First Vicksburg campaign

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The first Vicksburg campaign (November 2, 1862 to March 29, 1863) was a failed military operation by the Northern States during the American Civil War in the western theater of war. The campaign took place on both sides of the Mississippi in the states of Mississippi , Arkansas and Louisiana . The aim of the campaign was to be able to use the Mississippi militarily and economically without restrictions. By conquering the city of Vicksburg , Mississippi, this goal could have been achieved. However, the Tennessee Army under Major General Ulysses S. Grant failed to conquer the city in a series of battles, skirmishes and circumvention operations.

First Vicksburg campaign

prehistory

Abraham Lincoln believed that the fortified town of Vicksburg could be the key to victory in the American Civil War. Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Louisiana were the last Confederation bulwarks that prevented the Union from taking complete control of the Mississippi. The city was well protected against attacks from the river. Admiral Farragut had discovered this in the failed attempt to take Vicksburg with naval forces in May 1862.

For the Confederation, Vicksburg was the hinge that connected the western parts of the Confederation to the main area. The loss of the city meant not only the loss of secure communications with the west, but also the loss of control of traffic on the Mississippi and the loss of much of the state of Mississippi.

The simple plan for conquering Vicksburg was to bring the Tennessee Army Major General Grants from Memphis , Tennessee south and the Gulf Army Major General Banks ' from New Orleans , Louisiana north. Bank's advance, however, was slow and stalled at Port Hudson, 135 miles south of Vicksburg. Grant assumed the main responsibility in the two campaigns against Vicksburg, since Banks attack efforts were unsuccessful.

The commanders and commanders

The main actors on the Union side were Majors General Grant, Sherman, McClernand and Banks.

After Major General Halleck's call to Washington, DC , Grant was on October 16, 1862, in command of the Tennessee Military Area. William T. Sherman and John A. McClernand were subordinate division commanders and later commanding generals of the Tennessee Army. McClernand was one of the many political generals who served in the US Army , and received from Lincoln on October 20, 1862 permission to set up a major unit in southern Illinois and carry out an attack on Vicksburg with this. McClernand hoped to be able to increase his political influence again through military fame.

The commanders of the Confederate forces were Gen. Joseph E. Johnston , Commander West, Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton , Commander in Chief of the Mississippi Army, and Maj. Gen. Sterling Price and Earl Van Dorn as commanding generals of the Mississippi Army. This army was specially formed to defend Vicksburg on December 7, 1862.

Terrain and operation plan

The view from the heights of Vicksburg to the Mississippi illustrates the controlling position of the city over the river

Vicksburg was on a banked plateau at a sharp bend in the river. Shipping on the Mississippi could be monitored and blocked from the heights, which is why Vicksburg was also called the "Gibraltar of the Mississippi". The so-called Mississippi Delta - consisting of the Yazoo and its tributaries - extended north and east of the city in a north-south extension of about 200 miles and 50 miles in the other direction. Along the ridge, which stretched on either side of Vicksburg on the eastern banks of the Mississippi and Yazoo, were Confederate fortifications reinforced with artillery . The area west of the Mississippi in Louisiana cut innumerable rivers and former river arms and only a few bad country roads.

The Tennessee Army was to attack in the first part of the Memphis campaign in two ways: Grant marched along the Mississippi Central Railway with 40,000 men south through Mississippi. Sherman was to march down the Mississippi with the other half of the Tennessee Army and attack Grenada, Mississippi on the land bridge north of the Mississippi Delta in a pincer movement. The army was to be supplied from a main depot on the railway line. Grant had the depot built in Holly Springs, Mississippi. After supplies were secured, the Tennessee Army was to attack and take Vicksburg via Grenada south.

The campaign

Advance along the Mississippi Central Railroad

Grant began the reconnaissance advance on November 8, 1862. On December 1, the troops reached Tallahatchie 40 miles south of the Tennessee border. The supply of the troops was difficult because of a lack of locomotives; Holly Springs became the crucial depot for the attack to continue.

Johnston, who was responsible for the territory between the Appalachians and the Mississippi, recommended on November 24th to the Confederation Secretary of War that the Mississippi Army and Lt. General Theophilus Hunter Holmes' troops from Trans-Mississippi first defeat Grant and thereby keep Mississippi to be able to conquer Missouri afterwards . With the current distribution of forces, Vicksburg is in danger. Pemberton, commander in chief of the Mississippi Confederate Army, insisted on November 27th for reinforcements from Holmes, who refused to deploy 10,000 men. On November 29th , General Braxton Bragg sent a 1,000-man brigade to Meridian, Mississippi, on Johnston's orders .

The resistance of the Confederate I. Corps of the Mississippi Army under Earl Van Dorn grew after the abandonment of the Tallahatchie. The southerners took up Grenada's defensive positions on the south bank of the Yalobusha after giving up . Nevertheless, the Confederates were inferior to the opposing part of the Tennessee Army.

Due to the early capture of Grenada by the left wing of the Tennessee Army, the first part of the plan of operations had already been reached in early December without the right wing having been deployed. Grant ordered Sherman on December 8th to modify the original plan to land north of Vicksburg on the Yazoo and to destroy the Mississippi Central Railway north and east of Vicksburg. The left wing of the Tennessee Army, under Grant's leadership, was to advance from the north to support Sherman. Then Vicksburg should be taken together.

Grant Sherman did not set any appointments, but ordered him to show up as soon as possible with all units assembled in Memphis. One of his motivations for this type of command was Grant's lack of confidence in the leadership skills of McClernand, who, because of his seniority, would have taken command of the right wing of the Tennessee Army immediately after arriving in Memphis. Grant did not want the attack on the Yazoo to be led by the political General McClernand either, and therefore urged the matter to be urgent.

Sherman embarked in Memphis and marched downriver on December 20th. After casting off, Sherman had lost contact with the Army Commander in Chief.

Grant had come only 80 miles when Van Dorn's cavalry destroyed the depot at Holly Springs on December 20th. At the same time, Brigadier General Nathan Bedford Forrest invaded western Tennessee on his first raid and permanently destroyed the supply lines of Grant on both sides of Jackson's Tennessee. Because Grant could not continue the attack along the railway line for the foreseeable future, the left wing of the Tennessee Army evaded to Memphis until January 10th.

Fight at the Yazoo

Battle of Chickasaw Bayou
red: Confederate troops
blue: Union troops

The right wing of the Tennessee Army under Sherman reached Millikens Bend, Louisiana, 25 miles northwest of Vicksburg, on December 22nd and first destroyed part of the Vicksburg & Shreveport railroad, before bringing troops to a convenient landing point twelve miles up yazoo on December 25th translate. The area in front of the soldiers of the Tennessee Army was thickly forested, swampy, and criss-crossed by almost insurmountable bayous . The Chickasaw Bayou, which lay parallel to the direction of attack, separated the attacking divisions and made connections more difficult. In addition, the Confederates had built barriers with felled trees. The rivers and bayous were diked. Behind the dykes were paths on which the Confederates could move, protected from view, and thus shift the focus of the defense. The cliff Chickasaw Bluffs ran on the edge of the delta with a height of up to 60 m and offered use for heavy artillery. Sherman attacked the Confederates at Chickasaw Bayou on December 29 with 30,075 soldiers after a two-day skirmish . The Confederates defended themselves with about 12,000 men and repelled all attacks. Sherman stopped the attacks on January 1, 1863 because of the great losses and shipped the corps to Millikens Bend. Sherman wrote in Caesar fashion in the account of the January 5 defeat:

I reached Vicksburg at the time appointed, landed, assaulted, and failed.

I reached Vicksburg at the appointed time, landed, attacked, and failed. "

Attack on Arkansas

Attack on Arkansas Post

McClernand arrived in Memphis on December 28 and drove down the Mississippi on December 30 to personally lead the campaign to Vicksburg, as President Lincoln had permitted him. He reached Millikens Bend on January 2nd, took command of Sherman's divisions two days later and formed the Union's Mississippi Army with two corps out of his and Sherman's divisions, not without first complaining to the Secretary of War that Sherman's operation was deliberately without it was carried out to snub the President and the Minister of War. Since there was still no connection with the Army Commander-in-Chief Grant, Sherman reported in a report on January 5th directly to the Army Commander-in-Chief, General Halleck, of the defeat at Chickasaw Bayou and his influence on McClernand's decision not to continue attacking Vicksburg, but instead Attack arkansas post on arkansas. According to both generals, the importance of Arkansas Post was that there was a constant danger to shipping on the Mississippi - a steamer had only been hijacked with rafts a few days earlier . On the other hand, the soldiers of the army would be employed. After eliminating this threat, McClernand did not want to return to the original goal of the campaign, Vicksburg, but instead continued to advance in the direction of Little Rock , Arkansas. The Mississippi Army drove the Mississippi and Arkansas approximately 100 miles upriver and attacked the base on January 10th and 11th, 1863 in a combined operation with the Navy with more than 32,000 men. The more than six-fold defeated Arkansas Post crew surrendered after fierce fighting for the fort . The Union lost 1,061 soldiers and the Confederate 140 killed and wounded. 4,793 soldiers surrendered. The Mississippi Army returned to Millikens Bend on January 17th.

Confederate view

By repelling the attack on Chickasaw Bluffs, the Confederates remained in possession of the Yazoo, which was navigable to the center of the state as far as the Mississippi Central Railroad and on which a large number of steamships were anchored for troop transport. The ridge itself remained in Confederate hands from Haynes Bluff on the Yazoo to south of Vicksburg near Warrenton and was heavily fortified towards the river. Because of Sherman's evasion and the departure of the entire right wing of the Tennessee Army to the Arkansas Post, Pemberton came to the opinion that the enemy had given up on the plan to capture Vicksburg. He reported this to the Secretary of War on January 2, but not to his superior, General Johnston. The main focus of Pemberton's from now on was on the possibilities of approaching Grant to Vicksburg, i.e. the Mississippi from the north and the Mississippi Central railway line.

Taking command of the attack on Vicksburg

Major General Grant wanted to continue the attack on Vicksburg under McClernand's leadership after dodging the Tallahatchie. He first received information about Sherman's defeat and McClernand's intent on January 11th. Operation McClernand called Grant in the report to the Commander in Chief of the Army a fruitless undertaking ("wild-goose chase") and consequently ordered McClernand to cease and immediately follow up all movements that had nothing to do with the aim of the campaign - Vicksburg Return to Millikens Bend. Grant explicitly disapproved of the Arkansas Post push. Grant embarked with McPherson's Corps to Lake Providence and Millikens Bend to relieve McClernand from leading the attack on Vicksburg and take command himself. That led to a complaint from McClernand directly to Lincoln. McClernand complained bitterly about the "West Point clique" who envy him his success at Arkansas Post and who have followed him with resentment for months. Grant disbanded the Mississippi Army upon arriving at Millikens Bend on January 20. McClernand became Commanding General of the XIII, Sherman Commanding General of the XV. Tennessee Army Corps.

Grant set up his headquarters on January 30, 1863 at Millikens Bend and personally took over the leadership of the campaign against Vicksburg. The area of ​​command was extended to the areas west of the Mississippi, which Grant needed to carry out the campaign. Grant was convinced that he could take Vicksburg with the strength at hand; the taking is only a matter of time. Because of the heavily fortified banks, the goal from now on was to position the Tennessee Army first on the high ground north or south of Vicksburg on the east bank of the Mississippi and then to attack Vicksburg from there. The four corps of the Tennessee Army were spatially distributed as follows:

  1. XV. Corps (Sherman) at Youngs Point (across from the Yazoo Estuary) 12 miles west of Vicksburg
  2. XIII. Corps (McClernand) at Millikens Bend 25 miles northwest of Vicksburg
  3. XVII. Corps (McPherson) on Lake Providence 50 miles north of Vicksburg
  4. XVI. Corps (Hurlbut) in western Tennessee 200 miles north of Vicksburg

Grant did not believe in the repeatedly announced support from Banks, which had not materialized during the first months of the campaign. However, should Banks actually go to Port Hudson, Grant intended to send Banks two divisions on the right bank.

Almost simultaneously, in late January / early February, the Tennessee Army began with three different approaches to create the conditions for conquering the heights north and south of Vicksburg.

Canal across the DeSoto Peninsula

Grant's channel

Sherman's Corps was supposed to complete the canal through the De Soto Peninsula that was started last year. After completion, gunboats and transport ships should reach the Mississippi south of Vicksburg and support a landing there, without being able to be shot at by the artillery in Vicksburg. Work began on January 24th and was hampered by prolonged rainfall that raised groundwater and rivers in the delta. Grant also used steam-powered dredgers to support the Sherman soldiers and reported the completion of the work, initially by the beginning of March and then by the end of March. The flood resulted in a dam burst at the inlet of the canal in March and the demolition of the company on March 29.

Preparations for the attack on Vicksburg

Lake Providence

McPherson's Corps was to build a canal on Lake Providence, about 30 miles north of Millikens Bend, to a former arm of the Mississippi, which flowed back into the Mississippi via the Red River about 150 miles south of Vicksburg. On February 2, the corps began to deepen the bayous and free it of the trees that had grown there. This project, too, was slow because the floods forced McPherson to build camps for the deployed soldiers five to six miles from their locations on dry ground and the soldiers had to work constantly in the water. Nevertheless, the work was largely completed by the end of March. The operation was canceled due to falling water levels and the start of the second Vicksburg campaign on March 29th.

Advance over Yazoo Pass

Grant ordered a canal to be built about 200 miles north of Vicksburg to connect Moon Lake to the Mississippi. Troops were then to be moved over the Yazoo Pass and Coldwater into the Mississippi Delta, so that Vicksburg could then be attacked from the north on the Tallahatchie and the Yazoo. On February 4, Grant reported that this effort could destroy all troop carriers on the Yazoo, two gunboats under construction and even the railroad bridges inland. The Confederates had heard of this plan. Pemberton sent a small bandage to stop the boats from moving along the narrow waterways. The Union flotilla therefore had to struggle not only with low trees, which repeatedly damaged the superstructures and chimneys, but also with felled trees that the Confederates threw as barriers in the fairway. It was not until March 2 that an embarked division steamed down the Coldwater and anchored off Greenwood, Mississippi on March 10. Pemberton had a fort built there at the confluence of the Tallahatchie and Yazoo rivers - Fort Pemberton - which prevented the Union flotilla from continuing its journey. All attacks on the fort in mid-March were unsuccessful.

In support of these forces, Admiral Porter suggested that the armored gunboats, with the support of a Sherman division, should advance through the delta from the south at the northern end of the Confederate positions at Haynes Bluff. The operation began on March 16 and suffered the same bad conditions as the attack over the Yazoo Pass. Five gunboats came through the bayous to the mouth of the Rolling Fork and were forced to evade by the Confederates on March 20. It was only through the intervention of the infantry division from Sherman's corps that the boats were able to return to the ports of departure by March 27th. Then the Yazoo Pass Expedition returned to Helena, Arkansas.

Reasons for failure

The Tennessee Army consisted of approximately 70,000 soldiers and was more than three times superior to the Confederate Mississippi Army. Major General Grant's approach of strength prevented the Confederates from developing priorities; the Mississippi Army had to face the bulk of its forces under Van Dorn Grant and the rest under Maj. General Martin L. Smith Sherman. The weak point of Grant's units moving overland along the Mississippi Central Railroad were the overstretched connection and supply routes. Grant had therefore set up the main depot for the campaign in Holly Springs just behind the preceding corps. This depot was supplied from Columbus, Kentucky - 400 miles to the north - on the Mobile & Ohio Railroad . It was precisely these vulnerabilities that the Confederates attacked on December 19-20. Forrest destroyed the railroad line and the telegraph connections north and south of Jackson and Van Dorn destroyed the depot at Holly Springs and the connection lines to Memphis. Grant had to move to Memphis with no connections and no prospect of supplies. The Confederates were therefore able to move forces in the vicinity of Vicksburg and thereby repel Sherman's attack on the Chickasaw Bluffs. According to Sherman, this attack through rough terrain against a strong position could only have been successful if the bulk of the Tennessee Army had advanced south via Grenada. The disconnection after Sherman's march from Memphis was the main reason for the failure of the attack on Chickasaw Bayou.

Grant, with an obstinacy bordering on stubbornness, never missed an opportunity to conquer Vicksburg. However, because of the circumstances - opponents, terrain and weather - all plans were too demanding for people and material. All attempts to bypass Vicksburg and find a good starting position for an attack failed. Grant later stated that he had anticipated these failures and was only trying to keep the army busy and motivated. However, if one of his attempts had been successful, Grant would certainly have taken advantage of it and attacked Vicksburg.

Grant now had three options to attack Vicksburg:

  1. Head-on over the Mississippi from the west,
  2. out of Memphis again along the Mississippi Central Railroad or
  3. proceeding from the southeast to Vicksburg.

Grant chose the third option (see also Second Vicksburg Campaign ).

literature

  • United States War Department: The War of the Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies , Govt. Print. Off., Washington 1880-1901.
  • Robert Underwood Johnson, Clarence Clough Buell: Battles and Leaders of the Civil War . New York 1887.
  • Bernd G. Längin : The American Civil War - A chronicle in pictures day by day . Weltbild Verlag, Augsburg 1998, ISBN 3-86047-900-8 .
  • James M. McPherson : Die for Freedom . Augsburg 2003 (orig. New York 1988).
  • James M. McPherson: Battle Cry of Freedom . Oxford University Press, New York 2003, ISBN 0-19-516895-X .
  • James M. McPherson (Editor): The Atlas of the Civil War . Philadelphia 2005, ISBN 0-7624-2356-0 .
  • Bearss, Edwin Cole: The Campaign for Vicksburg . 3 Vols. Dayton, OH 1985-86.
  • Ballard, Michael B .: Vicksburg: The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi . Chapel Hill, NC 2005.

Sources and Notes

  1. The naming is analogous to the classification of the National Park Service Operations Against Vicksburg
  2. The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part II, p. 502: They conquer Vicksburg
  3. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part I, p. 468: Forced Enlightenment
  4. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part I, p. 471: Am Tallahatchie
  5. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part II, p. 758: Idea of ​​the battle
  6. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part II, p. 763: No Reinforcements
  7. The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part II, p. 769: Levies from Central Tennessee
  8. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part I, p. 474: Plan of Operations
  9. James M. McPherson: Battle Cry of Freedom, pp. 577f
  10. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part I, p. 503: Success in Holly Springs
  11. The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part I, pp. 604ff: Shermans reports
  12. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part I, p. 602: Strength of the XIII. corps
  13. Information about the strength of the Confederates varies. The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part II, pp. 824f: Confederate Strength
  14. Union losses: 1,776; The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part I, p. 625: [1] Confederate losses: 187; The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part I, p. 671: [2]
  15. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part I, p. 613: Sherman's Summary
  16. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part II, p. 528: Complaint
  17. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part I, p. 613: Assault on Arkansas Post Appropriate
  18. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part I, p. 716ff: Losses of the Union
  19. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part I, p. 780ff: Confederate losses
  20. The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part I, p. 669: End of the Threat?
  21. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part II, p. 551: Grant strengthens McClernand
  22. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part II, p. 553: wild-goose chase
  23. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part II, pp. 553f: express disapproval
  24. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XVII, Part II, pp. 566f: West Point Clique
  25. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XXIV, Part I, p. 11: Detachment
  26. ^ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XXIV, Part I, pp. 8ff: Plan of Operations
  27. The Yazoo Pass is the drain of Moon Lake and flows into the Coldwater.
  28. Jump up ↑ The War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume XXIV, Part I, p. 17: Plan of Action over Yazoo Pass

Web links

This version was added to the list of excellent articles on April 27, 2007 .