The ruling class

The ruling class (Italian Elementi di scienza politica ) is the main literary work of the Italian political scientist Gaetano Mosca . The book, published in 1895, is considered an important work in political sociology and founded the classic sociology of the elite . With the book Mosca wants to show that every society is ruled by a minority and that democracy in the sense of direct rule by the people is in principle not possible.

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Mosca's book is divided into 17 chapters, the first eleven of which are a self-contained work that was first published in 1895. Here the author sets out the main features of his social theory, as outlined in his previous work, the Sulla teorica dei governi e sul governo parlamentare (1884) . The remaining six chapters, here chapters 12 to 17, were not published until 1923. They take up the most important aspects of the original form again, supplement and relativize them, in particular on the basis of Mosca's experience with fascism and the resulting re-evaluation of representative democracy.

The first chapter presents the political theoretical research approach, the second the core of his rule theory. In the following nine chapters (Ch. 3–11) Mosca analyzes the implications of the theory presented in the second section.

Chapter 1: The Science of Politics

In the first chapter, Mosca justifies the need for political science. Research into structures of domination and society appears to be of great importance insofar as the cultural level of a society is not primarily based on natural causes (such as topography , climate or race ), but rather on social forces (such as religions , technical progress , economic Organizational forms) can be traced back. In order to scientifically justify generally valid statements about the connection between rulership and social structure on the one hand and cultural level on the other, Mosca favors a historical method that uses all the essential political developments of great civilizations in the past for an empirical verification of the theoretical connections. With such a procedure, a scientist should not limit himself to the consideration of culturally homogeneous time periods, but should rather use different periods that enable an assessment of political hypotheses that is not distorted by cultural specificities.

Chapter 2: The Political Class

The second chapter contains the central core of Mosca's theory of domination.

“Among the perennial facts and tendencies of state life, one is obvious: In all societies, from the most primitive in the rise of civilization to the most advanced and powerful, there are two classes, one that rules and one that is controlled. The first is always the less numerous, it [...] monopolizes power and enjoys its advantages, while the second, more numerous class is commanded and directed by the first. "

Based on the assumption that social cohesion is only possible through organized rule and that only minorities can organize themselves, a minority must rule the majority of a population in every society. Mosca attributes the organizational ability of this 'political class' to their material, intellectual and moral superiority, which their members display by virtue of natural talent or descent. Politics consists of the rulers' attempt to maintain their power by making their influence hereditary and in doing so come into conflict with individuals who want to rise above the masses and who succeed in advancing under favorable conditions, for example when new ideals and interests arise in the population, which undermine the superiority of the previous political class.

"One could explain the entire history of civilized mankind to the conflict between the striving of the rulers to monopolize and inherit political power and the striving of new forces to change the balance of power."

Mosca emphasizes that power struggles can change the composition of the ruling class, but never lead to the abolition of minority rule.

Chapter 3: Feudal and Bureaucratic Systems

The third chapter focuses on the legitimation of minority rule and the differentiation of state systems. The moral superiority with which the rule of a small elite can be justified over the masses is, according to Mosca, guaranteed by a political formula. This contains socially recognized doctrines and beliefs, which make the power of the current rulers appear justified to every member of society and also serve to satisfy the psychological need of the masses for legitimate domination. “No political class,” says Gaetano Mosca, “whatever it is composed, will bluntly say that it rules because [...] its members are best suited to it. Rather, it will always try to justify its power with an abstraction. "

Due to the dichotomous structure of every society, the division of states according to the number of rulers (such as with Aristotle into monarchy , aristocracy and democracy ) appears obsolete, because it only categorizes the superficial appearances of political rule without taking into account the oligarchic core inherent in every form of rule . Mosca therefore proposes a typology depending on the political stability inherent in the respective state and the expected cultural level. Mosca describes states in which the members of the political class have no functional division of labor , but rather combine all economic, legal, administrative and military competences. Because of the high burden of political decisions on the rulers in all areas of expertise, feudal states are often characterized by political delegations, which can result in a regional fragmentation of large empires and conflict-ridden secession efforts of powerful regional elites. The feudal state is thus politically unstable and typical of phases of cultural decline. The opposite ideal type is the bureaucratic state. It is characterized by a high degree of functional division of labor and the professionalization of political functions. In addition, rule is centralized in a bureaucratic state and is therefore mostly stable. Mosca emphasizes that through the separation of powers of the bureaucratic state, its rule is more effective and less arbitrary than that of the feudal state. Bureaucratic states are typical of phases of cultural bloom. Their decline and the transition to feudalism usually go hand in hand with an excessive bureaucratization of economic life, which stifles the economic productive forces.

Chapter 4: Political Class and Culture

In the fourth chapter, Mosca moves culture into the center of attention. With this he describes the specific expressions of life of the people. People tend to band together under a common rule, creating a political class in the process. It is important for society to remain culturally homogeneous, because otherwise the leaders of the respective culture try to monopolize political power for themselves and their culture. If the political class becomes culturally alienated from the masses through social isolation, this undermines the legitimacy of their rule because it is not possible for the subordinates to culturally identify with the elite. This alienation destroys the ability of the political class to deal with crises and provokes the formation of counter-elites who are recruited from the masses, are culturally closer to it and replace the ruling class at the first opportunity.

Chapter 5: Legal Protection

The role of morality for a society and its political class is discussed in the fifth chapter. The morality of a society, which finds its expression in the quality of codified legal norms and implicitly valid values , serves, according to Mosca, to control destructive human instincts and is, for him, a special expression of the sense of belonging of a cultural people. Their level depends largely on the political class, because in the case of amoral ruling classes, the contempt for morals and laws quickly spreads to the entire state apparatus and ultimately affects the entire society. In this case, the moral “superiority” of an elite no longer offers a meaningful benchmark for social interaction and thus undermines the political formula. The lack of legal security results in the restriction of personal freedom in a society, which hampers cultural development and, by undermining the political formula, also endangers state stability. Members of the political class are thus in a conflict, because observance of social moral codes must not stand in the way of the use of necessary means to maintain power and thus in turn to political stability. Finally, Mosca emphasizes that real morality depends on the separation of secular and religious violence, because there must be no inviolable dogmas, and their critical questioning must not be prevented.

Chapter 6: The Suffrage and Social Forces

The elections

Mosca's insight into the dichotomous structure of every society is reflected in the sixth chapter in a criticism of representative democracy. Since eligible voters in a representative system cannot choose any candidate, but are only allowed to choose between those candidates who have been nominated by the actually ruling minority, democracy in the sense of “rule of the people” becomes a farce. After all, the public discussion at elections promotes the critical capacity of the masses, especially in referendums on specific issues. However, the influence of professional propagandists can undermine this critical faculty. The representative system offers powerful groups (“social forces”) the opportunity to gain political influence through the nomination of candidates and propaganda. Mosca sees a particular danger in representative democracy, because the competition for votes means that their candidates always seek to fulfill the wishes of the voters and avoid unpopular but necessary measures. The result is inconsistent politics that ignore the solution to real problems and thus jeopardize political stability.

The state and the civil service

In the same chapter, Mosca deals with the state and differentiates its concept from the political class. As a state, Mosca describes the organization of social forces of political importance. The civil service appears as a functional sub-elite in the service of the political class. The cultural level of a society depends essentially on the intellectual and moral level of this functional elite. However, it must not interfere excessively in economic life, with which Mosca strictly rejects any intervention in the economy or even the nationalization of the economy of a country with an otherwise positive assessment of political centralism . He admits that the business leaders are also part of the elite , but as a result of free competition and thus because of economic competence. Your position cannot be replaced by appointed civil servants because they are not subject to comparable performance incentives.

Chapter 7: Churches, Parties, Sects

In the seventh chapter, Mosca addresses the emergence and structure of a political class. Historically, new elites are usually preceded by a charismatic leader with his own ideology who can credibly convey his convictions to the masses of a society. The ruling elite can only preserve the intellectual stock of ideas and thus the political formula of an ideologist after his death through a school in the sense of the further development of a paradigm , which ensures an adaptation of content and language to the respective time.

In the early stages, the leading core of a political class usually grows through co-optation , because the necessary skills are added without endangering the internal stability of the elite . At best, this consists of heterogeneous characters who have the ability to solve every problem and have an energetic will to power at all times (“theory of the alloy of noble and base metal”). In the course of their existence and the increasing monopoly of power, elite recruitment is then increasingly limited to the criterion of descent.

Chapter 8: Revolutions

In the eighth chapter Mosca shows with historical examples that revolutions always serve a new elite to gain power. At the same time, there is always the danger of anarchy in revolutionary times because those who have profited from the upheaval have no interest in returning to peace. The functional sub-elite plays a special role in revolutions in bureaucratic states: if a state has an obedient civil service that operates administratively independently of the political class, there is a special incentive for revolutionaries to overthrow, because the most important state business is continued at least for a short time even in revolutionary chaos would.

Chapter 9: The Standing Armies

Mosca restricts the possibility of revolution in times of modern armies because, in his eyes, if they are strictly led, they can suppress any uprising. Mosca examines the role of the standing armies in the ninth chapter. While in an economically underdeveloped society all men become warriors and in a feudal state the central authority often tries to suppress secession efforts with the help of unreliable and thus dangerous mercenary armies , the standing army is typical for bureaucratic states. The balance between the state and the leadership of the standing army is made possible by the fact that the officers are part of the political class and descendants of the masses have difficulty gaining access to the higher ranks. Their career opportunities in the army are largely limited to the positions of the functional sub-elite (e.g. officers below the rank of general). In addition, a purposeful upbringing in patriotic loyalty serves this balance. In order to control a standing army , it finally appears necessary not to split up its sub-units too much, but rather to limit the division of labor in the military and concentrate its power among members of the political class.

Chapter 10: Parliamentarism

In the tenth chapter, Mosca criticizes and defends the parliamentary system. Like every form of rule, this represents only the regiment of an elite, with the deputies being nominees of the political class. Special characteristics of parliamentarism are slow decisions, a disproportionate influence of rich people in politics and the constant interference of the members of parliament in judiciary , administration and distribution. Despite all these disadvantages, parliamentarism as a system of government is preferable to others because it would only be replaced by forms of absolutism . As “purely bureaucratic” systems, these would switch off all forces controlling central authority and thus lead to arbitrariness and lack of freedom. The form of government favored by Mosca contains an elected government whose members are financially independent, make moral decisions and are controlled by an independent judiciary.

Chapter 11: Collectivism

With the eleventh chapter Mosca closes the older part of his theory of the ruling class. In this, he criticizes efforts towards an egalitarian society, because people's striving for political and economic success always leads to inequality and thus excludes social equality from the outset. The collectivism , would nationalize what policy to eliminate, through a process of economic inequality production and distribution, can only lead to a totalitarian regime responsible for the central administration officials. Due to the enormous energy that would be necessary for a complete bureaucratization of social life or for an organization of the naturally unorganized masses, collectivist rule threatens not only the dictatorship of a few civil servants but also economic ruin. Mosca suspects that the economic downfall of a bureaucratic state through distribution struggles of powerful groups will lead to a feudal state again.

Chapter 12: Political Class Theory

Mosca repeats and supplements the main features of the rule theory from the twelfth chapter. He underlines that in all forms of government, including democracy, there is always a rule of educated and property owners. Their influence, however, is limited by the universal suffrage , which provokes a critical discussion of the population with political issues. The political strength of the ruling class depends on its ability to adapt to new circumstances, including recruiting capable members from the masses. Mosca adds that the balance between the elite and the masses depends on the middle class . In his eyes this appears to be a guarantee for a peaceful society because it is not easy to stir up like the mass of proletarians and is available as a reliable recruiting basis for the administrative functions of a state.

Chapter 13: Types of Domination

Mosca develops the typology of the forms of government from the third chapter in the thirteenth chapter (types of rule). He emphasizes that subordinates in a feudal state are mostly devoted to the regional princes, which makes it easy for them to separate their part of the country from central power. Mosca also explains historically that in all forms of government, performance and origin compete with one another as selection criteria for the elite. While performance is the necessary criterion for rule, descent is usually the one desired by the ruling class.

Chapter 14: The development of forms of rule

The transition from the feudal to the bureaucratic state or the process of cultural decline is examined by Mosca in Chapter 14 for its causes. From his historical analysis, which relates primarily to late ancient Rome, Mosca concludes that political collapse is preceded by moral decline. A culture "ages" as its unifying values ​​and norms deteriorate and, in particular, the middle class, which is so important for state stability, dissolves. This development produces popular leaders who - in order to please the masses - orient themselves to their needs and not to social necessities. If the political class no longer feels committed to the common good and loses its internal cohesion, an external impetus leads to collapse. The attempt to avert the decline with increased state intervention in economic life can only accelerate it.

It is striking that Mosca does not attach any role to economic development in the transition from the feudal to the bureaucratic state. Conversely, while the institutional framework conditions of an economy and, in particular, excessive bureaucratization can lead to the decline of a bureaucratic state into a feudal system (compare third chapter), in Mosca's eyes, economic development has no significant influence on the emergence of a bureaucratic state. He sees the empirical “proof” of this in the political advances in Central and Western Europe (especially England) at the end of the Middle Ages, which are not characterized by any comparable change in their economic mode of production. This historical analysis goes against the claims of historical materialism by Karl Marx and its overemphasis on the importance of economic progress for the development of societies.

Chapter 15: Origin and Organization of the Political Class

Liberal and autocratic principle

In order to characterize different forms of elite rule, Mosca coined the terms liberal and autocratic principle in the fifteenth chapter . He understands this to mean two opposing ways of assigning positions of power within the political class. According to the liberal principle , allocation takes place from the lower part of society, which does not belong to the political class. In the best case, according to Mosca, this is the administrative sub-elite because, on the one hand, it does not run for the ruling positions itself and, on the other hand, does not have to take into account the feelings of the broad masses of the population, which predestines them for an objective choice. According to the autocratic principle , positions of power are assigned by a monarch, i.e. from the top of society. Historically, these are mostly very hard-working and strong-willed personalities who know how to defend themselves against influences from the lower social class .

Aristocratic and democratic tendency

In addition, political classes can be categorized by the endeavors of the rulers to make their power hereditary and thus to defend themselves against external influences, as well as the efforts of members of the masses who are willing to rise to break this barrier. Mosca describes the former trend as the aristocratic trend , the latter as the democratic trend . Any excess of one of these developments weakens the political class, because in the case of complete isolation it lacks the necessary “blood refreshment” in the form of recruiting talented and power-hungry individuals from the masses and, with total opening, it loses its political ability through the influx of power-willing but largely incapable individuals . Mosca sees the stability of the ruling class secured if, through a slow penetration of capable elements from the lower class into the upper class, their political quality is maintained or increased (“doctrine of the golden mean”). The liberal principle and the democratic tendency, as well as the autocratic principle and the aristocratic tendency, historically verifiable, often appear together, but at least in theory they do not depend on each other.

Chapter 16: Ruling Class and Individual

The sixteenth chapter serves Mosca as a renewed plea in favor of individualism and against collectivism and historical materialism. In particular, he defends private property as an important incentive to perform and criticizes the theory of a classless society in which there are neither economic nor political differences. Mosca sees the only way to improve social conditions in the rule of a political class, which adapts its composition and its political formula to the social circumstances as best as possible, thus ensuring cohesion in a society and thus ensuring the prerequisites for a high cultural level. If a political class refuses to gradually accept new capable members from the crowd, it loses the ability to adapt to the changing times and thus also its basis of legitimation, namely the political formula.

Chapter 17: The Future of the Representative System

In the final seventeenth chapter (The Future of the Representative System), Mosca again emphasizes his negative attitude towards economic equalization efforts. Liberal states in particular lead to a “natural inequality”, the elimination of which through state intervention also eliminates freedom . Mosca also mentions an “artificial inequality” that arises from inherited wealth, the upbringing and culture of certain milieus and that cannot be abolished by state intervention. A social policy that reduces the worst poverty through redistribution makes sense as long as it remains affordable and makes the masses less violent. Mosca, the modern representative system appears to be suitable for the defense of freedom and morality against communism and fascism , because the separation of powers enables mutual control of all essential forces of a state.

Reception and criticism

In his book “The Myth of the Ruling Class”, James Hans Meisel describes Gaetano Mosca's criticism of Marx as superficial and “constructed”. Mosca tries "... to show that class struggle theory cannot be correct because, first of all, it does not explain external wars." (Meisel, p. 301) According to Meisel, this view seems implausible because no Marxist asserts that all conflicts of humanity are are due to class struggles. Mosca misunderstood the Marxist class struggle as a confrontation between rich and poor and, through his historical interpretations, came to the misjudgment that class-wise actions of the masses did not exist or, if they did, they would be of no significance for history.

Meisel also criticizes Mosca's analysis of historical materialism. While Mosca assumes that Marx takes the position that all development is due to economic causes, socio-economic aspects in Marxist theory do indeed play the most important role in history, but not the only one. Historical materialism implies that economic development influences every other social development, but not that every social development is justified by an economic one. If the mode of production in an economy does not change, other areas of society (such as politics) can very well change. Economic developments are only dominant compared to others, not constitutive. Therefore, Mosca's attempt to refute historical materialism with the help of historical examples that are characterized by political upheavals without simultaneous economic changes fails. (Meisel, pp. 298–305)

expenditure

• Elementi di scienza politica . Fratelli Bocca, Rome / Florence / Turin / Milan 1896 (already printed in October 1895 by the Tipografia della Camera dei deputati in Rome). On-line
• Elementi di scienza politica . Revised and supplemented 2nd edition, Fratelli Bocca, Turin 1923. Online
  • The ruling class (Elementi di scienza politica). Translated by Hannah D. Kahn, McGraw-Hill book company, inc., New York / London 1939.
• Elementi di scienza politica . 3rd revised edition, Laterza, Bari 1939. With a foreword by Benedetto Croce .
• Elementi di scienza politica . 4th edition, Laterza, Bari 1947. With a foreword by Benedetto Croce.
  • The ruling class. Basics of political science . Translated from the 4th edition by Franz Borkenau . Francke, Bern 1950.
• La classe politica . Edited and introduced by Norberto Bobbio , Laterza, Bari 1966 (abridged edition of the Elementi di scienza politica ).
• Elementi di scienza politica . In: Gaetano Mosca: Scritti politici . Critical edition , edited by Giorgio Sola, with a bibliography of Mosca's works, Volume II, pp. 539–1158, UTET, Turin 1982.
• Die Politische Klasse, Volume 1. After the 2nd edition, translated by Andreas Skrziepietz. Epuli, Berlin 2020.
• Die Politische Klasse, Volume 2. After the 2nd edition, translated by Andreas Skrziepietz. Epuli, Berlin 2020.

literature

• Ettore A. Albertoni (1987): Mosca and the Theory of Elitism , Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
• James Hans Meisel (1962): The Myth of the Ruling Class - Gaetano Mosca and the Elite , Econ-Verlag GmbH, Düsseldorf, Vienna.
• Gaetano Mosca (1884): Sulla teorica dei governi e sul governo parlamentare - studi storici e sociali , Palermo.

supporting documents

1. ↑ Michael Hartmann: Elitesoziologie: An introduction . Campus Verlag, 2004, ISBN 978-3-593-37439-0 ( google.de [accessed on November 29, 2016]).
2. ↑ Klaus von Beyme: Political Theories in the Age of Ideologies: 1789-1945 . Springer-Verlag, 2002, ISBN 978-3-531-13875-6 ( google.de [accessed on November 29, 2016]).
3. ^ Furio Ferraresi: Gaetano Mosca , in: Dizionario biografico degli Italiani , vol. 77 (2012). Online .
4. ^ Furio Ferraresi: Gaetano Mosca , in: Dizionario biografico degli Italiani , vol. 77 (2012). There is talk of an "edizione ridotta". On-line
5. ↑ See for example Giorgio Scichilone: Gaetano Mosca e la nascita della scienza politica in Italia , in: Salvatore Constantino, Claudia Giurintano, Fabio M. Lo Verde (eds.): Letture e riletture sulla Sicilia e sul Meridione , FrancoAngeli, Milan 2015, p 194–211, here: p. 210.