill for the night.

The next day, two tanks were brought to the mouth of the Snaky River by sea. They should move south to support the fighting. Company A and C were advancing west of Lone Tree Hill. On the hill, Company A tried to advance north to free the coast side. However, it could be stopped by the Japanese defenders who had buried themselves in caves on the cliffs. Company C continued to advance northwest, but was attacked on their left flank. As the water and ammunition supplies were running low, all companies were ordered to withdraw to the Snaky River.

LCM (Landing Craft Mechanized) as a ferry in the mouth of the Tor, late May 1944

General Patrick decided that he did not have enough men to expand his perimeter further west against such fierce opposition and decided instead to concentrate on the Japanese troops still to the south and east of the main part of the beachhead. His decision was confirmed when 200 Japanese troops attacked Toem on the night of May 27-28. In order not to lose two battalions of the 163rd Infantry, which were needed on Biak, one battalion of the 158th had to return east over the gate to defend the main bridgehead. The defensive position on the Snaky River wasn't ideal either. So the Americans withdrew 2 km to the Tirfoam River. The new line of defense was attacked on the night of May 29th to 30th. An attack that would have been successful against the endangered line on the Snaky River, but was repulsed at Tirfoam.

Realignment of the TORNADO Task Force

At the same time, General MacArthur Headquarters and the ALAMO Force were considering plans to deploy a new division in the Wakde-Sarmi area to prepare for operations further west. It was decided that the 6th Infantry Division , which had recently completed jungle and amphibious training in Eastern New Guinea, should be deployed.

While the new line of defense along the Tirfoam was being expanded by the 158th Infantry on May 30th, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 163rd Infantry moved together with the regimental headquarters to Biak. The 2nd Battalion remained on the west bank of Tementoe Creek, which marked the eastern flank of the TORNADO Task Force.

On the evening of May 30th, the task force was spread across nearly 12 miles of coastline between Tementoe Creek and the Tirfoam. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 158th Infantry and other attached units were in the area west of the gate. Various field artillery units were set up on the east side of the mouth of the gate. Headquarters was in Arare, near the main supply and ammunition depots, and was protected by the 1st Battalion of the 158th Infantry.

There were twenty-one areas of varying sizes, strengths, and distances from one another. Anti-aircraft guns were distributed to provide the greatest possible protection against low-flying Japanese aircraft. Almost all of them were manned exclusively by their operating teams. Only one position west of Arare had infantry protection. All other positions were more than 2 km from the nearest infantry positions.

Counterattack by the Japanese

While the 158th Infantry was still involved in heavy fighting over Lone Tree Hill, the two pincer arms of General Tagami's planned encirclement slowly approached the Toem-Arare area. The Yoshino Group bypassed the 158th Infantry by moving far inland. She had crossed the gate on the night of May 25th to 26th. On the 26th, leading elements of the Matsuyama group advancing from the east had positioned themselves about 4 km south of Toem.

The total strength of the Japanese in the Wakde-Sarmi area was still more than 8,000 men and not the maximum of less than 4,000 men estimated by the TORNADO Task Force.

Attack by the Japanese (Yoshino group) on the anti-aircraft guns standing in isolation on the coast in the night of May 30th to 31st, 1944

In the evening and night of May 30th to 31st, the Japanese attacked the scattered American positions on the coast west of Toem from the south. It first hit position no. 6 of battery B around 18:30, whereupon its crew withdrew to position no. 7 of battery A. But this position was also attacked shortly afterwards. The Americans repeatedly managed to repel the repeated attacks, which lasted until late at night.

At about the same time, the western position No. 8 of Battery B was attacked. Their anti-aircraft cannon overheated very quickly due to constant firing, so that the crew had no choice but to spread out into the surrounding undergrowth, where they had to survive several Japanese attacks during the night.

The next attack was on the 158th Infantry of the 1st Battalion. At 7 p.m. the 1st Battalion came under rifle and machine gun fire and at 10 p.m. the Japanese began a long attack on Company B. This was repulsed with very heavy losses.

On the morning of May 31, General Patrick, believing he would lose the last unit of the 163rd, ordered the 158th Infantry to retreat east of the gate and keep only a small bridgehead across the river. Patrick planned to stay on the defensive until the reinforcements from the 6th Division arrived.

The Japanese did not return that night and so the task force began to further strengthen their positions in the following days in anticipation of strong Japanese attacks.

Japanese withdrawal

The armed forces of Yoshino and Matsuyama had already missed every chance to gradually destroy the TORNADO Task Force. Neither Colonel Yoshino nor Colonel Matsuyama had been able to coordinate the operations of the pincer attack, and General Tagami was still at his command post on Mount Saksin due to communication and supply difficulties and the associated distance. From there he could not exercise any tactical control over the two units. After the heavy losses suffered, he decided that further efforts to capture the Toem-Arare beachhead would be unsuccessful.

On June 10, the Yoshino Force retreated southwest across the gate to move to new positions in Maffin Bay. The Matsuyama group, having difficulty organizing and collecting food, did not retreat west until two days later. In the meantime, the TORNADO Task Force waited for a combat team from the 6th Infantry Division to arrive before resuming offensive operations.

Relief by the 6th division

The plan also envisaged sending a battalion to the Sarmi Peninsula on June 9, which was to be followed by another the next day. Both should come from the 6th division. Reconnaissance teams had already landed on the peninsula and reported it as undefended. After the peninsula was secured, the two battalions were to move 16 km southeast along the coast to Lone Tree Hill. At the same time, the 158th Infantry was to advance from the gate to the west.

On June 5, the first units of the 6th Division reached Toem. The division's commander, Major General Clarence S. Ridley , demanded that none of his troops should be used offensively until at least two regimental combat teams were ashore and his men could familiarize themselves with the terrain and the situation in the region. For this reason and because the ships of the Navy were tied off Biak, General Patrick decided to postpone the actions.

The first units of the 6th Division to arrive in the Wakde-Sarmi area were the 1st Infantry Regiment and the 6th Engineering Battalion. The 1st Infantry immediately relieved the part of the 158th Infantry that held the Toem-Arare bridgehead.

General Patrick decided to continue the advance west. This attack was due to begin on the morning of June 7th. The first destination was the area at Lone Tree Hill and Hill 225. The final destination, as on May 25th, was the Woske River.

The Japanese west of the gate remained inactive on June 7, while 1st and 2nd Battalions patrolled toward Maffin No. 1, making preparations to move west the next morning. All units should interrupt their advance at 4:00 p.m. every day to take up night defense positions.

The advance began on June 8th at 8:30 a.m. Around noon, the units came under strong Japanese fire that came from shelters east of the Tirfoam. Tank support had to be requested. Two tanks arriving in the late evening were able to push the Japanese back through their fire.

After an uneventful night, the next morning the armored units, together with an infantry battalion, excavated the new Japanese positions previously explored. After this was done, all units advanced further west and reached the east bank of the Tirfoam at around 3:30 p.m. Undoubtedly, the 158th Infantry could have crossed the Tirfoam River in the afternoon, but by late morning the mission of the unit had been changed due to new orders from General Krueger, who intended to use the 158th Infantry to attack Noemfoor . The advance west of the Tirfoam had therefore been postponed until a second combat team of the 6th Division could arrive in the area to relieve the 158th Infantry.

On June 10 and 11, the 158th Infantry limited their activities to patrolling, expanding defensive positions and driving Japanese outposts westward, again in part with tank support.

The Japanese, assigned to the right sector group, fled towards Mount Saksin, leaving behind much of their weapons, ammunition and equipment.

General Franklin C. Sibert took command of the TORNADO Task Force on June 12th. His first problem was unloading the various units in the 6th Division. The division had been loaded hastily and unsystematically at Milne Bay , in eastern New Guinea, because the ships that were supposed to bring it to Toem arrived so late in Milne Bay that comprehensive loading plans could neither be drawn up nor executed. In addition, Toem beaches were unsuitable landing sites and storage facilities were inadequate. Unloading was therefore very slow and the 20th Infantry had to borrow many of the weapons operated by the crew from the 158th Infantry before they could relieve the unit at the Tirfoam.

On June 14th, the 20th Infantry of the 6th Division detained the 158th Infantry on Tirfoam. The 158th crossed the gate again and rallied in a defensive position on the west bank of Tementoe Creek. Patrols sent south and east over the next week encountered some stragglers from the Japanese garrison in Hollandia or the Matsuyama group. On June 22nd, the entire regimental combat team was relieved of all combat responsibility in the Wakde-Sarmi region and began with the final preparations for the mission on the island of Noemfoor.

The battle for Lone Tree Hill

The aim of the 20th Infantry was to capture Lone Tree Hill and 225, but the advance would continue until all the Japanese in the coastal region between Tirfoam and Sarmi inland were destroyed or driven out. Information received by the 158th Infantry Regiment was given to the 6th Infantry Division, but it turned out to be incomplete and incorrect. Beginning June 21st, the 20th Infantry was to receive a new and more detailed image of the Lone Tree Hill area.

Lone Tree Hill contained a veritable labyrinth of Japanese defenses. There were many caves and bunkers on the western cliff; Positions hidden from ground observers by tall trees or undergrowth on the cliff wall. Two 75 mm artillery pieces had been placed on the beach between ledges. At least one gun on the rocky bank and five more in the eastern gorge. All were positioned to cover most of the northwest, northern, and northeastern land attacks and sea approaches to Lone Tree Hill. On the hill plateau there were Japanese defensive positions in wooden and earth bunkers that were difficult to locate. One of the most problematic installations was a Japanese observation post in the northern part of the hill plateau. This post, about a hundred feet above the ground in the branches of a huge tree, was sturdy and cleverly camouflaged. From this position the Japanese were able to closely observe movements along the main road east of Lone Tree Hill, the entire beach area from Sarmi to Arare, and maneuvers on most of the hill. Information indicated that Lone Tree Hill was defended by 700 to 800 Japanese.

On the morning of June 21st, the 20th Infantry's activities consisted mainly of patrolling to locate enemy movement on and around Lone Tree Hill. Companies A and B were moving south of the main road towards Hill 225 and encountered strong resistance. At the end of the day, 1st Battalion's positions were essentially the same as in the morning, except that Company B was south of the road and about 600 meters from the rest of the battalion.

The 3rd Battalion patrols reached the northeast face of Lone Tree Hill in the morning and observed hostile activity on the beach below Rocky Point. Based on the reconnaissance it was decided that the 3rd Battalion should attack in the afternoon. After a 15-minute artillery and mortar fire, a company moved across the Snaky River. Japanese defenses had been built along a cliff, which they were not aware of. A company of the 3rd Battalion got stuck in heavy machine gun fire. Although attempts were made to bypass the Japanese positions and attack from the flank, it was not possible to advance. Since there was no time to bring additional missiles to the front before dark, all units of the 3rd Battalion were withdrawn to the east bank of the Snaky River for the night. The 20th Infantry was to continue the attack the next morning.

Units of the 6th Division reach the positions on hill 225 on June 22nd

The Task Force artillery and 81mm 20th Infantry mortars fired on Lone Tree Hill throughout the night, concentrating on the Rocky Point area. At 8:00 a.m. on June 22nd, 18 thunderbolts coming from Wakde fired at Lone Tree Hill and dropped their full auxiliary tanks , setting large areas on fire. After that, strong artillery fire began again for ten minutes. With little resistance, two companies were able to start climbing the hill from 8:30 a.m. It was only around 11:30 a.m. that the Japanese began to stop the advance with mortars and machine guns. So a third company was called up from the beach to support the other two. The first American soldiers reached the top of Lone Tree Hill south of Rocky Point at 12:40 p.m.

From the southeast side, two other companies tried to climb Lone Tree Hill under strong defensive fire, which they did not succeed. They withdrew to the east and from there started up the path taken by the other companies before them. By 3:00 p.m. all companies had secured a hold at the north end of the hill.

The 2nd Battalion tried to follow the others in the afternoon but only got to a point about 400 meters south of the 3rd Battalion. Increasingly strong enemy opposition made it impossible to close the gap between the two units before dark. Positions were hastily set up for night defense. The next morning the 2nd Battalion was able to climb Lone Tree Hill with little resistance.

For the second straight day, the task force commander had reason to believe that the Lone Tree Hill area was not heavily occupied and expected the hill to be secured shortly. However, in the afternoon the 3rd Battalion found indications that the Japanese had other plans. The new battalion position was within sight of the Japanese observation post, which was manned almost continuously, although four or five Japanese were shot out of it in the course of the afternoon. Due to the proximity of the post to the American position, the artillery could not shoot at him. In contrast, the Japanese shot at the American position with targeted artillery fire, which showed that the Japanese used their observers well. There was also reason to believe that the many caves and crevices along the gorge and Rocky Point contained numerous Japanese troops who apparently had deliberately allowed the Americans to reach the top of the hill without serious resistance.

The suspicion turned out to be well founded. At 5:30 p.m., approximately two Japanese companies, under the personal leadership of Colonel Matsuyama, rushed into American positions from hidden positions. The heavy fighting lasted until midnight and the Japanese had completely reversed the tactical situation on Lone Tree Hill. The 2nd Battalion found that it was completely encircled. In the early afternoon the 20th Infantry was still behind the Japanese. Now the enemy was in the rear of the 20th Infantry and had isolated both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions and cut off all lines of communication to the base of the hill.

At dawn on June 23rd, the Japanese attacked the 2nd Battalion. Since several Japanese had seized American uniforms from the fallen, it was thought that the enemy force might be a friendly patrol, and the Japanese could advance within fifteen meters of the battalion lines before they were recognized. It took an hour before the results of this misjudgment could be corrected; an hour in which both the 2nd Battalion and the Japanese suffered heavy losses. The hour ended with an enemy retreat.

In order to reach the 3rd Battalion, the 2nd tried to bypass the Japanese positions after the fighting in the morning. So they withdrew from the hill and turned north on the west bank of the Snaky River. They turned west about 250 meters south of the beach and were stopped by enemy fire at 10:00 a.m. The advance was opposed by enemy machine guns, mortars, artillery and rifle fire, but the 2nd Battalion, in which Company G suffered particularly heavy losses, slowly fought its way up through enemy fire. The first men reached the top of the hill at 2:00 p.m., but it wasn't until 4:30 p.m. that the battalion assembled and established a defensive position.

Meanwhile, a supply unit tried to reach 3rd Company with great difficulty and to supply it with water and food. However, she only had temporary contact with 3rd Company. Neither battalion received any significant amounts of supplies during the day, and only small groups of volunteers provided these units with enough food and ammunition to continue the fight. However, the supply groups managed to fight their way up and down the hill in various ways and evacuated many wounded during the day.

On the evening of June 23, there was another Japanese attack directed at both the positions of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions. These attacks came from the east side of Lone Tree Hill, with the Japanese apparently moving on the north side of the hill along Rocky Point. The first attack culminated in a bayonet attack, which was repulsed by rifle and machine gun fire with heavy losses for the Japanese. Despite this defeat, small groups of the enemy continued suicidal attacks on the night of June 23rd to 24th .

In order to cut the Japanese supply routes, General Sibert ordered an amphibious landing on the morning of June 24th to occupy the beach west of Rocky Point. The ships were loaded on the beach near the Tirfoam and ten LVTs, protected by thirteen LVTs (A), dropped Company K on the beach at 9:00 a.m. As they tried to move inland, they were immediately caught on the narrow beach by hostile fire of all kinds from the west face of Lone Tree Hill and Rocky Point. The LVTs also brought Company I to the beach at around 12:00 p.m. and then also four tanks from Company C of the 44th Tank Battalion . Upon arrival, the tanks covered the evacuation of the wounded and the landing of supplies by firing at Japanese positions in the swampy woods between the beach and the west cliff of Lone Tree Hill.

Companies I and K could not make any progress inland. Japanese defensive positions in the swampy forest prevented an advance. The four tanks tried to move away from the beach to attack these positions, but found that they could not negotiate the low clay and rock bank behind the shoreline. The tanks stayed on the beach the night to protect the infantrymen.

During the day on Lone Tree Hill, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 20th Infantry began to pull the Japanese out of the many caves and crevices at Rocky Point in the face of enemy mortar, rifle and machine gun fire. The attack teams were armed with a variety of weapons, including flamethrowers , bazookas , rifle grenades , hand grenades , BARs , TSMGs , explosives, and even gasoline . While this action was continuing, the 2nd Battalion secured the supply route up the hill with the support of Company L of the 1st Infantry.

The Japanese slowly gave up the fight the next day and were killed or trapped in their caves. The American losses continued to increase. Many of the losses were not due to Japanese actions. Many men were evacuated via the now secured supply route to the top of the hill where they died of exhaustion or fell ill.

On the beach west of Rocky Point, Companies I and K of the 1st Infantry had little success in expanding their beachhead. The tanks proved unusable in the area and were therefore withdrawn to Maffin No. 1. Only in the afternoon did the steady mortar fire, combined with the operations on the plateau, have the desired effect and companies I and K were able to shift their line of defense slightly to the south and west and towards the bank below Rocky Point over the narrow bridgehead. Patrols also managed to establish contact with units of the 20th Infantry.

In the evening, the Americans had essentially wiped out the Japanese Defense Force of 223rd Infantry in the area west of Lone Tree Hill and forced a retreat to the north of Lone Tree Hill. The commander of the Japanese 36th Division decided on June 25th to withdraw most of the armed forces of the center and the right sector west of the river Woske and to establish new defensive positions in order not to give up the 223rd infantry, most of which are not for use on the Lone Tree Hill had been used. Only the remnants of the 224th Infantry were to remain east of the Woske and retreat to impassable terrain southwest of Mount Saksin.

By June 30th, all remaining Japanese shelters on Lone Tree Hill could be excavated.

On July 1st, the 1st Infantry extended the perimeter along the coast to the Woske. On July 4th, elements of the 63rd Infantry occupied Hill 225 and the next day captured the ridge of Mount Saksin.

In the meantime, the remaining Japanese forces quickly withdrew west of the Woske. On July 12th, General Sibert sent a reconnaissance force across the river. She moved quickly over the Sawar airfield to Sawar Creek, which is about 3 miles behind the Woske. Only on the banks of Metimedan Creek, about 1.5 km behind Sawar Creek, was the force stopped by Japanese fire from positions of the left sector unit and the 3rd Battalion of the 223rd Infantry along the Metimedan and from the highlands across the river.

From July 14th, the 6th Division was replaced by the 31st Division under the command of Major General John C. Persons . From July 18 to August 31, an average of 2,500 tons of various supplies were unloaded daily in Maffin Bay. Until September 1944, smaller Japanese positions were repeatedly excavated in the Wakde-Sarmi area.

consequences

The conquest of Wakde provided General MacArthur with a new advanced base within range of his other planned objectives (→ Operation Montclair ). All remaining enemy air bases in New Guinea were now exposed to Allied bomber attacks. The enemy areas behind the Allied troops, which had already been destroyed by the conquest of Hollandia and cut off from supplies, were further brought into severe distress by Allied air, sea and ground troops.

Allied operations in the Western Pacific, New Guinea, and the Philippines from July 30 to September 22, 1944

Maffin Bay became an important base during operations further west in the South Pacific and the Philippines. Five different emergency services used it in 1944 to load troops and equipment from transport ships onto attack ships. These units then took part in the invasions of Biak and Noemfoor, the Vogelkop Peninsula and the early stages of the invasion of the Philippines.

As the fighting left the area, the areas around Maffin Bay and Wakde became less and less important. At the end of September the airfield on Wakde was closed and in December it was only used in emergencies. On February 6, 1945, the last American troops moved from the mainland to Wakde, which was held from then until October 1945 by a company of the 93rd Division and was finally given up. By the end of the war there were still around 2,000 Japanese troops in the region, but they no longer posed a threat to Allied operations.

Individual evidence

Note: The article is essentially based on:

Robert Ross Smith, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, The Approach to the Philippines, published in CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, UNITED STATES ARMY, WASHINGTON, DC, 1996, Library of Congress Catalog Number: 53-60474 (see individual records referred to as HyperWar ).

↑ HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, p. 206. Retrieved June 8, 2020 (English).
↑ PacificWrecks.com: Pacific Wrecks - Wakde Island, Sarmi Regency, Papua Province, Indonesia. Retrieved June 5, 2020 .
↑ HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 232, 233. Retrieved June 16, 2020 (English).
↑ HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 234, 235. Retrieved June 16, 2020 (English).
↑ HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, page 207. Retrieved June 8, 2020 (English).
↑ HyperWar: Campaigns of MacArthur / I (Chapter 6), page 150. Retrieved June 8, 2020 (English).
↑ HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pp. 211, 212. Retrieved June 11, 2020 (English).
↑ The Official Chronology of the US Navy in World War II - 1944, May 17, Wed. Retrieved June 18, 2020 .
^ ^A ^b The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia. Wakde. Retrieved June 8, 2020 .
↑ ^a ^b HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 219, 220. Accessed June 13, 2020 (English).
↑ Battle of Lone Tree Hill / Wakde-Sarmi, May 17-September 2, 1944. Retrieved June 13, 2020 (English).
↑ HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, page 222. Retrieved June 13, 2020 (English).
↑ HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pp. 224-231. Retrieved June 16, 2020 (English).
^ Samuel Eliot Morison: New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944 - August 1944 . University of Illinois Press, 2001, ISBN 978-0-252-07038-9 ( google.de [accessed June 18, 2020]).
↑ HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 235, 236. Retrieved June 16, 2020 (English).
↑ Madera Tribune November 30, 1967 - California Digital Newspaper Collection - 'Greatest Combat Team' Retired. Accessed June 17, 2020 (English).
↑ HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pp. 236-238. Accessed June 17, 2020 (English).
↑ HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pp. 238–243. Accessed June 17, 2020 (English).
↑ HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, page 244. Retrieved June 17, 2020 (English).
↑ Battle of Lone Tree Hill / Wakde-Sarmi, May 17-September 2, 1944. Retrieved June 17, 2020 (English).
↑ HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 247, 248. Retrieved on June 18, 2020 .
↑ Battle of Lone Tree Hill / Wakde-Sarmi, May 17-September 2, 1944. Retrieved June 18, 2020 (English).
↑ ^a ^b HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 254-256. Retrieved June 18, 2020 .
↑ Battle of Lone Tree Hill / Wakde-Sarmi, May 17-September 2, 1944. Retrieved June 19, 2020 (English).
↑ ^a ^b HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pp. 259, 260. Retrieved on June 19, 2020 (English).
↑ HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pp. 260-262. Accessed June 21, 2020 (English).
↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 266 to 277. Accessed June 24, 2020 (English).
↑ HyperWar: Campaigns of MacArthur / I (Chapter 6), page 152. Retrieved June 21, 2020 (English).
↑ Battle of Lone Tree Hill / Wakde-Sarmi, May 17-September 2, 1944. Retrieved June 21, 2020 (English).

Web links

[1] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, p. 206. Retrieved June 8, 2020 (English).

[2] PacificWrecks.com: Pacific Wrecks - Wakde Island, Sarmi Regency, Papua Province, Indonesia. Retrieved June 5, 2020 .

[3] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 232, 233. Retrieved June 16, 2020 (English).

[4] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 234, 235. Retrieved June 16, 2020 (English).

[5] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, page 207. Retrieved June 8, 2020 (English).

[6] HyperWar: Campaigns of MacArthur / I (Chapter 6), page 150. Retrieved June 8, 2020 (English).

[7] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pp. 211, 212. Retrieved June 11, 2020 (English).

[8] The Official Chronology of the US Navy in World War II - 1944, May 17, Wed. Retrieved June 18, 2020 .

[:0-9] A ^b The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia. Wakde. Retrieved June 8, 2020 .

[:2-10] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 219, 220. Accessed June 13, 2020 (English).

[:1-11] Battle of Lone Tree Hill / Wakde-Sarmi, May 17-September 2, 1944. Retrieved June 13, 2020 (English).

[12] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, page 222. Retrieved June 13, 2020 (English).

[13] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pp. 224-231. Retrieved June 16, 2020 (English).

[14] Samuel Eliot Morison: New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944 - August 1944 . University of Illinois Press, 2001, ISBN 978-0-252-07038-9 ( google.de [accessed June 18, 2020]).

[15] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 235, 236. Retrieved June 16, 2020 (English).

[16] Madera Tribune November 30, 1967 - California Digital Newspaper Collection - 'Greatest Combat Team' Retired. Accessed June 17, 2020 (English).

[17] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pp. 236-238. Accessed June 17, 2020 (English).

[18] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pp. 238–243. Accessed June 17, 2020 (English).

[19] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, page 244. Retrieved June 17, 2020 (English).

[20] Battle of Lone Tree Hill / Wakde-Sarmi, May 17-September 2, 1944. Retrieved June 17, 2020 (English).

[21] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 247, 248. Retrieved on June 18, 2020 .

[22] Battle of Lone Tree Hill / Wakde-Sarmi, May 17-September 2, 1944. Retrieved June 18, 2020 (English).

[:3-23] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 254-256. Retrieved June 18, 2020 .

[24] Battle of Lone Tree Hill / Wakde-Sarmi, May 17-September 2, 1944. Retrieved June 19, 2020 (English).

[:4-25] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pp. 259, 260. Retrieved on June 19, 2020 (English).

[26] HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pp. 260-262. Accessed June 21, 2020 (English).

[:5-27] ↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e ^f ^g HyperWar: US Army in WWII: The Approach to the Philippines, pages 266 to 277. Accessed June 24, 2020 (English).

[28] HyperWar: Campaigns of MacArthur / I (Chapter 6), page 152. Retrieved June 21, 2020 (English).

[29] Battle of Lone Tree Hill / Wakde-Sarmi, May 17-September 2, 1944. Retrieved June 21, 2020 (English).