Battle for Carentan

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Battle for Carentan
Map of the Battle of Carentan
Map of the Battle of Carentan
date 8. bis 15. June 1944
place Normandy , France
output allied victory
Parties to the conflict

United States 48United States United States

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) German Empire

Commander

United States 48United States Anthony McAuliffe Robert G. Cole
United States 48United States

German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era) Mr. von der Heydte Werner Ostendorff
German Reich NSGerman Reich (Nazi era)

Troop strength
101st Airborne Division
parts 2nd Armored Division
6th Parachute Regiment,
parts 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division,
parts 275th Infantry Division

The Battle of Carentan took place from June 8 to 15, 1944 as part of the Allied Operation Overlord on the French Cotentin peninsula in the department of Manche . The city of Carentan is in the hinterland of the Utah stretch of beach where Americans landed on D-Day , June 6th. It was a key position for the German defense in Normandy .

prehistory

The landings of the VII and V US Corps on the beach sections of Utah and Omaha were preceded on June 6 by air landings of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions in the hinterland of the Utah sector between Carentan and Sainte-Mère-Église . Their task had been to shield the landings against German flank attacks by troops stationed on the Cotentin peninsula. After the landing forces had not succeeded as planned in establishing the connection between the Utah and Omaha bridgeheads on the day of the landing, the American high command decided on June 7th to merge them through a concentrated attack by VII Corps on Carentan and V. on Isigny bring about. The 101st Airborne Division was given the sole aim of taking Carentan.

The city occupied by Germans could very well serve as a starting point for an attack wedge that could be driven between the V Corps and the VII Corps. This had to be prevented by all means in order to stabilize the bridgehead in Normandy. US Army Commander General Omar Bradley agreed with VII Corps Commander General J. Lawton Collins that if they did not break through to V Corps units in a short time, the division would have to be reinforced .

The battle

When the current orders came in, the 101st was involved in fighting at St. Come-du-Mont . The attack, under the command of Colonel Robert F. Sink of the 506th Parachute Infantry, was scheduled for 4:45 am on June 8th. Four battalions should be used for this purpose; on the right flank the 1st and 2nd battalion of the 506th parachute infantry, in the center the 3rd battalion and on the left flank the 1st battalion of the 401st glider infantry.

St. Come-du-Mont

The attack began with fire strikes on 15 previously identified German targets. The 3rd Battalion took Droueries and was able to advance quickly further south. By the time they reached the intersection east of St. Come-du-Mont, they were threateningly close to the other two flanks. A quick reorganization was undertaken and the 1st and 2nd Battalions were assigned defensive positions west of St. Come-du-Mont.

While the 1st Battalion of the 401st Glider Infantry lagged a little, the 3rd Battalion was able to reach the road towards Carentan in the late morning.

The commander of the 3rd Battalion Colonel Julian J. Ewell said he had seen the Germans withdrawing west of St. Come-du-Mont. So he decided to take the access roads and bridges south of the road. But when his men tried to storm across the street, they were shot at by German machine gun fire and tank shells from the houses opposite. From Carentan they were bombarded by 81 mm mortar shells. Since they could not establish any radio communication with their own artillery , they withdrew to positions east of the road.

The access dam to Carentan

On the way there, they were suddenly caught in the fire of a German counterattack from the north. It could be repulsed, but Germans still stayed on a small hill overlooking the road to the west. The Americans formed a line of defense to the hill from east to west and fought five violent German advances that ran right up to the hedge behind which the Americans lay.

In the afternoon, Colonel Sink ordered the 1st Battalion of the 401st Glider Infantry to intervene. But when they began to advance, the Germans quickly withdrew. They were seen moving south between the embankment to the west and the road. About forty loaded trucks on the road fell into the hands of the Americans.

A patrol sent to St. Come-du-Mont found the place completely empty. The 101st was now preparing to access the four access bridges in the south. The second bridge had been blown up by the Germans that afternoon.

The attack on the access dam

The attack on the access dam

On the evening of June 8, the 101st Airborne Division controlled a defensive arc on the southern flank of the VII Corps, which ran from Chef-du-Pont to the mouth of the Douve. On the right flank of the division, the 502nd Parachute Infantry had taken positions from Chef-du-Pont to near Houesville . The 327th glider regiment supported them near the lock and the harbor bridges. The 506th parachute infantry stood in the defense center on both sides of the access dam to Carentan. The 501st parachute infantry stood at Vierville-sur-Mer as a reserve in the back room.

The 101st plan provided for two crossings of the Douve. The left wing was to cross the river near Brevands at 1:00 a.m. on June 10, with the aim of reaching the V Corps southwest of Isigny at the bridge over the Vire , while the main force was to advance southwest to Carentan. The right wing first had to cross the access dam northwest of Carentan, but bypass Carentan itself and take possession of height 30 southwest of the city. The height 30 was exactly on the possible escape route of the Germans, since the ways to the east and south were blocked by the Canal de Vire et Taute and extensive marshland . In the further course, both flanks should then form a ring around carentane, which tightened more and more.

The advance

After St. Come-du-Mont had been secured, the right flank was ready to attack the access dam. There were indications that carentan should not be vigorously defended. The 506th had outposts on the first two bridges and the next day they made a reconnaissance into the outskirts of Carentan. They set fire near the fourth bridge. American aerial reconnaissance reported that the city had been evacuated and that a large gap in the embankment had been blown, so the road was the best way to get to Carentan. The access dam was narrow and straight through the marshland and the Americans could quickly make out advancing Germans and defend themselves in all directions without any problems.

The attack was carried out by the 502nd. Lt. Col. Robert George Cole took off with the 3rd Battalion shortly after midnight on June 10th. Since the engineers who were supposed to repair bridge no. 2 could not work under enemy fire, the attack was called off shortly afterwards. A little later a patrol was sent to scout the road. They crossed the canal in a boat at bridge no. When they wanted to continue to bridge no. 4, they were prevented from entering through a large steel gate, a so-called Belgian gate . While trying to open this obstacle, a mortar shell suddenly exploded next to them. At the same moment a thunderstorm of machine gun fire and more grenades began to pound on them from German positions near the road. The patrol had to withdraw again at around 5:30 a.m., but it was now known that the Germans had not yet given up the defense of Carentan.

Belgian gate

The afternoon was announced to the battalion as the new attack date. This time the 65th Panzerfeldartilleriebataillon and the 907th Gleiterfeldartilleriebataillon were to provide considerable support with their guns. Most of the artillery fire was concentrated in known and suspected enemy positions, which were mainly southwest of Bridge No. 4. At noon, the pioneers had not yet succeeded in closing the large gap at bridge number 2. Lt. Col. Cole and three other soldiers laid planks across the bridge so that the battalion could cross the bridge one by one in the early afternoon. From the direction of Carentan, a 8.8 cm cannon repeatedly opened fire on the street, but did not stop the men. The soldiers crouched or crawled along the embankment. When, after three hours, most of the Americans had crossed three bridges and were beyond Bridge No. 2, the Germans opened fire from protective hedges and a large farm on the right. The men immediately let themselves be rolled into the trenches. As they tried to advance further, a machine gun covered the trenches with numerous sheaves. After three soldiers were hit, the group withdrew.

In a long line, man behind man, the battalion marched down the street, unable to defend itself on the right and left flanks. They were constantly under German machine gun fire. The Belgian gate at bridge no. 4 had to be crossed under one by one by direct fire. Without the support of the artillery, which bombarded the German positions from 4:00 p.m. to 11:30 p.m., this would have been an impossible undertaking. Part of the G Company who led the battalion took positions to the right of the bridge, while the rest tried to slip through the narrow opening. Six soldiers managed to get through, but the seventh was hit. The action was immediately canceled and a defensive position was established. Three mortars were also added.

The farm

The entire battalion was now stuck. Company I crouched next to the embankment at Bridge No. 3 and was exposed to the German fire as good as coverless. You were badly hit. First of gunfire and around 11:30 p.m. also from two German fighter planes that shot at them and dropped bombs on their position. During a brief ceasefire at midnight, only 21 men and two officers of the original 80 soldiers in the company were able to retreat beyond bridge no. Soldiers from H Company also used the ceasefire to smuggle men through the gate at Bridge No. 4.

At around 4 a.m. on June 11th, the 3rd Battalion was instructed by the regimental leadership to continue the attack. In the dark, the G Company and the company from Headquarters pushed through the gate at Bridge 4. They advanced on both sides of the embankment. The main position of the Germans seemed to be a large farm to the right of the road, surrounded by high hedges . It rose clearly from the marshland on a little hill .

When the first soldiers approached the courtyard, they were attacked with rifles, machine guns and mortars. A concentrated American artillery bombardment did little to change the situation. Therefore, Lt. Col. Cole bayonet attack on the German position. To do this, he had the artillery fire smoke bombs in the area. At 6:15 a.m. after the end of the artillery fire, Cole whistled for the attack, but only 20 of the original 250 men followed him, and another 50 attacked the house with Major Stopka. Because the Americans were in cover over a large area, word of the order hadn't got around everywhere. In addition, the G Company had contact with the enemy and was attacked by German units with submachine guns on the floodplain east of the road to Carentan. The commanding officer was injured by an artillery shell that was shot too short. When the company heard Cole's whistle, or saw that the other Americans were storming towards the farm, they hurried after them.

Men from H Company were the first to reach the farm, but found it deserted. The enemy fire was now coming from a high hedge that ran at right angles to the road. The Americans stormed the area and killed the Germans with hand grenades and bayonets. The only German resistance that still existed was in the south, from where the Americans were constantly fired. Cole actually wanted the advance to continue immediately, but the battalion was no longer able to do so. All the Americans gathered near the farm. There it quickly became apparent that the units had become confused in the chaos of the battle and some had suffered high losses. The order was therefore sent to the 1st Battalion of the 502nd Parachute Infantry to continue the attack beyond the position of the 3rd Battalion.

The surroundings of the farm

The order reached the 1st Battalion north of Bridge No. 4. Under the leadership of Colonel Cassidy, the soldiers crossed the bridge in heavy German counterfire and reached the fields by the farm. But instead of advancing further, the 1st Battalion saw itself as reinforcement for the 3rd Battalion. However, they had suffered just as much losses as a result of the German fire and were just as disorganized as their comrades.

On the right flank, the Americans succeeded in taking a position from the Germans when they were about to change position. The Germans quickly retreated to the southern houses and the Americans followed them. There they faced each other for the rest of the day. The small American group had advanced the furthest and was about 140 meters away from the rest of the battalion. Another group installed two machine guns in a hedge corner behind the farm, which covered the area east to the orchards and the road to the next intersection. Despite everything, this was not a coordinated attack and Lt. Col. Cole was very concerned about this at the farm, as he could not assess the situation on either flank without a radio link. He also found the help of the artillery hardly effective. The area of ​​retreat was narrowed by the river and no reserve was available. Furthermore, the German defenders were almost never seen and their positions and distances had to be estimated based on the volume of the gunfire.

The German counterattack

In the morning the intensity of the German artillery and mortar fire increased. The Germans started a counterattack. One of the most violent advances came through the orchard and was aimed at the Americans south and east of the farm. But with the new machine gun positions, the attackers could be forced to break off the attack.

General Anthony C. McAuliffe

An unexpected break in combat shortly before noon gave the Americans the opportunity to rebuild the left flank. C Company advanced from Bridge No. 4 to a cabbage field between Hedges Two and Three, so that they could fire on the next hedge and the street. A Company was right behind them.

At noon, the units were informed by the regimental leadership about a request from the Germans for a ceasefire and the fire was stopped. Brigadier General Anthony C. McAuliffe , who led the operation of the 101st Airborne Division, accommodated this as he was now able to rescue the American victims himself. Major Douglas T. Davidson , the regimental doctor , then went through the enemy lines with two German envoys to ask the commander in Carentan for a cease- fire . An interview was declined and Davidson returned to Bridge No. 4 without having achieved anything. At that moment the German side opened fire from all available weapons and artillery with a previously unknown intensity. Lt. Col. Cole immediately asked the regimental leadership for permission to fire, but he did not get it because Davidson had not yet returned. However, the Americans on the front lines made up their own mind and began firing back. Since they had observed the German movements during the break in fire, they were convinced that these had served to strengthen the positions and prepare a heavy artillery attack.

The renewed German attack brought the Americans to their limits. The right flank had to retreat, but the machine gun emplacement on the farm helped the others hold their positions. The soldiers in the cabbage field on the left flank held their positions against repeated German attacks from the surrounding hedges and trenches. Some of them came so close to the Americans that they could hear the sound of the latches as they reloaded. The German artillery was rather weak, but the mortars fired continuously.

On the German side, the 6th Paratrooper Regiment under the command of Major Friedrich August Freiherr von der Heydte ( subordinated to the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division “Götz von Berlichingen” ) carried the brunt of the battle.

American success

Around 6:30 p.m. Cole wanted to inform the regiment leadership about his decision to withdraw, but the radio was defective. Cole assumed that only significantly increased artillery support could help his men. When the radio message could finally be sent, the situation changed suddenly. The entire American artillery immediately began with an intensive bombardment of the German positions, whereby the fire had to be set very close to the American positions. Two soldiers were killed in the process. The bombardment lasted only five minutes, but that was enough to convince the Germans to retreat into the city. Sent out patrols could only confirm this. The 1st and 3rd Battalions were finally able to withdraw around 8:00 p.m. The 2nd battalion took over the newly conquered areas. This cleared the way to Carentan from the north, but the 502nd Parachute Infantry was too weak to continue the attack. The 506th parachute infantry was ordered as a relief to finally take the place against resistance on June 15, 1944.

literature

  • Volker Griesser: Die Löwen von Carentan - Das Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 6 1943-1945 , VS-Books (2007), ISBN 978-3-932077-25-8 .

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