Palair Macedonian Airways Flight 301

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Palair Macedonian Airways Flight 301
Palair Fokker 100 PH-KXL Maiwald.jpg

The affected Fokker 100 PH-KXL two weeks before the accident
Accident summary
Accident type Flow stall during take-off due to wing icing
place near Skopje , MacedoniaMacedonia 1991North Macedonia 
date March 5, 1993
Fatalities 83
Survivors 14th
Aircraft
Aircraft type NetherlandsNetherlands Fokker 100
operator Macedonia 1991North Macedonia Palair Macedonian Airways
Mark NetherlandsNetherlands PH-KXL
Departure airport Skopje Airport , MacedoniaMacedonia 1991North Macedonia 
Destination airport Zurich-Kloten Airport , SwitzerlandSwitzerlandSwitzerland 
Passengers 92
crew 5
Lists of aviation accidents

On March 5, 1993, a Fokker 100 of the national airline Palair Macedonian Airways , which was supposed to operate an international scheduled flight to Zurich-Kloten Airport , had an accident on Palair-Macedonian flight 301 (flight number IAEA: 3D301 , ICAO : PMK301 ) . After the take-off run from Skopje Airport in wintry conditions, the wings were frozen in and stalled. In the accident, 83 of the 97 people on board the machine were killed.

machine

The eleven-month-old Fokker 100 with serial number 11393 was assembled at the Fokker plant in Schiphol and made its maiden flight on April 23, 1992. It received the Dutch registration number PH-KXL , which it received on January 27, 1993 to the Palair Macedonian Airways was delivered. The twin -engine, medium - range, narrow-body aircraft was equipped with two Rolls-Royce Tay 620-15 turbofan engines. The machine had completed 188 operating hours with 136 take-offs and landings since it was first put into operation. The machine was owned by the Dutch lessor Aircraft Trading and Financing (ATF) .

Passengers and crew

There was a two-person cockpit crew on board, consisting of a flight captain and a first officer. Captain was the 49-year-old Dutchman Peter Beer Drager, who on the flight as Prüfkapitän was used. Bierdranger had completed his last medical examination in 1992 and had 11,200 hours of flight experience, 1180 of which he had completed in the cockpit of a Fokker 100. In addition to the Fokker 100, he had type ratings for the Fokker F-27 , the Fokker F28 and the Fokker 50 . He was provided by the ATF and sat in the right cockpit seat. The first officer on board was a 34-year-old Macedonian pilot who had 5580 hours of flight experience, but of which he had only completed 65 hours with the Fokker 100. He had previously flown for the airline Jugoslovenski Aerotransport (JAT) and sat on the flight in the left seat. The cabin crew consisted of three flight attendants who, like the first officer, were provided by the Palair Macedonian.

92 passengers had taken the flight to Zurich, most of whom wanted to travel to Switzerland as migrant workers .

Weather

On March 5, 1993, there was light to moderate snowfall at Skopje Airport. Airport officials reported that the snow melted as soon as it hit the ground. Before the accident, there was no snow on the runways, taxiways or the apron . The precipitation was sleet . The temperatures at the airport were around 0 ° C. The machine was exposed to sleet and the temperatures were below freezing. So there were icing conditions.

Before departure

The aircraft arrived in Skopje at 9:40 a.m. local time, 35 minutes late, after completing a scheduled flight that day. The flight to Zurich should start at 10:50 a.m. On the flight to Skopje, the pilots suspected that they would violate the rest time regulations if they continued to fly to Zurich. The flight operations manager confirmed this after their arrival and decided to deploy a new crew for the flight to Zurich. He himself should fly as a test captain.

Between 9:55 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., the Fokker was refueled with 2000 kg of kerosene, which increased the fuel quantity to 6803 kg. At 10:30 a.m. the new crew arrived at the airport and went straight to the plane. Due to the weather conditions, the master decided to refuel the machine with 907 kg of kerosene. This refueling process lasted from 10:35 a.m. and 10:45 a.m.

The technical inspection of the machine was contractually agreed with Swissair . For this purpose, a Flying Station Engineer (FSE) from Swissair flew in the plane on flights from Zurich. He carried out the maintenance checks on the machine after landing.

The aircraft handler conducted a tour around the machine and scanned both wing leading edges for ice formation. He announced that he could not find any ice formation, only moisture from the snowmelt. After the new crew had boarded the machine, the FSE carried out another tour around the machine and was accompanied by three members of the Palair ground crew. The wings were sighted and their leading edges were scanned. The ground crew member who carried out the tests said that it could not see any ice deposits, only snow melt. The crew members then asked the FSE whether a de-icing should be carried out. A crew member demonstratively pushed a load of melted snow from the wing with his arm. The FSE explained that aircraft de-icing was not necessary and that any deposits during take-off would be blown off the wings by the airflow.

While the Fokker was taxiing to the take-off position, a Jakowlew Jak-42D from Vardar Air was de-iced. This was the first aircraft de-icing that day.

the accident

The machine was being controlled by the first officer at the time of the accident. At 11:11 hrs local time, the crew received clearance to take off runway 34. At this point, heavy snowfall had set in, reducing visibility to 900 meters. From their starting position, the pilots could not see the end of the runway, nor could the air traffic controller on duty. They accelerated the machine, which was rotating 28 seconds after it was released . Two seconds after taking off, the Fokker began to vibrate heavily. As the machine rose to an altitude of about 160 feet (49 meters) and airspeed increased to about 160 knots (296 km / h), the machine rolled sharply left and then right, with roll angles of 50 and 55 degrees. Then the pilots operated the cross and rudder to correct the attitude of the machine. The warning tone about the shutdown of the autopilot sounded and then the warning message about a too high sink rate. About 380 meters behind the end of the runway, the right wing tip touched the ground at an angle of 90 degrees, then the machine overturned. The fuselage broke into three parts. The machine exploded and went up in flames.

Rescue and rescue work

The first report of the crash came from a helicopter pilot with the United Nations peacekeeping forces , who heard the impact and rushed to the crash site. He was able to save seven survivors from the scene of the accident. Other rescue workers from the airport and the UN then arrived . Twenty survivors were transported to the Skopje hospital, five of them were in critical condition. Four of the survivors were found dead on arrival at the hospital , and others died of their injuries in the following days. In the end, 14 people survived the crash.

The wreckage of the machine was later loaded onto UN trucks and transported away.

Accident investigation

Since the machine was built and approved in the Netherlands, the Macedonian authorities worked closely with the Dutch Raad voor de Luchtvaart on the accident investigation , which also prepared the final report on the accident.

It was found that the machine was exposed to precipitation over a period of one hour and 15 minutes, which was initially light and later moderate. Based on the prevailing weather conditions at the time of the accident, the investigators estimated that the wings were covered by a layer of snow that might have frozen to the outer skin of the machine. A visual and tactile test was carried out, but this could only be carried out effectively by tall people and even these could only get to the leading edges of the wings, but not to the surfaces. They also found that the tanks were filled with "cold fuel" on arrival, which cooled the outer walls of the tank and thus promoted ice formation on the wings. For example, a ground technician recognized a frost on the underside of the wing before departure.

Fokker machines are susceptible to icing

The Fokker 100 is technically based on the previous model, the Fokker F28 . This was implicated in a number of incidents:

  • On February 25, 1969, an LTU Fokker F28-1000 stalled when taking off from Hanover-Langenhagen Airport due to icy wings. The start could be aborted in time, so that none of the 11 occupants on board the machine was harmed.
  • On January 26, 1974, when an F28-1000 operated by Türk Hava Yollari (TC-JAO) took off from Izmir Airport , a serious accident occurred . There was a stall at a height of eight to ten meters , the machine suddenly turned to the left and crashed 100 meters from the runway. 66 of the 73 inmates were killed. The plane was supposed to fly to İstanbul-Ataturk. The causes of the accident were excessive rotation (lifting of the nose) and hoar frost on the wings (see also Turkish Airlines flight 301 ) .
  • On 10 March 1989, a Fokker F28-1000 crashed (C-FONF) of Air Ontario near the airport of Dryden , Ontario on the way from Thunder Bay to Winnipeg on Dryden 49 seconds after lifting off. 21 of 65 passengers and 3 of 4 crew members were killed. Due to the defective auxiliary power unit (APU), an engine had to run on the ground. However, de-icing was prohibited and therefore did not take place, which led to the crash (see also Air Ontario flight 1363 )
  • On March 22, 1992, a USAir Fokker F28-4000 (registration number N485US ) crashed into Flushing Bay on its flight to Cleveland due to icy wings when taking off from New York-LaGuardia Airport . Of the 51 people on board, 27 died (see also USAir flight 405 ) .

A report published by Fokker indicated that even small accumulations of ice crystals on the wings can significantly impair the aerodynamic properties of a Fokker F28. As a result of the last two incidents, de-icing practices at North American airports have been significantly reformed. Since then, there had been no icing-related incident involving a Fokker F28.

meaning

It was the first aircraft loss and fatal incident involving a Fokker 100. Since the crash of another machine of this type on TAM Linhas Aéreas flight 402 with 99 deaths, it is the second most serious accident involving a Fokker 100. It was also the case at the time the most serious accident in Macedonia, since the accident of a Jakowlew Jak-42D on Avioimpex flight 110 on November 20, 1993 with 116 deaths, it is the second worst.

See also

swell

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Accident report F28-1000 PH-ZAA , Aviation Safety Network (English), accessed on March 9, 2019.
  2. ^ Accident report F28-1000 TC-JAO , Aviation Safety Network (English), accessed on November 28, 2017.
  3. ↑ Accident report F28-4000 N485US , Aviation Safety Network (English), accessed on November 25, 2017.
  4. ↑ Barron, James. "At Least 19 Killed in Crash at Snowy La Guardia" , The New York Times , March 23, 1992 , accessed on 3 October of 2007.
  5. ↑ Aircraft Accident Report, Takeoff Stall in Icing Conditions, USAir Flight 405, Fokker F-28, N485US, LaGuardia Airport, Flushing, New York, March 22, 1992. (PDF) In: National Transportation Safety Board . February 17, 1993, Retrieved March 30, 2019 (NTSB / AAR-93/02).

Coordinates: 41 ° 58 ′ 40 ″  N , 21 ° 36 ′ 57 ″  E