Kurfürstendamm riot of 1935

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During the Kurfürstendamm riot of July 15, 1935 and the following days, there were anti-Semitic attacks that the National Socialist government did not approve of because of their negative foreign policy effects and led to the replacement of the Berlin police chief Magnus von Levetzow . According to some historians, the excesses of radical anti-Semitic partisans created a pressure to act that influenced the enactment of the Nuremberg Laws .

Four years earlier, on September 12, 1931, there had been anti-Semitic riots in Berlin-Charlottenburg (see: Kurfürstendamm riot of 1931 ).

Starting position

The area around Kurfürstendamm was the preferred residence of bankers, doctors, lawyers and artists; among these representatives of the upper class in 1930 about 25 percent were Jews . Rejection of the cultural avant-garde , hostility to big cities, fears of foreign infiltration and fanatical anti-Semitism all focused on this site.

As early as the turn of the year 1934/1935, there had been anti-Semitic attacks and damage to Jewish shops on a local level. Such riots came from radical anti-Semites of the party base. It was not until April 1935 that part of the Nazi press picked up on this basic mood and reported specifically on "Jewish racial abuse" and "German women who were forgotten about their species". High-profile incidents were inconvenient for the government because of their effects abroad. The internal effect was also undesirable, when attacks caused unrest and harmed the authority of the state. That is why Rudolf Hess as Hitler's deputy and Hjalmar Schacht as Reich Economics Minister publicly called for moderation. Several party departments reprimanded the troublemakers with harsh words.

Kurfürstendamm riot in Berlin (1935)

Nonetheless, in June 1935, anti-Jewish rallies took place almost every day in front of some Jewish shops in two Berlin districts , at which Hitler Youth members stood out. In July the activities shifted to the Kurfürstendamm. There the anti-Semitic Swedish film Pettersson & Bendel was shown in a cinema . Allegedly Jewish viewers had disrupted the film screening. This circulating rumor was soon published by the Berlin daily newspapers directed by Joseph Goebbels .

On July 15, 1935, a crowd gathered in front of the Gloria Palast on Kurfürstendamm, physically attacked passers-by who were supposed to be Jewish, and also broke into nearby restaurants to beat Jews up. The riots continued unabated on July 16. The attackers believed that they were taking part in an action approved by the party leadership; they insulted the deployed police forces as "Jews servants" and threatened them. The unsettled police forces were unable to restore calm. It was only on July 19 that Goebbels, as Gauleiter of Berlin , declared the riots to be over.

Consequences

The unwanted headlines in the international press and the failure of the police to establish law and order and the associated loss of face of state power angered many members of the government. Goebbels disguised his involvement and skilfully dumped responsibility on the police chief Magnus von Levetzow. This was replaced shortly after by the SA leader Wolf-Heinrich von Helldorff , who had organized the first Kurfürstendamm riot as early as 1931 . Goebbels noted in his diary: “Riots on Kurfürstendamm. Beat up Jews. Foreign press roars ' pogrom '. But now it's over with Levetzow. "

Without further consideration of the reporting abroad, the National Socialist press, directed by Goebbels, soon resumed anti-Semitic agitation and thus served the radical partisans who could be instrumentalized as witnesses to the “popular will”. In the run-up to the Nuremberg party congress in 1935, Gauleiter Adolf Wagner claimed that the majority of the people “are pushing for a solution to the Jewish question in the spirit of the party program, which the Reich government must take into account, otherwise it would suffer a loss of authority”. In a high-ranking conference, Minister of Justice Franz Gürtner found it dangerous to let the radicals get away with the impression that they are actually only doing what the government wants, which the government itself is unable to do because of possible foreign policy consequences .

effect

Jochen Klepper gave the oral report of a witness who had witnessed the excesses: “You hit Jewish women in the face; the Jewish men fought bravely; Nobody came to their aid because everyone feared arrest. "On July 23, 1935, Klepper noted in his diary:" Loss of existence and physical abuse have become a daily fear for the Jews. " On July 21, 1935, Victor Klemperer wrote:" Die Judenhagze und Pogrom mood grows day by day. The ' striker ', Goebbels' speeches ('how fleas and bedbugs destroy!'), Violence in Berlin, Breslau and yesterday here too. [...] I really expect that my house will be set on fire and that I will be killed. "

According to a recording from 1937 attributed to Adolf Eichmann , the Kurfürstendamm riot had a long-lasting effect. The "popular anger that rioted," was "the most effective means to take the Jews the feeling of security."

Controversial interpretations

The historian Saul Friedländer attributes the anti-Jewish agitation that has flared up again since the beginning of 1935 by party radicals to “ongoing economic difficulties as well as the lack of material and ideological compensation for the large number of party members who were unable to find positions and satisfaction either at the local or national level. "

It is disputed among historians whether the “pressure of the party base” that emerged in the riot of 1935 was a decisive reason that led to the passing of the Nuremberg Laws, which - surprisingly for many observers - were passed at the 1935 Nuremberg Party Congress. The view taken is that influential party leaders like Joseph Goebbels deliberately fueled, directed and instrumentalized the “popular anger”. Other members of the government, however, feared a loss of trust among the population if the unleashed violence disrupted peace and order and the state's monopoly of force was disregarded.

literature

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Cornelia Hecht: German Jews and Anti-Semitism in the Weimar Republic. Bonn 2003, ISBN 3-8012-4137-8 , p. 236.
  2. ^ Peter Longerich: Politics of Destruction ... Munich 1998, ISBN 3-492-03755-0 , p. 82.
  3. ^ DHM: Summary / Commentary on the film, accessed on February 12, 2011.
  4. ↑ Peter Longerich: Politics of Destruction ..., p. 87.
  5. ↑ Christoph Kreutzmüller: Eyes in the Storm - British and American newspaper reports on the persecution of the Jews 1918-1939. In: Zeitschrift für Geschichtswwissenschaft 62 (2014) H. 1, here: pp. 38–41.
  6. ↑ Peter Longerich: Politics of Destruction ... , p. 86 f. / see. VEJ 1/176 in: Wolf Gruner (Ed.): The persecution and murder of European Jews by National Socialist Germany 1933–1945 (source collection). Volume 1: German Empire 1933–1937 . Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-486-58480-6 , p. 452 with note 2. Levetzow was then accused of having demonstrated against the anti-Semitic film [by whistling].
  7. ↑ Diaries - Complete Fragments , Volume 2, p. 494 (July 19, 1935), ISBN 3-598-21917-2 .
  8. ↑ Peter Longerich: "We didn't know anything about it! ..." Munich 2006, ISBN 3-88680-843-2 , p. 92.
  9. ↑ Saul Friedländer : The Third Reich and the Jews Volume 1: The Years of Persecution: 1933-1939 . seen through. Special edition. Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-406-56681-3 , p. 157 (meeting of August 20, 1935)
  10. ↑ Jochen Klepper: The shadow of your wings. From the diaries of the years 1932–1942. Deutsche Buchgemeinschaft, Berlin 1959, p. 270 (entry from July 21, 1935).
  11. ↑ Jochen Klepper: Shadow of your wings ... , p. 271.
  12. ↑ Victor Klemperer : I want to give testimony to the last. Diaries 1933–1941. 2nd Edition. Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-351-02340-5 , Volume 1, p. 209.
  13. ↑ Hans Mommsen : Auschwitz, July 17, 1942. dtv 30605, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-423-30605-X , p. 74 / Avraham Barkai: Vom Bokott zur “Entjudung”. The economic struggle for existence of the Jews in the Third Reich 1933–1943. Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1988, p. 137 attributes this to the "Judenreferat der SS" and gives the source: BAK, R58, No. 956: Security Service of the RFSS, SD-Hauptamt II / 112, Zum Judenproblem , January 1937, p. 9 f. / This memorandum is also attributed to Otto von Bolschwing in the blog ( Memento of the original from February 24, 2014 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Retrieved March 26, 2013 by Michael Wildt . @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.michael-wildt.de
  14. ↑ Saul Friedländer : The Third Reich and the Jews Volume 1: The Years of Persecution: 1933-1939 . seen through. Special edition. Munich 2007, ISBN 978-3-406-56681-3 , p. 154.
  15. ^ Moshe Zimmermann : The German Jews 1914-1945 . In: Encyclopedia of German History . tape 43 . Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, Munich 1997, ISBN 3-486-55080-2 , p. 48 .
  16. ↑ Michael Wildt: Politics of Violence. National community and persecution of the Jews in the German provinces. In: Werkstatt Geschichte ‚12 (2003). H. 35, p. 36 f.