Vincenzo Vinciguerra

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Vincenzo Vinciguerra (born January 3, 1949 in Catania ) is an Italian terrorist and former member of the neo-fascist organizations Avanguardia Nazionale and Ordine Nuovo ("New Order"). He is serving a life sentence for the murder of three Carabinieri with a car bomb near the town of Peteano in 1972. The later investigations by examining magistrate Felice Casson led to the discovery of the Italian secret organization Gladio through Vinciguerra's confession .

Life

Vinciguerra's political thinking was shaped by the right-wing intellectual Julius Evola . After joining the student organization Giovane Italia of the neo-fascist MSI , he joined the right-wing extremist terrorist organization Ordine Nuovo and became its head in the Udine section . He worked as a private detective and organized several political and violent activities in 1971 and 1972, including a plane hijacking in Ronchi dei Legionari in October 1972.

Attack in Peteano in 1972

In 1984 the Venetian examining magistrate Felice Casson investigated a hitherto unsolved bomb attack on May 31, 1972. Five Carabinieri (an Italian police unit) had examined a Fiat 500 parked on a country road near the village of Peteano. When they opened the trunk, three of the men were killed by a triggered bomb. The extreme left-wing terrorist organization Red Brigades was held responsible for the attack, but the perpetrators were never identified. Casson found numerous noticeable inconsistencies in the police investigation, which pointed to deliberate manipulation and falsification of evidence. Ultimately, his investigation led him on the trail of the neo-fascist Vinciguerra, who made an extensive confession. Vinciguerra explained that the Italian military secret service SISMI had protected him by allowing him to escape by plane to Spain , ruled by the fascist dictator Franco , after the Peteano attack .

Vinciguerra testified that he was covered by members of the state apparatus and that the assassination was part of a comprehensive strategy that Casson later referred to as the strategy of tension . Casson then continued investigations and, after researching the archives of the military intelligence service SISMI , uncovered the existence of the stay-behind organization Gladio , which he linked to various terrorist attacks in Italy. Casson concluded that a network of intelligence agencies ensured that the crimes were assigned to left-wing terrorists , especially the Red Brigades, by disseminating false information and falsifying evidence . Casson's revelations led to a national crisis in Italy. Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti stated in a subsequent parliamentary investigation that stay-behind organizations also existed in numerous other European countries. This led to parliamentary questions in several countries. In Italy, Belgium and Switzerland there were investigative commissions. The European Parliament expressed by a debate on 22 November 1990 from its strong protest against NATO and the intelligence involved.

According to the public prosecutor's investigation, the C4 explosive used in the attack was identical to the one that had been stored in a Gladio weapons depot in Aurisina and that had been discovered by chance a few weeks before the attack. Giulio Andreotti revealed its existence to Felice Casson and Carlo Mastelloni. Casson discovered that Marco Morin , an explosives expert who had worked for the Italian police and, like Vinciguerra, was a member of the right-wing extremist group Ordine Nuovo , had written a false report which, according to the explosives, was allegedly identical to that of the Red Brigades . Casson proved that the type of explosive was used exclusively for military purposes. It is still unclear whether the explosives used in Peteano came from the Aurisina weapons depot and whether the attack could be linked to the Gladio stay-behind organization.

Statement about the attack in Bologna in 1980

When he was questioned by the investigating magistrates about the Bologna massacre in 1980, Vinciguerra testified in 1984: “After the Peteano massacre and all that followed it should be completely evident that a real structure existed, in the dark and hidden, with the possibility of Prescribing a strategy of terror ... [It] lies within the state itself ... In Italy there is a secret force, parallel to the armed forces, consisting of civilians and military, with an anti-Soviet orientation, to oppose the Russian army on Italian soil form ... A secret organization, a super-organization with a network of communication links, weapons and explosives as well as men who know how to use them ... A super-organization which, in the absence of a Soviet military invasion, can take on the task of slipping the country out of the country political center to prevent left. She did this with the support of the official secret services and the political and military forces. "

literature

  • Vladimiro Satta : I nemici della Repubblica: Storia degli anni di piombo. Rizzoli, Milan 2016 (preview) .
  • Aldo Giannuli, Elia Rosati: Storia di Ordine Nuovo. Mimesis, Milan, Udine 2017.

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Mimmo Franzinelli: La sottile linea nera. Neofascismo e servizi segreti da piazza Fontana a piazza della Loggia. Rizzoli, Milan 2008, p. 237, end note 10. On the hijacking of aircraft, see Morto l'agente del blitz al Fokker del '72. In: Il Piccolo , November 29, 2013.
  2. a b c Gunther Latsch: The dark side of the west . In: Der Spiegel . No. 15 , 2005, pp. 48 ( online ).
  3. Philip P. Willan: Puppetmasters. The Political Use of Terrorism in Italy. Authors Choice Press, San Jose et al. a. 2002, p. 153 ; Vladimiro Satta : I nemici della Repubblica: Storia degli anni di piombo. Rizzoli, Milan 2016, pp. 445–454 (e-book) .
  4. Secret agents, freemasons, fascists ... and a top-level campaign of political "destabilization". In: The Guardian , December 5, 1990.