Philosophical aesthetics

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The philosophical aesthetics is the theory of aesthetic phenomena in their entirety. Like hardly any other philosophical discipline, it is subject to very different assessments. While on the one hand it is attributed a massive loss of meaning, on the other hand the claim is made that it will inherit what was traditionally called the " First Philosophy ". This lack of clarity is also reflected in their subject area, which was controversial from the start. Until the 19th century these were the beautiful , the sublime , the art or the sensual knowledge . All these attempts at definition are considered inadequate by numerous philosophers in the present.

The subject area of ​​philosophical aesthetics overlaps with that of other scientific disciplines such as psychology , sociology , musicology , literary studies , art history and art criticism . Compared to these, however, philosophical aesthetics differs in its questions and methods. Your questions are of a general nature; she examines the phenomenon of the aesthetic in general; it is not their job to analyze and evaluate individual aesthetic objects. Philosophical aesthetics is not an empirical discipline; she decides her questions not through observation and experiment, but through analysis of the commonly used aesthetic terms.

Concept history

The term aesthetics was first introduced by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten in his work Aesthetica , published in 1750 , where he defined aesthetics as the "science of sensual knowledge". By “sensual knowledge” Baumgarten meant knowledge through sensual perception. Baumgarten is therefore often seen as the founder of "philosophical aesthetics", although philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle were already concerned with the subject in ancient times .

Today's aesthetics have three roots: Since Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel , it has primarily been understood as a philosophy of art. According to a second definition it is the theory of the beautiful , and after in the 18th century first the sublime and then the magnificent, elegant, graceful as well as the ugly, grotesque etc. were added as further topics, generally a theory of aesthetic values, their experience and assessment .

The word "aesthetics" was coined by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, who in his dissertation Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus (1735) designed the program of aesthetics as a separate philosophical discipline. His main work Aesthetica , which has remained a fragment, is the attempt to carry out this program systematically. Baumgarten wanted to put the logic, which he understood as the doctrine of intellectual knowledge, a doctrine of sensory knowledge, the aesthesis . He was one of the first who, in contrast to the one-sided appreciation of rational, conceptual knowledge in the Enlightenment, emphasized the intrinsic value and the special cognitive performance of sensually vivid experience. For him, such an aesthetic also included a theory of the expression of such sensual knowledge. He emphasized that the form of its expression is much more important for the mediation of sensual knowledge than in the case of intellectual knowledge.

These three determinations of aesthetics as the theory of beauty, art and sensual knowledge are historically closely related. For Hegel, the philosophy of art essentially coincided with a theory of the beautiful, since for him beauty was an essential characteristic of works of art. For Baumgarten, the aesthetic experience was the central theme of the theory of sensory knowledge. In particular, its aesthetic should provide the basis for a theory of fine arts.

Since the 19th century, however, these theories have been described as inadequate because they either do not include all areas of aesthetics or even describe facts that go beyond aesthetics. In analytical philosophy , the essential tasks of philosophical aesthetics today are the clarification of its central concepts such as “aesthetic experience”, “aesthetic object” and “aesthetic property”.

Objects of Philosophical Aesthetics

Problems with Traditional Definitions

Theory of art

The first traditional definition of aesthetics as a theory of art is often criticized as being too narrow. Art is an essential part of aesthetics, since many aesthetic experiences are based on works of art. But there are also aesthetic experiences that are not caused exclusively by works of art. These include events in nature, which in aesthetic literature are often referred to as “natural beauty”. For example, a rainbow can trigger an aesthetic experience even though it was created solely by natural circumstances. But also everyday things such as B. a lovingly set breakfast table can have an aesthetic effect on the viewer.

Theory of beauty

Caravaggio's painting “Medusa” is not considered beautiful, but still a work of art

Against the traditional view of aesthetics as a theory of the beautiful, it is argued that there are aesthetically relevant questions that have nothing to do with beauty, such as: B. the problem of the authenticity of performances, or the problem of the relationship between originals and forgeries. On the other hand, objects that are not beautiful can also be objects of aesthetics. In art, many objects are generally recognized as works of art that are not considered beautiful or even ugly (e.g. Caravaggio's painting Medusa, the work of the Viennese Actionists in the 1960s, the pictures of Gottfried Helnwein , the caricatures by Manfred Deix ). It is further objected that besides “beautiful” and “ugly” there are other properties of objects that can affect us aesthetically, such as B. "graceful", "sublime", "touching", "poetic", "kitschy", "sensual", "expressive", "shallow", "boring", "humorous".

Theory of the sublime

While Kant used the concept of the sublime only for overpowering natural phenomena, Edmund Burke 's Philosophical Investigation into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful (1757) introduced the sublime as a second basic category of aesthetics alongside the beautiful.

Theory of Sensory Knowledge

The historically very powerful determination of sensual knowledge as an object of aesthetics is criticized for being too far on the one hand, since not every perception experience is an aesthetic experience, since the knowledge of aesthetic qualities is only one of many aspects of sensory perception. On the other hand, this definition is too narrow, since not every aesthetic experience is based on a perceptual experience. So z. B. literary texts have aesthetic qualities (such as tension, poetry and wit) that can only partly be traced back to sensory qualities.

Modern definitions

Maria Reicher defines aesthetics as "the theory of aesthetic experience, aesthetic objects and aesthetic properties". An aesthetic experience is an experience that “includes the grasping of an aesthetic property”, an aesthetic object an object that “has (at least) one aesthetic property”.

Aesthetic experiences

Components of aesthetic experiences

Scheme of views on the structure and basis of aesthetic experiences
Components of the Aesthetic Experience Reason of aesthetic experience
perception Properties of the perceived object
Attitudes of the perceiving subject
Perception + aesthetic feeling Properties of the perceived object
Attitudes of the perceiving subject

It is controversial whether aesthetic experiences differ from non-aesthetic experiences. A number of aesthetes believe that aesthetic experiences are perceptual experiences. According to this view, there cannot be a certain aesthetic experience without a simultaneous sense perception. The type and intensity of the aesthetic experience depend on the relevant sensory perceptions. A change in sensory perception leads to a change in the aesthetic experience. Critics of this view argue that not every aesthetic experience has to be based on a perceptual experience. So are z. For example, the sensory perceptions associated with reading are not directly responsible for the aesthetic experiences one has while reading.

Many aesthetes, on the other hand, take the view that aesthetic experiences have a complex structure and that, in addition to perception, there must be an “aesthetic feeling” as a psychological phenomenon. Usually at least two different aesthetic feelings are distinguished: a positive one ("liking") and a negative one ("displeasing"). It is discussed whether aesthetic feelings have a special quality compared to other feelings, which makes them aesthetic feelings. Is there e.g. B. a qualitative difference between an aesthetic (e.g. I like a picture) and a moral favor (e.g. I like a certain behavior of my child)? A related question is whether different aesthetic feelings correspond to different aesthetic experiences. Do two different aesthetic experiences correspond - e.g. B. an experience of grace and a harmony - each with different feelings or is the difference only based on the aesthetic quality perceived?

Subjective and objective explanation of the aesthetic experience

In addition to the components of an aesthetic experience, the origin of their specific aesthetic character is disputed. There are objective and subjective models of aesthetic experience for this purpose, and these can also occur in combination. According to the objective models, aesthetic experiences differ from non-aesthetic ones in the properties of their objects. So it is e.g. B. the quality of a landscape to be beautiful or dreary. Subjective models, on the other hand, explain the specific character of an aesthetic experience - e.g. B. the beauty or dreariness of a landscape - through the (aesthetic) attitude of the perceiving subject.

Uninterested pleasure and psychological distance

In philosophical aesthetics, attempts have been made again and again to gain clarity about what is special about the aesthetic attitude. Immanuel Kant's characterization of the aesthetic attitude as "disinterested pleasure" is famous (cf. Immanuel Kant: AA V, 265). More recent representatives of similar theories are Edward Bullough, Marshall Cohen, Sheila Dawson and Jerome Stolnitz. Uninterested pleasure is characterized by our interest in something for its own sake, not as a means of attaining any ends. It is often referred to as a "contemplative attitude". A similar view describes the characterization of the aesthetic attitude as “psychological distance” to something. This term puts the emphasis of the aesthetic attitude on the absence of will and desire.

For critics like George Dickie, cessation of disinterested pleasure is impossible, because every favor inevitably brings with it an interest in the existence of the subject. The concept of psychological distance is problematic because every aesthetic experience is characterized by the presence of an emotion, a favor or a displeasure. In addition, not every interest in a thing for its own sake has an aesthetic character (e.g. preoccupation with philosophy, following a football game) and is therefore at most a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an aesthetic attitude.

Therefore, in view of the difficulty of more precisely determining what the characteristics of the aesthetic attitude are, some aesthetes generally reject the concept of a particular aesthetic attitude.

Aesthetic properties

Scheme of views on the status of aesthetic statements
position Language type Reference of aesthetic statements
realism judgment (supervening) aesthetic property of the object
Noncognitivism Expression of a value attitude -
subjectivism judgment Effect on the speaker
naturalism judgment non-aesthetic property of the object

The question of whether there are aesthetic properties and how they may differ from other properties is controversial. As in the field of ethics, we can roughly distinguish between two positions, aesthetic realism and aesthetic anti-realism.

Aesthetic judgments

The question of whether there are aesthetic properties is closely related to the question of the meaning of aesthetic judgments. An aesthetic judgment is a judgment (e.g. “this picture is beautiful”, “this film is boring”) that contains an aesthetic predicate. Decisive for the respective position with regard to the status of aesthetic properties is (1) the question of whether a claim to truth is made with aesthetic value judgments and (2) whether this can only be redeemed if there are aesthetic value properties.

Aesthetic realism

Aesthetic realism claims that there are aesthetic properties. For this position, aesthetic value properties are the “ truth makers ” of aesthetic value judgments. Aesthetic realism is represented in different variants. The most common view is that there are aesthetic properties, but these are dependent on certain non-aesthetic properties. In contemporary philosophy, this type of dependency is called “ supervenience ”. Aesthetic properties supervise other, ultimately non-aesthetic properties. Objects with the same non-aesthetic properties necessarily also have the same aesthetic properties, but conversely, objects with the same aesthetic properties do not necessarily have to have the same non-aesthetic properties. Multi-level foundation hierarchies are possible. For example, the beauty of an object could be founded on the aesthetic properties of grace and harmony, these in turn by other properties, with non-aesthetic properties such as certain structural properties at the base of this hierarchy.

Aesthetic anti-realism

Aesthetic anti-realism is of the opinion that there are no aesthetic properties. Representatives of aesthetic anti-realism deny that an object can, for example, have the property of beauty. Aesthetic anti-realists either deny the thesis that there are true aesthetic value judgments or they deny that these aesthetic properties correspond. The positions that deny the existence of true aesthetic value judgments differ with regard to the question of how ostensible aesthetic value judgments are to be interpreted. For noncognitivism , aesthetic “value judgments” are not real judgments, but only expressions of values. Aesthetic “value judgments” therefore cannot be true or false. For example For example, according to a non-cognitivistic interpretation, the speaker of the sentence "This picture is beautiful" does not judge the picture, but only expresses - as in a bravo shout - that he likes the picture, possibly combined with a request to the addressee that to adopt the same value.

For subjectivism , aesthetic value judgments are judgments, but they do not refer to the intrinsic properties of objects, but to the effects that they exert on us and that can be described with aesthetic predicates. According to this view, for example, the judgment “This picture is beautiful” is not a judgment about an intrinsic property of the picture, but about the aesthetic feelings of the speaker, which should be more correctly described with the sentence “I like this picture”.

For naturalism , too , aesthetic value judgments are real judgments that can be true or false; In contrast to subjectivism, however, these do not relate to the feelings of the person making the judgment, but to the perceived object itself. The aesthetic value predicates, however - contrary to external appearances - do not represent aesthetic value properties, but natural properties of the object. Every aesthetic predicate, if it has any meaning at all, can in principle be replaced by a natural predicate.

Art philosophy

One of the most important areas of philosophical aesthetics is the philosophy of art. Her subject are the works of art. The philosophy of art asks what kind of objects works of art are and what makes them works of art.

Ontology of the work of art

Category systems

Category scheme
 
 
object
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
material
object
 
non-material
object
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
psychic
object
 
abstract
object

One of the most important points of contention in the ontology of the work of art is the question of what category of objects they are. Objects can be divided into different category systems. A very simple division is that into material, psychological and abstract objects. Material objects are all ordinary space-time things; they can basically be perceived with the senses. Psychological objects are all objects that take place “in consciousness” or are part of consciousness (ideas, beliefs, judgments, emotions, etc.). They have a temporal structure and are not accessible to the senses, but in many cases to introspection. Abstract objects (e.g. numbers - according to a realistic interpretation) are all objects that cannot be perceived by the senses and are not psychological objects. They are not structured in terms of space and time and cannot be grasped either through sensory perception or introspection, but only through the mind (in the broadest sense).

What kinds of objects exist is one of the dominant issues in the history of philosophy. Materialistic or nominalistic philosophers hold that only material objects exist. “Mentalists” acknowledge that there are also psychological objects in addition to material objects, but deny that abstract objects exist. Finally, “Platonists” or “Realists” claim that in addition to material and psychological objects, there are also abstract objects.

Literature and music

In a materialistic understanding, a literary work is identical with its concrete material realization. After that z. B. a particular novel as often as there are copies of it; musical works are identical to their concrete performances.

The objection is that the concrete material manifestation does not constitute the essence of a literary or musical work. So a novel can exist even without material manifestation; Literature existed in the western world long before the emergence of written culture, as it was only passed on orally for centuries. The same applies to musical works. If these were identical to their performances, they would cease to exist if they were not played.

According to a mentalistic understanding, literary and musical works are psychic objects. They exist in the consciousness of their authors or composers or that of the readers or listeners.

The objection is raised against the mentalistic interpretation that according to this model a literary or musical work that is not received would not exist either. In addition, a literary or musical work would never exist as a whole, since every reception is a time-limited process that can only ever grasp a section of the work and never its entirety.

According to the realistic-Platonic view, literary and musical works are abstract objects or at least contain abstract components. After that there are z. B. a certain novel only once, which is realized in the various material (book copies) and psychological objects (novel interpretations).

A central problem of this conception is the interpretation of the relationship between the work of art and its realizations. Musical and literary works can, for example, be realized in concrete performances, readings or recitations. In music in particular, realizations must be distinguished from notations (notation). Notations serve on the one hand as a guide for the realization of a work, on the other hand as a means to "record" it.

Visual arts

Works of visual art (paintings, sculptures, graphics, photographs, installations, etc.) generally differ from works of music and literature in that the artist creates his own works. In addition, many artistic decisions, for example in painting and sculpture, are only made in the process of producing a realization. A large majority of art theorists is therefore of the opinion that works of fine art are material individual objects (singularity thesis). According to this view, there is no opposition between works and their manifestations in the visual arts.

An important argument for the singularity thesis is the Fälschbarkeitsargument of Nelson Goodman . According to this, works of the visual arts - in contrast to musical and literary works - can be forged. A copy of a painting, according to Goodman, is not simply a second copy of the same painting (like a second book copy or a second concert performance), but a forgery. Therefore, works of fine art are identical with their material manifestations.

Critics of the singularity thesis point out that in the ordinary everyday understanding we speak of works of art even if they have only been conceived but not realized. So are z. For example, works that have not been realized in architecture are nothing unusual and are recognized there as completed works. The objection to Goodman's forgery argument is that forgeries are to be distinguished from copies. Copies that are distributed without intent to deceive about their origin are also common in the visual arts. For example, in the case of etchings, each individual print would be regarded as a work of art. The painting The Tower of Babel by Pieter Brueghel was copied three times by his son; none of these works is considered a forgery.

What is art

The question “What is art?” Deals with the essence of art. The point is to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a work of art. The aim is to find out what distinguishes works of art from objects that are not works of art.

Art and skill

In connection with the philosophy of art, “art” does not mean any manual skill (“healing art”, “culinary art” etc.). Until the 19th century, manual skills were often a necessary condition for artistic skills, especially in the field of fine arts; however, from the 20th century onwards this only applies to a limited extent. In addition, manual skills are not sufficient conditions for something to be a work of art. There are many handicrafts that require special craftsmanship to make, but which are generally not considered works of art.

Representation theory

The oldest art theory is the representation theory of art. It was the dominant art theory for more than 2000 years. Their origins can be found with Plato and Aristotle . According to representation theory, art is primarily about representing something (things, people, events, etc.). Their different variants differ in what they mean by "display".

The classic form of representation theory is the similarity theory of art. According to this, the essence of art consists in the imitation ( mimesis ) of reality, in particular of nature in art objects. According to conventionalistic representation theory, works of art are symbols. The relationship to the object they represent is based on sheer agreement.

The definition of the representation of art is criticized for excluding numerous works of fine art from the art history of the 20th century. In addition, representation theory does not do justice to whole art genres such as music and literature, the products of which do not primarily represent something.

Expression Theory

According to the theory of expression, an object is a work of art when it "expresses" something. Often the expression of feelings is meant, but there are also other theories of expression that speak of the expression of mental content. A famous exponent of the theory of expression was Leo Tolstoy . In the 20th century this position was represented by Robin George Collingwood , Benedetto Croce and Franz von Kutschera , among others .

Opponents of the theory of expression argue that not all works of art express something. On the other hand, expression is not a sufficient condition for being able to call an object a work of art, since there are also many non-artistic forms of expression.

Formalistic art theory

According to formalistic art theory, certain formal aspects are not decisive for a work of art, but rather certain formal aspects. Formalistic art theory played an important role in the first half of the 20th century in connection with the defense of non-representational visual arts. Clive Bell is considered a classic representative . The central concept in his theory of art is the "significant form" ( significant form ). Significant forms are relationships of combinations of lines and colors that have in common that they trigger an "aesthetic emotion" in the viewer.

The main objection to formalistic art theory is directed against the assumption that, given the formal diversity in art, aesthetic emotions should always be triggered by one and the same formal characteristic. Another objection is that our aesthetic emotions are not only caused by formal qualities, but often by a particularly successful combination of form and content.

Institutional theory

Only through the institution of the art world is Marcel Duchamp's urinal into a work of art

The u. a. The institutional theory of art advocated by George Dickie differs from traditional art theories in that the essence of art is no longer sought in the intrinsic characteristics of works of art. Is decisive is that an object from the art world ( artworld ) is recognized as a work of art. The term art world coined by Arthur C. Danto is used to describe an "institutionalized discourse of reasons", the participants of which are persons professionally involved in the art scene (artists, art theorists, art historians, art collectors, gallery owners, etc.) and institutions (museums, publishers, galleries , Concert halls, film festivals, art magazines, etc.).

For institutional theory, art status represents a property ascribed to the object by the art world. According to this theory, even common objects ( ready-mades ) can be elevated to works of art. The quality of the work of art has not yet been decided.

Since the art world is the criterion for the art status of an object, it cannot be wrong in its judgment. In addition to this consequence, institutional theory is criticized for the fact that the question of which persons or institutions can be counted in the art world is unclear. It is also questionable when one can speak of an object being treated as a work of art. Does it have to be recognized by an institution or is it sufficient if at some point any person regards the object as a work of art? What about objects that have not yet been received or forgotten by the art world?

literature

Philosophy bibliography : Aesthetics - Additional references on the topic

Historical foundations

Introductions

  • Noël Carroll: Philosophy of Art. A Contemporary Introduction . London: Routledge 1999.
  • George Dickie: Aesthetics. An Introduction. Indianapolis (Indiana): Pegasus 6th edition 1979 (1971)
  • Marcia Muelder Eaton: Basic Issues in Aesthetics. Prospect Heights (Illinois): Waveland 1999
  • S. Feagin / P. Maynard (Eds.): Aesthetics , Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997.
  • Berys Gaut, Dominic McIver Lopes (Eds.): The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics. London / New York: Routledge 2001
  • Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert : Introduction to Aesthetics , UTB for Science, Munich: Fink 1995.
  • Franz von Kutschera : Aesthetics . Berlin: de Gruyter. Second edition 1998 (1988)
  • Konrad Paul Liessmann : Philosophy of Modern Art. An introduction. UTB for Science, Vienna, 1999, 11–79. ISBN 3-8252-2088-5 .
  • Karlheinz Lüdeking : Introduction to the analytical philosophy of art , 1997
  • Stefan Majetschak: Aesthetics for the introduction , 3rd unc. Edition, Hamburg: Junius 2012, ISBN 978-3-88506-634-7
  • Günther Pöltner: Philosophical Aesthetics , Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2008. ISBN 978-3-17-016976-0
  • Maria E. Reicher: Introduction to Philosophical Aesthetics , Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 2005
  • Anne Sheppard : Aesthetics - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art . Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987

On the history of philosophical aesthetics

Web links

Commons : Aesthetics  - collection of images, videos and audio files
Wiktionary: Philosophical Aesthetics  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations
More general overview displays


Remarks

  1. See Günther Pöltner: Philosophische Ästhetik , Stuttgart 2008, p. 13
  2. Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten: Aesthetica § 1.
  3. See Franz von Kutschera: Ästhetik , Berlin 1988, pp. 1–3
  4. ^ Karl Rosenkranz: Aesthetics of the ugly . Publishing house of the Bornträger brothers, Königsberg 1853.
  5. Cf. Maria E. Reicher: Introduction to philosophical aesthetics, Darmstadt 2005, p. 32
  6. For a critical overview of the traditional views on the objects of a philosophical aesthetic cf. Maria E. Reicher: Introduction to Philosophical Aesthetics , Darmstadt 2005, pp. 13–16
  7. Maria E. Reicher: Introduction to Philosophical Aesthetics , Darmstadt 2005, p. 17f.
  8. Cf. Maria E. Reicher: Introduction to philosophical aesthetics , Darmstadt 2005, p. 36.
  9. See Alexandra King:  The Aesthetic Attitude. In: Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  10. Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA V, 265 .
  11. ^ Edward Bullough: Psychical Distance As a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle . British Journal of Psychology 5 (1912), pp. 87-117. [Reprinted in: M. Weitz (Ed.): Problems in Aesthetics . New York: Macmillan 1970.]
  12. ^ Marshall Cohen: Appearance and the Aesthetic Attitude . Journal of Philosophy 56 (1959), pp. 915-926
  13. ^ Sheila Dawson: Distancing as an Aesthetic Principle . Australasia Journal of Philosophy 39 (1961), pp. 155-174
  14. Jerome Stolnitz: Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism. A Critical Introduction . Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1960; Of the Origins of Aesthetic Disinterestedness . Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 20 (1961), pp. 131-143
  15. George Dickie: The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude . American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964), pp. 56-65.
  16. Cf. Maria E. Reicher: Introduction to philosophical aesthetics, Darmstadt 2005, pp. 47–49
  17. Cf. Maria E. Reicher: Introduction to philosophical aesthetics , Darmstadt 2005, pp. 50–53
  18. On the concept of aesthetic judgment cf. Nick Zangwill:  Aesthetic Judgment. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  19. On the supervenience of aesthetic properties see: Monroe Beardsley : The Descriptivist Account of Aesthetic Attributions . Revue internationale de philosophie 28 (1974), pp. 336-352; John W. Bender: Realism, Supervenience, and Irresolvable Aesthetic Disputes . Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54 (1996), pp. 371-381.
  20. The structure of the chapter is based on Maria E. Reicher: Introduction to philosophical aesthetics , Darmstadt 2005, pp. 92–127
  21. Maria Reicher calls works of music and literature “works of notation”, works of visual art as “works of realization”. Cf. Maria E. Reicher: Introduction to philosophical aesthetics , Darmstadt 2005, p. 117
  22. See Nelson Goodman: Languages ​​of Art. Draft of a symbol theory. Suhrkamp. Frankfurt am Main 1973 [engl. 1968]
  23. On the criticism of Goodman's falsifiability argument, see Anthony Ralls: The Uniqueness and Reproducibility of a Work of Art: A Critique of Goodman's Theory . Philosophical Quarterly 22 (1972), pp. 1-18.
  24. For this chapter cf. Maria E. Reicher: Introduction to Philosophical Aesthetics , Darmstadt 2005, pp. 128–169
  25. Leo Tolstoy: What is Art? A study. Edited and introduced by Klaus H. Fischer. Schutterwald: Verlag Klaus Fischer 1999. [1898]
  26. ^ RG Collingwood: The Principles of Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1970.
  27. Benedetto Croce: Aesthetics as a science of expression and general linguistics . Leipzig: Seemann 1905
  28. ^ Franz von Kutschera: Aesthetics . Berlin: de Gruyter. Second edition 1998 (1988)
  29. Clive Bell: Art. London 1914 (Clive Bell: Art im Project Gutenberg ( currently not available to users from Germany as a rule ) )
  30. George Dickie: Art and the Aesthetic. An institutional analysis . Ithaca (New York): Cornell University Press 1974; George Dickie: The Art Circle. A Theory of Art. New York: Haven Publications 1984.
  31. Monika Betzler: Arthur Coleman Danto . In: Julian Nida-Rümelin / Monika Betzler (Ed.): Aesthetics and philosophy of art. Stuttgart: Kröner, p. 190.