Battle of the Huon Peninsula

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Battle of the Huon Peninsula
Part of: Pacific War
A Matilda tank called Clincher marching on Japanese positions near Finschhafen, November 9, 1943
A Matilda tank called Clincher marching on Japanese positions near Finschhafen, November 9, 1943
date September 22, 1943 to March 1, 1944
place Huon Peninsula
output allied victory
Territorial changes the Japanese troops are driven from the peninsula
consequences Continuation of the Allied offensive
Parties to the conflict

AustraliaAustralia Australia United States
United States 48United States 

Japanese EmpireJapanese Empire Japan

Commander

George Wootten
Victor Windeyer
Bernard Evans
David Whitehead
Selwyn Porter
Cedric Edgar

Adachi Hatazō
Yamada Eizō
Katagiri Shigeru

Troop strength
~ 13,100 ~ 12,500
losses

1,028 dead and wounded

~ 5,500 dead

Battle of New Guinea (1942–1945)

The Battle of the Huon Peninsula was a series of combat operations between Japanese and Allied forces that took place in northeast New Guinea during the Pacific War in 1943 and 1944 . It marked the starting point of a general Allied offensive that began in 1943 and was able to displace the Japanese troops from their previous positions on the peninsula over a period of four months. The Australian troops mainly involved in the battle benefited from the rapid technological advancement of the Allied war industry, with which Japanese industry could not keep up. Due to the hostile superiority in the air and at sea, Japan also found it difficult to get sufficient supplies and reinforcements to New Guinea.

The battle was prepared by landings of the Australian 9th Division east of Lae on September 4, 1943. This was followed by an advance westward along the coast to join forces with the 7th Division advancing from Nadzab . In the meantime, American and Australian forces carried out a series of attacks in the Salamaua area . Heavy rain and floods slowed the advance of the 9th Division just like the Japanese rearguard, which is why Lae could only be secured by the march of the 7th Division on September 16. The city's Japanese garrison dodged north. Less than a week later, the Battle of the Huon Peninsula began on September 22nd when Australian troops landed further east from the sea to capture Finschhafen .

After landing on Scarlet Beach, the Allies advanced south to secure Finschhafen . This also resulted in fights at Jivevaneng . In mid-October, the Japanese troops launched a counterattack on the Australian bridgehead at Scarlet Beach, which at times brought the Australians into distress and forced them to split up their troops before it could be repulsed after about a week. Following this, they moved inland to regain the initiative by conquering the Sattelberg . After heavy fighting and another Japanese counterattack, the mountain was secured at the end of November and Australian troops could begin to secure a line further north between Wareo and Gusika . This succeeded until the beginning of December, after which the Allies advanced along the coast via Lakona to Fortification Point . It came to heavy skirmishes with Japanese units, which delivered a delay fight.

The final phase of the battle was marked by the collapse of the organized Japanese resistance. A rapid advance of Australian forces along the north coast of the peninsula and the conquest of Sios followed by January. At the same time , American troops landed at Saidor . By March, the Allied troops then carried out clean-up operations in the conquered area in order to track down and eliminate any remaining pockets of resistance and dispersed enemy formations. The battle was followed by a rather quiet phase of several months in northern New Guinea before heavy fighting on the Driniumor broke out in July . There were isolated battles until November, until the Australian army began the large-scale battle for Aitape-Wewak .

background

geography

The Huon Peninsula is located in northeast New Guinea and stretches from Lae in the south, on the Huongolf, to Sio in the north, on the Vitiaz Strait . The coastline between these two points is cut by a multitude of estuary rivers and smaller watercourses. The best known are the Bumi , Mape and Song rivers . The rivers have their origin in the interior, which is dominated by various mountain ranges. The most striking are the Rawlinson and Cromwell Mountains in the south and east, respectively, which form the Saruwaged Mountains at their meeting point in the center of the peninsula . This continues west into the Finisterre Mountains . Aside from a narrow, flat stretch of coast, the wartime area was dominated by dense jungle with only a few roads and paths crossed. Most of these transport routes were only expanded during the course of the war by engineer units to such an extent that they could be used by vehicles. The transport of the supplies took place away from the coasts largely on foot.

During the planning for the battle, the Allies defined three areas as important and decisive points: the beach north of Katika , which later received the Allied code name Scarlet Beach , the 960 m high Sattelberg, eight kilometers southwest, which dominated the surrounding areas due to its height , and Finschhafen, which had a small airfield and, due to its location on a bay, offered space for easy-to-protect port facilities. Finschhafen was 9 km south of Scarlet Beach. The Japanese staff had also identified Finschhafen and the Sattelberg as essential points. In addition, they had defined a ridge between Gusika on the coast, about 5.5 km north of Katika, and Wareo , 7.5 km to the west inland, as a key point. The importance of the ridge consisted of a path running along it, over which the Japanese supplies were transported to the Sattelberg. It was also a natural obstacle to any advance north from Finschhafen, making it an ideal line of defense.

Military situation

Huon Peninsula Operations Map, 1943–44

By 1943, the large-scale offensive actions of the Japanese in the Allied command area Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) had come to a standstill. Their advance on New Guinea had already come to a halt the previous year when Australian troops managed to block the Japanese army in the battle of the Kokoda Track . Subsequent defeats in the battles in Milne Bay , Buna-Gona , Wau and Guadalcanal already forced the local Japanese troops to withdraw. As a result, the initiative finally switched to the side of the Allies by mid-1943.

After these successes, the Allied military strategists began planning the further course of the war. They attached high priority to the reconquest of the Philippines , which could potentially be followed by an invasion of the main Japanese islands. The lynchpin of the Japanese armed forces in the region was the large Rabaul base . The elimination of this base was seen as elementary for the success of the SWPA and Operation Cartwheel was started for this purpose.

To achieve this goal, the Allies needed access to a number of airfields close to the front. The Allied commanders in chief, including General Douglas MacArthur , therefore ordered the conquest of the existing airfields at Finschhafen and Lae. The capture and security of Lae was intended to open a port to supply Nadzab and operations in the Markham Valley . Control of Finschhaven and the Huon Peninsula provided a starting point for operations on New Britain. The natural and protected harbor also made it easier to control the important Vitiaz and Dampier Straits .

Armed forces

In the time immediately before the start of the battle there were no US ground troops in direct combat with the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific Area, which is why Finschhafen should be secured by the Australian 9th Division. The division belonged to the Second Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF), which consisted largely of volunteers. She had already gained experience in the course of the African campaign . In early 1943 she was relocated to Australia and converted to the new jungle combat scheme . With a strength of 13,118 men, the division then had three infantry brigades, each with three battalions and various unattached support battalions. The 4th Army Reserve Brigade later intervened in the fighting. The American part in the battle consisted mainly in providing logistical and sea support, as well as in engineering.

A RAAF 4th Squadron Boomerang fighter with ground crew, October 5, 1943

Air support was provided by No. 9 Operational Group RAAF , whose squadrons were equipped with the Commonwealth Boomerang and Wirraway aircraft as well as the Vultee A-31 Vengeance dive bomber . They flew numerous close support and supply missions during the fighting. American Republic P-47 and Lockheed P-38 of the 348th and 475th Fighter Group flew fighter protection for the ship traffic supplying the fighting while medium and heavy bombers of the Fifth Air Force were bombing the Japanese airfields in New Britain and around Wewak and in cooperation with PT Speedboats attacked their communication lines. The difficult use of wheeled vehicles meant that the supply transport was heavily relocated to the water. Landing craft and other small sea vessels landed smaller quantities of supplies along the coast from where they were brought to the troops by local porters. Combat troops were also rarely deployed for transport purposes or, if possible, jeeps were used.

The main body of the Japanese troops during the battle was the 18th Army under Lieutenant General Adachi Hatazō , whose headquarters were in Madang . It consisted of the 20th , 41st and 51st divisions as well as smaller occupation and marine infantry units. The troops around Finschhafen were under the command of Major General Yamada Eizō although the command was divided into smaller units on the tactical level based on geographic features. They spread over the area between the Mongi River, east of Lae, and Arndt Point, the Sattelberg, Joangeng, Logaweng, Finschhafen, Sisi and the island of Tami. The greatest concentrations were on the Sattelberg and near Finschhafen. where they were subordinate to the commander of the 20th Division, Lieutenant General Katagiri Shigeru . Due to illness and the use of road construction between Madang and Bogadjim , the fighting strength of the Japanese was reduced.

Like the Allies, the Japanese were dependent on water transport. For this they used three submarines in order to avoid losses caused by enemy aircraft like during the battle in the Bismarck Sea . In order to land the supplies, the submarines had smaller barges. Their transport capacity was very limited and there was a high risk of being attacked by enemy PT speedboats during the reloading process. On land, the supply lines led inland on the beaten track. The most important of these led to the gathering of troops around the Sattelberg and Finschhafen. Air support was provided by the 4th Air Army , to which the 7th Air Fleet and the 14th Air Brigade were subordinate. She also controlled parts of the 6th Air Fleet . From Wewak, the Japanese air formations mainly carried out strikes against the Allied shipping traffic around their bridgeheads and protected their own ships. As a secondary task, they should fly close combat support. Naval Air Force units also flew anti-ship missions from Rabaul. The Japanese air forces were badly hit by bombing raids on their airfields around Wewak in August 1943, which affected their operational capability throughout the battle.

The ground troops lacked transport options, engineers and logistical support. Their decentralized command structure and the unclear distribution of competencies between the army and naval command made the situation difficult, as did the poor infrastructure. On the Australian side, in contrast, the troops who knew each other from previous operations and had short, well-organized supply routes fought.

Preparations

The area around Salamaua-Lae

Following MacArthur's directive to secure the airfields at Finschhafen and Lae, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific, General Thomas Blamey , ordered the conquest of the Huon Peninsula. The 9th Division under Major General George Wootten was to carry out this order. The first goal was to secure Laes. The Allied staff developed a plan for this, according to which the 9th Division should land east of Laes while the 7th Division should carry out an air landing at Nadzab in the Markham Valley. The place was captured on September 5th in an airborne operation by American and Australian troops. According to the plan, the 7th Division would advance from there from the south to Lae to support the 9th Division in conquering the place. At the same time, the Australian 3rd Division was to lead a diversionary attack on Salamaua together with the American 162nd Infantry Regiment .

After maneuvers in Queensland and Milne Bay, the 9th Division embarked on ships of the American VII Amphibious Force , which was under the command of Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey . The upcoming operation was considered to be the "largest amphibious operation [...] by allied forces in the Southwest Pacific". The 20th Brigade under Brigadier Victor Windeyer spearheaded the attack and landed on a beach 26 kilometers east of Laes. In preparation, five destroyers bombarded the beach for six minutes on early September 4th. The brigade landed without resistance in three waves of battalion strength and began a rapid advance into the hinterland after the landing of the first reinforcements. About 35 minutes after the first landing, a small formation of Japanese aircraft attacked the landing craft that were disembarking other troops, two of them being badly damaged and the first casualties.

In the afternoon there were further Japanese air raids. A formation of around 70 pilots launched from New Britain was repelled via Finschhafen. Others successfully attacked the Allied sea transports. At Morobe they shot at unloaded transporters and at Cape Ward Hunt a convoy of troops on which the 26th Australian Brigade was embarked. 51 men died on board the landing ships LST-471 and LST-473 , and a further 67 were wounded. These attacks could not effectively interrupt the landing of further supplies and the following day the 24th Australian Brigade went ashore. Following this, the 20th Brigade began the difficult advance through the jungle, severely obstructing the dense vegetation, swamps and various watercourses. Heavy rains also slowed down progress. The first contact with the enemy occurred on the night of September 5th to 6th when Japanese troops attacked the battalion, which was in front. They were not able to effectively stop the advance. At this point the 26th Brigade also began to leave their landing site in order to strike against Lae from the north-east, inland. The 24th Brigade advanced along the coast.

Troops of the Australian 9th Division land at Lae, September 4, 1943.

At this point a shortage of supplies delayed the advance of the 9th Division further. She did not reach the Busu River until September 9th. The river, swollen from heavy rains, carried many men in the advance department with it as they waded through it. Thirteen of them drowned. Since further heavy rains made it impossible for the other units to cross the river, the 2/28, which had already been crossed, was built. Battalion built a bridgehead. The isolated camp was subjected to repeated Japanese attacks in the days that followed before the rest of the brigade joined them on September 14. The 24th Brigade encountered a strong Japanese line of defense on the Butibum River, the last significant watercourse before Lae, as it advanced along the coast. The could not break through the Japanese positions until September 16, when Lae had already been occupied by the 7th Division.

Over 2,200 Japanese died in the fighting for Lae, while the Australians suffered comparatively low losses. The 9th Division lost 150 men, 77 of them dead. The historian Mark Johnston considers the Japanese defensive achievements in battle to be commendable, despite the high losses, as they slowed the Allied advance and made it possible for the majority of their own troops to move to the north of the Huon Peninsula and take up new defensive positions there.

Struggles

Finschhafen

Lae had fallen faster than the Allied planners had calculated. The first phase of the next operation consisted of amphibious landings by Allied troops north of Siki Bay , near the confluence of the river of the same name and south of the Song River. The landing beach was code-named Scarlet . To the east of Lae on the peninsula was Finschhafen, which the Allied staffs rated as strategically even more important than Lae. This assessment was based on the potential of being able to support operations from Vitiaz-Strasse to New Britain from there. False intelligence reports estimated the strength of the Japanese troops there to be far weaker than they actually were, which is why only the 20th Brigade was tasked with the attack on the city. Meanwhile, the 7th Division would advance northwest from Lae and march through the Markham and Ramu valleys into the Finisterre Mountains.

After a short period of preparation, the 20th Brigade landed under enemy fire on September 22nd. It was the first amphibious landing of Australian troops with resistance since the landing at Gallipoli in the First World War . Navigational errors caused the Australians to land on the wrong beaches, and they came under strong fire from entrenched Japanese units, especially in Siki Bay. After the initial confusion, the unit commanders managed to re-coordinate themselves and their troops and to advance beyond the beaches. From elevated positions around Katika, the Japanese managed to put up stubborn resistance before they had to retreat from the superior Australians. By the end of the day, the 20th Brigade was able to secure a “several kilometers” bridgehead with losses of 94 men. Late in the day, around 30 Japanese bombers and up to 40 escort fighters from the 4th Air Army operating from Wewak received the order to attack Allied shipping around Finschhafen. Forewarned by the destroyer USS Reid operating on Vitiaz Street , five American fighter squadrons were able to raise the alarm and embroil the Japanese Army Air Force in an air battle in which 39 Japanese aircraft were shot down.

Allied supplies landed at Finschhafen, October 30, 1943

The following day, the Australians began to advance to Finschhafen, about 9 kilometers to the south. Strong Japanese defenses on the south bank of the Bumi River prompted the Australians to attempt a circumvention in the west. While they were crossing the watercourse at a suitable place, they came under fire from elevated marines. While one battalion was marching on Finschhafen after the forcible crossing of the river, another attacked the Japanese marines on their left flank. When they reached their position there was close combat in which the Australians stabbed 52 Japanese with bayonets.

As a result of the continued advance and the resulting gains in terrain, the Australian lines increasingly thinned out. To prevent an attack on the western flank, the 2/17 was given. Infantry battalion ordered to position itself around the Sattelberg and repel all Japanese attacks. The Japanese 80th regiment stopped the Australians at Jivevaneng and tried several times to break through their lines to the coast.

The fear of Japanese counter-attacks led the troop leaders to request reinforcements from the high command . This declined further troop deployments, as its intelligence service estimated the strength of the Japanese units stationed in the area at no more than 350. In fact, there were around 5,000 Japanese troops around the Sattelberg and Finschhafen, which were reinforced to 12,000 by the beginning of October and began to prepare for a planned counter-offensive. The only reinforcement of the Australians was in 2/43. Infantry battalion, the arrival of which was 2/17, who was stuck near Jivevaneng. Battalion released for the attack on Finschhafen.

After the Australian breakthrough over the Ilebbe Brook on October 1st, the Japanese marines began to withdraw from Finschhafen. On October 2, the place fell to the Allies, who pushed the Japanese back over the Kakakog ridge with heavy air and artillery attacks. After securing Finschhaven, the 20th Brigade made contact with the 22nd Battalion, which had cleared the coastal areas on the southern edge of the peninsula and was advancing from Lae over the mountains. The Japanese previously stationed around the place withdrew to the Sattelberg. From October 4th, allied air operations started from the airfield near Finschhafen. The following day received the 2/17. Ordered the battalion to march to Kumawa and pursue the retreating Japanese troops. There were only minor clashes before the battalion reached Jivevaneng again on October 7th.

Japanese counterattack

While the Australian troops were still marching on Finschhafen, the Japanese staff began planning a counterattack. The main body of the 20th Division under Lieutenant General Katagiri Shigeru began to move from Madang to Sattelberg, where a Japanese troop concentration formed. Most of the units arrived there on October 11th. The Australians were aware of the Japanese plans through captured and decrypted documents, which is why they brought the 24th Infantry Brigade to reinforce the 20th. The Japanese counterattack began on October 16 when the first wave of attacks hit the 24th Infantry Brigade near Jivevaneng. The intermittent attack could be repelled. The following day, Japanese planes attacked the Allied forces on Scarlet Beach. The Japanese made an immediate attempt at an amphibious landing. Heavy defensive fire sank all landing craft before they even reached the beach. Some Japanese made it to the beach, but were all killed or seriously wounded by Australian troops by the following day. The American soldier Junior Van Noy, who fell in these battles, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his service .

Wrecks of Japanese landing craft on Scarlet Beach near Finschhafen, November 3, 1943

The previous night, the Japanese counterattack had been able to break through the forward and sparsely manned lines of the Australians. They penetrated the interface between the 2/28. Infantry Battalion and the 2/3. Engineer Battalion and advanced on the coast. The target was the hills 2.7 kilometers west of Scarlet Beach and the Australian troops at Katika, whose formation was to be broken up.

In response to the Japanese breakthrough, the 24th Brigade moved from Katika to the ridge north of Scarlet Beach to strengthen the defenses around the bridgehead. while the 20th Brigade positioned itself at Siki Creek to block the way to Finschhafen. In the following battles, the Australian defense stiffened and had to fight the enemy with their artillery sometimes down to a distance of 200 meters. Under the impression of strong resistance, the Japanese shifted their attack efforts mainly on the Siki Creek, on the course of which they reached the Siki Bay on October 18th. This drove a wedge between the 20th Brigade in the south and the 24th in the north. The retreating Australians left substantial supplies behind which helped the Japanese to level their own tight supply situation.

On the night of October 18-19, the Japanese succeeded in interrupting the supply route to Jivevaneng and blocking the road from there to Sattelberg. The 2/17. The battalion and other Australian units were thus trapped behind enemy lines. The 4th season of the RAAF then began to drop ammunition boxes over the trapped troops so that they could continue to defend themselves.

Immediately after the capture of Jivevaneng, the Japanese counterattack began to lose momentum. The heavy losses suffered despite the successes prevented the Japanese troops from taking full advantage of the advantages they had gained. As early as October 19, the Australian staff began to work out plans to repel the enemy again. On the same day, the 2/28. Battalion recaptured Katika after heavy artillery preparation. The following day, the 26th Brigade landed in Langemark Bay with some Matilda tanks , so that the 9th Division was now fully in the field. The Japanese withdrew from Siki Bay on October 21, but tried for four more days to drive the Australians out of Katika again. When the failure of the counter-offensive became evident, Lieutenant General Katagiri ordered on October 25th to retreat to the Sattelberg. In the fighting, the Japanese suffered around 1,500 casualties, including 679 dead, while the Australians recorded 49 deaths and 179 injured.

Sattelberg

Matilda tanks of the 3rd Australian Tank Battalion near Sattelberg, November 17, 1943

The Sattelberg, where an old German mission station was located, is about eight kilometers from the coast and, with its height of 960 m, represented a strategically important position for both warring parties. It offered the Japanese occupying it a good view of the surrounding area Areas and, according to the Australian commanders, massively threatened their own lines of communication. Based on this assessment, Major General Wootten ordered the capture of the mountain. The direction of the thrust should be along the road leading from Jivevaneng to the mountain. Despite the general termination of their counter-offensive on October 25th, Japanese forces continued to threaten the place and there were isolated attacks. In support of the 2/17 deployed there. Battalion led the Australians the 2/13. Battalion. The two units began to take offensive action against the enemy in the vicinity of Jivevaneng, which led to the withdrawal of the last Japanese forces on the night of November 2nd. On November 6th, the road to the mountain east of Jivevaneng, blocked by the Japanese during their offensive, was reopened.

With the backup of Jivevaneng, the Australians began to turn to the Sattelberg. The 26th Brigade, supported by nine Matilda tanks from the 1st Panzer Battalion, was supposed to conquer it. In preparation, the 4th Brigade, a unit of the Army Reserve that was subordinate to the 5th Division , relieved the 26th Brigade from its occupation duties in Finschhafen. As the tanks advanced towards Jivevaneng, the Australian artillery fired barrages to cover up the engine noise and thus keep the presence of the armored vehicles secret from the Japanese. On November 16, the 2/48. Battalion, supported by artillery and machine gun fire, conquered the ridge of Green Ridge, from which the planned deployment path could be viewed. This march began the following day.

Because of the rough terrain, the advance was much slower than the Australian staff had planned. The common Australian maneuver tactics made a planned advance in the jungle almost impossible, which is why the brigade commander Whitehead switched to infiltration tactics. He divided his troops into small units, no more than companies fighting their way through the jungle and scouting the way for tanks traveling individually or in pairs. Pioneer units followed the tanks and fortified the aisles and cleared possible traps and mines out of the way. Seen as a whole, three pillars of march emerged, one central and two security pillars north and south of the main route. After the first day, none of the units had achieved their daily goal. In the center, strong Japanese resistance had knocked out one tank and damaged two more in front of a ridge. The flanks also suffered sensitive losses from individual pockets of resistance. The ridge could only be taken on the following day.

The Steeple Tree Hill could be secured by the central march column until November 20th. The south pillar advanced from occupied Kumawa while the north wing advanced towards landmark 2200 . Originally these points were supposed to serve as a breakpoint to secure the flanks, but the slow advance meant that Whitehead changed his tactics and now planned a pincer attack in which the Sattelberg should also be attacked from the north.

In the meantime, the Australians had set up a number of reconnaissance posts in the northeast, closer to the coast, from where they could observe the Japanese supply routes. Regular raids on these routes soon put the troops on the Sattelberg in a difficult supply situation. However, since they also had supply problems, the Australians interrupted their advance for a day on November 21st to rearm. The main pillar then carried out an evasive maneuver at the point where the road turned north. She turned to the northeast while the southern flank left the path she had previously followed and headed northwest towards landmark 3200 . This was in the west of the Sattelberg. The north wing remained tied to landmark 2200 due to impassable terrain and heavy Japanese resistance and could not proceed up the mountain as planned. At the same time, Japanese troops moved toward Finschhafen in a renewed attempt to conquer the place. With the advance the Japanese commanders hoped to be able to secure their supply routes again. The attack got stuck on the deeply staggered Australian defense at Pabu and was finally canceled without having any significant impact on the associations standing on Sattelberg.

The Australian Sergeant Thomas Derrick hoists the Australian flag over the mission station in Sattelberg, November 25, 1943.

Heavy air raids on the defensive positions on the Sattelberg had taken place between November 19 and 23. Also on November 23, 44 Japanese airmen attacked Jivevaneng. The attack did not affect the Australian position around the mountain, which advanced again the following day. During the day the attacks failed again and again due to heavy defensive fire until a platoon managed to get almost to the top of the mountain and clear ten Japanese positions with hand grenades. The following night the Japanese evacuated the mountain, as their defensive lines were no longer closed, so the Australians reported it as secure the following day. The leader of the breakthrough train, Thomas Derrick, later received the Victoria Cross for his services in the battle .

Pabu

Although the main target of the Australian troops after landing on Scarlet Beach was Finschhafen, some attention was also directed to the area north of the combat area. Immediately after landing, the Papuan Infantry Battalion explored the situation as far as Bonga and Gusika. At the beginning of October the 2/43. Battalion also carried out some patrols in the area. The patrols and several reconnaissance flights showed that the Japanese were using the area to supply their troops further west on the peninsula via the paths there. In response, the Australians set up several reconnaissance posts in the area and quickly realized that a hill called Pabu , which was part of a larger massif called Horace the Horse , was the key point of the region. It was in the immediate vicinity of the Japanese main supply route and so close to the advanced Australian post at North Hill that it could be covered from there by indirect artillery fire. This allowed only a relatively small unit to defend the hill. In mid-October, at the height of the Japanese counterattack, Brigadier Bernard Evans ordered Pabu to be evacuated in order to shorten its own lines and free up forces for the defense of Scarlet Beach.

After the Japanese attack was canceled, the Australians tried again to win the initiative. Evans was replaced by Brigadier Selwyn Porter and Major General Wootten decided to establish a permanent post behind the enemy lines. To this end, the previous position at Pabu should be filled again. On November 19 and 20, three companies of 2/32 finally occupied. Infantry battalion again climbed the hill and immediately began to attack the Japanese supply units in the area with great success.

In the meantime, the commander of the 18th Army, Lieutenant General Adachi Hatazō, Katagiri had a new counterattack for the 23/24. November order. The reoccupation of Pabu forced him to bring the date of the attack forward and to withdraw forces from the lines of attack Finschhafen and Sattelberg.

In an attempt to evict the Australians from Pabu and the area north of the Song River, two battalions from Infantry Regiments 79 and 238 advanced south along the coastal route from Bonga. From November 22nd, they attacked the positions around North Hill. This cut off the only two company strong force on Pabu, which had to fight back in the following three days of continued attacks. Two other companies, supported by four Matilda tanks and artillery fire, marched on November 26th to relieve Pabu. They were able to reach the trapped on the same day and also drive the Japanese away from southern Pino Hill .

The following day, the Japanese stopped their attacks on the Australian right flank, which they immediately used to move troops to their eastern flank, which was still threatened. On November 29th solved the 2/43. Battalion 2/32. on Pabu, where they came under heavy Japanese artillery fire and suffered 25 casualties. The positions on Pabu drew strong forces from the Sattelberg, up to which the Australians were advancing in parallel, and the Japanese commander Adachi later stated that the Australian occupation of Pabu was one of the main reasons for the defeat of his troops on the Huon Peninsula. The losses in the battle ranged from 195 Japanese dead, 25 dead and 51 wounded Australians.

Wareo-Gusika

Faced with the second failed counterattack and the loss of Saddle Mountain, Katagiri decided to retreat north and build a new line of defense at Wareo where he would await the advancing Australians. The losses and insufficient supplies meant that Katagiri were too few men available. Major General Wootten did not want to give up the initiative he had just regained in the battle and decided to quickly follow the retreating enemy in order to secure the entire Huon Peninsula as quickly as possible. As a first phase to secure the peninsula, Wootten planned to secure a line in the north along a ridge between Gusika on the coast and Wareo, seven kilometers inland. Two columns were supposed to march north independently of each other. The 26th Brigade was to take Wareo from the Sattelberg and the 24th was to advance along the coast and secure Gusika and two larger lakes about three kilometers from the coast. As a third column, a smaller unit, consisting of troops from the 20th Brigade, was to advance in the center and occupy Nongora and the Christmas Hills .

Gusika, supported by tanks, was captured on November 29th. These troops later crossed the Kalueng River and advanced to the lagoon further north on the coast. From Pabu it was 2/48. Battalion set out to secure the two lakes. At Horace's Ears they encountered Japanese troops who held them up for a while. Once there, it took over the coordination of the central advance in order to relieve the part of the 20th Brigade that was not involved, which was supposed to freshen up for the next phase of the battle.

Soldiers of the Australian 23rd Infantry Battalion walk between Wareo and Bonga under mortar fire, December 10, 1943.

There was 2/15. Infantry battalion from Katika to Nongora on November 30th. While crossing the Song River, the battalion came under heavy machine gun fire. It could only advance after all the companies had crossed the river and locked in and eliminated the Japanese position. The following morning they attacked the elevated Nongora, but failed. They could not occupy Nongora and the ridge until December 2nd, after the Japanese had vacated their positions the night before. After the battalion had secured its position, it sent patrols along the ridge to clear any remaining enemy positions and to contact the 24th Brigade.

Contact was made on December 3, and troops from the brigade began to systematically comb the Christmas Hills for Japanese. On December 7th, they finally cleared the range of hills after they came under heavy artillery and mortar fire and threatened to be trapped by Australian flank maneuvers.

The advance on Wareo began on November 28th. The place, only 5.5 kilometers away from the Sattelberg as the crow flies, could only be reached via a series of paths, which roughly quadrupled the distance. In addition to the dense vegetation, heavy rain also hindered the advance, which softened the ground to such an extent that all motorized vehicles got stuck. Since no local porters were available for the march, the Australian soldiers had to carry their supplies themselves. Not used to such loads, it had to be 2/24. Infantry battalion to be completely deployed for this purpose, supplies for the 2/23. Transport battalion.

On November 30th, the battalion reached the song about which they had to translate under enemy fire. They were finally able to occupy the abandoned town of Kuanko. To the north of the village there were strong Japanese units that launched a counterattack that drove the Australians back. Only heavy artillery barrage could stop the attack. In the face of the counterattack, the 2/24. Battalion relieved of its transport task and sent west to bypass the Japanese positions there. It could cut off the Kuanko-Wareo route and occupy both Kwatingkoo and Peak Hill on early December 7th after the Japanese retreat . Proceeding from there, it reached Wareo early the next day.

Most of the Japanese units began to withdraw further north on Sio. Occasional pockets of resistance that remained threatened the Australian troops and covered the retreat of the main force. The toughest fighting occurred on December 11th, when Australian forces attacked the still-occupied 2200 Landmark, killing 27 Japanese soldiers there.

Sio

The advance of the 4th Australian Brigade on Fortification Point, May 5–20. December 1943

In the next phase of the battle, the Australians advanced along the coast on Sio, about 80 kilometers from Finschhafen. The 4th Brigade under Brigadier Cedric Edgar was initially responsible for this. It was relocated from Finschhafen to the front, where it had performed garrison service, and on December 5, the 22nd Infantry Battalion at the head began the advance by crossing the Kalueng River. The inexperience of the units drawn up from the Army Reserve led to a more cautious and slower approach than a regular unit would probably have done. They received support from American landing craft, which were equipped with rocket launchers, and from the Finschhafen airfield, which has now been expanded. A naval base set up there also enabled the use of Consolidated PBY flying boats and PT speed boats.

The Australians encountered stubborn resistance as the Japanese tried to buy time to allow the main body of the troops to withdraw from Wareo in an orderly fashion. The 22nd Battalion had to be reinforced by additional units before the breakthrough succeeded. The 3/51. The battalion then advanced inland parallel to the troops on the coast to protect their flank. On December 14th, the 22nd Battalion reached Lakona, which they bypassed due to strong Japanese forces and then cleared it out with tank support. Then took over the 29./46. Battalion led the advance on Fortification Point, where it arrived on December 20 and crossed the Masaweng River to occupy elevated positions north.

The 4th Brigade suffered 65 dead and 136 wounded in the fighting, to which an increasing number came sick, which is why it was replaced by the 20th Brigade. The 26th Brigade took over the inland flank protection. From here on, the Australian advance accelerated as both the morale and organization of the Japanese eroded more and more. After minor skirmishes, Hubika was occupied without resistance on December 22nd, followed by Wandokai two days later. At Blucher Point, which was reached on December 28th, the previous 2/13 came. Battalion came into contact with the retreating Japanese troops for the first time, resulting in heavy fighting. On the same day , American troops landed at Saidor .

The landing led the Japanese to the decision to vacate the area around Sio. Over the next two weeks, the Australians encountered only sporadic resistance on their advance, as the Japanese quickly withdrew to the west on Madang in order not to be trapped by the Americans. The last fighting in the Battle of the Huon Peninsula took place on January 15, 1944 near Nambariwa, and Sio was occupied on the same day.

consequences

The 9th Division's operations conducted during the battle were the largest Australian troops in the war to date. On the basis of the comparatively higher industrial capacity and more advanced industry, the Australians smashed the Japanese units located in the region to such an extent that they no longer posed an offensive threat. This meant that further operations in Northwest New Guinea and New Britain became possible without seriously exposing our own supply lines to the risk of being interrupted. After the occupation of Sios on January 21, 1944, the 9th Division handed over regional command to the 5th, a division formed from the Army Reserve. The detachment was part of a plan to free up the battle-hardened divisions for other fronts, particularly the upcoming landing in the Philippines. In the end, the 9th Division was not used in the Philippines, as other American troops took over this task. Instead, she was assigned to Operation Oboe to retake Borneo, which took place in mid-1945 . In the meantime, parts of the 5th Division took on the task of securing the wider area around Sio, clearing out the last pockets of resistance in January and February 1945 and establishing contact with the US troops at Saidor.

During the battle for the Huon Peninsula, the 9th Division lost 1,082 men, including 283 dead and one missing. Compared to other battles of the division during the war, the losses were relatively small. She had lost more than twice as many soldiers at El Alamein in North Africa. The inaccessible vegetation, the short distance from the fight and a worse than usual supply of food made the fights in New Guinea seem tougher than others. Illnesses also restricted the willingness to fight. 85% of the division personnel suffered from illnesses during the battle.

Soldiers of the 30th Infantry Battalion cross a shallow river between Weber Point and Malalamai during a cleanup, February 9, 1944.

In the eyes of many Australian soldiers, the actions of the Japanese soldiers also led to this severity of the fighting. Compared to the battles in North Africa, they found the Japanese soldiers to be brave and more willing to make sacrifices. At the same time, however, they had the feeling of clear technological superiority over their opponents. For the Japanese, this advantage of the Australians, as well as their own lack of supplies, were the main psychological factors by which they characterized the Australians as an enemy. To counter this feeling of inferiority, the Japanese officers encouraged their troops to believe in their spiritual strength as the way to victory. The main use of infantry, far from the nearest bases, limited the technical superiority of the Australians. The small-scale combined arms battle by the Australians ultimately turned out to be decisive. The repeated air raids on Japanese positions, especially around the Sattelberg, turned out to be physically ineffective, but had a comparatively large influence on Japanese combat morale. Together with the more effective artillery fire of the Allies, the already overstretched Japanese communication lines could be repeatedly interrupted.

The Japanese suffered significantly higher casualties than the Allies during the battle, although exact figures are not available. About 12,500 Japanese soldiers took part in the fighting, of which an estimated 5,500 were killed. Other authors estimate this number to be higher and, since only 4,300 Japanese reached Sio at the end of the fighting, assume 7,000 to 8,000 dead. The Japanese troops also lost significant amounts of war material. The Australians captured 18 of the 26 artillery pieces used, and 28 of 36 heavy machine guns were lost.

At the start of the battle, the Australians were the only allied war faction engaged in ground fighting with the enemy in the region. By the time it fell, there were already strong United States forces operating in the area, taking responsibility for all land fighting from the Australians. While the fighting in New Guinea continued to its full extent, the Pacific theater of war experienced a phase of relative calm that was only broken by Allied offensives at the turn of the year from 1944 to 1945.

literature

Remarks

  1. ^ A b Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. Iv.
  2. ↑ a b c d John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 99.
  3. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, pp. 98-99.
  4. ↑ John Miller Junior: Cartwheel. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 213.
  5. ^ Eustace Keogh: The South West Pacific 1941-45. 1965, p. 287.
  6. ↑ a b c d e f g Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. 1.
  7. ^ Eustace Keogh: The South West Pacific 1941-45. 1965, p. 287.
  8. ↑ John Miller Junior: Cartwheel. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 189.
  9. ^ A b c Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. 14.
  10. ^ Albert Palazzo: Organision for Jungle Warfare. 2004, p. 91.
  11. ^ Albert Palazzo: Organision for Jungle Warfare. 2004, pp. 183-184.
  12. ↑ a b c d e f Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. 7.
  13. ↑ George Odgers: Air War Against Japan 1943–1945. 1968, p. 68.
  14. ^ A b c John Miller Junior: Cartwheel. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 195.
  15. ^ A b George Odgers: Air War Against Japan 1943-1945. 1968, p. 82.
  16. ↑ John Miller Junior: Cartwheel. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 218.
  17. ^ A b Ross Mallett: Logistics in the South-West Pacific 1943-1944. 2004, pp. 103-104.
  18. ^ A b c Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. 11.
  19. ^ A b John Coates: The War in New Guinea 1943-44. Operations and Tactics. 1999, p. 93.
  20. ^ John Coates: The War in New Guinea 1943-44. Operations and Tactics. 1999, pp. 93-94.
  21. ↑ Kengoro Tanaka: . Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea Theater During World War II in 1980, p.177.
  22. ↑ Kengoro Tanaka: . Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea Theater During World War II in 1980, page 178.
  23. ^ John Coates: The War in New Guinea 1943-44. Operations and Tactics. 1999, p. 92.
  24. ↑ a b Kengoro Tanaka: Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea Theater During World War II. 1980, p.180.
  25. ↑ John Miller Junior: Cartwheel. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, pp. 41 and 194.
  26. ^ Charles Willoughby: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. 1966, p. 228.
  27. ↑ John Miller Junior: Cartwheel. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, pp. 194-195.
  28. ↑ a b Kengoro Tanaka: Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea Theater During World War II. 1980, p. 179.
  29. ^ Charles Willoughby: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. 1966, pp. 230-233.
  30. ↑ John Miller Junior: Cartwheel. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 219.
  31. ↑ John Miller Junior: Cartwheel. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 199.
  32. ^ Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, pp. 1-3.
  33. ↑ a b Mark Johnston: The Magnificent 9th. An Illustrated History of the 9th Australian Division 1940-46. 2002, p. 147.
  34. ↑ John Miller Junior: Cartwheel. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 200.
  35. ↑ Mark Johnston: The Magnificent 9th. An Illustrated History of the 9th Australian Division 1940-46. 2002, pp. 146-147.
  36. ^ David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, p. 330.
  37. ^ David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, p. 331.
  38. ^ David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, pp. 331-332.
  39. ^ David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, p. 334.
  40. ^ David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, pp. 334-335.
  41. ↑ Mark Johnston: The Magnificent 9th. An Illustrated History of the 9th Australian Division 1940-46. 2002, pp. 147-150.
  42. ^ A b c Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. 3.
  43. ^ Gordon Maitland: The Second World War and its Australian Army Battle Honors. 1999, p. 78.
  44. ^ A b c Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. 4.
  45. ^ Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. 153.
  46. ^ Philip Masel: The Second 28th. The Story of a Famous Battalion of the Ninth Australian Division. 1995, p. 178.
  47. ↑ a b c d e f Gordon Maitland: The Second World War and its Australian Army Battle Honors. 1999, p. 80.
  48. ^ Mark Johnston: The Australian Army in World War II. 2007, pp. 8-9.
  49. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 70.
  50. ^ Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, pp. 4-5.
  51. ^ A b David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, p. 466.
  52. ↑ John Miller Junior: Cartwheel. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 193.
  53. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 98.
  54. ^ A b c d Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. 5.
  55. ^ Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, pp. 5-6.
  56. ↑ a b c d Kengoro Tanaka: Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea Theater During World War II. 1980, p. 68.
  57. ^ A b Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. 6.
  58. ↑ John Miller Junior: Cartwheel. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 220.
  59. ↑ a b c d e f g h i Gordon Maitland: The Second World War and its Australian Army Battle Honors. 1999, p. 81.
  60. ^ John Coates: The War in New Guinea 1943-44. Operations and Tactics. 1999, pp. 164-165.
  61. ↑ a b c John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 195.
  62. ^ Charles Willoughby: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. 1966, p. 232.
  63. ^ Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, pp. 7 and 36.
  64. ^ Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, pp. 7-8.
  65. ↑ a b c d Kengoro Tanaka: Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea Theater During World War II. 1980, p. 69.
  66. ^ A b c Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. 8.
  67. ↑ Chris Coulthard-Clark: Where Australians Fought. The Encyclopedia of Australia's Battles. 1998, p. 242.
  68. ↑ Mark Johnston: The Magnificent 9th. An Illustrated History of the 9th Australian Division 1940-46. 2002, p. 167.
  69. ^ Eustace Keogh: The South West Pacific 1941-45. 1965, p. 330.
  70. ^ Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, pp. 8-9.
  71. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, pp. 216-217.
  72. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 217.
  73. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 218.
  74. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 222.
  75. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, pp. 222-223.
  76. ↑ Chris Coulthard-Clark: Where Australians Fought. The Encyclopedia of Australia's Battles. 1998, p. 245.
  77. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 225.
  78. ^ A b c d Charles Willoughby: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. 1966, p. 233.
  79. ↑ Mark Johnston: The Magnificent 9th. An Illustrated History of the 9th Australian Division 1940-46. 2002, p. 180.
  80. ^ A b Gordon Maitland: The Second World War and its Australian Army Battle Honors. 1999, p. 82.
  81. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 199.
  82. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, pp. 194-197.
  83. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, pp. 199-200.
  84. ^ Charles Willoughby: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. 1966, pp. 232-233.
  85. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, pp. 200-201.
  86. ^ David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, p. 634.
  87. ^ Gordon Maitland: The Second World War and its Australian Army Battle Honors. 1999, p. 83.
  88. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, pp. 204-205.
  89. ^ A b c Gordon Maitland: The Second World War and its Australian Army Battle Honors. 1999, p. 87.
  90. ^ Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. 9.
  91. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 206.
  92. ^ David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, p. 658.
  93. ^ Eustace Keogh: The South West Pacific 1941-45. 1965, p. 332.
  94. ^ A b Gordon Maitland: The Second World War and its Australian Army Battle Honors. 1999, p. 88.
  95. ↑ a b c David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, p. 664.
  96. ^ David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, p. 663.
  97. ^ David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, p. 671.
  98. ^ David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, pp. 665 and 670.
  99. ^ David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, p. 673.
  100. ↑ a b c d e f Gordon Maitland: The Second World War and its Australian Army Battle Honors. 1999, p. 89.
  101. ↑ John Miller Junior: Cartwheel. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, pp. 220-221.
  102. ^ A b John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 241.
  103. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 243.
  104. ^ A b John Miller junior: Cartwheel. The Reduction of Rabaul. 1959, p. 221.
  105. ^ A b Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. 12.
  106. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 245.
  107. ^ John Coates: Bravery Above Blunder. The 9th Australian Division at Finschhafen, Sattelberg, and Sio. 1999, p. 246.
  108. ^ Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, pp. 12-13.
  109. ^ Charles Willoughby: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area. 1966, p. 240.
  110. ^ A b Gordon Maitland: The Second World War and its Australian Army Battle Honors. 1999, p. 90.
  111. ↑ a b c d e f Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, p. 13.
  112. ^ A b Eustace Keogh: The South West Pacific 1941–45. 1965, p. 395.
  113. ^ Eustace Keogh: The South West Pacific 1941-45. 1965, p. 396.
  114. ^ Eustace Keogh: The South West Pacific 1941-45. 1965, pp. 429-431.
  115. ^ Eustace Keogh: The South West Pacific 1941-45. 1965, p. 432.
  116. ^ David Dexter: The New Guinea Offensives. 1961, p. 769.
  117. ^ Mark Johnston: The Huon Peninsula 1943–1944. 2005, pp. 2-3.
  118. ↑ Peter Williams and Naoko Nakagawa: The Japanese 18th Army in New Guinea. 2006, pp. 60-62.
  119. ^ John Coates: The War in New Guinea 1943-44. Operations and Tactics. 2004, p. 66.
  120. ↑ Kengoro Tanaka: . Operations of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces in the Papua New Guinea Theater During World War II in 1980, p.70.