Organization Gehlen

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Reinhard Gehlen in Wehrmacht uniform , 1943

The Gehlen Organization (also called Organization , Org. , Operation Rusty , Operation Zipper or OG ) was an intelligence service that emerged in early 1946 and from which the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) emerged on April 1, 1956 . The long-time director was Major General a. D. Reinhard Gehlen , former head of the Foreign Army East Department (FHO) and first president of the BND. The Americans, who financed and supervised the organization and received the reconnaissance results , pursued the goal of using the German intelligence service expertise on the Soviet Union in the looming Cold War .

US Army supervision

Origin under Baun

The establishment of an intelligence service, which later bore the name Organization Gehlen, began in the spring of 1946. After several months of preparation, the former Lieutenant Colonel of the Abwehr , Hermann Baun , received an order from the United States Army (US Army) to set up an intelligence operation. At that time Gehlen was still a prisoner of war in the United States . The project officially began in April 1946 and shortly thereafter was given the cover name "Operation Rusty". When building up the organization, Baun (service name: "Berndt") at the beginning loosely tied in with the structures of the front reconnaissance of the Wehrmacht against the Soviet Union, for which he was responsible during the Second World War . He built up a staff under his leadership as well as several centrally organized departments. The staff was housed in a separate area within the US Military Intelligence Service Center at Camp King , Oberursel . After August 1946, the procurement staff was relocated to a former hotel in Schmitten, 15 kilometers away (code name: "Dustbin"). For the staff, Baun mainly relied on former members of the Abwehr control center "Walli I". In the spring of 1947 the staff consisted of 25 people. The staff inspection department, headed by Gustav-Adolf Tietze, assessed the reports obtained from the external organizations according to their novelty and credibility. The screening was divided into the four working areas of military , economy, politics and counter- espionage / counter-espionage .

Gehlen returned from captivity in July 1946 and was integrated into Operation Rusty. His first day of work in Germany was July 15, 1946. He initially headed the evaluation group (also known as the "Intelligence Group"), which included Gerhard Wessel as his deputy, Albert Schoeller, Hans Hinrichs and Horst Hiemenz.

Gehlen and his confidants had managed the entire archive of the Department of Foreign Armies East (FHO) of the former German General Staff in early 1945 from the headquarters of the Army General Staff for Bayern to transport and bury in 50 steel boxes. After interrogation in the POW camp and in a special interrogation camp in Virginia , the US intelligence officers recognized the importance of Gehlen's knowledge and his archives.

Management under Gehlen

After Gehlen had tried harder since autumn 1946 to replace Baun as head, he was appointed in February 1947 by the US Army as "German Chief of Operation Rusty". On December 6, 1947, the organization moved into what would later become the BND property in Pullach and the former Reichsiedlung Rudolf Hess in Pullach near Munich . The move date, St. Nicholas Day, earned the neighborhood the nickname "Camp Nikolaus". Gehlen helped many former employees of the "Foreign Armies East Department" of the Army High Command , which he had previously headed and which was responsible for evaluating the enemy situation on the Eastern Front by analyzing news, to a new career in the young Federal Republic. Gehlen's department had a reputation for systematic and precisely documenting detailed work.

The organization also included the so-called group of professors, in which the representatives of Ostforschung Werner Conze , Gunther Ipsen , Hans Koch , Werner Markert , Reinhart Maurach , Hermann Raschhofer , Otto Schiller and Theodor Oberländer gathered. The head of the group was Peter-Heinz Seraphim . The group of professors wrote larger and smaller studies for a fee, mainly on current economic topics and population developments in certain regions or the entire Eastern Bloc. It existed from 1946 to December 1949.

From July 1946, the members of the evaluation received a fixed monthly salary of between 400 and 600  Reichsmarks  (RM) as well as bonuses for married couples (100 RM) and per child (50 RM). The US Army provided the organization with money on a monthly basis, as well as consumer goods and luxury goods from their depots, which were used on the black market as barter goods for money before the currency reform in 1948 or which were used to pay directly. In September 1946, the organization received 160,000 cigarettes, 43,300 liters of gasoline, and about $ 50,000 from the US Army; For the months of July to November 1948, there were 82,153 bars of chocolate, 67,150 packets of cigarettes, 4,500 razor blades and 1,815 pairs of woolen socks. Later the budget was $ 125,000, which remained the same through June 1949. The exchange of goods for money was an essential source of income for the organization, which fell away with the currency reform on June 18, 1948 and plunged it into a financial crisis.

In February 1948, 160 people were employed at the headquarters; in May 1949 there were around 270. The total number of employees (headquarters and branch offices) in the spring of 1949 was around 700 to 800 people.

CIA oversight

On July 1, 1949, the Gehlen organization's financier and client moved from the US Army to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) founded in 1947 . In November 1948, CIA employee James H. Critchfield was sent to Pullach to examine the possibility of a takeover. On the basis of his report of December 17, 1948, the then CIA chief Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter and the head of the intelligence service of the US Army, S. Leroy Erwin, decided to take over on December 27, 1948 . The organization ran in the CIA from 1949 to 1950 under the name "Offspring", from 1950 to 1951 under "Odeum" and from 1951 to 1956 under "Zipper".

The American staff in Pullach, headed by Critchfield, consisted of around 30 to 35 people between 1950 and 1956 (Pullach Operation Base: POB). When selecting its employees, Critchfield attached great importance to the fact that they spoke German and had experience in the intelligence service, if possible during operations in (Central) Europe. Every German group, department and external organization leader had a CIA person in charge. Gehlen built up a staff of personal collaborators. These were Horst Wendland (overall management / administration), August Winter (procurement / evaluation), Wolfgang Langkau (office manager), Alfred Franz Kretschmer (internal investigations), Hans-Ludwig von Lossow (connection to high-ranking contacts in federal ministries), Wilhelm Oxenius (security ) and Georg Buntrock (special connections: contacts to foreign intelligence services). At the end of October 1951, Horst von Mellenthin was appointed as Gehlen's deputy. When he became the first resident in Washington, DC in early 1956 , Hermann Foertsch took over the representation of Gehlen during an extended absence. The " service instructions for the headquarters of the organization" of March 1953 established a new management organization: Head of the overall organization (Gehlen), permanent representative (von Mellenthin), administrative, personnel and organizational tasks (Wendland), personal assistant for ND development ( Walter Schenk, also responsible for training), head of Group I (information) procurement, counter-espionage / counter-espionage, evaluation, telecommunications , stay-behind planning, special connections as well as psychological research and counteraction.

Adolf Heusinger was the head of the evaluation for four years. At the beginning of 1952 he went to the Blank office . His successor was Gerhard Wessel for a year , who then also moved to the Blank office. In followed Heinz Herre as the last head of the evaluation. It had a military focus. Hans Hinrichs was the head of the Army and Navy Analysis Unit, Werner Boie was the Head of the Air Force Analysis Unit and Johnannes Härtel was responsible for Transport Analysis . All three held their posts from 1949 to 1955 and later became generals in the Bundeswehr. In 1952 the marine evaluation became an independent unit under Alfred Schulze-Hinrichs . In 1955 the function of the head of the military evaluation was created, which Walter Nielsen took. The economic evaluation moved in 1953 from Schloss Kransberg to Pullach. From 1953 it was led by Walter Kienitz , who later became a Brigadier General of the Air Force. Herbert von Dirksen was head of political evaluation and successor to Gustav Hilger . Even Otto groom belonged to this organizational unit.

The CIA wanted the organization to concentrate on procurement in the GDR, Poland and Romania. The procurement area was divided into three groups: counter-espionage / counter-espionage (Kurt Kohler), strategic reconnaissance (Walter Schenk; deputy: Conrad Kühlein) and close-up reconnaissance (initially provisional: Siegfried Graber). In the strategic reconnaissance, Heinrich Kurtz was country worker for Poland and the CSR country department was occupied by Hermann Wondrak. After only one year, at the beginning of 1952, strategic and close-up reconnaissance were merged again because the separation had not proven its worth. Head became cool. He was responsible for the three areas of GDR (Siegfried Graber; deputy: Eberhard Blum ), other satellite states (Dietz von dem Knesebeck) and the Soviet Union (Eugen Dükrsen; previously acting: Heinz Herre). The operational external area was consolidated in August 1949. At their head were six so-called general agencies (GV): GV A ( Salzburg ), GV C ( Darmstadt ), GV E ( Ulm ), GV G ( Frankfurt am Main ), GV H (also Frankfurt), GV L ( Karlsruhe ). Subordinate to these were district representatives, sub-representatives and branches. The general agencies took on general control and coordination tasks. They distributed the intelligence requests from the headquarters, collected the incoming reports, checked them and forwarded them to Pullach for inspection. They were also responsible for radio technology, training and general safety. All general agencies, with the exception of GV A, had GDR procurement as their mandate. GV A was responsible for Romania, GV C and E for Czechoslovakia. GV L focused on counter-espionage and counter-espionage. GV A was dissolved on June 1, 1951, and GV B (Bremen; management: Hans-Heinrich Worgitzky ) was created around the same time . Another type of external organization were the project groups (later: organizational groups), which were led directly from Pullach and which arose between November 1950 and spring 1951. In the course of a wave of spies arrested in the GDR in autumn 1953, organizational units could be renamed extensively at the beginning of 1954.

In 1950, department "40" was created, which was divided into the so-called III activity and domestic political reporting. The III area was the significantly larger and was subdivided into counter-espionage and counter-espionage supplemented by independent sections for the self-protection of the service, for processing security incidents and the "card index". Henning Wilcke was active in domestic political reporting . Originally Alfred Radke was supposed to lead the department; instead Kurt Kohler took over the management. Active counter-espionage, i.e. the infiltration of intelligence services in the Eastern Bloc, was not carried out by the department. Heinz Felfe joined the department on October 1, 1953 . Felfe was a mole of the Soviet KGB who was not exposed until 1961. The KGB had used Felfes' involvement in Nazi crimes to recruit him before he joined the Gehlen organization.

In February 1951 the organization set up a semi-official liaison office in Bonn ( code name: "Forsthaus"), the first head of which was later major general of the Bundeswehr, Karl Kleyser . The organization sent reports entitled “Customer Service” to selected customers.

While the main focus of the organization was military reconnaissance, political reconnaissance formed a screened off special area called the “archive”. During the transition to the BND, this became the “Strategic Service”. From 1954 the organization received monthly funding of DM 30,000 from the federal government, with which the expansion of the “archive” was (partially) financed. The money came from a reptile fund of the Federal Chancellor. In addition, the organization raised money from the German economy through an office with the code name "Industrial Research Institute"; In 1951 she received around 600,000 DM. The donors included Standard Elektrik AG , Rodenstock and Messerschmitt .

In mid-1949 the Gehlen organization was funded by the USA with an annual amount of 1.5 million US dollars . As a result of the Korean War , the financial resources were increased significantly. The first important operation of the organization for the Americans was the radio reconnaissance of the air forces of the Soviet Union during the Berlin Airlift . The smuggling of spies and saboteurs into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was largely unsuccessful.

On May 1, 1951, the organization reported to the CIA a workforce of 1,132 and 1,152 information and operational management personnel. On July 1, 1952, an internal survey showed 1011 full-time employees, 425 "management and management assistants" and 1421  informants (including interrogators); altogether 2857. In June 1953, 3921 people with different functions and connections worked for the organization and 3231 in June 1954. When the company was transferred to the federal service on April 1, 1956, the workforce was 3982. The organization differentiated between the categories of general staff and ND staff , Flat-rate recipients and special connections. The recruitment of new employees took place mainly from the family and friends of the existing staff. Unsolicited applications did not increase until 1954, when the organization became better known to the public. The organization was skeptical of these, however, because they feared enemy agents among the unsolicited applicants. In 1951, new employees had to make a declaration in which they undertook “of their own free will and in a voluntary commitment to the occidental - western - Christian view of life as well as loyal to my German homeland to put all my energies at the service of the task announced to me ".

Takeover in the federal service

As early as 1951, the discussion about the establishment of one or more intelligence services at the federal level began. According to a report by the CIA, the name "Bundesnachrichtendienst" was first used in August and September 1952 during talks at the Federal Chancellery . In addition to Hans Globke and Reinhard Gehlen, Gehlen employees Hans von Lossow, Horst Wendland and Werner Repenning also took part in the secret founding talks that took place in the office of the then Ministerial Councilor Karl Gumbel . With the German Treaty, the Federal Republic received the Allies' approval to have its own foreign intelligence service. On April 1, 1956, the Gehlen organization was taken over as the “Federal Intelligence Service” in the federal administration.

Employment of personnel from former Nazi organizations

The organization helped their relatives with the denazification process . Gehlen managed, even if he himself emphatically denied this, to interest a large number of the surviving members of his former office in the service, because they were often given a new identity in their new position. For the most part, former SS , SD , Gestapo , Abwehr and, above all, Wehrmacht officers were hired . Research carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency in the early 1950s showed that 13 to 28 percent of the Gehlen organization's employees were former NSDAP members, and of these 5 to 8 percent were also members of the SS, SD or SA. The CIA report points out that the proportion of former members of the NSDAP is comparable to the occupation of the 2nd German Bundestag . The 487 members of the Bundestag included 129 former NSDAP members, which corresponds to a percentage of 26.5 percent. It is estimated that around 400 mostly high-ranking employees had such a background at the end of the 1940s.

The US government was interested in the expertise of the "Third Reich" intelligence workers, as its own intelligence agencies had little knowledge of the Soviet military at the time the Cold War began to emerge. In addition to military reconnaissance and espionage against the Soviet zone of occupation and other Eastern Bloc countries, the Gehlen organization was also supposed to ward off a possible “communist danger” inside West Germany .

Action Hermes

From the summer of 1947, Gehlen began a survey under the code name "Aktion Hermes" among the 3.1 million soldiers and other German returnees who were now released from Soviet captivity . The skimming was very productive. The agents of the Gehlen organization took up permanent posts in the homecoming camps in the western zones and later in the Federal Republic of Germany. Almost every returnees, whether soldiers or civil internees, passed the agents , who asked in which camps they lived and in which companies they had worked. Above all, the agents were interested in spies of the opposite side and in students of the " Antifa courses" in the Soviet camps. Anyone who was considered to be influenced by communism was registered by the Gehlen organization as a possible enemy agent in a special file. Gehlen's agents, almost exclusively old comrades from the Foreign Army East Department, from the SS and the Abwehr , received an extensive body of knowledge from first-hand reports from people who "had got to know the East like no other person from the West had before."

Jefferson Adams specified in 2009 that in a later intensive survey of returnees whose research seemed promising, the agents used the code name "Historical Research Institute Wiesbaden" against the respondents. The research focused on Soviet industry, armament, telecommunications and the attitude of the population towards the government. When Gehlen's agents determined a noticeable increase in the construction of tanks and military aircraft in the Soviet Union after 1945 as a result of the questioning, this caused unrest among the US military, to whom all reports were sent.

When the flow of returnees dried up, the Hermes campaign shifted to subversion , especially against Poland. B. for 1952. The agents commissioned with Subversion reached their target country across the Baltic Sea.

literature

  • Mary Ellen Reese: Organization Gehlen. The Cold War and the establishment of the German secret service . 1st edition. Rowohlt Verlag , Berlin 1992, ISBN 3-87134-033-2 .
  • Magnus Pahl / Gorch Pieken / Matthias Rogg (eds.): Warning, spies! Secret services in Germany from 1945 to 1956. Essays . 1st edition. Sandstein Verlag, Dresden 2016, ISBN 978-3-95498-210-3 .
  • Gerhard Sälters: Phantoms of the Cold War. The Gehlen Organization and the revival of the Gestapo enemy image »Red Chapel« (=  publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Research into the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 2 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag , Berlin 2016, ISBN 978-3-86153-921-6 .
  • Agilolf Keßelring : The organization Gehlen and the reorganization of the military in the Federal Republic (=  publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 6 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2017, ISBN 978-3-86153-967-4 .
  • Thomas Wolf: The creation of the BND. Structure, financing, control (=  Jost Dülffer , Klaus-Dietmar Henke , Wolfgang Krieger , Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]): Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Research into the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 .
  • Klaus-Dietmar Henke: Secret services. The political domestic espionage of the Gehlen organization 1946–1953 (=  publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Research into the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 10 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-023-0 .
  • Bodo Hechelhammer : The long shadow of the past. About the handling of SS personnel in the "Organization Gehlen" and in the Federal Intelligence Service . In: Jan Erik Schulte , Michael Wildt (eds.): The SS after 1945. Debt narratives, popular myths, European memory discourses . V&R unipress, Göttingen 2018, ISBN 978-3-8471-0820-7 .
  • Bodo Hechelhammer: Spy without limits. Heinz Felfe - agent in seven secret services . 1st edition. Piper, Munich 2019, ISBN 978-3-492-05793-6 .

Web links

Commons : Organization Gehlen  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 32, 36 f, 352 .
  2. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 88 .
  3. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 36-41 .
  4. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 41-43 .
  5. ↑ Janusz Piekalkiewicz: World history of espionage. Augsburg 1993. Quoted from: Udo Ulfkotte: classified document BND, Munich / Berlin 1998, ISBN 3-453-14143-1 , p. 133 f.
  6. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 65 ff .
  7. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 74-86 .
  8. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 90 .
  9. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 101 .
  10. ↑ Bodo V. Hechelhammer: Spy without borders. Heinz Felfe. Agent in seven secret services . Piper, Munich 2019, ISBN 978-3-492-05793-6 , pp. 86 .
  11. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 105-110 .
  12. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 110-125 .
  13. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 125-138 .
  14. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 144-167 .
  15. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 197 ff .
  16. ↑ Bodo Hechelhammer: Spy Without Borders. Heinz Felfe - agent in seven secret services . Piper, Munich 2019, ISBN 978-3-492-05793-6 , pp. 80-106 .
  17. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 177 .
  18. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 188 .
  19. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 230 ff .
  20. ↑ James H. Critchfield: Partners at Creation. The Men Behind Postwar Germany's Defense and Intelligence Establishments. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis MD 2003 ISBN 1-59114-136-2
  21. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 248-272; Quote p. 268 .
  22. ^ Future Federal Military Security and Intelligence Agencies. Central Intelligence Agency, November 12, 1951, archived from the original on July 13, 2012 ; accessed on May 16, 2014 .
  23. ^ "Federal Intelligence Service". Central Intelligence Agency, November 14, 1952, archived from the original on July 13, 2012 ; accessed on May 16, 2014 .
  24. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Structure, financing, control (= Jost Dülffer, Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Wolfgang Krieger, Rolf-Dieter Müller [eds.]: Publications of the Independent Commission of Historians for Researching the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). 1st edition. Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 300 .
  25. ↑ Thomas Wolf: The emergence of the BND. Construction, financing, control . Ed .: Jost Dülffer et al. (=  Publications of the Independent Historical Commission for Research into the History of the Federal Intelligence Service 1945–1968 . Volume 9 ). Ch. Links Verlag, Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-96289-022-3 , pp. 69 .
  26. ↑ See e.g. B .: Reinhard Gehlen: The service. Memories 1942–1971. Hase & Köhler, Mainz a. a. 1971, ISBN 3-920324-01-3 , p. 186: " Sefton Delmer [...] placed the management of the service under the authority of deliberately and systematically evading former Nazis and SS men from prosecution."
  27. ↑ biographic scetch on General Reinhard Gehlen. (PDF file; 1.7 MB) January 20, 1954, p. 12 , accessed on November 24, 2015 (English, CIA files Gehlen, released from 2001): “POB Figures of SS, SD & SA: 50 out of 600 ZIPPERites checked = 8% "
  28. ↑ sometimes also “Operation Hermes”, cf. Jefferson Adams: Historical Dictionary of German Intelligence. Scarecrow, Lanham (Maryland) 2009, ISBN 0810855437 , sub voce , p. 183.
  29. ↑ after Hermann Zolling, Heinz Höhne : Pullach intern.
  30. ↑ This section after: Snoopers without a nose . In: Der Spiegel , April 24, 1995; Pullach intern. Episode 4, April 5, 1971 and The Epochs of Treason: History of Espionage. January 1, 1996 - only 5 pages on the campaign can be found in the BND archive, now accessible online in the Koblenz Federal Archive (B 206/3104). The archive material has obviously been cleaned up to be handed over to the Federal Archives.
  31. ↑ Bundesarchiv Koblenz (B 206/3104): Organization of the sea border protection. Action Hermes.