Kuomintang in Burma

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Kuomintang in Burma (KMT) are the national Chinese military units that fled not to Taiwan but to Burma after their defeat in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 . There they were built up by the CIA as a "second front against communism" ( Operation Paper ). They soon developed into the dominant force in the Shan states. The units were not very successful militarily. By the mid-1970s, the KMT is believed to have controlled around 80% of opium production in the Golden Triangle in Burma .

1942 to 1954

During the Second World War , after the completion of the “ Burma Road ”, brisk traffic began between allies and national Chinese troops.

Parts of the border between the two countries were not clearly defined. A final demarcation did not take place until the 1961 agreement.

Towards the end of the Chinese civil war , the Kuomintang fled to Burma for the first time in May 1949. They tried to penetrate Laos , but were repulsed by the French or interned on the prison island of Côn Đảo (also: Pulo Condore; Côn So'n). On December 18, 1949, the Chinese government under the leadership of Mao Zedong received diplomatic recognition . In the south of China there were still Kuomintang troops under the command of Li Tsun-yen , who, driven by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), fled to Burma in increasing numbers from January 1950. The commander went to Taiwan, from where 700 regular troops came. The now about 5000 well-armed men, now commanded by General Li Mi (8th Army) - as successor to the warlord Lu Han  - began a guerrilla war against the Karen hill tribe in the Shan states. As a result, they created a base of operations for themselves, initially in the state of Kengtung . At the same time they “taxed” the opium cultivation of the defeated mountain farmers. In July 1950 there was a first attempt at retaking Yunnan by 4,000 Kuomintang troops. Li Mi moved his headquarters from Tachilek to Monghsat (= Möng Hsat ; 20 ° 32 ′ 0 ″ N, 99 ° 15 ′ 0 ″ E ) and began to recruit among the Chinese and Shan - sometimes under duress. Volunteers also arrived from Malaya and Taiwan via Thailand. Bases close to the border were set up in Mong Mao and Mong Yang , which were supplied from the air by unmarked aircraft.

The opium, which was produced under the supervision of KMT, was flown to Thailand in planes belonging to Civil Air Transport, founded by Claire Chennault (since 1949 as a front company directly owned by the CIA), where it was distributed by General Phao Siyanon .

Since the victory of the Chinese communists on the mainland, the Chinese national troops, the number of which rose to around 10,000 by 1951, have been armed, fed and paid for by the CIA. In addition to parts of the 8th Army, those of the 26th Army under General Liu Kuo and the 93rd Division (Major General Mah Chaw Yu ) had fled to Burmese territory. From January 1951 they referred to themselves as Yunnan's anti-communist Army of Salvation ("The Yunnan Anti-Communist Salvation Army").

Attacks were soon launched on Yunnan. The first in June 1951 was canceled after a week and heavy losses in the face of counter-attacks by the People's Liberation Army, after Gengma had initially been occupied without resistance. A second in July - by 2,000 men from Mong Mao - ended with 800 to 900 casualties, including several CIA advisors on the KMT side. The People's Liberation Army pursued the defeated as far as near Kengtung. A third attack with 2100 men in August 1952 was similarly unsuccessful. The last major attack ended with another catastrophic defeat in January 1953. By March 1953, a troop strength of 30,000 men (in fact, probably only 12,000 armed men) should have been reached Had extended their influence in Burma beyond the Salween to the west a year earlier . They also formed a coalition with other groups of rebels operating in the inaccessible mountain regions.

The Burmese government, which did not succeed in defeating the KMT militarily, protested through diplomatic channels against US support for the invaders, including in front of the UN . The US denied any involvement; at the same time they sold the KMT weapons from 1951 through the front companies Far East Film Co. and Overseas Supply , headed by Paul Helliway .

As diplomatic pressure increased, the US agreed to help "evacuate" the KMT units to Taiwan. This mission, led by Bill Donovan and General Phao Siyanon via Thailand, was initially not allowed to be controlled by Burmese government officials. In fact, between November 7, 1953 and May 1954, between 5,000 and 6,000 people were flown out, most of them not KMT soldiers, but tribesmen, women and children. If they sold weapons, they were museum pieces. At least the same number of modern, but relatively undisciplined soldiers remained behind. The KMT's fighting was now limited to skirmishes in the border area and resistance against the Burmese army. Several KMT members founded families by marrying into the local hill tribe , especially the Lahu .

1954 to 1961

The KMT supported the establishment of the Shan National Army (SNA; also Shan United Army ) under Khun Sa , which, especially after the military government took office in 1958, advocated the independence of the Shan states - possible in the Burmese constitution of 1948.

The Burmese army drove most of the KMT to Laos through several smaller attacks between 1954 and 1957, so that it was estimated that only about 1,350 men were left in the country in 1958. However, the displaced seeped back. The KMT troops, which had grown to around 2,300 men again by 1960, established two new bases near the border in Keng Lap and Möng Pa-liao.

In December 1960, the Burmese army began the successful Operation Mekong against the KMT. Many KMT fled across the borders, but soon seeped back again. State-of-the-art American equipment (some of which was supplied from Taiwan) fell into the hands of the government forces. One of the strategic goals of the CIA is said to have been to induce the Chinese government to attack Burmese territory. Such an attack with 20,000 men took place in 1961, but at the invitation of the Burmese government. The People's Liberation Army drove the quickly defeated KMT units to Thailand.

At the beginning of 1961, KMT units fought in Laos for the first time. Phoumi Nosavan's army took in 3,000 men ( Battalion Speciale 111 ), and another 4,000 were flown to Ban Houi Sai . The newly-elected Kennedy administration officially announced that it would no longer support the KMT in Burma. An estimated 4,000 KMT members were then evacuated again via Thailand - using Civil Air Transport machines . The number of those remaining was officially given as only 750. Around 5000 to 6000 are said to have settled in northern Thailand. Control of the Shan states passed to the Shan National Army , which was also financed by the cultivation of opium, which had increased fivefold since 1945.

1961 to 1967

With the defeat, the KMT had lost its bases in Burma. The Chinese national government ordered the commanders back and canceled the financial contributions. The remaining units were organized into the 5th Army (1,800 men) under General Tuan Shi-wen , 3rd Army (1,400; General Ly Wen-hyuan) and the independent unit (400; General Ma Ching-kuo). All of them concentrated - partly in rivalry - to finance the opium trade (illegal in Thailand since 1959) between Burma, Northern Thailand and Laos. They levied tariffs on caravans of other organizations that brought opium to Thailand. These activities were at least tolerated by the ruling military in Thailand, whose leaders shared in the profits.

Only the “independent unit” carried out isolated acts of sabotage and espionage missions against China until the early 1970s. This group, under the direct control of Chiang Ching-kuo , son of Chiang Kai-shek , continued to receive funds from Taiwan.

The American liaison officer for Laos was Shan-born Baptist missionary William Young (CIA agent since 1958). He recruited mercenaries among the KMT, who then joined the "Armée Clandestine" des Vang Pao . The Americans then invited the torture specialist Roger Trinquier , who had just been expelled from the Congo and who had experience in the area ( Operation X ), to lead the operation. After a few months, the CIA man Anthony Posephny (aka Tony Poe ), who had trained KMT troops in 1960, took control until 1971. This mercenary force - trained by the Thai secret police in Mong Hkan (= Ban Muang Kan ; located on the Laotian side of the Mekong) - carried out over 50 smaller advances into China from the Sino-Burmese border area, but also fought the Pathet Lao in secret .

A raid in late July 1967 on a large opium caravan Khun Shas in the Laotian border town of Ban Khwan turned into a six-day battle. The Laotian General Ouane Rattikone urged both sides to leave the country. When the Shan National Army asked for US $ 500,000 and the KMT asked for US $ 250,000, he seized the opportunity and ordered six Air Force aircraft to bomb the fighters. Almost all of the annual production fell into the hands of the Laotian army. Rattikone, who already controlled the income from the country's secret opium administration for the junta, rose to become the region's most important heroin producer in the following years.

After this defeat of the Shan National Army, the KMT, which in the meantime had also set up heroin laboratories near their bases, controlled about 80% of opium production in the Golden Triangle . From now on, a substantial part went to Rattikone, whose heroin laboratories supplied the US soldiers fighting in Vietnam. The actual production areas remained under the control of the Shan National Army, which subsequently strengthened again.

In 1968 Taipei wanted to regain control of the troops in order to attempt an invasion of the mainland, which had become disordered by the Cultural Revolution .

Was on drugs

As part of the "War on Drugs" proclaimed by President Nixon in 1971, the American government paid US $ 1.85 million for "the last 26 tons of opium from KMT", which were then burned in a publicity campaign. In fact, only 5 tons were burned, the rest being straw and chemicals. The KMT officially disbanded their troops in 1973. The participation of the KMT in the heroin trade under the protection of the Thai military only came to an end when, from 1980 onwards, civilian governments took more serious measures, including against the Khun Sas associations. Since around 1990 other groups have been developing alternative export routes for opium from the Golden Triangle.

The Yunnan Chinese are considered "civilian refugees" who had been settled in northern Thailand since 1962 (around 80,000 in total). The younger generation is migrating: to the cities, or as students or workers to Taiwan.

See also

literature

  • Alexander Cockburn, Jeffery St. Clair: Whiteout . London / New York 1998, ISBN 1-85984-897-4 (Chapter 9: The US Opium Wars, pp. 215–35)
  • Victor Kaufman: Trouble in the Golden Triangle. The United States, Taiwan and the 93rd Nationalist Division . In: China Quarterly No. 166 (Jun. 2001), pp. 440-56
  • Alfred McCoy: The Politics of Heroin . New York 1991 (rev. Ed .; Orig. 1972), ISBN 1-55652-126-X
  • Gibson, Richard M .; Secret army: Chiang Kai-shek and the drug warlords of the Golden Triangle; Singapore 2011; ISBN 978-0-470-83018-5
  • Maung Maung; Grim War Against the KMT . Rangoon 1953
  • Ministry of Information (Union of Burma): Kuomintang Aggression Against Burma . Rangoon, 1953
  • Robert H. Taylor: Foreign and Domestic Consequences of the KMT Intervention in Burma . Ithaca NY 1973
  • Frederick Teiwes: “Force and Diplomacy on the Sino-Burmeses Border”. in: Smith, David (ed.); The Next Asia… . New York 1969 (border war 1955-1960)
  • Wen-chin Chang: From War Refugees to Immigrants. The Case of the KMT Yunnanese Chinese in Northern Thailand . Intl. Migration Review , Vol. 35 (2001), pp. 1086-1105
  • Francis W. Belanger: Drugs, the US, and Khun Sa . Editions Duang Kamol, Bangkok 1989, ISBN 974-210-480-8 , chapter: The Emergence of the KMT, p. 80–
  • Overseas Chinese Problem in Sino-Burmese Relations : Viewed from the Declassified Documents of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs . In: Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia , Issue 10 (August 2008)

Individual evidence

  1. E. Whittam Daphne: The Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty . In: Pacific Affairs Vol. 34 (1961), pp. 89f
  2. ^ New York Times April 28, 1949, March 31, 1950
  3. Shen Yu-Dai: Peking and Rangoon . In: China Quarterly . 1961, No. 5, pp. 131-144
  4. Kaufman (2001), p. 442
  5. 21 ° 17 ′ 25 ″ N, 99 ° 35 ′ 59.3 ″ E
  6. ^ New York Times . July 13, 1950
  7. (head of the police since the coup in 1948, the country's “strong man” in the 1950s), Whiteout (1998), pp. 215, 225f
  8. ^ Nation February 15, 1953
  9. ^ New York Times . March 3, 1953, Time May 18, 1953 (No. 20)
  10. to April 1966; Taylor (1973) Intro.
  11. ^ Paul Helliwell , on spartacus-educational.com
  12. ^ Whiteout (1998), p. 227
  13. Kaufman (2001), pp. 447ff
  14. McCoy, p. 176; Kenneth Young: National Chinese Troops in Burma… . New York 1970 (Diss. NYU), pp. 145f; for a different interpretation cf. Kaufman (2001), footnote 63
  15. Taylor (1973), pp. 58ff
  16. Taylor (1973), p. 65
  17. Kaufman (2001), p. 454
  18. Whiteout (1998), pp. 228-230
  19. ^ Full section after: McCoy (1991). Opium War of 1967 . Map p. 358
  20. Kaufman (2001), p. 455
  21. Jack Anderson: Thai Opium Bonfire mostly fodder . Washington Post . July 31, 1972, p. B-11
  22. ^ Kuomintang troops as arable citizens . In: Die Zeit , No. 28/1973
  23. Wen-chin Chang (2001), pp. 1095-1099