Camp David II
In 2000, at Camp David , the summer residence of the US presidents , talks between President Bill Clinton , President of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak took place on the Middle East conflict . This meeting is known as Camp David II .
Camp David I marks the positive steps that took place in 1979 between Jimmy Carter , Anwar as-Sadat and Menachem Begin . Camp David II was supposed to lead to a far-reaching defuse of the Middle East conflict on the basis of the Oslo Agreement of 1993 (between Yitzchak Rabin and Yasser Arafat).
President Clinton, Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat met at Camp David on July 5, 2000 in order to be able to continue the efforts for the Oslo peace process. The summit met on July 11th and was canceled on July 25th with no tangible result. A trilateral statement was issued containing the agreements that would guide future negotiations.
initial situation
The West Bank ( West Bank ) and the Gaza Strip , the 1967 Six Day War were conquered by Israel, make up about 22% of up to 1948 British mandated territory of Palestine from or one third of the fertile areas. In the Oslo Accords , Israel had already recognized the PLO and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, the Palestinians had renounced their right to the Israeli heartland and accepted the Green Line , the 1949 armistice line . The agreement was ratified by the Israeli Knesset a week after the decision . A ratification by the PLO has not yet taken place.
With reference to Resolution 242 of the UN Security Council, Israel demands a “safe and defendable” border as a basic principle for peace negotiations. These limits would deviate from the green line . Since 1967, Jewish settlements have also been established in the West Bank and, to a lesser extent, in the Gaza Strip , which were built for military-strategic reasons as well as for religious reasons. In addition, it should serve to relieve the densely populated heartland. Israel has had significant population growth for decades ; the fertility rate around 2010 was 2.67.
The summit
Briefly, the content of the joint statement of US President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat on July 25, 2000 was as follows:
Between July 11 and 24, under the auspices of President Clinton, Prime Minister Barak and Chairman Arafat met at Camp David with the aim of reaching an agreement on a permanent solution to the status of the Palestinian territories and Palestinian-Israeli relations. Although they were unable to bridge the differences and reach consensus , their negotiations were unprecedented in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of scope and detail. Building on the progress made at Camp David, the two leaders agree on the following principles that will guide the negotiations for the future:
- Both sides agreed that the goal of their negotiations is to end the decades-old conflict and achieve a just and lasting peace.
- Both sides undertake to continue their efforts to reach an agreement as soon as possible.
- Both sides agree that the resolutions of the UN Security Council 242 and 338 are the only way to reach such an agreement. They also undertake to create a climate for further negotiations that is free from pressure, intimidation and threats of violence.
- Both sides can understand how important it is to avoid unilateral actions that prejudice the outcome of negotiations and that their differences can only be resolved through joint negotiations.
- Both sides agree that the US is a necessary partner in the search for peace and will continue to work closely with President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Albright . "
The failure
Both sides blamed each other for failure: the Palestinians claimed they had not been offered enough and the Israelis claimed they could no longer offer. At the end of the summit it was agreed to continue negotiations in Taba ( Egypt ). These negotiations took place from January 21 to 27, 2001, but the two parties remained without an agreement.
The following questions remained open at Camp David and after
- the future status of (East) Jerusalem
- the fate of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank
- the right of return of the Palestine refugees
- Distribution and use of the scarce water supplies in Jordan and Yarmuk
- the exact demarcation between Israel and the Palestinian territory,
- Initiation of confidence-building measures and related
- the mutual guarantee of security
area
Barak's last proposal envisaged 10% of the West Bank, which has been controlled by Israel since 1967, as future Israeli national territory (mainly settlement blocks with 69 settlements, in which 85% of Israeli settlers live). This should be done in exchange with an area of the Negev . The remaining 90% of the West Bank would have been available for the creation of a Palestinian state. The Palestinians declared that the adoption of this proposal would have reduced the future state of Palestine to a " homeland ": scattered areas separated by Israeli highways, security checkpoints and Israeli settlements. In addition, according to Israel's proposal, the water resources and the security of the external borders (especially on the Jordan border) as well as the customs of the Palestinian state would have remained under Israeli control for 20 years. In the opinion of the Palestinians, this would have meant an additional 10% of the disputed areas. However, the Israelis considered this necessary for Israel's security.
The Palestinians argued that the settlements would increase the distances between Palestinian towns by a factor of ten. Extra-territorial roads that the Palestinians are not allowed to use would also cut the area up. Since the area would remain enclosed on all sides by Israel or areas under Israeli control, it would not even be possible to leave the area by land without Israel being able to control border crossings. The proposal also deprives the Palestinians of any land reserves that could possibly be used for refugees willing to return.
Jerusalem and the Temple Mount
A very controversial discussion arose over the final status of Jerusalem . Although they were offered a large part of East Jerusalem , the Palestinians rejected the administration of the Temple Mount because it would not have meant full sovereignty in East Jerusalem. For Israel this would not only have meant a loss of the prestigious east city, but also the western wall / HaKotel , the most important shrine of the Jews (see also Jerusalem # Holy City for Jews, Christians and Muslims ).
Refugees' right of return
See also: Expulsion of Jews from Arab and Islamic Countries and Palestinian Refugee Problem
The Palestinians claimed that no adequate solution to the Palestinian refugee problem had been found. Although they accepted that not all refugees would be able to return, they argued that a meaningful peace treaty must take into account the future of these people. In particular, they demanded a right of return and the Israelis' admission that they are complicit in the emergence of the refugee problem. Israel pointed out that a large part of the Palestinian refugees had been driven out by Arab-motivated wars and that the attackers in question had never done enough to compensate and shelter the refugees. At the same time, Israel referred to the refugee and immigration situation in their own country that had arisen at the same time, such as the fate of around 850,000 oriental Jews who had been expelled from their Arab homelands since 1948 without any compensation and who - even if they wanted - could not return.
consequences
Due to the failure of the negotiations and the outbreak of the Second Intifada on September 28, 2000, Ehud Barak was replaced as Israeli Prime Minister on March 7, 2001 by Ariel Sharon . The disappointment over the failure caused a shift to the right in Israeli politics, which now advocated a hard line against the Palestinians. The Sharon government responded to the loss-making terrorist attacks of the second Intifada in the Israeli heartland at the beginning of 2003 with military measures in the West Bank and the construction of the controversial barrier between Israel (and important settlement areas) on the one hand and the Palestinian territory on the other. Yasser Arafat was isolated at his Ramallah headquarters .
Clinton's successor, George W. Bush ( US President 2001-2009), declined to meet with Yasser Arafat and asked for his removal from the post of prime minister; The PLO responded to this request with democratic elections and the appointment of Mahmud Abbas as prime minister. The “roadmap” provided for a democratic Palestinian state by 2005, but has not yet been implemented because both sides accuse each other of not meeting the preconditions.
criticism
Barak made suggestions to Arafat, often referred to as "Barak's Generous Offers" . How many percent would actually have been returned is controversial. While the Israeli side says that 97% of the occupied territories had been returned to the Palestinians (Israel started the negotiations with 88% and increased this offer from 92% to 97%), other sources speak of only 80%. The American chief negotiator of the peace talks, Dennis Ross, describes the latter as a myth and misinterpretation of the actual concessions made by Israel in the article "Don't Play With Maps" in the New York Times . The maps he commissioned, which were the basis of the talks, contained a Palestinian state in 100% of the Gaza Strip and 97% of the West Bank.
The Israeli peace movement Gush Shalom , which advocates the 80% theory, rejected the term "generous offers" as a euphemism because the offer was not that generous and this term was therefore only used to "justify further aggression against the Palestinians". Since some settlements of radical supporters of a Greater Israel were located in the area remaining under Israeli control, it was seen as unlikely that Israel would ever give up this control again. However, the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula in 1982 and the Gaza Strip in 2005 retrospectively showed that Israel was quite ready to evacuate areas, even against fierce resistance from the settlers.
According to Sari Nusseibeh's memoir , the Temple Mount question was the crucial point. Clinton is supposed to have suggested dividing sovereignty over the Temple Mount horizontally: Above the Palestinians and below (Western Wall and various caves) Israel. Moshe Amiraw of the Likud reports that when the Arafat asked Clinton whether he would give the area under the streets of Washington to another state, Arafat indignantly refused.
Many voices sharply criticized the Palestinian leader for his negative stance in the negotiations and for not making a counter offer. So Bill Clinton, Arafat accused to bear the blame for the failure of the talks: "You have been here fourteen days and said no to everything." . The Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Bandar ibn Sultan , stated disapprovingly in an interview with the New York Times:
“Since 1948, every time we've had something on the table we say no. When we say yes, it's not on the table any more. Then we have to deal with something less. Isn't it about time we say yes?… If we lose this opportunity, it's not going to be a tragedy, it is going to be crime. "
“Since 1948 we (Arab states) have rejected every proposal on the negotiating table. As soon as we agree, it will be too late. Then we have to come to terms with less. Isn't it finally time to say yes? If we lose this chance, it won't be a tragedy, but a crime. "
See also
literature
- Charles Enderlin : Le Rêve brisé. Histoire de l'échec du processus de paix au Proche-Orient. 1995-2002 . Ed. Fayard, 2002, ISBN 2-213-61026-6 . - Enderlin and his television team spoke to both sides throughout the negotiations and produced almost four hours of documentation for Antenne 2 and this book.
Individual evidence
- ^ Camp David II . Retrieved February 16, 2015.
- ^ Israel's Critical Requirements for Defensible Borders . In: Jerusalem Center For Public Affairs . ( jcpa.org [accessed June 17, 2018]).
- ^ History of the Israeli Settler Movement. dw.de, August 17, 2005.
- ↑ www.cia.gov
- ↑ List according to: Wichard Woyke (Ed.): Handwortbuch Internationale Politik , Opladen 2000, ISBN 3-89331-489-X , keyword “Middle East conflict”, p. 316
- ↑ Dennis Ross: Don't Play With Maps ( English ) The New York Times Company. January 9, 2007. Retrieved February 7, 2019.
- ↑ Sari Nusseibeh, Anthony David: Once upon a time there was a land. A life in Palestine. Kunstmann, 2008, ISBN 978-3-88897-510-3 , p. 408.
- ↑ Efraim Karsh: Arafat's War. The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest. New York 2003, p. 171.