Battle of Myriokephalon
The battle of Myriokephalon, historicizing illustration from the 19th century
| date | 17th September 1176 |
|---|---|
| place | near the Beyşehir lake , today's Turkey |
| output | Seljuk victory |
| Parties to the conflict | |
|---|---|
| Commander | |
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| Troop strength | |
| by 25,000 (possibly 50,000) | unknown |
| losses | |
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unknown |
unknown |
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The Battle of Myriokephalon was a clash between the Byzantine Empire and the Sultanate of the Rum Seljuks in Phrygia ; it took place on September 17, 1176.
background
Manuel I Komnenos and the Seljuk Sultan of Rum , Kılıç Arslan II , kept peace with one another in the 1170s. It was a fragile peace as the Seljuks pushed west, deeper into Asia Minor , while the Byzantines wanted to recapture territory in the east that they had lost after the Battle of Manzikert a hundred years earlier. However, the great power politics of the emperor brought Byzantium to the brink of exhaustion. Manuel was able to retake Cilicia and extend his power to the principality of Antioch . He also benefited from the death of Atabeg Nur ad-Dins of Aleppo in 1174, who came from the Turkish Zengid dynasty and was allied with the Seljuks. Since his son and nominal successor was only 11 years old when he died and the other successor Saladin put his main focus on Egypt and thus against the Crusader states , the Seljuks no longer had a strong ally. 1175, however, Kılıç Arslan II refused. Anyway to return territories, which he the common enemy (also Turkic ) Danishmends had decreased.
preparation
Manuel rallied an army supposedly large enough to stretch for 10 miles and marched with it to the Seljuk border. Arslan tried to negotiate with Manuel, but he valued his superiority so highly that he rejected a new peace. He sent part of the army under Andronikos Batatzes towards Amasya , the rest of them turned towards Ikonion ( Konya ). Both routes were on wooded stretches where the Turks could simply hide and ambush. Batatzes' army was destroyed in such an ambush, and the head of the commander was sent to Kılıç Arslan II.
The Turks also destroyed the harvest and poisoned the wells to hinder Manuel's advance (see Scorched Earth Tactics ). Arslan harassed the Byzantine army and tried to lure them into the Meander Valley and, in particular, to the bottleneck at the destroyed fortress Myriokephalon. Here Manuel decided to attack, although he feared further ambushes and he could have tried to catch the Turks in the nearby Philomelion plain.
The battle
Manuel had around 25,000 men available (but it could also have been 50,000), including a troop from the Principality of Antioch and Hungarian soldiers. The army was divided into an infantry advance guard, cavalry , archers and an infantry rear guard. Baldwin of Antioch , the son of Raymond of Poitiers and brother-in-law of Manuel, led the right wing , the left Johannes Kantakuzenos . The rearguard was in command of Manuel himself. Arslan will have had roughly the same troop strength, the exact number here too is unknown. The Byzantine advance guard was the first to encounter the Seljuk troops, but got through the pass with little loss as the Turks apparently had not yet completed their preparations. When the vanguard reached the end of the pass, the rearguard led by Andronikos Kontostephanos was about to enter - the Turks had now occupied the flanks of the pass and the Byzantines were almost completely trapped. The Seljuks attacked the right wing first, inflicting great losses; Baldwin was also one of the fallen. The soldiers were so crowded that they could hardly move.
Manuel was evidently panicked and fled the pass. The main army tried to follow him, but saw their way back blocked by their own entourage. Only a few managed to escape. When night fell, the Turks offered a truce, on the condition that Manuel withdraw without hesitation and razor the border fortresses at Dorylaion and Siblia. When the emperor accepted, the undefeated vanguard was allowed to return through the pass.
consequences
Manuel's war machines had been destroyed and were never replaced. Manuel himself compared the defeat with Manzikert. In fact, this battle (contrary to what is often assumed) did not ruin the Byzantine army by any means, which a little later fought again in the Balkans . Although it took Kılıç Arslan II a long time to understand what this victory was worth, the balance between the two powers began - as after Manzikert - to shift: Manuel never attacked the Turks again, who on the other hand were pushing further and further west, deep into Byzantine territory.
Myriokephalon was more of a psychological than a military blow. The army was quickly replenished by mercenaries and was able to regain some areas in 1177. Until his death in 1180, Manuel limited himself to facing the Seljuks in smaller battles. Byzantium had outwardly made its policy appear successful, but inside there were clear symptoms of crisis. Less than 30 years after the Battle of Myriokephalon, the conquest of Constantinople by the Crusaders finally ended the period when Byzantium was a great power.
The result of the Battle of Myriokephalon was that the Turks could no longer be expelled from Anatolia for good. The Byzantine counter-offensive after Manzikert had reached its climax and had failed. Nevertheless, the Byzantines held parts of West Asia Minor for another 120 years or so until the Turkish Ottomans completely and finally conquered Anatolia in the first half of the 15th century.
literature
- John F. Haldon : The Byzantine Wars. Reprinted edition. History Press, Stroud 2009, ISBN 978-0-7524-4565-6 .
- Ralph-Johannes Lilie : The battle of Myriokephalon (1176). Effects on the Byzantine Empire in the late 12th century. In: Revue des Études Byzantines. Vol. 35, 1977, pp. 257-275, doi : 10.3406 / rebyz.1977.2074 .
- Warren T. Treadgold : A History of the Byzantine State and Society. Stanford University Press, Stanford 1997, ISBN 0-8047-2630-2 .
Individual evidence
- ↑ Michael Neumann-Adrian, Christoph K. Neumann : Turkey. One country and 9,000 years of history. List, Munich 1990, ISBN 3-471-78225-7 , p. 166.
- ^ László Markó: A magyar állam főméltoságai Szent Istvántól napjainkig. Magyar Könyvklub, Budapest 2000, ISBN 963-547-085-1 .