Battle of the Stones River
| date | December 31, 1862 to January 2, 1863 |
|---|---|
| place | Murfreesboro, Tennessee |
| output | Union victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
| Troop strength | |
| 43,400 | 37,712 |
| losses | |
|
13,249 killed |
10,266 killed |
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The Battle of the Stones River (Murfreesboro) was a Civil War battle that was about domination in central Tennessee . It lasted from December 31, 1862 to January 2, 1863.
background
After the victory of the Union forces in the Battle of Perryville (October 8, 1862), the Confederate forces under General Braxton Bragg had withdrawn south from Kentucky. Although Perryville was a strategic Union victory, there were changes in the high command of the Northern States. President Abraham Lincoln was unhappy with the slow operations of Don Carlos Buell and replaced him on October 24 with Major General William Starke Rosecrans . But this also delayed the operations and reorganized the high command of his Cumberland Army (from the command of the XIV. Corps) and their cavalry troops. Meanwhile, Bragg's army was reinforced by troops under Major General Edmund Kirby Smith and eventually stopped in Murfreesboro. Murfreesboro was the capital of Tennessee until 1826 and the residents were southerners. The area was covered extensively with dense forest, it was easy to get food for the army, and from here one could block the road to Chattanooga. The divisions of the Army of Tennessee were reorganized and some received new leadership cadres. Two corps commands were formed, which were entrusted to Lieutenant General William Hardee and Leonidas Polk . The cavalry was led by the young Brigadier General Joseph Wheeler .
While Rosecrans was preparing his army to counterattack, Bragg ordered Colonel John Hunt Morgan and his cavalry to raid behind the enemy line north of Nashville to disrupt supplies to the Union army. During this attack, the battle of Hartsville broke out on December 7th , where Morgan surprised the brigade under Absalom B. Moore and took over 1,800 prisoners with them. According to President Lincoln, the nation needed a great victory, to raise the morale of the North he demanded a military success. At the urging of the Union Chief of Staff Henry Halleck , Rosecranse opened the Stones River campaign.
The Army of Cumberland marched from Nashville on December 26th in three columns southeast towards Murfreesboro. The left wing of 14,500 men under Major General Thomas L. Crittenden took a route that ran parallel to the Nashville-Chattanooga railroad and ran through La Vergne and south of Smyrna. The 13,500-man center under Major General George Henry Thomas marched south along the Wilson and Franklin Turnpike, parallel to the Nashville and Decatur railroad, then east through Nolensville, and along the same route that Crittenden used south of Nashville and Chattanooga. The right wing of 16,000 men under Major General Alexander M. McCook advanced south along the Nolensville Turnpike to Nolensville and Triune and then turned east on Murfreesboro. The cavalry under Brigadier General David S. Stanley and Col. John Kennett preceded the columns as vanguard.
The Confederate cavalry divisions under Forrest and Morgan operated in the rear of the Union during this time, causing severe damage to the connections and threatening the opposing supply lines. Although Rosecrans had reported that his army in Nashville numbered 81,729 men, his force was barely more than half that strong after reaching the march goal, as he had to protect his base and supply lines from the harassment of the Confederate cavalry.
On the evening of December 29, the Union troops reached the northwestern apron of Murfreesboro , where the Confederate Tennessee Army under General Bragg with 37,700 men had taken a defensive position on the railway line to Nashville. Before sunset, two-thirds of Rosecran's army were on Nashville Road, and by the following morning he had about 43,000 soldiers concentrated. The CS cavalry under General Wheeler, which intervened the next day, destroyed several Union wagon trains and destroyed large amounts of war material.
On December 30, the Union Forces advanced three kilometers northwest of Murfreesboro. The two armies faced each other at a short distance in parallel lines, facing south-west to north-east, about six kilometers long. Braggs Army had Polks Corps on the west bank and Hardees Corps on the east bank of the Stones River for resistance. Wheeler's cavalry interpreted the Union's movements as preparation for a retreat and passed on his assumptions to Bragg, who gave the order to attack the next day.
The armies camped only 640 meters apart. On the eve of the battle there was a competition between the opposing military bands, at the end of the concert veterans of both armies, across the front, voted together the song "Home Sweet Home".
Involved armed forces
CS Army of Tennessee
Hardees Corps under Lieutenant General William J. Hardee
- McCown's Division, Maj. Gen. John P. McCown with the Brigades of Mathew D. Ector , James E. Rains, and Evander McNair
- Cleburnes Division, Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne with the brigades of Lucius E. Polk , St. John R. Liddell , Bushrod R. Johnson, and Sterling AM Wood
- Breckinridge's division under Maj . Gen. John C. Breckinridge with the brigades of Daniel W. Adams , Joseph B. Palmer , William Preston , Roger W. Hanson, and John K. Jackson
Polks Corps under Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk
- Cheatham's Division, Maj . Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham with the brigades of Daniel S. Donelson , Alexander P. Stewart , George Maney, and Alfred J. Vaughan .
- Withers Division, Maj. Gen. Jones M. Withers with the brigades of John Q. Loomis, James R. Chalmers , James Patton Anderson, and Arthur M. Manigault
Wheeler's Cavalry Corps with the equestrian brigades Joseph Wheeler, Abraham Buford , John Pegram and John A. Wharton
US Army of the Cumberland
Right wing under Maj. Gen. Alexander M. McCook
- Jefferson C. Davis Division with Philip S. Post , William P. Carlin, and William E. Woodruff Brigades
- Richard W. Johnson Division with August Willich , Edward N. Kirk and Philemon P. Baldwin Brigades
- Philip Sheridan's Division with Joshua W. Sill , Frederick Schaefer, and George W. Roberts Brigades
Center under Major General George Henry Thomas
- Lovell H. Rousseau Division with Benjamin Scribner, John Beatty, and John C. Starkweather Brigades
- Speed S. Fry Division with the brigades of Moses B. Walker and Colonel Oliver L. Shepherd
- James Scott Negley Division with the brigades of James G. Spears , Timothy R. Stanley, and John F. Miller
Left wing under General Thomas L. Crittenden
- Division Thomas J. Wood with the brigades of Milo S. Hascall , George D. Wagner and Charles G. Harker .
- Division John M. Palmer with the brigades of Charles Cruft , William B. Hazen and William Grose .
- Division Horatio P. Van Cleve with the brigades of Samuel Beatty , James P. Fyffe and W. Samuel Price
Cavalry Corps under Brigadier General David S. Stanley . 1st Cavalry Division (Col. John Kennett) with the brigades of Robert H. Minty and Lewis Zahm
Course of the battle
December 31
Rosecrans had ordered his men to be ready to attack after breakfast. The Crittenden Corps was to cross the Stones River and attack the heights east of the river to establish an artillery position that would dominate the entire Confederate lines. Crittenden, whose troops faced the division under Breckinridge on the left side of the Union, failed to inform US Major General Alexander McCook (on the right wing of the Union) about his troop movements the previous evening. McCook, expecting the Crittenden general attack to begin the next day, kept numerous bonfires in his area in hopes of deceiving the Confederates as to the strength of this flank. Thomas in the middle was instructed to make a limited attack and act as the fulcrum for the main thrust columns.
Bragg anticipated Rosecrans' attack intentions. At dawn on December 31st, Major General McCown's division, assisted by General Cleburne's forces, attacked across the frozen fields. Hardee attacked with seven brigades under Manigault, Loomis, Polk, Bushrod Johnson, Wood, Liddell and McNair with about 10,000 men. The men of General Richard Johnson's US Division were preparing breakfast when the outpost fire sounded the alarm. McCown's division moved too far to the left, leaving a gap on the right, which Cleburne's division could fill. According to Bragg's plan, the Hardees Corps should encompass the right wing of the Union and push it back to the Stones River, while the opposing supply routes at Nashville Pike and the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad should be cut off. After half an hour, McCown's division broke the opposing resistance and pursued the remnants of the Willich and Kirk brigades, whereupon the still intact Baldwin brigade withdrew to a nearby forest and tried to stop there again. The generals of the Union tried to tone down and resist the following attacks on every fence and tree line. After half of the crew was out, several artillery batteries from Johnson's division fell into the hands of the southerners. General Augustus Willich was taken prisoner.
Soon General Jefferson C. Davis's US division was attacked head-on and on the right flank. The protruding right front corner of the Union line, created by holding the Brigadier General Post and Carlin, has now been violently attacked by the Confederate Brigades McNair and Liddell. Whister's brigades under Manigault and Loomis attacked around 8 a.m. but had to withdraw. The troops of Cleburnes were unsuccessful for a time, three successive attacks failed. Rosecrans had all planned movements on his right wing stopped after Crittenden wanted his division from Cleve to cross the Stones River to the east bank at 7:00 a.m. The transfer of these troops to the right flank began. The Vaughan and Maney brigades relieved the Loomis and Manigault brigades. At 8:30 a.m., the Union line on the right wing began to disintegrate and retreat to the north.
Polks Corps with Cheathams and Whiters Division also took part in the second phase of the attack. General Sheridan foresaw the attack and had his division ready for action early. The defeat of the divisions to his right forced Sheridan's commanders to reposition their own lines to prevent Cleburne's division from cutting off his path of retreat. Whiter's forces attacked Sheridan's right flank on the seam with Davis's division, but three attacks were repulsed in a row. Then Sheridan's and Negley's troops were attacked head-on by Cheatham's division and Cleburnes attacked simultaneously from the flank, but the attack was poorly organized. The Confederate brigades' complete success was hampered by the terrain and a lack of communication between the lines of attack. It was later alleged that General Cheatham was drunk that day and that he should not have run the brigades himself. All three of Sheridan's brigade commanders (Joshua Sill, Frederick Schaefer and George W. Roberts) were killed or mortally wounded, and the Union units lost more than a third of their men. Union soldiers later recalled that the area with the many dead looked like the Chicago slaughterhouses. Hardee's troops were able to push the enemy back almost 3 miles by 10 a.m., and Richard W. Johnson finally managed to stop his troops on the railway line.
After the attacks on the left wing stalled, Bragg decided to strike on the other side of the front at 10 a.m. Around noon, the Confederate Brigades of AP Stewart, J. Patton Anderson, George Maney, AM Manigault and AJ Vaughn attacked the Union from three sides. For over two hours, the Union forces retreated step by step fighting, but slowing the Confederate attack. Eventually the ammunition ran out, the Negley and Sheridan's lines collapsed, and the men returned, partly through the cedar trees, north and west towards Nashville Pike. Major General Leonidas Polk's corps, whose men were exhausted after fighting Sheridan's forces, launched a series of attacks that failed to shake the Union's lines. Sheridan had fought his way back through the cedar forest, the "The Slaughter Pen", so as not to be outflanked. It was only thanks to the use of Sheridan's division that the right wing of the Union front was stabilized again. The line of the Union was now bent back to a right angle along Wilkinson Turnpike. Rosecran's new front line was now oval in shape, with the back leaning against the Stones River. Sheridan's lines were re-anchored to the tree and rock formation along McFadden Lane after joining General James Negley's division.
Bragg decided to attack that part of the oval of the enemy positions that stretched to the southeast and was held by the Hazen Brigade. Bragg ordered John Breckinridge's division to renew the attack. Reluctantly, Breckinridge sent his units to the Rundwald at 4 p.m. The first two Breckinridge brigades attacked the Hazen front, but withdrew immediately after heavy losses. Later two fresh brigades came into the fight and also had to be pulled out without success. Major Generals George H. Thomas and John M. Palmer, concentrated divisional artillery to support Hazen's sector. Hazen and Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft defended a formidable head start whose conquest might have secured the Confederate victory. The focus of the new effort was in the 16,000 m² cedar forest, which became known as the Rundwald and after the battle as "Hell's Half-Acre". Several attacks by the Confederate were repulsed with losses.
When Hardee asked for reinforcements, Bragg replied that he had no reserves. The Unionists withdrew to a horseshoe-shaped position and positioned cannons on the heights. Lieutenant General Hardee captured the moment for eternity by declaring: “The enemy was out of range of our cannons, safely protected behind the strong defenses of the railway embankment, with wide open fields in between, dominated by superior artillery. It would have been folly, not bravery, to attack her in this position. “Thomas's divisions even made a small counterattack in the center, as a result of which the battle ended at 4:30 pm on December 31st.
Nevertheless, Bragg reported to Richmond that evening that the battle had been won and that the Union army would withdraw. Rosecrans convened a council of war to decide what to do next. Some generals suggested that they'd better retreat before they were completely cut off from Nashville. Rosecrans did not agree to this proposal and was supported by Corps Commanders Thomas and Crittenden. Thomas reportedly said in the council: "The army is not withdrawing" or "There is no better place to die." In the end it was decided to hold out and continue the fight after the arrival of reinforcements.
Interlude
Bragg was surprised when the Union forces still held out on New Year's Day. He had not achieved his main objective, he could not cut off the enemy from his rear connections and was forced to attack again. Apart from a few minor skirmishes and the care of the wounded, things remained quiet on January 1st. Both sides spent January 1st expanding their lines and tending to their wounded. The Union had to deploy strong escorts for the convoys with the repatriated wounded in order to protect them from attacks by Joseph Wheeler's cavalry. Rosecrans, now in a narrow position and both flanks connected to the Stones River, decided to extend its flank to the east bank. Bragg's reluctance to renew the Confederate attack on January 1 enabled Rosecrans to further expand its position and bring in additional reinforcements. Behind McFladden Ford, several Union batteries were deployed under Captain John Mendenhall. Mendenhall placed 46 cannons on the ridge, 12 more guns he distributed a mile of them with the front to the southwest.
January 2nd
At 4:00 p.m. on January 2, Bragg ordered the Breckinridge Division with Beatty's troops, who were occupying a hill on the east side of the river, to attack again to push the Unionists back from the occupied hill across the river. Breckinridge fought vehemently against this order, because on the other side of the river on a hill the strong artillery of the Union was recognized and the attacking troops would have to operate exactly in their field of fire. When Breckinridge expressed his opinion on the hopelessness of the situation after observing the state of the country first hand, which Bragg had not done, Bragg replied with a terse arrogance, “Sir, my information is different. I have given the order to attack the enemy on your front, and I expect it to be obeyed. "Bragg was not open to discussion and was known to" characteristically bristle when his judgment was questioned or even criticized ". After the decision was made, Breckinridge and his division had to attack west of McFadden's Ford and storm the hilltop occupied by the Northern States. He sent his men forward against the Union positions in heavy snowstorms at 4 p.m. About 5,000 Confederates crossed half a mile of open field, their formations receiving frontal and flank support from massed artillery. The Union line might soon have been shaken with this attack, but the hasty shifting of reinforcements to this section saved the situation.
At 4:45 p.m. General Negley's Union Division counterattacked and the Southerners began to retreat. The attack failed, within a few minutes the so-called Orphan Brigade (Brigadier General Roger Hanson) lost a third of its troops. 1,800 Confederate soldiers killed or wounded in less than an hour proved that Breckinridge was right in his views. Finally, by the time the last Confederate soldier withdrew from the range of enemy guns, the battle was over, although sporadic shots continued through the night and the next morning.
Consequences and balance
Very early in the morning of Saturday, January 3rd, around 2 a.m., a council of war was held at Bragg's headquarters. In the morning a large convoy with supplies and another fresh brigade for Rosecrans approached. Wheeler's cavalry attempted to attack the convoy but was thrown back. Bragg realized that Rosecrans had no intention of withdrawing and would continue to receive reinforcements. As the rising river threatened to isolate the two wings of the Confederate army that morning, Bragg realized his precarious situation.
Bragg had about 20,000 troops left to continue the battle, with Scouts informing him that Rosecrans had amassed up to 70,000 troops. At 10 a.m. he agreed with Polk and Hardee that the army had to be withdrawn. When Murfreesboro townspeople were preparing to retire to sleep on the evening of January 3, the Confederate Army began to withdraw from the battlefield. Later that evening, General Thomas attacked the center of the Confederate line in response to constant sniper fire on his positions. Thomas managed to throw the enemy out of the trenches and capture nearly 30 prisoners. This was the only action that day. Bragg vacated Murfreesboro at 10:00 p.m. and began retreating to Tullahoma. The Confederate Army retreated to the Duck River , 25 kilometers further south, after this battle .
It was not until January 5 that Rosecran's forces occupied Murfreesboro, but did not attempt to follow up with Bragg's forces. After the defeat of Fredericksburg and the temporary setback of Sherman at Vicksburg , this small victory in the West was at least positive news for Abraham Lincoln.
The Battle of the Stones River was a tactical draw overall, but a clear strategic Union victory after the Confederate withdrawal. On the side of the Union about 43,000 soldiers went into battle, with 13,249 victims (dead, wounded and missing) to mourn, the Confederates had lost 10,266 men with a strength of around 38,000 men.
The battlefield today
The Stone River National Battlefield & Cemetery was established on the battlefield at that time, with many cannons and monuments at the historical locations. A National Park Service brochure leads to the most important places.
literature
- Peter Cozzens: No Better Place to Die: The Battle of Stones River. Urbana, IL 1990
- Joseph B. Mitchell: Decisive Battles of the Civil War , New York 1955, ISBN 0-449-30031-5 , pp. 93-98.
- Robert Underwood Johnson / Clarence Clough Buel (Eds.): Battles and Leaders of the Civil War , Volume 3, Published by The Century Co., New York (1885-1888), pp. 613-631
- James Lee McDonough: Stones River - Bloody Winter in Tennessee, Knoxville 1980, p. 131 f.
- Larry J. Daniel: Battle of Stones River : The Forgotten Conflict Between the Confederate Army of Tennessee and the Union Army of the Cumberland. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012. ISBN 978-0-8071-4516-6 .
- Christopher L. Kolakowski: The Stones River and Tullahoma Campaigns : This Army Does Not Retreat. Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2011. ISBN 978-1-59629-075-4 .
- James M. McPherson: Die for Freedom ; List Publishing House; ISBN 3-471-78178-1
- William C. Davis: The American Civil War ; Weltbild Verlag; ISBN 3-8289-0384-3
- Steven L. Walker & Matti P. Major: Civil War Parks; the Battlefields of Freedom ; Camelback, Elan Venture; ISBN 1-879924-03-X
