Action double oak

The Doppeleiche campaign was the undertaking of the military government of the British occupation zone and the Hamburg authorities to forcibly relocate some of the refugees who had streamed into the city of Hamburg in 1945 to Schleswig-Holstein . The campaign started in September 1945 and was canceled at the turn of the year 1945/1946 because the intended districts had no more reception capacity. By then, 8,200 people had been relocated to Eiderstedt and Dithmarschen . The name "double oak" should be an allusion to the double oak as a traditional symbol for Schleswig and Holstein.

background

In the course of the Second World War , a large part of the residential buildings in Hamburg was destroyed and damaged, in particular due to targeted large-scale attacks on residential areas by the British Air Force . The most devastating attacks of this kind took place in July and August 1943 under the name " Operation Gomorrah " and resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and 61% of the living space in Hamburg being destroyed and 900,000 inhabitants - over half - leaving the city for a short time. As a reaction, Hamburg was declared a “hot spot for housing needs”, which was linked to a ban on moving to the city, which was subject to exceptions and was only applicable to a limited extent, especially for returnees. After the Red Army advanced into the territory of the German Reich in October 1944, large numbers of the affected population fled to the western parts of Germany, including the British zone and Hamburg. Despite the policy of restricting the influx of people to Hamburg, which continued even under British occupation, the population rose sharply in the course of 1945.

In Hamburg there was a shortage of living space, food and fuel in the first months after the end of the war . With a view to the coming winter, the military government and the German authorities were concerned that they would not be able to provide adequate care for the refugees. After the return to the Soviet occupation zone in particular proved impossible, the military government therefore decided in September 1945 to relocate them to rural areas of Schleswig-Holstein before the onset of winter and to accommodate them there on farms and in barracks camps. The independent mayor Rudolf Petersen , appointed by the British , supported the project. According to the initial plans, 50,000 people should have been affected; Anyone who worked for the occupying power or in reconstruction should be allowed to stay in Hamburg.

In Schleswig-Holstein, where many refugees and German prisoners of war were already housed, the political leadership viewed the project with reluctance. However, the British military government initially asserted its authority and did not accept the protest.

execution

For the implementation, a separation of duties between British and Germans was established, according to which the Hamburg authorities had to organize the registration and accommodation of the affected refugees in Hamburg, while the 8th British Army Corps under Evelyn Barker was responsible for the accommodation in the reception areas. The Hamburg administration formed a relocation staff under the direction of the Social Democratic Senator Heinrich Eisenbarth with representatives of the police and civil authorities. Eisenbarth was completely subordinate to the military government and, unlike Mayor Petersen, was not even consulted by the British.

Registration of the affected group of people

The refugees were recorded in September. All people in Hamburg who had moved to the city since January 1, 1945, were asked by posters and through the newspapers to report to the issuing offices for food cards . Those who did not comply were threatened with fines and with the refusal of ration cards.

In this way, more than 250,000 people were recorded, the vast majority of whom, however, turned out to be returned Hamburgers who had already had a place of residence in Hamburg before September 1, 1939. These were generally excluded from the campaign. According to an interim report in October, only about 43,000 people were foreign refugees. Of these, however, only a small part was actually used for relocating, since the German authorities applied a very extensive practice of exemption. Sick and infirm, pregnant women, single young people under the age of 18 and foreigners, who were mainly forced laborers who were deported to Hamburg by the Nazis, were exempt. Furthermore, students, self-employed traders and members of the liberal professions were exempted, as well as employees who had a shortage of occupations, pursued an activity approved by the employment office or were employed by the occupation authorities. In particular, the job-related exception rules went much further than the original plan to only exempt workers from transport who were employed under the occupation regime or who were engaged in vital activities during reconstruction. In addition, the exemption also affected the family members of the exempted persons, since families were not allowed to be torn apart. In this way, approx. 83% of those affected were released according to the assessment already mentioned.

Transport to the receiving areas

The refugees assigned to the transport were housed in assembly camps and air raid bunkers , which were all more or less close to the Altona train station, namely camps on Bahrenfelder Strasse and Brahms-Eck (probably on the former Brahmsstrasse in Ottensen) and bunkers on the Barnerstrasse, Missundestrasse, Kleine Marienstrasse, Lammstrasse and Arnoldstrasse. At these collection points, they received cold and warm food and were examined by a doctor and deloused. Those affected should not actually stay there longer than a day until they were taken away, but in practice they usually stayed longer because, on the one hand, they should be taken from their previous accommodation as quickly as possible, and on the other hand, the transports were delayed. The humanitarian conditions in the bunkers were precarious, but at least offered better protection against the rigors of winter than Nissen huts .

The transports took place between October 1 and the end of November 1945 and were distributed among the villages of Heide , Lunden , St. Michaelisdonn , Meldorf , Tönning and Tating . The people assigned to the transport were picked up from the collection points and taken to the station, from where they drove to Holstein on special trains of the Reichsbahn accompanied by British officers. At the terminus they received representatives of the district administrators who were to assign them their new accommodations. The accommodation at the destinations was partially completely inadequate. There was a lack of fuel, clothes and shoes, food, medicine and decent accommodation; For example, during an inspection trip to Lunden, Eisenbarth found that 85 refugees slept there for weeks in a mass camp on straw sacks. (At least he was able to put an end to this grievance.) Because of the poor conditions and partly also because they were refused the allocated accommodation, numerous refugees returned to Hamburg. Those who remained often did not take up work and tensions arose with the local population.

failure

Due to the numerous exemptions, hardly any people were available just a few days after the start of the transports, and a failure of the "Doppeleiche" campaign became apparent. By October 25, 1945, only 5,600 people had been evacuated.

The British leadership, especially the Hamburg city commander Armytage , initially came to the conclusion that the small number of people relocated was not due to the exemptions, but to the fact that the police did not enforce the action rigorously enough. Only in the course of time did Armytage change its orders on the practice of exemption, but this was not implemented due to disagreements in the British leadership. The measures to enforce the relocation were tightened; The labor and housing office directed the refugees affected directly to the assembly camp.

At the turn of the year 1945/1946 the action was canceled due to the overpopulation of Schleswig-Holstein. The problems that occurred there were comparable to those that had also been feared in Hamburg, in particular the lack of furnaces and fuel.

literature

Evelyn Glensk: The admission and integration of displaced persons and refugees in Hamburg 1945–1953 (= contributions to the history of Hamburg . Volume 46 ). Association for Hamburg History, Hamburg 1994, ISBN 3-923356-57-9 (dissertation; History, University of Hamburg, 1990).
Evelyn Glensk, Rita Bake , Oliver von Wrochem : The refugees are coming. Arrival and admission in Hamburg after the end of the war . Results-Verlag, Hamburg 1998, ISBN 3-87916-053-8 , p. 39 ff .

Individual evidence

↑ ^a ^b ^c ^d ^e Glensk 1994, p. 68 ff.
↑ Glensk 1994, pp. 27 ff.
^ ^A ^b Heinrich Eisenbarth: Care for refugees, bombed-out and homeless after the surrender . In: New Hamburg. Evidence of the reconstruction of the Hanseatic city . No. 2/1948 . Ullstein, Berlin, p. 76 . Quoted from: Rita Bake (Hrsg.): Neues Hamburg - Evidence from the reconstruction of the Hanseatic city. Selected articles from 12 issues from the years 1947–1961 . State Center for Political Education, Hamburg 2005, ISBN 3-929728-78-8 , p. 63, 64 .

[glensk-1994-68-1] Glensk 1994, p. 68 ff.

[glensk-1994-27-2] Glensk 1994, pp. 27 ff.

[eisenbarth-3] A ^b Heinrich Eisenbarth: Care for refugees, bombed-out and homeless after the surrender . In: New Hamburg. Evidence of the reconstruction of the Hanseatic city . No. 2/1948 . Ullstein, Berlin, p. 76 . Quoted from: Rita Bake (Hrsg.): Neues Hamburg - Evidence from the reconstruction of the Hanseatic city. Selected articles from 12 issues from the years 1947–1961 . State Center for Political Education, Hamburg 2005, ISBN 3-929728-78-8 , p. 63, 64 .