Large block

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An electoral agreement between Democrats , National Liberals and Social Democrats against the dominance of the Catholic Center Party in the elections for the second chamber of the Assembly of Estates in the Grand Duchy of Baden was first entered into in 1905 as a large bloc . Following a similar agreement, a social-liberal cooperation in terms of content developed from this after 1909. This failed in 1913/14 due to resistance in the parties involved and fundamental questions of imperial politics. Since the Baden Kulturkampf , no political event in the Grand Duchy of Baden had attracted such empire-wide attention as the alliance between the national liberal "Reich founding party" and the social democrats, who were ostracized as "enemies of the Reich". Within the German social democracy, the cooperation with bourgeois parties and especially the approval of the state budget led to severe criticism from the party as a whole.

prehistory

Leading Social Democrats in Baden, probably recorded in 1906 in front of the old state hall in Offenburg . Sitting from right: Emil Eichhorn , Ludwig Frank , Wilhelm Kolb , Georg Monsch . Standing, first from the right: Adolf Geck. The other people are not known.

Until the turn of the 20th century, the National Liberals dominated politics in Baden. Opposite this were the center, freedom , democrats and the SPD as opposition forces, who had common interests with regard to the demand for a reform of the electoral law, especially after the direct election and the redistribution of the constituency boundaries.

The Baden Social Democrats took part in elections for the second chamber of the assembly of estates since the 1890s. Their first MPs owed their election in part to electoral agreements with left-wing liberals. In Karlsruhe they even concluded a formal electoral alliance with the Democrats in 1897. There both parties waged a joint election campaign.

The internal party dispute about it also made Wilhelm Kolb , who had played a key role in planning the alliance, to be more cautious in this matter. Alliances with commoners would harbor the "danger of demoralization". In the run-up to the state elections of 1899, the SPD agreed to only put up candidates in promising constituencies, while in other constituencies they wanted to support the bourgeois opposition. In the party there were conflicts between an emphatically reform-oriented wing and representatives of the general Marxist party line. The fact that the reform-oriented Baden Social Democrats were ready to act against the party line was shown during the parliamentary session of 1899/1900, when the parliamentary group approved the state budget. The editor-in-chief of the people's friend from Karlsruhe, Anton Fendrich, defended this course in the Socialist Monthly Bulletins : A stereotyped budget refusal would have no effect, “and the party of a state parliament that does not have to approve any military expenditure but actually only has to keep the administrative machinery going, comes through stereotypes Use of this remedy in danger of not being taken seriously anymore “This line garnered sharp protest not only from leftists like Rosa Luxemburg , but also from moderates like the Austrian party leader Victor Adler . August Bebel even feared some kind of conspiracy between the budget approvers and the revisionists . The Baden state party was therefore sharply criticized by Bebel at the Lübeck party congress.

In the elections of 1901, the SPD ran its own candidate in nine of 29 constituencies. Wherever it was promising, the party entered into run-off agreements with the Democrats or left-wing liberals.

Despite setbacks for the SPD in the 1901 state elections, Bebel did not succeed in mobilizing a majority against the reformist forces around Kolb, Fendrich and August Dreesbach at the 1902 state party conference . However, with the departure of members, the focus shifted to the left in the parliamentary group. The faction remained isolated in parliament and was unable to play an active role in discussions about electoral law reform, for example. Its chairman, Emil Eichhorn, said that the National Liberal Party was “ruled by senile, decrepit talkers who fear their own past. Only one thought dominates them: not to lose the support they have had from the government, which they have always had up to now ”. However, reformers around Kolb in the state party remained strong. In the elections of 1904 the party acted differently. In some constituencies it ran its own candidates against democrats and left-wing liberals, in others there were agreements with the center or the democrats against the national liberals.

Change of electoral law and state elections in 1905

Ständehaus in Karlsruhe

In 1904, there was finally an electoral reform in Baden, which was a compromise between the political camps. For the first time, the members of the second chamber of the assembly of estates were elected directly and no longer indirectly through electors. In addition, the constituencies have been redesigned. The urban constituencies were preferred, which in the medium term did not benefit the national liberals, but the social liberals. However, the influence of the first chamber and that of the National Liberals dominating there was strengthened. For this reason, the SPD rejected the law, while the other parties agreed.

The uncompromising attitude of the center broke the alliance of the opposition, which was connected with the electoral law changes.

For the parties, the consequences of the changes in electoral law for the outcome of the elections for the assembly of estates of 1905 were also difficult to calculate. National liberals, democrats and liberals signed an agreement in December 1904 in which they agreed to support each other in the main and runoff elections. The National Liberals in particular refrained from nominating candidates in six constituencies in favor of the two partners. This alliance primarily aimed at weakening the Center Party, which alone or together with the conservatives could achieve an absolute majority. In the main election, the center turned out to be the strongest force (42.4%), followed by the National Liberals (30.2%) and the Social Democrats (17%). The Democrats got 4.1% and the Conservatives 2.9%. It was likely for everyone that the center would win the seats in the runoff elections, which lacked an absolute majority. This would also have meant that the government would not last in the long term. In addition, the center would do everything in its power to overcome the laws from the time of the Baden Kulturkampf.

The only real possibility of preventing the center from winning was to include the SPD in the alliance. The initiative for this came from the National Liberals. The SPD agreed to this after brief negotiations. There was a runoff agreement between the National Liberals and the SPD.

Runoff Agreement 1905

Grand Duke Friedrich I was opposed to the large bloc agreement.

For the SPD, their relationship with the National Liberals had changed to the extent that they had so far refused to reform the electoral law and were therefore the party's main opponent. This was no longer the case after the change in the electoral law; the National Liberals were only one political opponent among others. When the question arose, the Social Democrats were able to weigh up whether the content overlap with the Center Party or with the National Liberals was greater. The decision was made in favor of the National Liberals. A reason for a formal agreement was also with them the fear of an absolute majority of the center together with the conservatives. This would hardly have left the party room for maneuver.

The government-affiliated Karlsruher Zeitung spoke out in favor of this previously considered excluded cooperation between parties from the bourgeoisie and the often ostracized social democrats. Both parties agreed not to run against each other in certain constituencies. The alliance proved successful. Of the mandates to be awarded after the main elections, the National Liberals received 9, the Democrats 8, Freinn 1, the SPD 7 and the Conservative 3 mandates. The center came out empty. Although this represented the strongest parliamentary group, it remained clearly removed from an absolute majority. The National Liberals had 23, the SPD 12, the Democrats 5, the Conservatives 4 and the Liberals 1 mandate.

In Baden, the SPD was recognized as a political partner with the secret approval of the government. This step would have been unthinkable at the level of the Reich and most other countries. “A national liberal party leader outside Baden, who would have asked party members to vote in several constituencies for the social democrats stigmatized as enemies of the Reich, would have signed his own political death warrant, and from a social democratic point of view there was something unreal about the electoral alliance because the national liberals were, according to their self-image, the firmest support of the political system, the revolutionary overcoming of which was the long-term goal of the SPD. "

The large bloc met with rejection in other parts of the bourgeois camp. This was seen as giving up political principles in favor of electoral considerations. Among the left-wing liberals, however, the move was welcomed as a model for a similar alliance at the Reich level of a bloc from Bassermann to Bebel .

In Baden, Grand Duke Friedrich I saw it as critical to come to terms with the Social Democrats. The Grand Duke successfully demanded a declaration from Minister of State Alexander Dusch not to stand on the basis of the large bloc and to continue to fight social democracy as a party of overthrow. A long-term coalition-like cooperation was not planned by the bourgeoisie anyway. The willingness to work together was much stronger among the Social Democrats, especially among their parliamentary group chairman Wilhelm Kolb and Member of Parliament Ludwig Frank . In the cooperation between liberals and social democrats, they saw an opportunity to make political and culturally progressive decisions.

At first the big bloc parties worked together. It was not a representative of the Center as a member of the strongest parliamentary group, but a National Liberal who was elected President of the Second Chamber. For the first time, with Adolf Geck, a social democrat was elected as one of the deputy presidents. In factual policy there was hardly any cooperation. In the SPD parliamentary group, efforts were made to work together constructively and to moderate agitation. There were considerable differences in terms of willingness to come to terms with the bourgeois-monarchical system. After the death of the Grand Duke in 1907, Wilhelm Kolb and Ludwig Frank attended his funeral, while Geck stayed away. While Kolb and Frank were criticized by party friends outside of Baden for this, Geck's behavior outside of the social democracy in Baden met with outrage, which meant that he was no longer elected vice-president of the Estates Assembly.

In the first half of the legislative period, therefore, there was only selective cooperation between National Liberals and Social Democrats. These were mainly in the cultural-political area. However, the SPD approved the state budget of 1908.

Actual big bloc politics

The social democrat Adolf Geck was elected vice-president of the second chamber as a result of the large bloc agreement. His refusal to attend Grand Duke Friedrich I's funeral put a strain on the parties' cooperation.

In the run-up to the next state elections, another election agreement with the SPD was disputed among the National Liberals and the Democrats. Although the center remained the strongest force in the main election in 1909 with 29.8%, it had lost considerably. The Social Democrats were almost on par with 28.1%, followed by the National Liberals with 24.5%. However, the center already had 23 mandates with the conservatives and the farmers' union. The uncertain situation forced the Liberals to sign another runoff agreement with the SPD. As a result, the Center finally received 26, the SPD 20, the National Liberals 17, the Democrats 6, the Liberals one, the Conservatives two and the Federation of Farmers one mandate. As a result, the SPD urged the liberals to work together against the clericals and conservatives.

This was only possible because the National Liberals did not want to lose their political influence and the Social Democrats were very unideological and reform-oriented. In addition, a left-wing wing prevailed among the National Liberals. On the part of the National Liberals, not only did opposition to the center play a role in closer cooperation with the SPD, but the aim was also to integrate the Social Democrats more closely into the existing order.

Now the parties worked like a coalition. By 1913, this proved capable of a “consistent, systematic bloc policy”. Together, in 1910, the parties succeeded in pushing through far-reaching reforms in the primary school system against the resistance of the center. There was also a reform of local electoral law. In view of the widely divergent positions in tax policy, it is noteworthy that there was a tax reform in 1910. Both sides had to make substantial concessions. But the parties involved pushed through the reform against the center. Against this background, it is not surprising that the SPD parliamentary group also approved the state budget of 1910.

The willingness to cooperate constructively and the need for compromises led to internal party conflicts in the SPD in Baden, without these being so strong as to plunge the party into a deeper internal crisis. Conversely, Wilhelm Kolb, among others, argued that cooperation with the liberals could gradually contribute to the realization of socialist hopes for the future. Moreover, cooperation and the demonstration of reliability and a sense of responsibility should also help to reduce the fear of social democracy among broad sections of the electorate. This also meant that the new social democratic vice-president of the second chamber, Anton Geiß , went to court like the other representatives of parliament.

Budget dispute in the SPD

August Bebel sharply rejected the policies of the Baden social democratic parliamentary group.

The question of budget approval and participation in courtly ceremonies met with the sharpest criticism from within the SPD, less the election agreements or the cooperation on factual issues. The parliamentary group in the Reichstag had so far refused to approve the overall budget under the motto: “Not a penny for the system”.

The 1908 party congress already debated the question against the background of the Baden parliamentary group's approval of the overall budget and confirmed old resolutions according to which every opposing government had to refuse the state budget in the overall vote, unless the refusal implied the acceptance of one for the working class would result in less favorable budgets. 66 delegates, especially from southern Germany, declared that the party congress was the highest authority for decisions across the empire. In all special state affairs, the state organization is the appropriate and competent authority to independently determine the course of state politics. The respective decision on budget coordination must be left to the dutiful discretion of the parliamentary group responsible for their state organization.

This debate became more heated after the budget was approved in 1910. Wilhelm Kolb and Ludwig Frank also saw the approval as a demonstrative act in the direction of their own party. They saw it as a counterpoint to the mass strike debate . They also wanted to use it to advertise cooperation with liberal parties at the national level. The Baden state party congress approved the course with a large majority. The SPD in Baden was supported by the state associations in Württemberg, Bavaria and Hesse. This resulted in an opposing attitude between southern and northern German associations. The party congress in Magdeburg was all about this question. August Bebel himself lectured for the party executive. For the party center he represented, the Baden attitude was not entirely inconvenient. The left mass strike initiatives and the right budget approval decisions could both be branded as attacks on the party line. In this way, Bebel was able to avoid giving the impression that he was mainly targeting the left wing. The party congress sharply condemned the actions of the Baden parliamentary group. The most severe disapproval was given to the members of the Baden state parliament and participation in courtly ceremonies and monarchist demonstrations of loyalty was declared incompatible with social democratic principles. The party congress made it the duty of party members to stay away from such rallies. Nevertheless, this could not prevent the party from not only having the left wing around Rosa Luxemburg, the center around Kautsky, but also a wing of the mainly southern German reformists in the party since 1910 at the latest.

End of the large block

After the reform laws mentioned, the common ground between the parties involved was largely exhausted. There was a final runoff election agreement in 1913. However, numerous local electoral associations of the National Liberals opposed the agreement. The party's leadership had gone too far and could no longer convince its own base of its course. In the elections, the center and conservatives were largely able to make up for their losses in 1909, while the SPD suffered losses. Although they still had a majority with the liberals, the big bloc had in fact failed because the liberal base refused to continue this policy. In addition, there were opposing positions of the parties on all-German issues. The block was not formally terminated, but in fact it dissolved in 1913/14.

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Reinhold Weber: Political culture, party system and voter traditions in the German south-west. In: Baden-Württemberg: Society, History, Politics. Stuttgart, 2006 p. 70f.
  2. ^ Reinhold Weber: Political culture, party system and voter traditions in the German south-west. In: Baden-Württemberg: Society, History, Politics. Stuttgart, 2006 p. 70
  3. ↑ Merith Niehuss: The position of social democracy in the party system of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. In: Gerhard A. Ritter / Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (Hrsg.): The rise of the German labor movement. Social democracy and free trade unions in the party system and social milieu of the empire. Vienna, 1990 p. 117
  4. ↑ Merith Niehuss: The position of social democracy in the party system of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. In: Gerhard A. Ritter / Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (Hrsg.): The rise of the German labor movement. Social democracy and free trade unions in the party system and social milieu of the empire. Vienna, 1990 p. 118
  5. ^ Frank Engehausen: The beginnings of the social democrats in the Baden state parliament, 1891-1904: On the prehistory of the large bloc. Lecture manuscript
  6. ^ Frank Engehausen: The beginnings of the social democrats in the Baden state parliament, 1891-1904: On the prehistory of the large bloc. Lecture manuscript
  7. ↑ Merith Niehuss: The position of social democracy in the party system of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. In: Gerhard A. Ritter / Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (Hrsg.): The rise of the German labor movement. Social democracy and free trade unions in the party system and social milieu of the empire. Vienna, 1990 p. 117
  8. ^ Frank Engehausen: The beginnings of the social democrats in the Baden state parliament, 1891-1904: On the prehistory of the large bloc. Lecture manuscript
  9. ↑ Merith Niehuss: The position of social democracy in the party system of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. In: Gerhard A. Ritter / Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (Hrsg.): The rise of the German labor movement. Social democracy and free trade unions in the party system and social milieu of the empire. Vienna, 1990 p. 117
  10. ↑ Merith Niehuss: The position of social democracy in the party system of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. In: Gerhard A. Ritter / Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (Hrsg.): The rise of the German labor movement. Social democracy and free trade unions in the party system and social milieu of the empire. Vienna 1990, p. 118.
  11. ↑ Merith Niehuss: The position of social democracy in the party system of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. In: Gerhard A. Ritter / Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (Hrsg.): The rise of the German labor movement. Social democracy and free trade unions in the party system and social milieu of the empire. Vienna 1990, p. 118.
  12. ↑ Hans Fenske: Baden 1860 to 1918 In: Handbuch der Baden-Wuerttemberg history: Vol. 3 From the end of the Old Empire to the end of the monarchy. Stuttgart 1992, p. 195.
  13. ↑ Merith Niehuss: The position of social democracy in the party system of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. In: Gerhard A. Ritter / Elisabeth Müller-Luckner (Hrsg.): The rise of the German labor movement. Social democracy and free trade unions in the party system and social milieu of the empire. Vienna 1990, p. 120.
  14. ^ Frank Engehausen: The beginnings of the social democrats in the Baden state parliament, 1891-1904: On the prehistory of the large bloc. Lecture manuscript
  15. ↑ Hans Fenske: Baden 1860 to 1918 In: Handbuch der Baden-Wuerttemberg history: Bd. 3 From the end of the Old Empire to the end of the monarchy. Stuttgart 1992, p. 196.
  16. ^ Frank Engehausen: The beginnings of the social democrats in the Baden state parliament, 1891-1904: On the prehistory of the large bloc. Lecture manuscript
  17. ^ Frank Engehausen: The beginnings of the social democrats in the Baden state parliament, 1891-1904: On the prehistory of the large bloc. Lecture manuscript
  18. ↑ Hans Fenske: Baden 1860 to 1918 In: Handbuch der Baden-Wuerttemberg history: Bd. 3 From the end of the Old Empire to the end of the monarchy. Stuttgart, 1992 p. 197
  19. ↑ Hans Fenske: Baden 1860 to 1918. In: Handbuch der Baden-Wuerttemberg history: Bd. 3 From the end of the Old Empire to the end of the monarchy. Stuttgart 1992, p. 197.
  20. ↑ Markus Schmidgall: The revolution 1918/19 in Baden. Karlsruhe 2012, p. 47 f.
  21. ^ Dieter Langewiesche: Liberalism in Germany. Frankfurt 1988, p. 224.
  22. ↑ Hans Fenske: Baden 1860 to 1918. In: Handbuch der Baden-Wuerttemberg history. Vol. 3. From the end of the Old Kingdom to the end of the monarchy. Stuttgart, 1992 p. 198.
  23. ↑ Markus Schmidgall: The revolution 1918/19 in Baden. Karlsruhe, 2012 p. 48 f.
  24. ^ Dieter Langewiesche: Liberalism in Germany. Frankfurt, 1988 p. 224.
  25. ^ Dieter Langewiesche: Liberalism in Germany. Frankfurt, 1988 p. 224.
  26. ↑ Markus Schmidgall: The revolution 1918/19 in Baden. Karlsruhe, 2012 pp. 48–51.
  27. ^ Axel Kuhn: The German labor movement. Stuttgart, 2004 p. 124
  28. ^ Franz Osterroth / Dieter Schuster: Chronicle of the German Social Democracy. Vol. 1. Until the end of the First World War.Berlin [u. a.], 1975 entry for 13./19. Sept. 1908
  29. ^ Franz Osterroth / Dieter Schuster: Chronicle of the German Social Democracy. Vol. 1. Until the end of the First World War.Berlin [u. a.], 1975 entry on 18./24. Sept 1910
  30. ^ Axel Kuhn: The German labor movement. Stuttgart, 2004 p. 124f.
  31. ↑ Markus Schmidgall: The revolution 1918/19 in Baden. Karlsruhe, 2012 p. 53
  32. ^ Dieter Langewiesche: Liberalism in Germany. Frankfurt, 1988 p. 224f.

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