Note crisis
The note crisis is a phase in the history of relations between the Soviet Union and Finland that was initiated on October 30, 1961 by a diplomatic note from the Soviet Union. Against the background of the international tensions of the Berlin crisis and with reference to the Finnish-Soviet friendship treaty of 1948, the Soviet Union demanded the start of military consultations to ward off an expected aggression by the West. Such consultations threatened to involve Finland in the conflict of the power blocs in a way incompatible with the country's previous neutrality policy . The Finnish onePresident Urho Kekkonen finally resolved the crisis using his good personal relations with the Soviet party and government leader Nikita Khrushchev : In personal talks between the two men in Novosibirsk on November 24, 1961, Khrushchev abandoned the consultation request. One of the effects of the banknote crisis was that a party alliance formed against the re-election of Kekkonen in the upcoming elections in early 1962 broke up and Kekkonen was safely re-elected. It is historically controversial whether and to what extent the Soviet Union used the note precisely in this sense for the purpose of influencing Finnish politics and whether Kekkonen even conspired with the Soviet side to secure his re-election.
prehistory
The background to the banknote crisis in 1961 was formed by two independent lines of development, one in Finnish politics and one in world politics. The Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, who has been in office since 1956, was seen by the Soviet Union as the personification of the policy of friendly Finnish-Soviet relations. However, Kekkonen's re-election in the upcoming presidential election in 1962 appeared to be in danger when a broad coalition of Kekkonen opponents formed behind a common opponent. At the same time there was a dramatic increase in tensions in international politics, particularly over the status of Germany and Berlin . Despite the Finnish policy of neutrality, the latter could have immediate effects for Finland, since the Finnish-Soviet friendship treaty of 1948 provided for military consultations in the event that an attack by Germany or its allies threatened.
Finnish-Soviet post-war relations and friendship treaty
The Finnish policy towards the Soviet Union experienced a reorientation after the Second World War under President Juho Kusti Paasikivi . In Paasikivi's assessment, Finland's independence after the lost war could no longer be secured militarily in the future, but only through a policy of friendship with its large neighbor and by taking into account its defense interests. This friendship policy, also known as the Paasikivi line, was gradually supplemented by the Finnish endeavor to pursue a policy of neutrality and for this to be recognized by both power blocs.
When the Soviet Union closely bound Hungary and Romania with military cooperation agreements in 1948 , the Soviet dictator Josef Stalin proposed a similar agreement to the Finnish government. In negotiations, in which Paasikivi's later successor Urho Kekkonen played a decisive role, a treaty was agreed that met the strategic interests of the Soviet Union, but did not mean a direct military alliance. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, signed in Moscow on April 6, 1948, contained a limited military section in the first two articles.
In Article 1 Finland undertook to repel the attack by mobilizing all forces in the event of an attack "by Germany or another country allied with it" on Finland or by the territory of Finland on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union undertook to "provide Finland with the assistance it needs, the provision of which the contracting parties shall agree on." Article 2 provided for the possibility of military consultations between the two countries:
"The High Contracting Parties will negotiate with each other in the event that the threat of an attack referred to in Article 1 is established."
Despite the restricted wording, the treaty caused unrest among the Finnish population and continued uncertainty about the extent to which it could stand in the way of a credible policy of neutrality. On the other hand, the treaty put relations between the two countries on a reliable basis and was soon seen as an important element of Finnish foreign relations.
Juho Kusti Paasikivi was replaced by Urho Kekkonen in the office of President in 1956. More than Paasikivi, Kekkonen developed the element of neutrality in Finnish post-war policy and made it a cornerstone of his foreign policy. At the same time, however, he also introduced the cultivation of personal relationships as a tool for shaping Finnish-Soviet relations. During his first six-year term in office, he established close, often referred to as friendly, relationships with Nikita Khrushchev, the party leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and, from 1958, Prime Minister. In early 1959, the so-called night frost crisis , which had burdened relations since the summer of 1958, was overcome in personal conversations between the two top politicians, as was the resistance of the Soviet Union to the association of Finland with the EFTA in 1960 .
Kekkonen's position and election constellation
Kekkonen gave foreign policy priority over all other issues, with the focus of foreign policy again on maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union. During the night frost crisis, the Finnish government consisted of a broad coalition of parties, some of which were critical of the foreign policy course or at least were perceived as such by the Soviet Union. The government fell in late 1958 due to political and economic pressure exerted by the Soviet Union. Subsequently, Kekkonen ensured that only parties were represented in the government that were “capable of foreign policy”. A number of short-lived governments followed, which were either minority governments under the leadership of the Landbund or purely civil servant governments .
In the run-up to the 1962 presidential election , the parties dissatisfied with Kekkonen agreed at the beginning of 1961 to nominate Olavi Honka , Justice Chancellor of the Finnish government, as a common opponent . This so-called Honka Bund consisted of parties that had little political connection apart from their opposition to Kekkonen: the Social Democratic Party of Finland , the right-wing National Collection Party , the Swedish People's Party and the Finnish Small Farmers' Party , which was split off from the Landbund . On the other hand, Kekkonen could count on the support of the Landbund, the communist electoral organization Democratic Union of the Finnish People and the Social Democratic Union of Workers and Small Farmers, which was split off from the Social Democrats . In addition, the parties of the Honka Federation did not stand united behind Honka; Votes for Kekkonen were to be expected from among their ranks.
The parties of the Honka Association assured that the fight against Kekkonen was based on purely domestic political reasons. A change in Finland's foreign policy is in no way intended. On the other hand, in Finnish communist circles and especially in the press of the Soviet Union, soon after the formation of the Honka League, the view was expressed that its main goal "despite all masking" was to change the country's foreign policy direction. The Soviet diplomats in Helsinki made no secret of their rejection and demonstratively refused to have any contact with Olavi Honka.
International tensions and the Berlin crisis
In the summer and autumn of 1961 tensions between the blocs of the Cold War escalated dramatically. The Berlin crisis, which has been smoldering since 1958, was the subject of discussion at the meeting between Nikita Khrushchev and the new President of the United States John F. Kennedy in Vienna in June 1961. Khrushchev again demanded the conclusion of a peace treaty for Germany and, in this context, the removal of the special status of Berlin. According to Khrushchev, the Federal Republic of Germany has used the lack of a peace settlement to arm itself and take a leading role in NATO, which increases the risk of a new world war. Khrushchev threatened that the Soviet Union would unilaterally conclude a peace treaty with the GDR by December at the latest if the Western powers do not agree to an overall settlement .
Kennedy said in a televised address in July that Berlin's status was non-negotiable. At the same time, both sides took measures to strengthen their armed forces. When, under the impression of escalating tension, more and more people from the GDR streamed into West Berlin, the National People's Army erected barriers on the border on August 13, which were later expanded to form the Berlin Wall . The United States significantly increased its military presence in Berlin, the Soviet Union threatened air blockades and began a series of nuclear weapons tests on September 1 . The direct confrontation between American and Soviet troops occurred on October 27 at Checkpoint Charlie , when ten main battle tanks from the American and Soviet armies were erected directly opposite each other on the border line. Only after a 16-hour war of nerves were both groups of tanks withdrawn.
Course of the note crisis
The Soviet Union sent Finland a diplomatic note on October 30, 1961, in which it requested the start of military consultations between the two countries, referring to the international situation and aggressive military intentions of the Federal Republic of Germany . The note sparked deep concern in Finland about whether the country could continue to stay away from the conflicting interests of the great powers within the framework of neutrality. President Kekkonen tried on the one hand to emphasize that Finland would have to cope with the crisis without outside help, and on the other hand to transfer the talks from the military to the political level. After initial political talks gave the impression that the Soviet Union was primarily concerned with maintaining security about the continuation of Finland's foreign policy course, Kekkonen dissolved parliament and called new elections. When the Soviet Union stuck to the demand for consultations, Kekkonen finally traveled to the Soviet Union for personal negotiations with Khrushchev. In these talks on November 24th, Khrushchev withdrew from the request for consultation.
The note of October 30, 1961
On October 28, 1961, while the tanks were still facing each other in Berlin, the Foreign Ministry of the Soviet Union contacted the Finnish ambassador Eero Wuori and invited him to meet on Monday morning, October 30th. At this meeting, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko Wuori delivered a note to the Government of Finland.
The ten-page document dealt in detail with the dangers posed by “militarism and revanchism” in the Federal Republic of Germany, particularly in the Baltic region. The Federal Republic had again formed a strong army and occupied its leadership with the "generals of Hitler". Under the banner of NATO, they strive for control over nuclear weapons . In the north, the Bundeswehr has expanded its sphere of influence to Denmark and Norway , where it has already been given bases. The focus of the German Navy has shifted to the Baltic Sea area after its headquarters had been moved from the North Sea to Flensburg .
The note went on to say that the Western powers were knowingly or unintentionally promoting the dangerous endeavors of West Germany by refusing a final peace settlement of the situation in Germany, including recognition of the borders of the two German states. Contrary to the official foreign policy of the country, views in support of the NATO countries' preparations for war are also being spread in the Finnish press.
The note read that the Soviet Union had taken measures to increase its own defense readiness and that of its allies. The events described concern the security of Finland as well as that of the Soviet Union. The actual purpose of the note followed in the final paragraph:
“In view of the above, the government of the Soviet Union turns to the government of Finland and, due to the threat posed by West Germany and its allied states, proposes consultations on measures to safeguard the defense of the borders of the two countries, as was done in the between The Soviet Union and Finland concluded a treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. The time and place of the designated talks will have to be agreed through diplomatic channels. "
First reactions
For the political leadership of Finland, the demand for military consultations did not come as a complete surprise. Ambassador Wuori had already expressed in a report in the summer that if the Soviet Union could not stop the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany, it would isolate and condemn West Germany the international public will seek. In doing so, it will demand statements from the neutral states in particular. At the beginning of August 1961, the leadership of the Finnish army predicted that the international crisis would worsen to the threshold of war and assumed that the Soviet Union would demand consultations from Finland on the basis of the friendship treaty. Concrete preparations had already been made for the eventuality that such consultations should actually take place.
For the general public, however, the development represented a shock. The note brought the uncertain position of Finland in international politics in the public consciousness. Many felt reminded of the events in the autumn of 1939, when the Soviet Union, also referring to the tense international situation and its defense interests, had called for negotiations. When these negotiations did not produce the desired results, the Soviet Union resorted to the military option and started the winter war . The threatening scenario caused by the association with 1939 was reinforced by the fact that the Soviet Union carried out an unusually strong nuclear weapon test ( Tsar bomb ) with an explosive force of around 60 megatons on the same day on which it presented the note to the Finnish ambassador .
For Finland's foreign policy, the credibility of its neutrality policy was at stake. Entering into military consultations would not only have created the appearance of a military alliance with the Soviet Union, but Finland would also have indirectly backed the assessments made in the note regarding the role and aspirations of the Federal Republic of Germany and NATO. Finland's foreign policy leader, President Urho Kekkonen, was on a state visit to the United States at the time, following an invitation issued in April and starting on October 16. Political talks, especially with President John F. Kennedy, ended on October 30th and Kekkonen was in Hawaii to relax . After the news of the note arrived, Kekkonen ordered the immediate return of Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen . He himself decided to continue his visiting program as planned.
On November 1, Kekkonen had the opportunity to make his first public statement on the note in his speech to the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles . Kekkonen stressed that the note did not introduce any new elements into relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. It is a reflection of the severe state of tension prevailing in Europe. Kekkonen assured that Finland would continue its neutrality policy in the future without taking any outside help.
After his return to Finland, Kekkonen made a more detailed statement in his radio address on November 5th. In it he endeavored to shift the focus of the crisis from the military to the political level. With regard to the former, he avoided taking any position on the question of whether the conditions for consultations laid down in the friendship treaty, i.e. the risk of attack by Germany or its allies, were met. On the political level, he emphasized the note's recognition of Finland's foreign policy line and took the position that the note was primarily about the question of continued confidence in this line.
Reactions from the west
In the Federal Republic of Germany, which, according to the wording of the note, was the actual trigger, the official reactions initially concentrated on refuting the allegations contained in the note. The federal government's particular concern was that, under pressure from the Soviet Union, Finland might recognize the German Democratic Republic or conclude a peace treaty with it. This would have been the first recognition from a non-socialist country and would have called the consistency of the Hallstein doctrine into question. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer did not consider the note to Finland to be an isolated event, but rather saw it as part of a whole series of propaganda "thunderbolts" by the Soviet Union against the West.
In the United States, Secretary of State Dean Rusk wrote an initial assessment of the situation before Kekkonen's departure, which was also distributed to the most important allies. The Soviet Union pursued three main goals with the grade: to secure its influence on Finnish domestic politics; to weaken the resilience of the Scandinavian countries by creating the appearance that the Federal Republic of Germany is a threat to the status quo in the north; as well as to weaken the determination of the "free world" and to increase the pressure in the negotiations for the status of Berlin.
The United States initially acted cautiously in public. At the same time, however, they were preparing for NATO intervention. On November 3, they proposed an official NATO position to the allies. Representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy spoke out in favor of political intervention by NATO. Denmark and Norway, however, were reluctant to intervene by NATO. The decision was postponed at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on November 8th. The Finnish government reacted sharply and negatively to these attempts. Kekkonen instructed the ambassador in Paris on November 9th to say that Finland would view any NATO intervention, in whatever form, as a disservice . Eventually, NATO remained passive on the matter.
The United States, on the other hand, made several attempts to encourage Finland to adhere to the demands of the Soviet Union. They offered political and economic support, which the Finnish side refused, pointing out that Finland must be able to maintain its relations with the Soviet Union itself.
Political talks
As in his radio address, Kekkonen pursued the basic strategy of avoiding military issues and turning to the political level in further efforts to cope with the crisis. Political talks were supposed to find out what goals the Soviet Union was really pursuing in relation to Finland. Kekkonen also sought to clarify the question of whether the note should in reality primarily be understood as an attack on NATO, Denmark and Norway, as he suspected.
Foreign Minister Karjalainen turned to the Soviet embassy in Helsinki on November 7th and asked to meet his Soviet counterpart Gromyko. He announced that Karjalainen was welcome in Moscow, and so he arrived in the Soviet capital on November 11th. In the conversation, Karjalainen suggested, citing the good relations between the two countries, that the military consultations be postponed and that only political talks be held for the time being. Gromyko noted that military circles in the Soviet Union had long requested consultations. So far, however, these efforts have been fended off because the Soviet Union completely trusts President Kekkonen and Finland's foreign policy direction. Now the political situation in Finland has become unstable. "A certain political grouping" had formed, the aim of which was to prevent the continuation of the foreign policy course.
Karjalainen assured Gromyko that the Finnish people unanimously support official foreign policy. However, Gromyko considered this to be meaningless. He emphasized that the Soviet government must be certain that the course would be maintained as soon as possible. This cannot wait until the presidential election and the parliamentary election scheduled for next summer have been held.
Dissolution of parliament
Immediately after Karjalainen's return, Kekkonen decided on November 14 to dissolve parliament and to schedule new elections for the earliest possible date on February 4 and 5, 1962. He justified this step by stating that this would provide the Soviet Union with the desired rapid foreign policy security should be. Kekkonen later stated that the dissolution of Parliament should also buy time. Kekkonen estimated that the international situation could be more favorable again after the elections.
At the same time, Kekkonen saw the early election as a means of weakening the Honka Bund and promoting its own re-election. The parliamentary election now took place immediately after the election to the electoral body. This forced the Honka Bund parties to campaign with and against each other at the same time. This strategy was nothing new to Kekkonen. Already on April 18, 1961, shortly after the formation of the Honka Federation, Kekkonen had met his closest confidantes, Ahti Karjalainen, Vieno Sukselainen and Arvo Korsimo in his official apartment and had agreed with them that Parliament would be dissolved in the autumn and the new election should be scheduled for February 4 and 5, 1962.
Insofar as the decision aimed to end the banknote crisis quickly, the attempt failed. Ambassador Wuori informed the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasili Kuznetsov on November 15th of the dissolution of parliament. At the same time, he asked whether the consultation proposal could thus be regarded as finished. The following day, Kuznetsov called Wuori over and said that the situation in northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region had worsened and that there was an imminent threat to the security of the Soviet Union and Finland. The minister referred to the increased activity of the "German militarists", the advancement of the joint military projects of the Federal Republic and Denmark and the trip of the West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss to Oslo . The consultations are now "extremely essential".
In the subsequent deliberations in Helsinki, Kekkonen took the view that the only way to prevent the start of military negotiations was to make a personal appeal to Prime Minister and party leader Khrushchev. On November 18, the government formally asked Kekkonen to travel to the Soviet Union and negotiate with Khrushchev. Two days later, Moscow agreed to the meeting. At that time Khrushchev was in Siberia on a large-scale trip to inspect the agricultural situation. This is how the meeting should take place in Novosibirsk, Siberia. Kekkonen left on November 22nd with no formal travel ceremonies.
Kekkonen and Khrushchev in Novosibirsk
Urho Kekkonen reached Moscow by train on the morning of November 23. From there he traveled by plane and arrived in Novosibirsk that evening local time. Nikita Khrushchev traveled by train from Zelinograd the following morning . The conversations with Kekkonen began an hour later, initially with one-on-one discussions that took a good hour. To date, there are no written documents available to historical science about the content. Kekkonen himself did not take any notes and did not create a written report afterwards. It is unknown whether reports were made on the Soviet side. In any case, these have not yet appeared.
The reasons for the lack of Finnish records are speculated; official explanations are not available. On the one hand, the thesis was put forward in this context that Kekkonen had to concentrate entirely on communicating with Khrushchev during the conversation. Communication was particularly difficult because the inexperienced diplomat Vladimir Shenichov acted as interpreter. Later recordings were not possible because the conversations were immediately continued in a larger group. After all, the subjects of the discussions were probably essentially the same as in the subsequent discussions. Other authors see the lack of records and official explanations as an indication that the events in Novosibirsk, as well as the music crisis as a whole, represented an amicable staging by Kekkonen and Khrushchev.
The talks continued after the delegations from both sides were called in. In this round, Kekkonen was the first to speak. He explained that in Finland it is assumed that the security interests of the Soviet Union are in the background of the note and that it is not intended to change the good relations between the two countries. He suggested that the Soviet Union desist from the proposed military consultations. The note has heated the mood in the Nordic countries and as a result an obvious war psychosis is spreading. Such a development could only lead to further armament. Refraining from the consultations, on the other hand, could calm the mood. The security interests of the Soviet Union are secured by Finland's neutrality and the good relations between the Soviet Union and Finland. Kekkonen also referred to the propaganda value of these good relationships for the peaceful coexistence sought by Khrushchev .
In his answer, Khrushchev first went into detail about the tense international security situation. Finally, he came up with Kekkonen's proposal and said that the reasons put forward were grave and that he understood them. Particularly emphasizing the confidence in the assessment by Kekkonen, he agreed to the proposal:
“You are our good friend and we trust you completely. If you say that it would be useful for Finland and the Soviet Union and the relations between our countries not to conduct the military negotiations, then we believe that it is, and then I am ready for my part, what you said Aspect. "
Khrushchev did not want to agree to a complete abandonment of the consultations, but suggested speaking of a postponement. The possibility of resumption of consultations was worded in the joint statement published on the same day that was widely interpreted to mean that Finland should play the role of a "watchdog":
"NS Khrushchev expressed the wish on behalf of the Soviet government that ... the Finnish government for its part closely followed the development of the situation in Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region and, if this proves necessary, presented its opinion to the Soviet government regarding the implementation of the necessary measures."
In his dinner speech at the lunch that followed, Khrushchev also addressed the situation in Finland. He stated that in the tense situation for the Soviet Union it was necessary for Finland to have great security about the continuation of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. This line enjoyed the full confidence of the Soviet Union.
After the threatened military consultations were averted, Kekkonen returned to Finland on November 26, 1961. He was received by hundreds at the border station in Vainikkala and almost ten thousand at Helsinki Central Station.
Effects and interpretations
The party alliance directed against Urho Kekkonen's re-election fell apart quickly during the banknote crisis. Kekkonen was eventually re-elected safely. The question of whether this was exactly one of the goals or even the central motive for the Soviet note was and is the subject of controversial historical debates. In some cases, the opinion has also been taken that Kekkonen knew about the note in advance or even “ordered” it in order to secure his re-election. In any case, the crisis established Kekkonen as the undisputed leader of Finnish foreign policy, but at the same time placed a burden on the credibility of Finnish neutrality.
Disintegration of the Honka Federation
Immediately after the note was received, the first voices were voiced in the Honka Federation that in the new situation the attitude towards a re-election of Kekkonen might have to be reconsidered. After the talks between Karjalainen and Gromyko in Moscow, this process picked up further. On November 18, 1961, the chairman of the small farmers' party Veikko Vennamo declared that it was possible to support Kekkonen. On November 22, the representatives of the Gathering Party and the Swedish People's Party announced at the meeting of the Honka Federation's Organizing Committee that they would break away from the joint project in the near future.
On November 23, the Social Democratic parliamentary president Karl-August Fagerholm proposed in an open letter that the groups behind Honka should refrain from being elected to the electoral body and that Kekkonen's term of office should instead be extended by an exceptional law. On the evening of November 24th, the Finnish People's Party announced that it was pulling away from Honka and called on its supporters to support Kekkonen. The Swedish People's Party also broke away from Honka on the same evening and leaned towards the solution proposed by Fagerholm by exceptional law. At 11 p.m. on the same evening, Olavi Honka declared that he would refrain from running for "the good of the fatherland".
The parties of the Honka Federation now had to reorient themselves shortly before the upcoming election. Both people's parties supported a re-election of Kekkonen. The rallying party was unable to openly support Kekkonen, as in this case many of the party's voters would have chosen the social democratic candidate or would not have exercised their right to vote. She therefore ran for election to the electoral committee without naming a candidate. In the actual presidential election, however, the rally party electors voted for Kekkonen. The Social Democrats, who, contrary to Fagerholm's proposal, were unable to warm to an exception law, finally agreed on Rafael Paasio as their own candidate.
Urho Kekkonen was finally confirmed safely for a second term as President of the Republic. In the first ballot he received 199 of the 300 votes in the electoral committee and thus the required absolute majority.
Kekkonen's re-election as the motif of the note
In retrospect, there has been much speculation as to whether the abandonment of the Honka project was a precondition or at least an actual impetus for the consent of the Soviet side to postpone the consultations. The final withdrawal of Honka, like the previous distancing of the popular parties from Honka, did not take place until the talks in Novosibirsk had already ended. On the other hand, the disintegration process could already be observed beforehand, and the polls of the parties of the Honka Bund also left little hope for Honka.
It is undisputed that the Soviet side generally endeavored to ensure the continuity of the Soviet-friendly Finnish foreign policy, and that Urho Kekkonen was regarded by the Soviet Union as the personification of this foreign policy. Whether and to what extent the influence on the political situation in Finland was one of the motives pursued by the Soviet leadership with the note is one of the central historical issues in connection with the note crisis.
Kekkonen biographer Juhani Suomi sees the motifs primarily outside of Finland. In the foreground he sees the sincere and sustained concern for the military strengthening of the Federal Republic of Germany and for its military cooperation with the Nordic NATO members Denmark and Norway. The note should be understood primarily as a message to the West. He recognizes a second group of causes in Soviet domestic politics. The military leadership had been calling for Finland to be more closely linked to the military for a long time. The origin of the note should also be understood in connection with the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held from October 17 to 31, 1961, at which Khrushchev was exposed to attacks by the Molotov wing. Khrushchev's balancing act at the party congress forced him, who had distanced himself from the note, to make concessions. Finnish politics played no role in the creation of the note and the short section concerning Finland was only included in the text at the urging of the Finnish communists.
The historian Hannu Rautkallio , who recognizes that the entire note crisis was staged jointly by Kekkonen and the KGB , questions the credibility of Gromyko's assertion that military circles in the Soviet Union had long been calling for the initiation of military consultations. There are no documents from military circles in the documents of the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the note crisis. In general, the military did not have a position in the Soviet Union that would have made it possible to put the party under pressure. Rather, securing Kekkonen's position and breaking the Honka Federation was the real motive of the note. This had been prepared for months and then coincidentally coincided with the 22nd party congress and the Berlin crisis.
In the field of tension between these interpretations, the majority of historical publications in Finland have come to believe that influencing the Finnish presidential election was at least one of several motives of the Soviet leadership. The note probably had a number of objectives. The significance of the Finnish target for this "multiple warhead", however, remains dependent on personal interpretation and is controversial.
Conspiratorial theses
Based on the possibility that one of the central motives of the Soviet government was to secure Urho Kekkonen's re-election, theses were and are repeatedly put forward according to which Kekkonen already knew about the note before the beginning of the crisis or even with the Soviet side agreed or “ordered” them from there.
References to this were circulated soon after the crisis. Väinö Tanner , leader of the Social Democratic Party, declared in party circles in January 1962 that the note was based on "wishes expressed from here". Tuure Junnila , one of the protagonists of the Honka Association, published a review of the banknote crisis in April 1962. Without giving any specific details, Junnila reported on cases in which "the few people belonging to the inner circle of power have indicated in various contexts that something so decisive would happen before the presidential elections that the elections would certainly turn in favor of President Kekkonen."
In the later historiography, the aforementioned Hannu Rautkallio made a name for himself in this area, who passionately advocates the thesis in several works that Kekkonen shaped Finnish foreign policy primarily as an extension of the KGB. Kekkonen planned the banknote crisis down to the last detail together with the Soviet leadership. The trip to Novosibirsk, on the other hand, was an insignificant political staging.
Under the known external circumstances, the conspiratorial theses are most likely to find support in the fact that Kekkonen was already considering dissolving parliament in April 1961 for reasons of electoral tactics, and the crisis of notes then offered a solid justification for it at exactly the right time. Otherwise, only indications can be used that leave room for interpretation. For example, Kekkonen found a newly built sauna at his accommodation in Novosibirsk, the urgent installation of which had been ordered about two weeks earlier. This shows that the Soviet side was expecting a visit from Kekkonen before it was officially agreed. It remains to be seen whether this was part of a joint overall plan or, as Juhani Suomi assumes, an expression of the fact that the Soviet side had decided to derive the greatest possible propaganda benefit from the note.
There is still no direct evidence that Kekkonen knew about the note before it was sent or that it had even planned it together with the Soviet side. Rautkallio also states that the indubitable proof of Kekkonen's share has not yet been found. Juhani Suomi accuses the advocates of this thesis, however, of consciously turning a blind eye to the circumstances that speak against their view. It is difficult to understand why Kekkonen would have consciously taken measures that undermine the large-scale efforts undertaken in the same year to consolidate the image of Finnish neutrality.
Finland's foreign policy position
Urho Kekkonen emerged from the banknote crisis as the undisputed leader of Finnish foreign policy. His Soviet interlocutors had expressly justified the abandonment of the demand for military consultations with their personal trust in the President. In the years that followed, the impression grew that Kekkonen was indispensable as a guarantor of the neutrality policy towards the East, a fact that contributed significantly to his long term in office, which lasted until 1982.
The formulation of the joint Novosibirsk Declaration assigned Finland the task of observing developments in the north and, if necessary, making proposals to Moscow. Finnish foreign policy soon began to interpret this in such a way that the right of initiative to initiate military consultations under the friendship treaty was transferred to Finland. The Soviet Union never accepted this point of view, but the banknote crisis actually remained the only case of official calls for consultations.
In relation to the West, the crisis posed a credibility problem for Finnish policy of neutrality, which had only just been recognized during Kekkonen's visits to London and Washington. Soon after the end of the crisis, the United States Department of State indicated that new Soviet measures and interference against Finland could be expected at any time. According to the American assessment, the crisis had called Finnish neutrality into question and Finland must now be helped to break away from the Soviet embrace. In February and March 1962, American diplomats tried to persuade the other Nordic countries to take support measures for Finland. They refused on the grounds that such measures would do Finland more harm than good.
The banknote crisis brought the vulnerable position of Finland and the possibilities of the Soviet Union to influence the political situation in Finland into the focus of the world public. It formed an important background for the Western view of Finland's special position, which later in the same decade was often pejoratively referred to as Finlandization .
literature
- Lauri Haataja: Kekkosen aika , in: Jukka Tarkka (ed.): Itsenäisen Suomen historia 4 , Weilin + Göös, Vantaa, 1992, ISBN 951-35-5161-X , pp. 11-101. (quoted: Haataja ).
- Tuure Junnila: Noottikriisi tuoreeltaan tulkittuna . WSOY, Helsinki, 1962 (quoted: Junnila ).
- Hannu Rautkallio: Novosibirskin lavastus. Noottikriisi 1961 . Tammi, Helsinki 1992, ISBN 951-31-0023-5 (quoted: Rautkallio ).
- Esa Seppänen: Miekkailija vastaan tulivuori. Urho Kekkonen yes Nikita Hruštšev 1955–1964 . Tammi, Helsinki 2004, ISBN 951-31-2628-5 (quoted: Seppänen ).
- Juhani Suomi: Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956-1962 . Otava, Helsinki 1992, ISBN 951-1-11580-4 (quoted: Suomi ).
Individual evidence
- ↑ Original text in the Finnish version: Korkeat Sopimuspuolet tulevat neuvottelemaan keskenään siinä tapauksessa, että 1 artiklassa tarkoitetun sotilaallisen hyökkäyksen uhka on todettu.
- ↑ On the election constellations and the prospects of success of the Pentti Virrankoski groups: Suomen historia 2 . SKS, Helsinki 2001, ISBN 951-746-342-1 , pp. 957 ff.
- ↑ This point of view was defended shortly after the note crisis had ended in Junnila, pp. 41–45.
- ↑ Suomi, p. 407 ff .; Quotation from Pravda of February 24, 1961, quoted from Suomi, p. 408.
- ↑ Suomi, p. 432 f.
- ↑ Suomi, pp. 433 f., 474.
- ↑ The original text of the note is in Russian. All quotations of this text are based on the Finnish translation by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, printed in full by Rautkallio from p. 361.
- ↑ Finnish source text: Ottaen huomioon edellä esitetyn, Neuvostoliiton hallitus kääntyy Suomen hallituksen puoleen ehdottaen konsultaatiota toimenpiteistä molempien maiden rajojen puolustuksen turvaamiseksi Länsi-Saksan ja sen kanssa liitossa olevien valtioiden taholta ilmenevän uhkan johdosta, siten kuin tätä on edellytetty Neuvostoliiton ja Suomen kesken solmitussa sopimuksessa ystävyydestä, yhteistoiminnasta ja keskinäisestä avunannosta. Mainittujen neuvottelujen ajasta ja paikasta voitaneen sopia diplomaattiteitse.
- ↑ Suomi, pp. 478-481.
- ↑ Suomi, p. 483 f.
- ↑ Suomi, p. 487 and 494.
- ↑ Raiko Häyrinen: "A thunderbolt against Finland" - Suomen noottikriisi Länsi-Saksan Näkökulmasta . Helsinki 1997 (pro grad work at the University of Helsinki).
- ↑ Rautkallio, p. 201 f.
- ^ Rautkallio, p. 227 f .; Suomi, p. 497 f.
- ↑ Suomi, pp. 511-514
- ^ Suomi, p. 499.
- ↑ Suomi, p. 500.
- ^ Suomi, p. 501.
- ^ Suomi, p. 504
- ↑ Suomi, p. 418, with reference to Karjalainen's diary.
- ↑ Suomi, p. 505; Haataja, p. 52.
- ↑ Suomi, pp. 521-524.
- ↑ Suomi, p. 524.
- ↑ Rautkallio, p. 239 f.
- ↑ Suomi, p. 525 f.
- ↑ Quoted from Suomi, p. 528. This, in turn, quotes from a minutes of the conversation on December 5, 1961. Finnish text of the quote: Te olette meidän hyvä ystävämme ja me luotamme Teihin taydellisesti. Kun Te sanotte, että sotilaallisten neuvottelujen pitämättä jättäminen olisi hyödyksi Suomelle ja Neuvostoliitolle sekä maittemme välisille suhteille, niin me uskomme, että asianlaita on niin ja minä puolestani olne valmis kannkohtaan esittämäa.
- ↑ Quotation from Suomi, p. 531. Original Finnish text: NS Hrushtshev esitti neuvostohallituksen puolesta toivomuksen, että… Suomen hallitus puolestaan tarkasti seuraa tilanteen kehitystä Pohjois-Euroopömassa ja Itämerittios oueältiittella ja ,piteallituäksä to Itämerittos oueältiittella ja, seinallituäksä to Itämeritti alueälttella ja, espiteallituäsä suänuittiittella ja ...
- ^ Suomi, p. 530.
- ↑ Suomi, p. 516 f.
- ↑ Haataja, p. 53 f .; Suomi, p. 532 f.
- ↑ Haataja, p. 54.
- ↑ On the Suomi surveys, p. 517; on the chronology in detail Suomi, p. 532 f.
- ↑ so also Suomi, p. 548.
- ↑ Suomi, pp. 540-546.
- ^ Rautkallio, p. 156.
- ↑ Rautkallio, p. 123 f.
- ↑ The concept of multiple warheads introduced by Juhani Suomi is often used in the Finnish literature in this context, e.g. B. Seppänen, pp. 279-285. Seppänen explicitly leaves the question of the weighting of the motives open as it cannot be clarified.
- ↑ Suomi, p. 549, with reference to the minutes of the party executive committee of January 19, 1962.
- ↑ Junnila, p. 67.
- ↑ Rautkallio's work, Novosibirskin lavastus , cited here is appropriately titled as Die Stzenierung von Novosibirsk .
- ↑ a b Suomi, p. 532.
- ↑ Erkki Tuomioja: Historian roskatynnyreillä . Review of the works of Juhani Suomi and Hannu Rautkallio, in Ydin (magazine), 1/2003, pp. 35–37
- ^ Rautkallio, p. 254.
- ^ Suomi, p. 550.
- ↑ Suomi, pp. 580-587.
