Company Liège

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Company Liège
German armored vehicle destroyed by air raid
German armored vehicle destroyed by air raid
date August 7. bis 13. August 1944
place near Mortain and Avranches , France
output Allied victory
Parties to the conflict

United States 48United States United States United Kingdom
United KingdomUnited Kingdom 

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) German Empire

Commander

United States 48United States Omar N. Bradley

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) Günther von Kluge

Troop strength
5 infantry divisions
5 mixed combat groups
USAAF Ninth Air Force
RAF Second Tactical Air Force
3 armored divisions
2 infantry divisions

The Liege operation was a German counterattack in the context of the Battle of Normandy with the aim of advancing from the Mortain area to Avranches and thus cutting off the US units that had broken out of the landing head in Operation Cobra . It took place from August 7th to 13th, 1944 in Normandy and ended with an Allied defensive success that finally led to the Falaise pocket .

planning

The German plan provided for the 7th Army to break through the Allied line in the southern area of ​​the Cotentin Peninsula and to cut off and rub off American units. Hitler's instruction to do so reached OB West , Field Marshal Günther von Kluge , on August 2nd. Von Kluge later stated that he considered the submitted plan too grandiose and impossible to carry out; at the moment of delivery, however, he was quite taken with it.

Hitler authorized von Kluge to slightly shorten his front line in the west and east and to transfer forces from there and from Caen to the Sourdeval area in order to prepare the counterattack. Units were also withdrawn from the area of ​​the Pas-de-Calais department , as a further invasion was now considered unlikely there. On August 3, the German units closed a gap that had opened between Panzer Group West and the 7th Army. In this way they stabilized the front line in the northwest and west and established a security line in the south. Von Kluge decided to start the attack at the end of the first week of August, even if the formation of the troops was not yet over. Hitler was slightly annoyed by this and insisted on postponing until the troops were fully assembled. He also ordered General Heinrich Eberbach to lead the attack. Von Kluge said, however, that it was impossible to delay the attack any further and to change the direction of the attack. At the last minute, Hitler gave his approval and demanded that the two commanders swap posts immediately after the attack. To check this he sent General Walter Buhle of Berlin to the headquarters of Commander-in-Chief West, who was to report to him.

“The German preparations did not go unnoticed by the allied aerial reconnaissance, and Bradley prepared in good time to face the shock.
On a front of 18 miles between Vire, St.Pois and Mortain he developed 5 infantry divisions with 2 tank combat commands in reserve and kept 3 of Patton's divisions west of Mortain around St. Hilaire in depth. (...) On August 6th (...) the Americans took Vire and overran a section of the starting point that the Germans had chosen for the offensive east of St. Pois. "

- Chester Wilmot : The struggle for Europe. P. 424.

course

Map of the battle

In the late afternoon of August 6th, von Kluge gave the order to begin the attack.

“Under cover of darkness the 2nd Panzer Division broke through between Mortain and Sourdeval and was able to advance seven miles on Avranches before it was brought to a standstill by a combat command of the 3rd (US) Panzer Division. To the south of it the Germans took Mortain again, but could not take advantage of the success because the American 30th Division held the most important heights to the west and north-west tough. On the other wing (2nd SS Panzer Division) the attack did not gain any ground, although dense morning fog (on August 7th) favored the Germans. "

- Wilmot : Europe. P. 425.

Around noon, the Allied air units then intervened and finally stopped the advance. Air support on the German side was not possible.

After Bradley had thwarted the direct threat to Avranches, he increased the pressure on the German southern flank: On August 7, a combat command of the 2nd US Armored Division moved from St. Hilaire via Barenton and attacked the Germans in the rear near Mortain the next morning on.

“Far more alarming for v. What was clever, however, was the deep outflanking movement that 3rd Army carried out on August 8 south to Angers and east to Le Mans. The Germans in Normandy were now in extreme danger of being trapped. [...] When it was high time to take them (the German armies) back to the Seine, Hitler drove them westward into annihilation ”

- Wilmot : Europe. P. 426ff.

In the meantime the British 43rd Division had conquered Mt. Picon in the north of the German attack area and the Canadian 1st Army had launched an attack from Caen to Falaise far in the rear area on the night of August 8th (→ Operation Totalize ). Nevertheless, on the evening of August 8, Hitler renewed the order to attack.

Memorial at Mortain

Also on August 8th, Eisenhower and Bradley met in Normandy. They were aware of the possibility of enclosing the German armed forces by turning the American 12th Army Group, which had advanced to Le Mans, north towards Alençon in conjunction with the allied troops attacking from the north down to Falaise.

On August 10th, four Patton divisions advanced against Alencon, the 7th Army's supply center. Kluge knew that the only way to avoid the threat was to withdraw the attacking troops, “thereby giving up the basis for the offensive against Avranches ordered by Hitler. To propose such a retreat would have been folly, if Hitler had taken the mere proposal as sabotage. "

On August 11th, the attack area in Mortain fell back to the Americans and Sourdeval was threatened. In the afternoon von Kluge reported to the Fuehrer's headquarters that “the attack in the direction of Avranches [...] was no longer feasible.” Hitler authorized Kluge to retreat, but “after a success against the American XV.AK ordered the attack against the sea to the west if necessary via Mayenne or to the north. "

Before von Kluge could act, the Americans took Alençon on August 12 and stood at Argentan on the evening of August 13, despite the deployment of the German troops planned for the new offensive . "The city was still in German hands, but the gap between the north (Falaise) and the south edge of the trap was less than 20 miles." The Liège operation was over and the Falaise basin began to form.

The guilty party was soon found:
"Field Marshal Kluge," said Hitler, "wanted to lead the whole Western Army into a surrender as planned and go over to the enemy himself ..."

Kluge committed suicide on August 19, 1944.

literature

  • Chester Wilmot : The Struggle for Europe. Book Guild Gutenberg, Atrium-Verlag 1955, original edition "The Struggle for Europe", London 1953, translated by Hans Steinsdorff.

Web links

Commons : Battle of Mortain  - Collection of pictures, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Wilmot: Europe. P. 439.
  2. Telex v. Kluges to Jodl, August 11, 1944. (From the document collection v Tempelhoffs.) Quoted in: Wilmot: Europa. P. 439.
  3. Reproduced in an instruction from Kluges to his army leaders, August 12, 7:30 a.m. (From the document collection of von Tempelhoffs.) Quoted in: Wilmot: Europa. P. 440.
  4. Wilmot: Struggle for Europe. P. 441.
  5. Führer situation discussions, fragment 46, August 31, 1944. quoted in: Wilmot: Europa. P. 444.