Alfred Kretschmer

Alfred Franz Kretschmer (born December 17, 1894 in Hünern , Trebnitz district , province of Silesia , † December 30, 1967 in Wiesbaden ) was a German lieutenant general in World War II and a military attaché in Tokyo . He later worked for the Gehlen organization , where he was responsible for internal investigations.

Life

At the outbreak of World War I, Kretschmar joined the 4th Silesian Infantry Regiment No. 157 of the Prussian Army as a volunteer . He came to the Eastern Front in Reserve Infantry Regiment No. 230 . In May 1915 he was transferred to the 7th West Prussian Infantry Regiment No. 155 as an ensign , where he was promoted to lieutenant in mid-November 1915 and was awarded both classes of the Iron Cross and the silver wound badge .

Weimar Republic

In 1919, Kretschmer was taken over by the Reichswehr and served in the Reichswehr Infantry Regiment 32 until October 1920. After serving as an adjutant until 1924 , he was assigned to a management training course for 2 years. This corresponded to the earlier general staff training, which, however, was prohibited for the Reichswehr due to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. That is why it was realized in camouflaged form. During this time he was promoted to first lieutenant and then appointed himself as a trainer by the Reichswehr Ministry. He gained important experience in dealing with subordinates and teaching in front of officers' listeners. Subsequently, he was seconded to the Reichswehr Ministry to train future military leaders. These were Russian officers who were invited to Germany as part of the German-Soviet military cooperation and received general staff training there. For Kretschmer, as a supervisor of these officers' groups, this period of service lasted a year until October 1927. During this teaching assignment, he came into contact with management personnel from numerous work areas and structures of the Reichswehr Ministry.

As a result, after his teaching duties had expired, Alfred Kretschmer was transferred to the Reichswehr Ministry to Department T 3 - Foreign Armies - on October 1, 1927 . Head of department here was Colonel Curt Liebmann (1881–1960) since 1924 . The task of this department was intelligence gathering and intelligence analysis. The information required came from very different sources, including the evaluation of the press and publications on military topics, reports by the military attachés and intelligence gathering information about the enemy armies, armaments development, military strategy, and the staffing of the army structures of the “foreigners “National armed forces, but also counter-espionage combined with the protection of our own army units and the associated structures belonged. This department combined the area of ​​counter-espionage, the guidance of the military attachés, an extensive reading service, a press area for cooperation with publishers and editorial offices, the military intelligence service and an area of ​​encryption. But Kretschmer came to Department T 3 at a time when it was in the midst of upheaval. On July 1, 1927, the head of the Abwehr Colonel Friedrich Gempp (1871-1947) was relieved and replaced by Günther Schwantes (1881-1942). On August 8 and 9, 1927, the business journalist Kurd Wenkel kicked off the Lohmann affair (Weimar Republic) through his articles in the Berliner Tageblatt , in which Walter Lohmann (1878–1930), the head of the maritime transport department in the Reichswehr Ministry, was the main initiator of secret armaments deals and Abuse of government funds was implicated. But also the areas of information gathering, especially the naval intelligence service and defense, were affected. Over the course of several months, more and more clear information came to light, which led to the Reichswehr Minister Otto Geßler (1875–1955) having to resign on January 29, 1928 . Walter Lohmann was still fired in 1927, but the main aim of immediately taking steps to combat damage was to prevent further information about the background, the people involved and the machinations from being made public. The naval intelligence service, which was also involved in the stories, was directly subordinate to the new Reichswehr Minister Wilhelm Groener (1867–1939) together with the Abwehr . Department T 3 was restructured, the work areas redistributed, the working methods critically reviewed and, above all, the issues of secrecy subjected to a significant revision. On March 1, 1928, the post of department head was filled again, this position was taken over by Colonel Erich Kühlenthal (1880–1958). The entire process of realigning Department T 3 continued until 1931. But even before this time, on September 30, 1929, Kretschmer switched to the headquarters of the 6th Division in Münster . This military area belonged to Wehrkreis VI, which included the regions of Westphalia, Hanover and the Rhine Province. Here he was promoted to captain on December 1st . In this sector, there was again a clear demand for his skills in instructing and training other people. And so on October 1, 1932, he was assigned directly to Military District Command VI in Münster. At that time, the commander was Lieutenant General Wolfgang Fleck (1879–1939), through whom Kretschmer worked as an instructor for the “secondary leader training” in military district VI. was held responsible. In these courses the future staff officers were prepared for the later assumption of duties in the staffs and higher command levels of the Reichswehr. Since the Versailles Treaty in Germany still prohibited the training of general staff officers in 1932, these training groups had cover designations such as “Führergehilfen” courses or “secondary leaders” training and were carried out decentrally in the military districts to maintain secrecy. In accordance with the organization of the course, new courses were started in spring and autumn and the current ones were completed. Accordingly, Kretschmer stayed in Münster during the National Socialist seizure of power in January 1933 and only switched to different areas of responsibility on September 30, 1933.

Third Reich

On October 1, 1933, Alfred Kretschmer was assigned as a company commander in the 2nd Infantry Regiment and, one year later, again as a company commander in the Rastenburg infantry regiment . Here, too, he only stayed for a short time and on March 1, 1935, he was assigned to the staff of the military district command I, in Königsberg , as second general staff officer (I b). Here he was responsible for all supplies, including weapons and military equipment. Commanding general was Walther von Brauchitsch (1881–1949) at this time. But when teachers with military experience were wanted at the newly formed war academies in 1935, due to the immensely increasing need for officers and staff officers, he switched back to teaching on October 1, 1937. This time as a quartermaster at the War Academy. It was here that he was promoted to lieutenant colonel in 1938. He carried out this activity until shortly before the German invasion of Poland . In preparation for the planned attack, he was assigned to the 10th Army as a quartermaster on August 26, 1939. She was part of Army Group South, which advanced from the southern flank into Polish territory. He remained at the head of the 6th Army until the end of January 1940 and moved from here as senior quartermaster to the tank troops of Field Marshal Ewald von Kleist (1881–1954). It was the XXII. Army Corps , where he was promoted to colonel. Stationed in the western part of the Rhine, Kretschmer took part in the western campaign against France until January 1941.

Japan

On January 5, 1941, Alfred Kretschmer was ordered to Japan to perform the duties of military attaché at the German embassy in Tokyo in the years to come. He was selected and prepared for this mission by his former Foreign Armies department, now in the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The German ambassador in Tokyo had been Eugen Ott (1889–1977) since 1938 . The location of Japan was of extraordinary importance for the strategic planning and the follow-up of the war plans of the "Third Reich". The alliance agreements between Germany and Japan that had existed since 1936 and the Three Power Pact concluded in September 1940 were an important basis for the focus of the military attaché Alfred Kretschmer's activities. In the latter pact, Germany and Italy had respected all of Japan's activities in the reorganization of power-political positions in Asia. This largely determined the strategic priorities and the alliance-political aspects of trade for the attachés. For this reason, there has been a strong concentration of high-ranking military personnel in the embassy in Tokyo and of forces of the NSDAP within the German groups living in Japan. In early 1941, Kretschmer replaced the previous military attaché Gerhard Matzky (1894–1983). At the side of Alfred Kretschmer worked on the post of naval attaché since March 1940 Paul Wenneker (1890–1979) and as air force attaché since 1939 Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang Gronau (1893–1977). Captain Karsch worked as an assistant to the military attaché. The existing contacts to the military, economic and political circles in Japan, which were mainly maintained by the embassy staff, were in a mutually balanced sphere of interests. The military attaché regularly took part in maneuvers, visits to military sites and social highlights of the Japanese leadership circles. The experience of the German partners with regard to the development of the armed forces, geostrategic issues and armaments developments, especially the modernization of weapons systems and increasing the effectiveness of the armed forces through the rapid and targeted implementation of the latest research results, was highly regarded by the Japanese. Even the steps towards the establishment of such a tightly organized internal political apparatus of power, as had been taken in Germany since 1933, met with very interested ears in political, police and intelligence circles in Japan.

But around March 1941, when the planning for the attack on the Soviet Union in the High Command of the Wehrmacht was confirmed, the attachés in Tokyo received a special instruction as a "secret matter of command" from March 5, 1941, which directly affects their work in Japan in the future had to determine. It ordered that Japan's readiness for war should be strengthened in order to “bring it to active action in the Far East”. For this purpose, the Japanese wishes for German war and combat experience, including technical ones, should be met comprehensively and generously. The main focus should be on topics that “can have an impact on warfare in a short time”. In the meantime, a large number of German armaments companies with corresponding branches were present in Japan. This concerned Daimler-Benz AG, Flugzeugwerke Heinkel from Oranienburg, Henkel AG Düsseldorf, IG Farben, Kaiser-Wilhelm-Iron Werke, Krupp AG, Lufthansa, MAN Augsburg, Messerschmidt AG Haunstetten, Stahlwerke Roechling, Siemens-Schuckert Werke, Telefunken AG and other companies in the field of ship and submarine construction, military optics, electronics, and radio and radar sectors. In addition to the economic attaché Helmuth Wohlthat (1893–1982), Kretschmer was responsible for a large part of his information and "support work" here. From 1939 onwards, numerous German specialists also worked in the Japanese armaments industry. These were important for the military attachés from two perspectives. On the one hand, it had to be ensured that no German know-how flowed away in this way or that this group of people was recruited for espionage purposes. On the other hand, there was a large pool of people who could be used to obtain information about the Japanese military and armaments sectors.

In October 1941, working conditions changed in a special way for Alfred Kretschmer, the other attachés and the executives of the German embassy. On October 15, 1941, the Japanese Ozaki Hotsumi (1901-1944) and in the night hours of October 18, Richard Sorge (1895-1944) were arrested by the Japanese Kempeitai . Actually only a routine action in the fight against internal oppositional Japanese forces. In the course of the investigation, however, it became more and more apparent that both of them had collected material that was urgently to be kept secret concerning the security of Japan. Since 1936, Sorge had not only been a welcome guest at the German embassy, ​​but also an important, trustworthy conversation partner who had an office job at the embassy and had written the current war reports for the superiors in Berlin for many months. He maintained extremely good relations with all three attachés and also with the ambassador Eugen Ott himself and had siphoned off military and strategic knowledge from them over several years. The interrogations conducted by the Japanese investigators made the role of Ambassador Ott in a special way, but also of the Naval Attaché Wenneker, the Air Force Attaché Gronau and, last but not least, Kretschmer appear increasingly dubious. As a result of these revelations, the Japanese mistrusted their previous German interlocutor to a considerable extent. Among other things, this led to the fact that the information volume previously provided by Alfred Kretschmer lost a considerable amount of quality in the period that followed. And the three attachés, now in the clear awareness that they had willingly divulged information of high secrecy for several years, tried hard to make it clear to their respective superiors in the Wehrmacht High Command that Eugen Ott was the scapegoat. But now Ott's superiors and also the head of the Foreign Office / Defense in the High Command of the Wehrmacht, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris (1887–1945), began to collect material against Ott in a very targeted manner. On November 23, 1942, he was recalled as ambassador with a telegram personally addressed to him that he had to decipher himself.

Despite the changing situation after this glaring incident, Alfred Kretschmer continued to take part in more selected visits and excursions to military areas. One such trip took him from March 5, 1942 to the former combat area of ​​the Japanese army against the Allied forces in the former occupation areas of Malaysia. In addition to high Japanese officers, the delegation included the military attachés of Finland Colonel Auno Kaila (born 1898), Italy's Colonel Bertoni and Romania's Major General Gheorghe Bagulescu. Above all, the Japanese side wanted to convey the significance of the Battle of Jitra to their foreign companions. They visited Kuala Lumpur, the island of Sumatra, the military port of Selata in Singapore and the military port of Cavite. After 4 weeks they started their return journey to Tokyo from the former front area. Returning there, Kretschmer was promoted to major general on June 1, 1942 and two years later in 1944 to lieutenant general. On September 13, 1945, he was captured by American troops in Tokyo. His captivity lasted until February 13, 1946, after which he returned to Germany.

After the war he worked for the Gehlen organization , where he was in charge of the department responsible for internal investigations.

Alfred Kretschmer died on December 30, 1967 in Wiesbaden.

literature

• Dermot Bradley (ed.), Hans H. Hildebrand, Ernest Henriot: The General of the Army 1921–1945. The military careers of army, engineering, medical, weapons and administrative officers in the rank of general. Volume 7: Knabe – Luz. Biblio Verlag, Bissendorf 2004, ISBN 3-7648-2902-8 , pp. 207-208.
• Manfred Kehrig: The reintroduction of the German military attaché service after the First World War. Boppard 1966, DNB 457166495 .
• Isabel Kreitz: The matter of concern. Stalin's spy in Tokyo. Carlsen Verlag, Hamburg 2008, ISBN 978-3-551-78743-9 .
• Michael Müller: Canaris: Hitler's chief of defense. Ullstein Verlag, Berlin 2006.

Individual evidence

1. ↑ GENERAL ALFRED KRETSCHMER MEDALS AND INSIGNIA GROUPING. Retrieved March 19, 2020 . 
2. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND structure, financing, control . In: Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller (eds.): Publications of the Independent Historical Commission for Research into the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968. 1st edition. tape 9 . Christoph Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , p. 110-125 .
3. ↑ Manfred Kehrig, The re-establishment of the military attaché service after the First World War (1919–1933) , Harald Boldt Verlag, Boppart am Rhein 1966, p. 38ff. See also Friedrich Gempp, Intelligence Service of the Army , memorandum, Federal Archives, Freiburg Military Archives, 11th volumes
4. ↑ Bernd Remmele, Lohmann Affair. Secret armaments of the Reichswehr in the twenties, Master's thesis at the University of Freiburg, 1995
5. ↑ Manfred Kehrig, The reintroduction of the German military attaché service after the First World War. Boppard 1966
6. ^ Walter Hubatsch: Hitler's instructions for warfare 1939–1945. Documents of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. Bernard & Graefe Verlag für Wehrwesen, Frankfurt / Main 1962, p. 103 ff.
7. ↑ See among other things: Letter from Alfred Kretschmer to Hilmar Bassler of November 14, 1941, in: Julius Mader, Dr. Sorge Report, Berlin 1984, p. 191 f.