RENO plans

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
General Douglas MacArthur (1943)

The RENO plans were framework plans drawn up by the American General Douglas MacArthur for the gradual approach to the Philippines, which were conquered by the Japanese in the early stages of the Pacific War in World War II . A total of five versions of the plans were worked out under his leadership with the SWPA -G3 planning staff in the period from 1943 to 1944, of which the plans RENO III and IV could essentially be implemented. In July 1944, the GHQ's musketeer plans for landing in the Philippines replaced the RENO plans.

prehistory

From December 7, 1941 to the middle of 1942, Japanese units occupied the Philippines, the Malay Peninsula including Singapore , the Dutch East Indies , parts of New Britain and New Ireland (→ Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia ) as part of the Second World War . The troops of the USA, Great Britain , Australia and the Netherlands stationed there were hardly able to oppose the advancing Japanese landing units , so that Southeast Asia was firmly in Japanese hands until 1945.

MacArthur, who was deployed as a military advisor in the Philippines and had only begun the regular establishment of a Philippine-American defense army in October 1941, was completely surprised by the Japanese air raids on December 8, 1941 and the massive amphibious landings that followed two days later . When the defense situation became hopeless, the US War Department withdrew MacArthur from the Philippines in March 1942 to appoint him commander in chief of the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific. From then on, his final goal was to recapture the Philippines .

The plans

General MacArthur favored the New Guinea - Mindanao axis for his project . After he had been given command of the combat area in the Southwest Pacific, he began planning operations that included amphibious operations along the north coast of New Guinea. Since the success of landing operations in the Philippines was heavily dependent on the attainable air sovereignty , airfields had to be taken step by step by the Japanese or new ones created along the approximately 2250 km long north coast of New Guinea . An advance from the Vogelkop Peninsula was threatened on the north flank by the Japanese-occupied Palau and in the east by the Japanese-occupied Dutch East Indies .

MacArthur also stated in his considerations that Japanese air strikes from the Marshall or Caroline Islands could be repulsed by strong maritime intervention and so the advance would not be endangered. After the Allied forces left the Vogelkop Peninsula, they would be protected by land-based aircraft, whose bases are between New Guinea and the southern Philippines. The right flank would be under the protection of the Palau Island to be conquered, or could be secured by strategic operations of the US Pacific Fleet . It would be their job anyway to destroy the Japanese fleet or at least keep it from the battle lines . MacArthur saw an important strategic goal fulfilled as he advanced over the north coast of New Guinea: the interruption of the Japanese lines of communication to the East Indies .

Division of combat areas in the Pacific (1942)

On the other hand, an advance into the Philippines through the central Pacific via the Marshall and Caroline Islands would have had to take place without any land-based air support. This time-consuming operation would have been disproportionately high. In addition, this procedure would have meant a departure from the strategic division into a Central Pacific and Southwest Pacific combat area that had taken place until then , which provided for the bypassing of the Japanese base in Rabaul . In conclusion, MacArthur saw in this concept the return to old pre-war planning, which excluded the inclusion of Australia as a basis for offensive operations.

For some time, MacArthur's plan included taking Hansa Bay in northeastern New Guinea as the first step on the way to the Philippines and the last step in bypassing Rabaul. The next step was to build a logistically and strategically important airfield at Hollandia , around 440 km to the northwest, bypassing the Japanese base at Wewak . The Geelvinkbucht was a future goal, then airfields either Halmahera or Celebes to conquer that were strategically located between the Vogelkop Peninsula and Mindanao. To secure the left wing of the attack, bases could then be set up on islands in the Arafura Sea , south of western New Guinea, and Ambon , south of Halmahera.

RENO I

On February 25, 1943, shortly after the decision of the Buna operation , General MacArthur presented the first overall plan, which finally had the capture of the Philippines as its goal. This plan, worked out by the G3 planning staff of the SWPA, was called the RENO plan and had to be subjected to numerous revisions in the course of the Pacific War, which were due to the respective tactical, strategic and logistical situations.

RENO I was based on the premise that the location of the Philippines on the direct route from Japan to the raw material areas in the Dutch East Indies, Malaya and Indochina represented a vital artery that had to be cut. Whoever had air and sea sovereignty over this area also had control over this logistical supply route. If this path were blocked, the Japanese raw material reserves would very quickly become scarce and they would hardly have any more defense reserves against the advancing allies.

RENO II

While American troops fought their way to the Munda airfield on New Georgia , the planners in Washington prepared the next conference with the British in Quebec . Although the main focus there was on the war in Europe, the Americans also focused on the war in the Pacific. Although there was no long-term strategy for this theater of war, attempts were made to establish a sequence of operations for the next eighteen months that would take into account the studies already carried out. The main strategy of taking the Marshall Islands had already been defined, but it was unclear where the troops under the command of Chester W. Nimitz would then turn. The Operation Cartwheel while also presented a clear line for William Halsey firm and MacArthur, but voices been raised in the meantime, which was against a direct attack on Rabaul. The planners turned to MacArthur for further advice.

In response to this request, MacArthur submitted a first revision of his RENO plan in early August 1943. His advance into the Philippines was divided into six phases, the first steps of which were similar to those of Operation Cartwheel . According to RENO II, the goals set in phase 1 - control of the Bismarck Archipelago including the capture of Rabaul and eastern New Guinea - should be achieved and secured in the southwestern Pacific by March 1944 . Phase 2 should then begin in August. It was planned to take Hollandia, bypassing the Wewak. Accompanying operations should affect the Kai , Aroe and Tanimbar Islands off the southwest coast of New Guinea. During the remainder of 1944 and the first few months of 1945, during Phase 3 operations, Northwest New Guinea and the Vogelkop Peninsula would be captured.

Allied landings in New Guinea

During the next two phases of RENO II, for which MacArthur had not yet set a date, the forces in the Southwest Pacific were to continue their advance across the axis of the Dutch East Indies to occupy the islands between New Guinea and the Philippines. Control over the Celebes Sea was to be gained. At the same time, the conquest of Palau was planned, either by MacArthur or Nimitz, to protect the right flank to advance into Mindanao, which was the final phase of RENO II.

MacArthur's RENO II made it clear that all available funds should be used centrally in order to have all options available, as it was clear that the planned allocations would only allow one operation at a time. However, a concentrated use of all Allied forces would shift the borders and increase the pace of war. Nevertheless, the plan showed that Mindanao could not be reached until 1945 or even later, but that Rabaul and the Admiralty Islands should be taken by the Allies before the summer of 1944

RENO III

RENO III was also based on decisions made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Quadrant Conference in Quebec. General Marshall conveyed the following message to General MacArthur on October 19, 1943:

“Certain papers delivered to you by Colonel Ritchie contain quadrant decisions covering operation against the Japanese. It is requested that you forward by 1 November 1943 outline plans for your operations to seize Kavieng and Admiralty Islands and for your advances in New Guinea as far west as Vogelkop .... This information is necessary for the integration of operations in your area with other approved operations against the Japanese in 1943-1944, particularly those to be conducted in the Japanese Mandates. "

"Some of the papers that were given to you by Colonel Richie contain Quadrant Conference decisions concerning operations against the Japanese. It is requested that you send master plans concerning Kavieng and the Admiralty Islands before November 1st, 1943, as well as your further course of action in western New Guinea to Vogelkop .... This information is for the coordination of operations in your area with others approved operations against the Japanese in the period from 1943 to 1944 are important, especially those that are to be carried out in the Japanese mandate area. "

- General George C. Marshall : Memo - Reno III, Outline Plan for Opns of the SWPA, 1944

To this end, Marshall submitted three strategic points to isolate Japan from the Malaya-Dutch-East Indies region:

  1. Conquering or neutralizing Eastern New Guinea as far west of Wewak as possible, including the Admiralty Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago; Neutralization of Rabaul, primarily the conquest.
  2. Advance over the north coast of New Guinea, as far west as the Vogelkop Peninsula by means of amphibiously supported jumps from the air.
  3. Preparing for the air and seaborne conquest of Mindanao.

Our final operation, he went on, is to retake the southern Philippines and isolate Japan from the Malaya-Dutch East Indies.

RENO IV

RENO IV was a direct reaction to the successful landing at Hollandia on April 22, 1944 ( Operation Reckless ) and the largely successful elimination of the 4th Japanese Air Force in this area. It was mainly a time streamlining, but no new operations or even a change in the overall strategy were decided.

RENO V

MacArthur drew up another version of his plan in the summer of 1944, but it was never published. At the beginning of July 1944, a conference took place with all representatives of the Central Pacific combat area, who welcomed MacArthur's plan for sea and airborne landings in the southern Philippines and, on this basis, worked out the musketeer plan . It planned additional operations for Morotai and other islands in the western Carolines . Air strikes on Palau , Yap and Ulithi were also integrated into the plan.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Robert Ross Smith: US Army in World War II - The Aproach to the Philippines (Chapter I, The Strategic Background) , p. 3 f. , accessed July 20, 2013.
  2. ↑ Reports of General MacArthur - The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume I, Chapter VII - The Philippines: Strategic Objective , p. 168 , accessed July 28, 2013.
  3. ↑ a b US Army in World War II - Strategy and Command: The first two years (Chapter XXV, Operations and Plans, Summer 1943) p. 512 f. , accessed August 16, 2013.
  4. ↑ Maurice Matloff : Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944, Chapter IX: Current Plans and Future Operations in the War Against Japan - June-August 1943 , Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, DC, 1990, p. 194 , accessed August 16, 2013.
  5. ↑ a b US Army in World War II - Strategy and Command: The first two years (Appendix W) , p. 686 , accessed on August 18, 2013.
  6. ^ Army Air Forces in World War II - Vol. IV - The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (Chapter 19) , p. 616 , accessed August 18, 2013.
  7. ^ Reports of General MacArthur - The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Volume I, Chapter VII - The Philippines: Strategic Objective , p. 170 . Retrieved August 18, 2013.